



AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE
PUSA

Vol. VIII, No. 1.

October, 1938.

JOURNAL

OF THE

ANNAMALAI UNIVERSITY

EDITOR

PROFESSOR B. V. NARAYANASWAMI NAIDU, M.A., B.Com., Ph.D.,
BAR-AT-LAW

EDITORIAL BOARD


PROFESSOR C. S. SRINIVASA-
CHARIAR, M.A.

PROFESSOR A. NARASINGA RAO.
M.A., L.T.

MAHAMAHOPADHYAYA PROFESSOR
S. KUPPUSWAMI SASTRIAR. M.A.

PROFESSOR S. RAMACHANDRA RAO,
M.A., D.Sc. (LOND.), F.Inst.P.
(LOND.).

PROFESSOR R. RAMANUJACHARI,
M.A.



PUBLISHED BY THE UNIVERSITY

ANNAMALAINAGAR

1938

.

.

.


CONTENTS

	PAGE
1. The Foundation of Andhra Culture By P. S. Naidu, M.A.	.. 1
2. The Development and Fate of the Operculum and Gill-Chambers in <i>Bufo Melanostictus</i> Schneider By A. Ramakrishna Reddy, B.Sc. (Hons.)	.. 15
3. The Passive Voice in Tamil By A. Chidambaranatha Chettiar, M.A.	.. 22
4. Tholkappia Araichi—Ullurai By S. S. Bharati, M.A., B.L.	.. 35
5. Bhartṛhari a Pre-Śaṅkara Advaitin By V. A. Ramaswami Sastri	.. 42
6. The Daśa-Prakaraṇas By B. N. Krishnamurti Śarma, B.A. (Hons.)	.. 54
7. Nyāyakuliśa By R. Ramanujachariar, M.A., and K. Srinivasachariar	
8. Bodhavimarsa By V. Subrahmanya Sastri	
9. University Notes By B. V. Narayanaswami Naidu, M.A.	
10. Reviews :—	
1. Brahmavidyā By R. R.	
2. New Catalogus Catalogorum By R. R.	

CONTENTS

	PAGE
1. The Madras Agriculturists' Debt Relief Act <i>By B. V. Narayanaswamy Naidu, M.A.</i>	.. 79
2. A Reconstruction of the Hormic Theory of Sentiments <i>By P. S. Naidu, M.A.</i>	.. 107
3. The Madras Land Revenue System <i>By S. Subramanian and B. Sitaraman</i>	.. 118
4. The Passive Voice in Tamil <i>By A. Chidambaranatha Chettiyar, M.A.</i>	.. 125
5. St. John Hankin <i>By K. P. Karunakara Menon</i>	.. 131
6. Certain Philosophical Bases of Madhva's Theistic Realism <i>By B. N. Krishnamurti Sarma. B.A. (Hons.)</i>	.. 146
7. Tattvasārah <i>By R. Ramanujachari, M.A.</i>	
8. Vedārtha-Saṅgraha <i>By R. Ramanujachari, M.A. and K. Srinivasacharya</i>	
9. Nitimālā <i>By R. Ramanujachari, M.A., and K. Srinivasacharya</i>	
10. Bodhavimarsa <i>By V. Subrahmanya Sastri</i>	
11. Mukura <i>By K. A. Sivaramakrishna Sastri.</i>	

CONTENTS



	PAGE
1. Lytton Strachey the Biographer <i>By T. N. Jagadisan</i>	.. 177
2. Ancient Tamilian Worship <i>By E. S. Varadarajan</i>	.. 193
3. Tattvasārāḥ <i>By R. Ramanujachari, M.A.</i>	
4. Vedārtha-Saṁgraha <i>By R. Ramanujachari, M.A., and K. Srinivasacharya</i>	
5. Bodhavimarśa <i>By V. Subrahmanya Sastri</i>	
6. Bhāvanāviveka with Viṣamagranthibhedikā <i>By V. A. Ramaswami Sastri and K. A. Sivaramakrishna Sastri</i>	

JOURNAL

OF THE

ANNAMALAI UNIVERSITY

VOL. VIII.

OCTOBER, 1938.

NO. 1.

The Foundation of Andhra Culture

BY

P. S. NAIDU

(*Annamalai University*)

In a recent paper on 'A Psychological Orientation to the Concept of Culture' (published in *Prabuddha Bhārata*, Feb.' 1938), an attempt was made by the author of this article to coin an original formula for the understanding of 'Culture,' and for the interpretation of cultural objects. As the aim of this essay is to apply that formula to the elucidation of Āndhra Culture, it is necessary to re-state that formula, and to summarise the arguments leading up to it.

Culture (like freedom) is a psychological term that has not been analysed with care. The haziest notion of the concept prevails in the minds of sociologists and political theorists. Contemporary Psychology has established beyond the shadow of any doubt that 'culture' is a characteristic of the activity of the human mind. A verb is the part of speech which denotes an activity ; so the word which denotes a characteristic of that activity should be an adverb. 'Culture' is, in reality, an adverb masquerading as a noun. The psychological analysis, to be essayed below, is proof positive of this contention.

Before we discuss the activity of the human mind, which results in culture and produces cultural objects, it is necessary to understand the *structure* of the mind. A question may be raised here as to the possibility of analysing the structure of something which, by its very nature, is intangible. Our answer is that we infer the structure from function. This procedure is justified by the established usage in the physical and

biological sciences. The atom and the gene, are, by their nature, intangible. Yet we have pictures, mathematically accurate, of their constitution. These pictures have been constructed solely by a process of inferential reasoning from data supplied by the observable behaviour of the atom and the gene under conditions artificially set up and controlled by the experimenter. Making use of this fruitful methodology, Professor McDougall, the leader of the Hormic School of Psychology, has analysed for us the structure of the mind as it reveals itself in concrete behavioral situations controlled by the experimental psychologist. The structural elements, as thus discovered by the learned professor, are described in the chapters dealing with 'Instinctive Dispositions,' and 'Propensities' in his three great works, '*Social Psychology*,' '*An Outline of Psychology*' and the '*Energies of Men*.' The elements that go to make up the complex structure of the human mind are the '*instinctive dispositions*' (or *propensities*, to use the latest term in psychology). This does not mean that the intellect is eliminated from the scheme of things. The intellect is a halo that plays round instinct, guiding the latter by shedding light in its path. An unlighted path is difficult to traverse; but a brilliant lamp without a path to be lighted by it, and with no one to go along that path is an absolutely useless thing.

The elemental propensities which make up the mind have a complex structure of their own. Each disposition is stimulated by an *objective situation*, gives rise to an *emotion*, and leads to a specific course of *action*. The instincts and their corresponding emotions are the elements of mental structure.

It is surprising to note that our Alamkara Sastra is based upon a psychology which bears a marked resemblance to Professor McDougall's Hormic Theory (vide Fig. I). As the purpose of this article is to analyse Āndhra culture, we shall make free use of Alamkara terminology.

The Emotions with their excitants, accompaniments and resultant activities constitute the foundation on which human experience is built.

Unlike the objects in the physical environment, the human mind, as it is a living dynamic entity, is constantly undergoing change. In this process of development, the elements are modified very considerably. With the steady growth of the child's experience of the world, the elemental propensities of mental constitution get organised into patterns of ever increasing complexity. Let us illustrate this point with reference to a 'talkie' of some repute—'Bāla Yōgini'—. Baby Saroja *hates* the lady doctor. *Hatred* is a *sentiment* composed of the two elemental emotions of *fear* (*bhayānaka*) and *anger* (*raudra*). One never hates a person of whom one is not afraid. A loathsome creature generates *disgust*

The elements of structure as discovered by careful scientific investigation are given in the following diagram :




FIG. I.
I.—(Alamkara list of) Rasas, and II.—(the corresponding Hormic list of) Propensities.

Note.—Corresponding to every element in I we have one or more in II. Analysis has been carried much further in II than in I, for the latter is mainly concerned with Poetics. Karuṇa, Vira and Bhaya have been further analysed in II into simpler elements.

Santa, as we know, is a doubtful element in Alamkara. It has a metaphysical flavour. There is nothing corresponding to it in Prof. McDougall's hormic list of instinctive propensities, unless we care to mention the physiological needs of rest, sleep, etc., which the professor adds, in the *Energies of Men*, to his original list.

(*bībhatsa*) in us, but when we begin to hate it, we may rest assured that fear has entered into our mind. Saroja's hatred for the woman is transferred to the doll presented by the latter. The child tramples the plaything under her foot in order to express her intense dislike of her mother's enemy. A *concrete sentiment of hatred* has been built by the baby round the doll.

In her telephonic conversation the baby imagines that her father is at the other end of the line; but she discovers to her dismay that it is the lady doctor who is attempting to cajole her. At this dramatic moment her voice and facial expression disclose the *sentiment of scorn*, a compound made of *self-assertion* (*vīra*), *anger* (*raudra*), *fear* (*bhayā naka*) and *disgust* (*bībhatsa*). A concrete sentiment of scorn has been organised in Saroja's mind round Mrs. Bullock.


The baby's lame cousin Kamala is the object of pity, a very complex sentiment composed of the protective impulse, sympathy, *hāsyā* etc. (Fig. 2).

In the mind of a young child the formation of complex emotional patterns, called sentiments, is confined to the concrete level. As the child grows into youth-hood (or maiden-hood), and man-hood (or woman-hood) abstract sentiments are formed, wherein the centres of organisation are ideas or concepts. Loyalty, patriotism, honour etc, are abstract sentiments.

Complex sentiments, both abstract and concrete, are not structures lying loose, one beside the other, in the mind of the human adult. They are arranged into a scale of sentiment-values, with a master-sentiment at the top of the scale, controlling, in terms of its intrinsic worth, the descending order of values of the other sentiments down the scale. *CULTURE is the process of forming concrete and abstract sentiments, and then of organising them into a definite scale of values.* Culture has been rightly defined as '*culturing*' or '*cultivating*' the mind. Such mental cultivation results in the formation of, what we have called, the scale of sentiment-values. He who achieves a permanent scale of values has won the most coveted thing in human experience, a stable character. But, with the vast majority of human beings the scale of sentiment values is a shifting thing. Do we not hear it said often of a man, as though it were a great achievement, that he is one person at home, another at the place of business, a third different man in his club, and yet a fourth personality in the games field. Our scale of values is constantly changing, because the master-sentiment at one moment yields place to another at the next. At home the master-sentiment may arise out of *śrīgāra*, at the office out of *bhaya*, at the club out of *karuṇa*, and

FIG. 2.

Diagram illustrating the Formation of Concrete and Abstract Sentiments.



Note.—Level I deals with the concrete sentiments with special reference to the mental structure of Baby Soroja; and level II with the conflict which is the main subject of this paper. Each sentiment is connected with the elements that enter into its constitution.

in the games field out of *vīra*. Professor McDougall says that the *self-regarding sentiment* (in which self-assertion plays the most prominent part) is the master-sentiment for the Westerner. We hold that the *Brahman-regarding sentiment* (wherein *sāntā*, *karuṇa* and *śṛṅgāra* play the chief roles) is or should be the master-sentiment for us.

One of the inevitable consequences of the dynamic constitution of the mind is that it must express itself in some manner or other. For the ordinary individual the channel of expression is conduct. We judge a man by his conduct, for conduct is the expression of character. According as a man's conduct is consistent and reliable or inconsistent and unreliable do we judge his character to be stable or unstable. For the gifted and superior individuals, the channel of expression for their mental organisation called *culture*, is fine art. Poetry and drama, song and dance, painting and sculpture, science and philosophy, are expressions of superior culture.

As with individuals, so with nations and groups. National or racial culture is merely the manner in which the national mind has created its sentiments and organised its scale of sentiment-values. Such national culture finds expression in cultural objects, such as, social institutions, traditions and customs, costumes and ornaments, folk-lore and dance, domestic and sacred architecture etc.

II

ĀNDHRA CULTURE

Culture, as we have analysed it, is a term indicating the psychological fact of the organisation of the elements of mental structure into a scale of sentiment-values. From an analysis of cultural objects, which are the aesthetic expressions of superior culture, both individual and racial, we can infer with confidence the structure of the mind which created those objects. Armed with the hormic formula of culture, we shall analyse the Āndhra cultural objects in order to get an insight into the manner in which the Āndhra genius is attempting to organise its sentiment-values.

At the outset, the significant remark ought to be made that sophistication is utterly alien to Āndhra culture. Nothing suspicious is hidden underneath a smooth and glossy outer surface. The cultural objects in the Andhradesa are the direct and unvarnished expressions of the way in which the Āndhra mind has been organised. In them there is not to be found any trace of that brand of hypocrisy mis-named civilisation. This characteristic straightforwardness is, in a sense, helpful to the analyst of culture.






Fig. 4. Stupa from Amarāvati.




Fig. 5. Foliated Arches on the roof of Vijayanagar Temple.

The conclusion that we shall essay to establish through an analysis of the cultural objects produced by Āndhra genius is that *there has been and still is a perpetual conflict between self-assertion (vīrya) and sympathy (karuṇa) in the Andhra group-mind.* (Occasionally one of the components dominates over, and temporarily assimilates the other).

FIG. 3.

Diagrammatic Representation of the Conflict between Vīrya and Karuṇa.

VĪRYA	vs.	KARUNA
(the elements entering (into this sentiment)		(the elements entering (into this sentiment)
Raudra		Śṛṅgāra
Vīra (dominant)	Hāsya	Karuṇa (dominant)
Bhayānaka	(neutral	Śānta.
Bibhatsa	element)	
Adbhuta.		

ANALYSIS OF THE CULTURAL OBJECTS OF THE ĀNDHRADESA

Sculpture and Architecture

The earliest remains of the cultural objects of the Andhra nation are the sculptures at Amarāvati, and the frescoes at Ajanta. Amarāvati, as we are aware, represents a more important city—Dharaṇīkota dating back to 200 B.C. Historical research bears testimony to the indigenous nature of the Amarāvati sculptures. Vincent Smith is of opinion that these sculptures owe nothing to Gandhara influences. Speaking of the Amarāvati stūpa, the learned historian says in his *Fine Art in India and Ceylon*, 'The authority of the Kushan kings, however, did not extend as far south as Amarāvati, which was then within the dominions of the powerful Āndhra dynasty of Deccan.' We may take these stupas as typical expressions of early Andhra culture.

In the first specimen (Pl. I Fig. 4) chosen here for analysis, we notice a central uprising dome, surrounded by a writhing mass of men and animals. The former is suggestive of the sentiment of *vīrya* with its dominant emotion of *vīra* (*self-assertion*), while the latter points to the primitive passive sympathy of the *elan vital* with itself. The life-energy having first scattered itself in innumerable centres of animal organism, is drawing these towards itself through the psychic force of sympathy. Already at the commencement of Andhra cultural evolution, we notice the conflict between *vīrya* and *karuṇa*. A similar conflict is to be found in the stupas (also dating back to the second century b.c.) at Jaggayyapet, 30 miles N.W. of Amarāvati. 'The adoration of the throne,' and 'The Chakravartin,' the two

representative samples found in the Madras Museum, reveal the struggle for supremacy over the racial mind between self-assertion and sympathy. The throne and the chakravarti are typical of *vīrya*, while the suppliant figures in the posture of adoration, and the royal women are embodiments of sympathy. The conflict reveals a tendency to sink down to the unconscious level of the group-mind. In interpreting aesthetic works the sub-conscious and the unconscious levels of the mind will have to be taken into consideration, and often it will be necessary to refer to the elaborate symbolism of psycho-analysis behind which the psyche entrenches itself. The apparent and the trivial details acquire tremendous significance when we delve into the unconscious levels. But luckily the specimens that we have chosen are comparatively easy to interpret.

The intriguing term 'Ajanta' is usually associated with Buddhistic culture in the minds of historians. But we should remind ourselves that it is Āndhra Buddhism that created the marvellous frescoes at Ajanta. The earliest Ajanta art is the expression of Andhra mental organisation. Fuller in his *Studies of Indian Life and Sentiment* says, 'At the commencement of the Christian Era the Āndhra dynasty had for nearly two centuries held sway over the northern part of the peninsula. It adopted Buddhism, and left its memory enshrined in a stupa of extraordinary magnificence and elaboration.' Dr. Ananda Coomaraswamy, in his introduction to *Indian Collection*, remarks that Barhut railings, Amarāvati stupas, sanchi rails, and toranas, and the *earliest Ajanta paintings* were all executed under Āndhra patronage in the period between 220 B.C. and 236 A.D.

The earliest Ajanta frescoes, which are characteristic expressions of Āndhra culture, are found in caves ix and x. Figures 6 and 7 in plate II are fairly typical of the paintings in these caves. In Fig. 6, we have an amazon-like figure, with bold and firm lines, seated in an attitude of great determination indicating assertion ; yet her hands are folded in *Añjali*, a pose typifying submission and craving for sympathy.

In cave X panel after panel is filled with rows of elephants (Pl. II. Fig. 7) drawn bold and austere. What is it that tempted the artist to paint these massive creatures in wild profusion ? Was it the presence of these animals in the Ajanta region ? The insight of the psycho-analyst helps us to solve the problem. The elephant by its nature, especially as depicted in these panels, is the very embodiment of *vīrya* (domineering self-assertion). When roused, he is the typical representative of uncontrolled outburst of passionate energy. Yet, how mild, how kind and sympathetic he is in his gentler moods ! Which of

PLATE II



Fig. 6.
Seated Women (cave ix)




Fig. 7.
The Ajanta Elephant (cave x)

us who has read Kipling's stories can forget the pathetic scene where the raging beast is tamed into passive submission by the mahout's baby ? Truly may it be said that the Ajanta elephant is a strange mixture of *vīrya* and *karuṇa*.

Not only in sculpture but in architecture too the same conflict is evident. We shall now take a very wide stride, and land in the xvi century when the prosperity of Vijayanagar reached its peak. Commenting on the architecture of this period Havell remarks, 'In the ruins of Hindu—Vijayanagar will be found not only the prototypes of Muhammad Bijapur, but illustrations of the process by which the Arab architecture of the vi, vii and following centuries gradually became the style of the pointed arch.' Havell is here describing the outward symbol of what was taking place within the Āndhra mind. In the foliated arch (Pl. I. Fig. 5) we note how the unrelieved Muslim semi-circular dome is relieved by the elongation. The pattern is the same as that of the Amaravati stupa, but with this difference that here the Muslim bondage is broken through. The uncompromising self-assertion of Muhammadan culture is being toned down here by the innate sympathy of the Āndhra mind.

So far as the plastic arts are concerned we hold that they are the expressions of the struggle between *vīrya* and *karuṇa* in the Āndhra group-mind.

A Western aesthetic critic who has travelled widely in our country, studying our sculpture and architecture, observes, while commenting on the striking features of Āndhra culture, 'This tone. changes at Amaravati. It is only now that the understanding for the powerful emotions of the human heart manifests itself. The elementary weight of the latter is now being recognised, and the artist is able to illustrate and to depict *passionate out-bursts, ecstatic devotion, the mildness of man and motherly solicitude.*' What is vaguely and inarticulately conveyed by the observation of this accomplished critic, is clearly and succinctly expressed in our hormic formula for the interpretation of Andhra aesthetic works :

Āndhra Culture= $vīrya \times karuṇa$.

THE ANDHRA SCRIPT

From the great and massive monuments of the Andhradesa, we shall now pass on to, what appears to be microscopically small and insignificant, the Andhra Script. To the psychologist of the twentieth century nothing is insignificant. Psychoanalysis has taught us the profound significance of what common sense (or popular ignorance) con-

siders to be insignificant. Even such apparently trivial acts of behaviour as biting the nails, scratching the head frequently, making explosive noises through the nose, are symptomatic of deep seated conflicts and repressions in the human mind. The script of a nation, when viewed phylogenetically, reveals the hidden tendencies of the group-mind. The evolution of the three letters, A—K—R, of the Andhra alphabet indicates the conflict that has taken place in the Andhra mind. (Vide Fig. 8). Each one of these letters starting with a high domineering tendency in the Vengi stage, and passing through several stages wherein their assertiveness was gradually toned down, finally ends in the Telugu xv century stage in which the rounded form clearly denotes the unmistakable influence of sympathy. Here too, in this apparently trivial expression of Andhra culture, we notice the conflict between *vīrya* and *karuṇa*.

FIG. 8.

STAGES IN THE EVOLUTION OF SOME LETTERS OF THE
ANDHRA ALPHABET.

(From the Andhra Encyclopaedia.)

		ॐ	ॐ	ॐ	ॐ
VENGI	V CENT.	ॐ		ॐ	ॐ
VENGI	VI "	ॐ		ॐ	ॐ
BADAMI CALUKYA	VI "	ॐ		ॐ	ॐ
VENGI CALUKYA	VII "			ॐ	ॐ
DO	X "	ॐ		ॐ	ॐ
RAJA RAJA	XI "	ॐ		ॐ	ॐ
TELUGU	XIII "	ॐ		ॐ	ॐ
DO.	XIV "	ॐ		ॐ	ॐ
DO.	XV "	ॐ		ॐ	ॐ

TELUGU LITERATURE

For purposes of our analysis, we should have welcomed indigenous Andhra literature of the pre-Nannayya period. But unfortunately Telugu literature is silent about the most glorious period of Andhra history. It is, as Mr. Chenchaiya remarks, 'a remarkable instance of national loss of memory.' We have to content ourselves, therefore, with the mere mention of the two outstanding men of letters in the age of translation. Srinatha, the typical man of the world, the *vīra par excellence*, was the prosperous author who knew how to get on in this world. Potanna, on the other hand was pre-occupied with the world beyond. He typifies the *karuṇa* rasa. Between them they illustrate the relationship between the two tendencies that we have been emphasising.

ANDHRA TRADITIONS AND CUSTOMS

The traditions and customs of Andradesa bristle with illustrations of the conflict between *vīrya* and *karuṇa*. We have selected two examples, at random, to emphasise our contention.

The legend about the origin of the Baliya sect runs thus: Goddess Parvathi desires to beautify herself, but finds that she has no ornaments. She prays to Siva for the fulfilment of her desire. Siva consults Brahma, who suggests a severe course of penance for the former as the only means for securing what his consort desires. The penance is performed, and as a result of Siva's austerities there springs into existence a Mahapurusha (the primeval Baliya) bearing all the articles necessary for a sumangili's toilet. The great Purusha presents these along with innumerable ornaments to Parvathi.

Vīrya is represented by the Mahapurusha himself. *Karuṇa* is revealed in his attitude to Parvathi. It is his sympathy with the mother of the worlds that made him bring her the welcome gifts.

Thurston describes nearly thirty different varieties of Gauri Vratam, a ceremony dear to the heart of the Andhra ladies. The elaborate technique of the Vratam invariably involves gifts to sumangilis given with the hope of an adequate return from the presiding deity, Sri Gauri. Self-assertion, sympathy and even touches of fear are all suggested by the ceremony of bestowing the gift on the married women.

MUSIC

One has to be very guarded in speaking about Andhra music. Though Mr. V. Subba Rao remarks in the Four Arts Annual for 1935 that the Andhras are most emotional and sensitive to new impressions,

and allow few innovations....' yet the increasing tendency to make an alarmingly free use of the Hindustani style, reveals the successful efforts of self-assertion to subdue karuna and assimilate it so completely as to destroy all traces of its influence. We remarked at the outset that one of the components of the psychic complex may occasionally annihilate the other. Here, in Andhra music we witness the beginnings of such annihilation of karuna by self-assertion. If the Arab influence filtering through the Hindustani style of music is not controlled, as it was controlled in Vijayangar architecture, we shall soon witness the annihilation of classical Andhra music.

PAINTING

The crowning phase of Āndhra culture is to be found in, what we consider to be, the high water-mark of Andhra painting, the paintings of Damarla Rama Rao. We are impressed with the profundity of karuṇa rasa portrayed, for example, in the masterly depiction of the scene in which the exiled Yakṣa in Meghadhūta appeals to the passing clouds to carry his message of poignant grief to his beloved in the far distant land. The aesthetic genius of Mr. Rao has caught and fixed on the canvas for us the depth of the feeling of the primitive passive sympathy of the hero. In the case of painting sympathy has over-mastered self-assertion. This subduing and assimilation of vīrya is a step in the right direction in which Āndhra culture ought to develop if it is to be true to the highest ideal of our national genius.

III

If the main contention of this essay, that Andhra Culture is the result of a conflict between vīrya and karuṇa be granted, then two questions of supreme importance present themselves to us and demand satisfactory answers. How long should this conflict be permitted to last? And, in what manner may the conflict be resolved? We are prepared to grant that conflict is the very essence of life on this earth, and that the resolution of one conflict will lead to the generation of another. But every single conflict resolved represents a step taken in the direction of progress. So the conflict in Āndhra culture should be resolved as soon as possible.

'Man has the mystical intuition of universal transformism. Through transmigrations, by passing from one appearance to another, and by raising within himself, through suffering and combat, the moving level of life, he will doubtless be pure enough one day to annihilate himself in Brahma.'

This significant statement of Elie Faurie in the History of Mediaeval Art, suggests the direction in which the conflict should be resolved. Vira (and the sentiment of virya generated by it) should first be annihilated, and whatever be the psychical force that may oppose the elements left over, successive annihilations should take place until pure Brahma Ānandam results.

The sole aim of the purest type of culture should be to enable man to attain Brahmānandam.

The Development and Fate of the Operculum and Gill-Chambers in *Bufo Melanostictus* Schneider

BY

A. RAMAKRISHNA REDDY, B.Sc. (HONS).,
Annamalai University, Annamalainagar.

INTRODUCTION

This aspect was studied in *Rana* by Marshall (1882), Helft (1926) and Brock (1929). But none of them stated at what stage exactly the ventral communication between the right and the left gill chambers closes and whether the primary branchial aperture contributes to the formation of the secondary branchial aperture of the left side or not. In *Rhacophorus* (Reddy 1938) these two points were studied. The present paper is an investigation into the formation and subsequent fate of the operculum and gill-chambers in *Bufo melanostictus* Schneider.

MATERIAL AND METHOD

I am very much indebted to Mr. K. V. Reddy, B.A., B.Sc., (Edin.), Forest Officer, Jeypore, who kindly supplied me with all the stages of *Bufo melanostictus* employed in this work.

Bouin's fluid was used for fixing the material. After washing in 70% alcohol and dehydration, the material was cleared in cedar-wood oil. The advanced stages were decalcified by leaving the material in 2.5% nitric acid in 70% alcohol for about 15 days. It was subsequently washed in 70% alcohol till there was no trace of acidity. The material was embedded in the usual way. Transverse longitudinal and sagittal sections of 10 μ to 12 μ were cut. Delafield's haematoxylin with eosin as counter stain was employed.

THE DEVELOPMENT AND FATE OF OPERCULUM AND GILL-CHAMBERS

A. Formation of Operculum and primary branchial aperture:—

The operculum arises as a fold of skin from the sides and the ventral surface as in the case of *Rana* and *Rhacophorus*. The growth of the operculum behind is almost uniform. At a slightly later stage the ventral region and the ventro-lateral region of the left side do not




Fig. 1. Showing the lagging behind of the ventral flap of the opercular fold and the ventro-lateral region of the left opercular fold in *Bufo melanostictus*.




Fig. 2. Showing the formation of the primary branchial aperture in *Bufo melanostictus*.

keep pace with the rapidly growing opercular fold of the right side (Fig. 1). The opercular fold on the right side fuses with the body-wall while the ventral fold (V.O.F.) grows backwards as a free flap for some distance and then fuses with the body-wall posteriorly (Fig. 2). On the left side the opercular fold (L.O.F.) does not grow uniformly. As a result towards the ventro-lateral region an aperture (P.B.A. Fig. 2) is left within the fold. The fold itself subsequently fuses with the body-




Fig. 3. Showing the ventral communication between the right and the left gill-chambers in *Bufo melanostictus*.

wall behind at about the same time as the ventral flap of the opercular fold. The ventro-lateral aperture (P.B.A.) is the primary branchial aperture or the spiracle which keeps the gill-chambers in communication with the exterior.

Though the primary branchial aperture is formed on very much the same lines as in *Rhacophorus* its position is different in the two genera. In *Rhacophorus* it is more towards the side while in *Bufo* it is nearer to the ventro-median line. This difference in position of the primary branchial aperture in the two genera is entirely responsible for the difference in the function and fate of the primary branchial aperture as exhibited by these two genera.

B. Formation of the secondary branchial apertures:—

As in the case of *Rana* and *Rhacophorus* the anterior limb bud of the right side is liberated by the histolysis of the opercular fold of the right side (R.O.F. Figs. 5 & 6) and at the base of the leg the secondary branchial aperture of its side is formed (Fig. 6). In the case of the




Fig. 4. Showing the growth of the median ridge on the ventral flap of the opercular fold closing the ventral communication in *Bufo melanostictus*.

liberation of the left limb the primary branchial aperture is of minor importance. This is due to the ventro-lateral position of the primary branchial aperture. In *Rhacophorus* where the primary branchial aperture is towards the side the liberation is mostly brought about by the primary branchial aperture and to a slight degree by the histolysis of the opercular fold. In *Bufo* the lower half of the primary branchial aperture exhibits partial closing up even before the emergence of the left anterior limb. The limb is liberated entirely by the histolysis of the opercular fold. The rupture does not close up entirely; but the secondary branchial aperture is left at the base of the limb. The primary branchial aperture does not contribute towards the formation of the secondary branchial aperture. Such a contribution is rendered impossible by the primary branchial aperture being located nearer to the ventro-median line unlike that of *Rhacophorus*.

The two secondary branchial apertures are of the same size.




Fig. 5. Showing the anterior limb buds in the gill-chambers just before their liberation in *Bufo melanostictus*.




Fig. 6. Showing anterior limb buds and the primary branchial aperture in *Bufo melanostictus*. The positions at which the secondary branchial apertures appear are indicated by 'X' marks.

C. The fate of the gill-chambers:—

After the liberation of the anterior limbs and the formation of the secondary branchial apertures the ventral flap of the opercular fold (V.O.F.) shows a longitudinal median ridge (Fig. 4). This grows upwards and fuses with the body wall. Thus the ventral communication between the left and right gill-chambers is closed (Fig. 5). Each gill-chamber communicates with the exterior independently by its secondary branchial aperture as in *Rana* and *Rhacophorus*. The closing up of the secondary branchial apertures is brought about on exactly the same lines as described for *Rhacophorus*.

SUMMARY

1. The general development and fate of the operculum and gill-chambers is similar to those of *Rana* and *Rhacophorus*.
2. The primary branchial aperture or spiracle is formed nearer to the ventro-median line.
3. The primary branchial aperture begins to close up even before the emergence of the anterior limbs.
4. The primary branchial aperture is in no way concerned in the liberation of the anterior limb of its side and it does not contribute towards the formation of the secondary branchial aperture of its side.
5. The difference between *Bufo* and *Rhacophorus* in the function and fate of the primary branchial aperture is entirely due to the different positions of the primary branchial aperture in the two genera.
6. The secondary branchial apertures are formed by the histolysis of the opercular fold of the right and the left sides.
7. The right and the left secondary branchial apertures are of the same size.
8. The secondary branchial apertures persist till the disappearance of the tail.
9. The two secondary branchial apertures close up at about the same time.
10. After the liberation of the anterior limbs and the appearance of the secondary branchial apertures a median ridge grows upwards on the ventral flap of the opercular fold and fuses with the body wall, thus closing the ventral communication between the right and the left gill-chambers.

REFERENCES

- Balfour (1881) "Comparative Embryology", Vol. 2.
- Brock (1929) "The formation and fate of the operculum and the gill-chambers in the tadpole of *Rana temporaria*." Q.J.M.S. Vol. 73.
- Goodrich (1930) "The structure and development of vertebrates," London.
- Helft (1926) "Studies on Amphibian Metamorphosis, Part I. Formation of opercular leg perforation," Journal. Exper. Biol. Vol. 45.
- Kerr (1919) "Text-book of Embryology," Vol. Vertebrates, London.
- Latter (1923) "An over-looked feature in the four legged tadpole of *Rana temporaria*," Nature (Feb. 1923).
- Marshall (1882) "The Frog—An introduction." (12th edition 1928) London.
- Reddy (1938) "The development and fate of the operculum and gill-chambers in *Rhacophorus maculatus*, Bouleng." Jour. Annamalai University, Vol. VII, No. 2.
- Shumway (1935) "Introduction to Vertebrate Embryology," New York.

EXPLANATION OF FIGURES

G.—Gills ; L.A.L.—Left anterior limb ; L.G.G.—Left gill-chamber ; L.O.F.—Left portion of the opercular fold ; L.S.B.A.—Left secondary branchial aperture ; O.F.—Opercular fold ; P.B.A.—Primary branchial aperture ; R.A.L.—Right anterior limb ; R.G.C.—Right gill-chamber ; R.O.F.—Right portion of the opercular fold ; R.S.B.A.—Right secondary branchial aperture ; V.C.C.—Ventral communicating channel ; V.O.F.—Ventral portion of the opercular fold.

The Passive Voice in Tamil

Dr. Caldwell's Statements Considered

By

A. CHIDAMBARANATHA CHETTIAR

(*Annamalai University*)

Dr. Caldwell said "none of the Dravidian dialects possesses any passive particle or suffix."¹ But it was shown in a previous issue of the Journal² that "paḍu" has assumed the rank of a morpheme in Tamil. Expressions such as "satyamba palkambaḍun",³ "vāni reṇṭi jayiṇchina vāḍu gāni endu barama dharumikuḍenē ennabaḍadu"⁴ found in the Telugu Bhāratam and "eydappaḍuvār" and "eriveppaḍuvōr" found in the Kannada inscriptions⁵ of the 7th century A.D., though not sufficient in themselves to warrant the conclusion that these languages too have a passive particle in paḍu, suggest that if the literature and inscriptions of the other Dravidian languages are explored it might sometime be possible for someone to show that paḍu is a regular passive particle of the Dravidian languages. The fact that paḍu had some semantic value at one time does not stand, as we know, in the way of our accepting it now as a particle in Tamil at least. When it is said at one breath that there is a passive voice in Sanscrit formed by means of annexing the particle "Ya" which itself might have once had a semantic value of its own and that there is found a passive voice in several languages of the Uralo-Altaic family because of the employment of the particle "il" in Turkish, "et" in Finnish and "at" in Hungarian,⁶ how could it be said at another that there is "no passive voice, properly so-called" in Tamil,⁷ especially after having witnessed the process through which paḍu has become a morpheme?

Dr. Caldwell, probably not stopping to inquire whether paḍu was a particle or not, expressed the view that paḍu was an auxiliary verb (= to suffer or to experience) added to the infinitive form of the Verb

1. Comparative Grammar of the Dravidian Languages, p. 463.

2. Vol. VII, No. 2.

3. Telugu Bhāratam--Āraṇya. IV Canto. 191.

4. *Ibid.*, V Canto, 42.

5. Epigraphia Carnatica VI, edited by Lewis Rice, p. 323.

6. Caldwell's Comp. Gram., p. 463.

7. *Ibid.*

or to the ultimate base of a Verb.⁸ In conformity with this view he regarded expressions such as “*aḍikkappaḍu*” rather as phrases⁹ than as single words. But it is possible to show that every one of these expressions is only a single word. Expressions such as “*aḍikkappaṭṭān*” probably arose at one time as a result of compounding two words, one of which was “*paṭṭān*.” This should have happened however at a time when *paḍu* had not become the characteristic mode of expressing the passive sense and when it retained its sense of “to stay” or “to obtain.” For instance, that was the time when one could understand by means of the expression “*aḍikkappaṭṭān*” “he got a blow.” “*Aḍikka*,” the modern infinitive form of the verb, is but a representative of perhaps an older form “*aḍikkal*”¹⁰ or “*aḍittal*” (= a beating). And “*aḍikkal*”, to be sure, was a verbal noun. This verbal noun could adequately stand for “*aḍi*” (= a blow), another noun formed without any change from the root “*aḍi*” meaning “to beat.” Thus, what was “*aḍipaṭṭān*” (= got a blow) at one stage could easily be replaced by “*aḍikkalpaṭṭān*” at a subsequent period. And as long as forms of the type “*aḍikkalpaṭṭān*” remained, one was justified in regarding them as compounds of two words or as phrases.

But when “*aḍikkal-paḍu*” (= to get a blow) took the shape of “*aḍikkappaḍu*” (= to be beaten), that is to say, when these two elements after floating at first in close proximity were welded into one, it must have ceased to be reckoned as containing two words. *Aḍikka*, *Aḍikkappaḍu*, *Aḍikkapaṭṭa*, *Aḍikkappaḍukinra*, *Aḍikkappaḍum* are all different words even as *do*, *did*, *does* and *done* are in English.¹¹ The form “*aḍikka*” by having dropped the final “*l*” in “*aḍikkal*” has tended to partake more of the character of the verb. And on being joined to the passive implement *paḍu* it has become a different word, “*aḍikkappaḍu*”, from which *paḍu* itself could not be separated in order to be treated as an isolated form. Here *paḍu*, though conveying a passive sense, is not a free form in itself but occurs only in construction as part of a larger form. There was however a transitional stage when a form like “*aḍikkappaṭṭān*” itself could be treated as a phrase. That was when it occurred with an interruption in the middle as “*aḍikkavumpaṭṭān*.”

8. *Comp. Gram.*, p. 466.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 467.

10. Cf. *Tirunāvukkarasar Tēvaram* (S. S. Samāja edn., 1930), p. 21, St. 6: “*cēyalpaḍuvatu ariyēn nān*”; also *Kural*, St. 40 and 437; cf. also *karayalpaḍa* (= to be called) in *Kanarese* and *hand-al(le)* (= to go) in *Gond*.

11. Cf. *Bloomfield's "Language"*, p. 178: “In our school tradition we sometimes speak of forms like *do*, *does*, *did*, *done* as different forms of the same word. Of course, this is inaccurate . . . they are different words.”

Thus, forms such as “*ēttavumpaḍumē*”¹² and “*tāḍiyavum-paṭṭāṇan*,”¹³ where “*um*” adds nothing to the sense, lay on the border line between words and phrases. But when no interruption could be thought of in such expressions as these, when for instance one could not say “*aḍikkanaṇṇākappaṭṭāṇ*” as one could say “*nanrāka aḍikkappaṭṭāṇ*,” the stage had been reached when “*aḍikkappaṭṭāṇ*” could no longer be regarded as a phrase. “The principle, namely that a word cannot be interrupted by other forms (whereas a phrase could be), holds good almost universally” says Mr. Bloomfield.¹⁴ If, as he says, “jack-in-the pulpit”—a plant name—because it cannot be interrupted in the middle as “jack-in-the *little* pulpit,” should be regarded as a word and not a phrase, there can be little doubt that “*aḍikkappaḍu*” (= to be beaten) is a word.¹⁵ And Sivañāṇa Swamigaḷ, an able exponent of Tolkāppiyam, has regarded such forms as this only as stems equivalent to the verbal themes.¹⁶ Parimēlaḷakar, the masterly commentator of Tīrukkuraḷ, has similarly treated such expressions as “*uyttuviḍum*,” “*kāṭṭiviḍum*” etc., as single words rather than sets of two words.¹⁷ It must be noted here that *paḍu* occurring in passive connections is different from *paḍu* occurring independently, for the Tamil language has adopted this expression from its hereditary stock to be turned into a grammatical instrument for the formation of the passive stem. Even as “*iḍu*” in “*uḷḷiḍappaṭṭa arasaṇai*”¹⁸ and “*cey*” in “*uraiseyappaṭṭavarruḷ onṟum eydātatillai*”¹⁹ are different from “*iḍu*” and “*cey*” occurring independently, *paḍu* here is different from *paḍu* which may occur independently in the sense of “to be able” or “to suffer.” *Paḍu* here is not a free form in itself and is therefore not a word. It is not a word forming part of a phrase but a linguistic form occurring as part of a bound form. So the welding of the passive particle to a verb in the infinitive yields only a word and not a phrase.

Dr. Caldwell’s view that *aḍikkappaṭṭāṇ* was a phrase was forestalled in his statement “the ultimate base of a verb is sometimes used instead of the infinitive or verbal noun in construction with this auxiliary (*paḍu*), in which case the base is regarded as a noun—e.g. instead of

12. *Puraṇānūru*, St. 1.

13. *Manimēkhalai*, Chap. XXII, l. 79.

14. “*Language*” (1935 edn.), p. 180.

15. Cf. also “*Blackbird*” in Archbishop Trench’s *Study of Words*, p. 130 and Bloomfield, p. 180.

16. *Mutal Sūtra Virutti*, p. 40: *enappaḍu—mudal nilait taṇmaip paṭṭu*, etc.

17. *Vide Kural*, 121, 168, 28 and 167.

18. *Kalittogai*, St. 139.

19. *Cikāḷattippuraṇam*, St. 121 (See also “*iḍu*” in *Chintāmani*, St. 181 and *Perunkatai*, p. 95, l. 21.).

‘*aḍikkappaṭṭān*’ we may say ‘*aḍipaṭṭān*’; and where this form can be used, it is considered more idiomatic than the use of the infinitive.”²⁰ The point he appears thereby to emphasise is that the phrasical nature was consciously and ardently kept up. But the history of the language as evidenced by literary documents does not show that forms like “*aḍipaṭṭa*,” where they could be used, were preferred to forms like “*aḍikkappaṭṭa*.” Several instances can be cited which run counter to Dr. Caldwell’s view. In “*Kaḷavaḷinārpātu*”²¹ by Poigaiyār and “*Peruṅkatai*”²² by Koṅguvēḷ for instance, we find the expressions “*tuṇikkappaṭṭu*” and “*tuṇiyappaṭṭu*” occurring where “*tuṇipaṭṭu*” might have as well been used. “*Tuṇi*” (= a chopping), a noun, has not been preferred here to “*tuṇikka*” or “*tuṇiya*” (= to chop) the infinitive. And where “*Vaḷai-paṭṭu*” might have been used, “*Vaḷaikkappaṭṭu*” has been used by Tōlāmōḷittēvar;²³ and where “*piṇipaṭṭān*” might have been used, “*piṇikkappaṭṭān*” has been employed by Tiruttakkatēvar.²⁴ Instances wherein “*koḷappaṭṭa*” (infinitive + *paḍu* + *a*) has been preferred to “*kōṭpaṭṭa*” (noun + *paḍu* + participial ‘*a*’) are found in abundance. One has only to refer to *Kalittogai* (e.g. St. 7), *Nāḷaḍiyār* (e.g. St. 8), *Tirukkuraḷ* (e.g. St. 699) and *Cīvakachintāmaṇi* (e.g. *Maṇmakal ilambagam* St. 207) for a verification of this statement. Truly, the authors of these works, by their use of the infinitive, were not less idiomatic than those that would have employed the nominal form instead!

So Caldwell’s conclusion²⁵ that “it is only when combined with nouns that its (= *paḍu*’s) use is thoroughly allowable” does not appear to carry weight. On the contrary, the infinitive it is that seems to have gained preference in the course of the development of the passive formation in Tamil. The reason is to be sought for in its characteristics which befit it much better than a noun for use in a voice of the verb. By representing the verbal idea shorn of all accessory and adventitious elements, by indicating neither person nor number and by being able to express an exclamation, a wish or an order,²⁶ it is indeed well-suited for employment where a verbal aspect is concerned. By being half substantive and half verb, it could very well play the role of a *locum-tenens* of the nominal form. If in forms such as “*aḍipaṭṭān*” (blow got he) and “*aḍipaḍukirāṇ*” (blow

20. *Comp. Grammar*, p. 467.

21. St. 14.

22. p. 204, l. 9.

23. *Chūḷāmaṇi*—*araciyal carukkam*, St. 329.

24. *Chintāmaṇi*—*Kuṇamālaiyār*, St. 283.

25. p. 467. (This is his last word on the subject of the Dravidian passive voice.).

26. Cf. Breal’s *Semantics*, pp. 79-80.

gets he) the root is not expressive of the verbal element, it is because it is not a verb but only a noun which could serve as the object of the old independent verb “paṭṭān.” But when the Tamils gradually developed the use of the old word paḍu to such an extent as to make it the special implement of the passive voice of the verb, little by little they appear to have dropped the nominal form in favour of the infinitive. And as the infinitive is a part of the hierarchy of verbal forms,²⁷ nay, as it is the most general form of the verb,²⁸ as it is the name of the action, it not only effectively replaced the older nominal form but appropriated to itself the place where it came in as a substitute. Thus, in harmony with having proved in the earlier part that paḍu is a passive particle in Tamil, it is now shown that it is not an auxiliary verb occurring in combination with a noun, nor a free word forming part of a phrase as taken by Dr. Caldwell.

He next proceeded to say²⁹ “paḍu is often added not only to active but also to neuter or intransitive verbs, and the addition of the passive auxiliary does not alter the signification—e.g. there is no difference in Tamil between the intransitive “teriyum” (= it appears or it will appear) and “teriyappaḍum.” He is probably emphasising here his view that paḍu was not the characteristic implement to form the passive. To start with, “teriyappaḍum” is not a common occurrence. If that occurrence however is found anywhere, it is possible that there “teri” has already become a transitive verb in analogy to “aṟi” (= to know).³⁰ If it has become a transitive verb and if to it has been added paḍu there is hardly any doubt as to the passive purport of paḍu. The following remark of Mr. Vendryes lends authority to this view: “In the course of the development of any language these constructions are seen to change, intransitive verbs becoming transitive and *vice versa*”.³¹

Next, the statement of Dr. Caldwell “in ordinary use paḍu conveys the meaning of continuous action or being, rather than that of passivity—e.g. irukkappaṭṭa is vulgarly used for “irukkira,” “that is”; and I have heard a Tamilian say, nāṇ naṇṛāy cāppiḍappaṭṭavan, meaning thereby, not ‘I have been well eaten’ but ‘I have been accustomed to eat well’”³² may be considered. Without discussing the propriety of generalising

27. Vendryes’ “Language”, p. 120.

28. Breal, p. 80.

29. Comp. Gram., p. 467.

30. Jaffna T. Ramanatha Pillai in Yavana Mañcari, p. 52: *Teriyappaḍum poruḷum onrē*.

31. Language—A Linguistic Introduction to History, p. 106.

32. p. 467.

from the vulgar speech of Caldwell's time and without seeking to know whether what a Tamilian was heard to say to Caldwell was the norm in the Tamil language, let us see whether the word *paḍu* occurring in these expressions is the same as the passive particle *paḍu*. The word *paḍu* which, as was shown before, originally started with the meaning of "to appear" and passed on to assume the meaning of "to stay", probably had analogous extensions such as "to be inured", "to be able" etc. And thus "*irukkappaṭṭavan*" (= one inured to stay) contains a *paḍu* which means "to be inured" and "*cāppiḍappaṭṭavan*" (= one able to eat) a *paḍu* which means "to be able." Expressions such as "*uḷḷiḍappaḍāta tiruvuvuvu*"³³ (= the great figure (of god) which is not able to conceive) and "*uṇṇappaḍā naṇcam*"³⁴ (= the poison that cannot be eaten) containing a *paḍu* which means "to be able" are enough to show that in "*cāppiḍappaṭṭavan*" also there is a *paḍu* which may mean "to be able." Then this word *paḍu* is entirely different from the *paḍu* which at the stage of possessing the meaning "to get" was seized upon and turned into a passive particle.³⁵ It is not therefore fair to argue that *paḍu* ordinarily expresses the meaning of continuous action or being rather than that of passivity. The fact that *paḍu* expresses continuity in certain places may be conceded; but the view that it is the same word as *paḍu*, the passive particle, cannot be countenanced. Even as "*Yām aruntappaṭṭa*"³⁶ *uṇavu iṇku amutu ceyap paruvam idu*" contains a *paḍu*, (= to be inured to or to be fit) which is different from *paḍu*, the passive particle, in "*eṇṇāl uṇavu aruntappaṭṭadu*," the *paḍu* occurring in "*cāppiḍappaṭṭavan*" is entirely different from that which may be found in such expressions as "*adu avanāl cāppiḍappaṭṭadu*." Similarly, the *paḍu* occurring in "*nam napi.....kāṇiḍai viḷaṅkappaṭṭa*"³⁷ *kāraṇam evaikol*" in the sense of "to appear" is completely different from the one found in "*napiyāl kāṇ Viḷakkappaṭṭadu*." *Viḷaṅkappaṭṭa*" in the foregoing passage only stands for "*viḷaṅkiya*" the active form but it is more expressive. Likewise, "*irukkappaṭṭavan*" and "*cāppiḍappaṭṭavan*" are only as good as "*irukkiraṇavan*" and "*cāppiḍukiraṇavan*" with the qualification that they have more expressive value. On close scrutiny we find moreover that it is not after all *paḍu* that conveys the meaning of continuous action in these places but that it is something else that does so. It is but reasonable to regard "v" the future tense-infix occur-

33. *Tiruvāchakam*—*Tirukkōtumbi*, St. 16.

34. *Nakkīrar* : *kailai pāti kālatti pāti antādi*, St. 75.

35. *Vide A. U. Journal*, Vol. VII, No. 2, p. 131.

36. *Villi Bhāratam*—*Duruvāsamuni carukkam*, St. 3.

37. *Čiṭṭapurāṇam*—*Hijarathukkāṇḍam*—*Čurākkattut toḍarnta paḍalam*, St. 10.

ring in these expressions as denoting the aorist. But if we still assume that *paḍu* in *cāpṇidapaṭṭavan* and *irukkappaṭṭavan* conveys the sense of continuous action or being, that however does not preclude the existence of a passive *paḍu*. And the passive *paḍu* is as entirely distinct from this *paḍu* as the “ing” in “the house is building” is from the “ing” in “the man is building.”³⁸ It is an expression as very distinct as “has” occurring in two places³⁹ in “He *has* lost all he *had*.” Viewed in this way, *paḍu*, the passive particle, is found to be an expression of a distinctive species, having nothing to do with the continuity attributed to it. If we attempt to show then that *paḍu* cannot by any means be taken to indicate continuous action in such an expression as “*kollappaṭṭavanai erittārgal*” (=They burnt him that was killed), we would be simply flogging a dead horse.

Dr. Caldwell said “It (=this compound of *paḍu* with an infinitive or noun of quality) is rarely found in the classics; and idiomatic speakers prefer the other modes of forming the passive.”⁴⁰ There is no gainsaying that it is rare in the classics. But the reason for this rarity probably lies in the rarity of ancient Tamil prose works. Not even one prose composition of the Sangam period⁴¹ has come down to us, whereas several poetical works are available. If we do not find in abundance passive forms with *paḍu* occurring in the poetical literature of the Sangam days, it is probably because the poets cared more for the dramatic way in which they could express the subject as active by means of employing the neuter or intransitive form of the verb.⁴² This will be borne out by a comparison of the occurrence of this form in Tamil prose on the one hand and poetry on the other of any given period. In *Bhārata Venbā* (of about the 8th or 9th century A.D.)⁴³ for instance, there is not even one passive form with *paḍu* in the verse part, whereas in the prose part of the same work by the same author there are, within the first hundred pages, no less than five times when “compounds of *paḍu* with an infinitive” for expressing the passive have occurred.⁴⁴ Taking a book of the present day whose verse-composer and commentator are one and the same person, we find further support for the reason now suggested.

38. Lounsbury : History of English Language, pp. 170-173.

39. Cf. Breal, p. 210.

40. Comp. Gram., p. 467.

41. Not even *Takaḍūr Yāttirai* prose is available.

42. Vide A.U.J., Vol. VII, pp. 126-127.

43. Mr. M. S. Purnalingam Pillai's History of Tamil Literature (1929), p. 54 and late K. Srinivasa Pillai's Tamil Varalāru, II part (1930), p. 210.

44. *Bhārata Venbā* (edited by Mr. A. Gopala Aiyar), pp. 8, 17, 70 and 71.

Pārikātai⁴⁵ verse no. 236 has only one paḍu as a passive form, whereas the commentary of this verse alone has three. And we find that, whereas in this book of about 660 verses there are no more than 10 places where paḍu as a passive form occurs, there are no less than 10 within the first five pages of "*Sētunāḍ and Tamil*," a prose book⁴⁶ written by the same author. To bring home the truth of the statement that the apparent rarity in the classics of "paḍu compounds with infinitives" is due to the fact that prose compositions of the ancient days are not available to us, one more book will now be instanced. "*Iraiyānār Kaḷaviyal*," a grammar which runs in a metre akin to that of poetry, bears only one passive paḍu in the first rule (sūtra) as against nearly 60 paḍus in the commentary of this single rule. And this entire commentary, which is in prose, is as old as the 8th century A.D., even although parts of it could be assigned to earlier periods.⁴⁷ When, as is seen from the first 34 pages of this book, paḍu with a passive import has occurred at the average rate of two per page, it is impossible to maintain that the occurrence of the passive paḍu is rare in that period. If only prose writings of earlier periods were available to us, we would not have had any difficulty in showing that passive paḍus were by their nature employed then also more largely in prose than in poetry. In the absence of the earliest prose writings which, if available, might show a large use of the passive paḍu and in the face of such a super-abundant use in the prose of medieval and modern periods as contrasted with the use which is not so frequent in the poetry of the same periods, it is not unreasonable to put forth the view that if passive paḍus are found only occasionally in the classics it is because what we have of the classics is poetry alone and not prose. Then it would not be fair to agree with Dr. Caldwell that the writers of the classical period preferred to avoid "compounds of paḍu with the infinitives." If the classical writers of poetry, however, made only a sparing use of this method, they did so probably because of their tendency to be more dramatic and imaginative.

But that they did not make a large use of it because it was unidiomatic to them is suggested by Dr. Caldwell. This cannot be sustained. If an expression is unidiomatic, it is reasonable to regard it as having come out, escaping the attention of the writer.⁴⁸ But if an expression

45. Annamalai University Publication, 1937.

46. Madura Tamil Sangam, 1928.

47. Vide Srinivasa Pillai's *Tamil Varalāru II*, p. 25 and Mr. V. C. Chengalvarāya Pillai's *History of Tamil Prose Literature*, pp. 24-26.

48. Cf. Breal (p. 72): "With the ordinary man an infringement of what he supposes to be the rule provokes either laughter or contempt."

occurs several times in the course of a brief while in one's writing, no one would be justified in saying that that expression has escaped one's attention. On the other hand, that expression would be treated as having deliberately come out as the result of a habit.⁴⁹ And what has become the habit of a nation or a community can hardly be considered unidiomatic. For instance, in seven consecutive lines of a classical verse⁵⁰ *paḍu* occurs seven times consecutively in conjunction with the infinitive form of the verb "en" meaning "to say."⁵¹ The passage runs:—

"Paṇpu eṇappaḍuvatu pāḍarindu oḷugudal
 Aṇbu eṇappaḍuvatu taṇ kiḷai ceṛāmai
 Ceṛivu eṇappaḍuvatu kūṛiyatu maṛāmai
 Aṛivu eṇappaḍuvatu pēdaiyār col nōṇṇal
 Nīrai eṇappaḍuvatu maṛai pīrar aṛiyāmai
 Muṛai eṇappaḍuvatu kaṇṇōḍātu uyir vauval
 Poṛai eṇappaḍuvatu pōṛṛāraip poṛuttal."

To regard this form then as unidiomatic is utterly to disregard evidence from literature. When we notice the adoption of the active form in two places alone⁵² as "Āṛṛtual *enpatu* onru alantavarkku utavutal, Pōṛṛutal *enpatu* puṇarntāraip piriyaṁmai" as against the use of 7 passive *paḍus* in the same setting and in the same context, we cannot but question the theory that compounds of *paḍu* with infinitives are rarely found in the classics because of their unidiomatic nature. The common occurrence of the passive *paḍu* in all the five parts of *Kalittogai*,⁵³ a classical collection of the five authors Pālai Pāḍiya perunḱaḍuṅkō, Kapilar, Marutaṇ Iḷanākanār, chōḷaṇ Nalluruttiraṇ and Nallantuvanār is so significant as to challenge the statement of Dr. Caldwell.

"And idiomatic speakers prefer the other modes of forming the passive" said Dr. Caldwell.⁵⁴ That this is not correct is apparent from what we have seen in the preceding paragraphs. In order to show the fallaciousness of his theory further examples can easily be cited. Where

49. Cf. Mr. L. R. Palmer's *Introduction to Modern Linguistics* (1936), p. 63: "As far as mere morphology is concerned, speaking involves mere reproduction of inherited speech-forms."

50. *Kalittogai*, St. 133, ll. 8-14.

51. See Mr. Ramakrishnaiah's *Studies in Dravidian Philology*, p. 133.

52. St. 133 of *Kalittogai*, ll. 6-7; cf. Caldwell, p. 466, "Iyēsu enbavar."

53. Vide Appendix I.

54. *Comp. Grammar*, p. 467.

active forms themselves could have been used with equal force we find the passive forms in the following⁵⁵ instances :—

- (1) Pallār nakku *eḷḷappaḍum* maḍal mā ēri
- (2) Tēvar toḷappaḍuvānaik kāṇa
- (3) Uraiyaḷ *uṇarappaḍāta* aḍi
- (4) Mulai *Maṛaikkappaṭṭu* niraḍip peṇkaḷ tiṇḍi
- (5) Kāḷatti *kāṇappaṭṭa* kaṇa nāthan kāṇ
- (6) Nālantān *paravappaḍukinra* nāṇmaṛai nāvaṇ
- (7) Tuṇai eṇru nāṇ *toḷappaṭṭa* oṇ cuḍarai
- (8) Kaṛṇavar *paravappaḍuvānaik* kāṇa.

In each one of these examples the authors, if they chose, might have employed the active forms themselves which would have brought out the passive sense by the mere connection. It is here that Caldwell would have said⁵⁶ in accordance with his own view that “so distinctively in these cases is the passive sense expressed by the connection alone, that the use of the more formal modern passive would sound awkward and foreign.” And yet the forms used in these instances are passive forms with *paḍu*.⁵⁷ How they could sound awkward or foreign we are unable to find. When on the one hand Caldwell says that this is awkward and foreign and when on the other we find that one of those that have adopted this use is Kapilar, a Tamil poet of the 3rd Sangam Age held in great esteem and reverence by his contemporary men and women for his very idiomatic use of expressions⁵⁸ and that the other three persons just cited in this behalf are those that spoke out their feelings and Revelations in hymns (7th century to 9th century A.D.) which are considered sacred by the Tamils, we have little to pick and choose. If after reading Caldwell’s statement and if after being told time and again by other great scholars following him⁵⁹ that it is unidiomatic in Tamil to use *paḍu* as a passive auxiliary, certain Tamilians are found to avoid it, it would not be more surprising than the artificiality that would creep in if they were

55. (1) by Kapilar in Kalittogai, St. 61 ; (2) by Sambandar in Tēvaram (S. S. Samāja edn. 1927), p. 427 St. 1 ; (3) to (5) by Tirunāvukkarasar in Tēvaram (ibid., 1930), p. 326 St. 7, p. 321 St. 11, and p. 329 St. 1 to 3 ; (6) to (8) by Sundarar (ibid. 1929 edn.), p. 105 St. 10, p. 112 St. 2 and p. 121 St. 10.

56. Cf. Comp. Gram., p. 465.

57. Only they are not modern !

58. Vide *Paḍirruppattu*, St. 85 by Perunḱuṇṇr kīlār, *Puṛam* 53 by Poruntīl ḷāṅkīraṇār and *Puṛam* 174 by Maṛōkkattu Nappasalaiyār.

59. Dr. I. S. Taraporewala in his “Elements of the Science of Language”, p. 349 and Dr. S. K. Chatterji in his “Origin and Development of the Bengali Language”, Vol. II, p. 925.

to avoid, following the statement of the commentator⁶⁰ of "Prayōka Vivēkam," the use of the pronominal termination of the verb "an" in places where an action for one's own self has to be indicated (i.e., in expressions corresponding to the ātmanēpadas of Sanscrit). The commentator of Prayōka vivēkam says that camaikkirāṇaṇ means "he cooks for someone else" and that camaikkirāṇ means "he cooks for himself". This artificial restriction, which he thought was existing in Tamil, does not at all exist in it. Similarly, what Caldwell considered as unidiomatic in Tamil is found to be not unidiomatic after all. Our sense of fairness would no doubt revolt against the venturesome implication that the revered Kapilar or the three great Saiva hymnists and others employed the passive form so that a scholar like Dr. Caldwell coming several centuries after them might be justified in putting them down as employers of a form that is "foreign, modern, awkward and unidiomatic."

And Dravidian languages are said to resist every effort to bring paḍu into general use.⁶¹ How far is this true in Tamil? A part of the verse cited before from Kalittogai⁶² was found to have made a general use of paḍu. And a very common, repeated use of it is found in Tiruk-kuraḷ, Tirumantiram, Tirunāvukkarasar Tēvāram, Tiruvāchakam, Chintāmaṇi, Chūlāmaṇi, Kambarāmāyaṇam, Yāpparuṅkalakkārigai, Taṇikaippurāṇam, Tāyumāṇavar pāḍal, Minakshisundaram Pillai's poetical works and Ramalingaswami's poems.⁶³ And Aḍiyārkkunallār, commentator of Chilappadikāram, who has used it 6 times within 8 lines,⁶⁴ cannot by any means be considered to have made a restricted use of it. In fact Tamil has not resisted the coming of paḍu into common use. If it resists, it resists only so far as paḍu is tried to be employed in the *impersonal* forms of the verb. That is because impersonal forms⁶⁵ such as "It is requested", "it is stated" etc. are as unidiomatic as "it rains" itself in Tamil. To say this is not to concede however that the Tamil language wants a passive voice properly so-called.

Next it is said⁶⁶ that efforts are constantly made to bring paḍu into general use "by foreigners, who are accustomed to passives in their

60. p. 66 : "Camaikkirāṇaṇ eṇa aṇ irāy uraittāl piṇarkku."

61. Caldwell, p. 467.

62. (St. 133) supra, p. 30.

63. Vide Appendix II.

64. Vide Chilappadikāram V—commentary on ll. 105-110 at p. 163 (of the 3rd edn.).

65. Cf. Paul's Principles of Language, p. 119 and Vendryes, p. 103.

66. Comp. Gram. of the Drn. Langs., p. 467.

own tongues, and fancy that they cannot get on without them". But on examination of certain books written in Tamil by foreigners we find that this is probably not correct. The Rev. Mr. Beschi, the Italian missionary and author of the famous *Tēmbāvaṇi*, has not used *paḍu* in the passive sense in more places than ten in that book. And *Māthai Tiruvēnkaṭa-nātha Aiyar* has not employed this *paḍu* more than five times in his *Prabōdha Chandrōdayam*, adapted from the Sanscrit original. These two great scholars, despite being accustomed to passives in their own tongues, do not appear to have made any effort to bring *paḍu* into a larger use than that by the Tamilian writers themselves. Not that they consciously guarded against a larger use ; but that the form of their writing being verse, the active forms were more suitable. This again lends support to the point suggested before that if in the classics much use of the passive *paḍu* is not found it is because the classical writings available to us now are all poetical compositions. And the prose works of any modern foreign writer contain only as many *paḍus* as the prose of any Tamilian writer himself.

"Nothing sounds more barbarous to the Dravidian ear than the unnecessary use of *paḍu* as a passive auxiliary " concluded Caldwell.⁶⁷ He has used the word "barbarous" apparently not in the sense of uncivilised, rude or savage but in the sense of foreign or incorrect. A form that has been in vogue ever since the extant Tamil literature arose, a form which has not been resisted but adopted throughout the twenty centuries and more,⁶⁸ a form which has now become the characteristic symbol in Tamil for expressing the passive, is far, far from being barbaric to the Tamilians. Unnecessary use of *paḍu* as a passive auxiliary, it is true, will sound barbarous to the Tamilian ear. Only *necessary* use of anything whatsoever will not be ugly! But the places where the unnecessary use of *paḍu* will thus be condemned are those where it may be sought to be used as an impersonal passive form in such an expression as "*ellōrum kūṭṭathirku varumāru kēṭṭukkoḷappaḍukiradu*" (=It is requested that all will come to the meeting) which is un-Tamilian. "*Ellōrum kēṭṭukkoḷappaḍukirārkaḷ*" (=All are requested) however is not barbarous to the Tamilian ear, but if it is less used than the active form "*ellōrum varumāru kēṭṭukkoḷkirēn*" (=I request all to come) that is because the Tamilians prefer to give a personal touch to such situations as this. Thus the abhorrence, if any, for *paḍu* arises not at all from any desire of the Tamilian to resist its entry as a passive element proper, but from the

67. *Comp. Grammar*, p. 467.

68. *Vide Appendix III.*

genius of the Tamil language which does not permit *impersonal* forms themselves, *whether passive or active*.

In the light of this inquiry, Caldwell's statements that the Tamil language is destitute of a passive voice properly so-called, that there is no passive particle in Tamil, that paḍu is an auxiliary verb forming part of a phrase, that paḍu is more idiomatic when combined with a noun rather than with an infinitive, that it expresses continuous action rather than passivity, that idiomatic speakers prefer other modes of forming the passive than by means of paḍu, that the Tamil language resists efforts to bring paḍu into general use, that it is foreigners that try to make a large use of it and that its use is barbarous to the Tamilian ear do all require to be revised and rewritten.

தொல்காப்பிய ஆராய்ச்சி

உள்ளுறை

உள்ளுறை என்பது புதை பொருள். சொற்களின் சொம்பொருளன்றிக் கூற்றினகத் தடங்கின்று உய்த்துணரத் தோன்றும் மறைபொருளை உள்ளுறை என்பர் தொல்லுநல் இயற்றமிழ்ப் புலவர். உள்ளுறை என்பது வெளிப்படையின்றிக் கூற்றினுள்ளே குறிப்பாய் உறைவது (அல்லது தோன்ற நிற்பது) எனப் பொருள்படும். எனவே, கூறிய சொற்பொருளின் புறத்தே குறிப்பிற் கொள்ளுமாறு கூற்றினுள்ளே எஞ்சி நிற்கும் பிறிதொரு கருத்தே உள்ளுறை அல்லது எச்சம் எனப்படும். இவ்வாறு செய்யுளில் புலவர் தங்கருத்தைப் பட்டாங்குக்குக் கூறுவது தவிர, மறை பொருளாகத் துறைபல புனைந்து உய்த்துணர வைக்கு முறைகளைத் தொகுத்து, அவை தம்மியல்பால் இருதிற்படுமெனவும், கூறும் புலவர் குறிக்கோள் கொண்டு ஐந்து வகைப்படுமெனவும் தொல்காப்பியர் விளக்கியுள்ளார்.

I. செய்யுளுறுப்பாம் எச்சம் என்னும் உள்ளுறை தம்மியல்பால் இருவகையாமாறு :—

(1) சொற்பொருளின் வேறாய்க் குறிக்கும் மறை பொருளை, கூறும் சொற்றுணைகொண்டே, துனித்தாய்வேர் உய்த்துணரத் தோற்றுவிக்கும் கூற்றைச் “சொல்லொடுமுடிவு கொளியற்கை புல்லிய கிளவி” எனவும், (2) புலவன் நோக்குணர்த்தக் கூற்றுச்சொல் துணையாகாமல், கூறும் முறை ஒலி முதலிய பிறவற்றால் அதனை உய்த்துணர வைக்கும் கூற்றை “குறிப்பொடு முடிவு கொளியற்கை புல்லிய கிளவி” எனவும் தொல்காப்பியர் செய்யுளியலில் விளக்கினார்.

“சொல்லொடும் குறிப்பொடும் முடிவு கொளியற்கை

புல்லிய கிளவி எச்சமாகும்.”

(செய்யுளியல் சூ. 198)

என்பது இதுபற்றி அவர் கூறும் சூத்திரம்.

இச் சூத்திரத்திற்கு, “பொருள்முடிக்க வேண்டப்படும் பிறிதொரு சொல் எஞ்சி வருவது சொல்லெச்சம்” எனவும், ‘பிறிதொரு சொல் வேண்டாமல் கூற்றுத் தானே நின்று சொற்பொருளன்றிப் பிறிதொரு பொருளில் முடிவது குறிப்பெச்சம்’ எனவும் ‘எச்சம் இருவகைத்தாம்’ எனப் பொருள் கூறுவர் பழைய உரைகாரர். அவ் வெச்சங்கள் சொல்லளவில் அமைவனவாய் சொல்லதிகார எச்சவியலில் விளக்கப்பட்டுள்ளன. இங்குச் செய்யுளில் கூறப்படும் இவ்வெச்சங்கள் குறித்த பொருளை முடிய நாட்டும் யாப்பின் வழித்தாய் செய்யுளுறுப்பாம் ஓர் கூற்றின் பார்ப்பும். [கூற்றெனினும், கிளவி யெனினும் ஒக்கும்.] இவை சொல்லளவு குறியாமல் கூறியசொற்களின் உள்ளுறையாம் பொருளெச்சத்தையே குறித்துவரும். சொல்லும் குறிப்புமாய் சொல்லதிகார எச்சங்கள் சொல்லளவில் அமைந்து, “பிரிநில முதல் பத்து வகைப்படும். செய்யுளுறுப்பாம் உள்ளுறைப் பொருளெச்சங்கள், சொல்லோடு முடிவு கொளியற்கைய (1) குறிப்பொடு முடிவு கொளியற்கைய (2) என்றிருவகைத்தாம். சொல்லெச்சங்களை, அவைதாம் தத்தம் குறிப்பின் எச்சம் சுட்டும்’ என முன் எச்சவியலிற் கூறிய

தற்கு மாறாக, இங்குக் குறிப்புப் பொருளெச்சங்களைச் “சொல்லொடும், குறிப் பொடும் முடிவுகொளியற்கைய” எனவும், “எழுத்தொடும் சொல்லொடும் புணரா தாகிப் பொருட்புறத்துவே” எனவும் செய்யுளியலில் தொல்காப்பியரே கூறுதலா னும், இய்வீரெச்ச வகைகளும் வெவ்வேறின மென்பதே அவர் கருத்தென்பது தெற்றென விளங்கும். இவற்றுள் சொல்லளவிற்கு முன்னவை பத்தும் சொல் லதிகார எச்சவியலில் “பிரிநிலை வினை” என்னும் 34-வது சூத்திர முதல் “சொல் லெனச்சம்” என்னும் 45-வது சூத்திர மீறாகப் பல சூத்திரங்களால் தெளிக்கப் பெற் றிருப்பதாலும், அவற்றுள் சொற் குறிப்பெச்சம் “அவை தாம் தத்தம் குறிப்பின் எச்ச மாகும்” எனும் 44-ஆம் சூத்திரத்திலும், சொல்லெச்சம் “சொல்லெனெச்சம், முன் னும் பின்னும் சொல்லள வல்லது எஞ்சதலிலவே” எனும் 45-ம் சூத்திரத்திலும் தனித்தனியே விளக்கப்பட்டிருப்பதாலும், சொல்லிலக்கணத்தின்பாற்பட்ட அவ் வெச்சங்கள் இவ்வாறு அமைவுபட ஆண்டுச் சொல்லதிகார எச்சவியலில் கூறப்பெற்ற வற்றையே ஈண்டுப் பொருளதிகாரச் செய்யுளியலில் மீண்டும் கூறும் குற்ற முடையர் தொல்காப்பியர் என்பது பொருந்தாமையாலும், இச் செய்யுளியற் சூத்திரத்திற்கு பழைய உரைகாரர் கூறுவது பொருளன்மை அறிக.

II. இனிச் செய்யுளை ஆக்கும் புலவனின் நோக்கங்கொண்டு உள்ளுறை ஐந்து வகைப்படும் என்பதைத் தொல்காப்பியர் “உடனுறை, உவமம், சுட்டு, நகை, சிறப்பெனக் கெடலரு மரபின் உள்ளுறை ஐந்தே” எனும் பொருளியல் 46-ஆம் சூத்திரத்தால் விளக்கினார்.

(i) இவற்றுள் உடனுறை என்பது இறைச்சியாகும். ஒரு கூற்றில் வரும் சொற்களின் வெளிப்படைய்பொருளொடு அதனின் வேறாய் அக்கூற்றில் உள்ளுறைத் திறுவது “இறைச்சி” அல்லது “உடனுறை” எனப்படும். இறுதல், இறைச்சி என்பன ‘தங்குதல்’ அல்லது ‘அடங்கி அமைவது’ எனும் பொருள் தரும். எனவே, ஒரு கூற்றில் அதன் மொழிப்பொருளின் புறத்தே “திறத்தியல் மருங்கிற்றெரியு மோர்க்கே” உய்த்துணரப் புலனும் பொருளை இறைச்சி எனவும், உடனுறை எனவும் வழங்குவர் பழம் புலவர். அது, “இறைச்சி தானே பொருட் புறத்துவே” (சூ. 33). ‘இறைச்சியிற் பிறக்கும் பொருளுமாருளவே’ (சூ. 34) “அன்புறு தகுந”... (சூ. 35) எனும் பொருளியற் சூத்திரங்களால் கூறப்படும்.

(ii) உள்ளுறை உவமமாகவது, ஒப்பும் பொருளும் ஒருங்கு புலப்பட வரும் எனே உவமம் அல்லது செவ்வொப்பணி போலாது, கூறப்படும் கருப்பொருட் செய்தியி னகத்தடங்கி, அச்செய்தியே ஒப்பாய், அது விளக்கும் பொருள் கூறக் குறிப்பாய், உய்த்துணர்வோரால் மட்டும் அறிய நிற்பது.

உள்ளுறை உவமம், அகத்தினை இயலில்,

“உள்ளுறை உவமம்”—49

“உள்ளுறை தெய்வம்”—50

“உள்ளுறுத்தித்தோடு”—51

எனும் மூன்று சூத்திரங்களால் தெளிக்கப்பட்டது.

(iii) சுட்டு என்பது ஒரு கூற்றின் வெளிப்படையான சொற்பொருளன்றி அக் கூற்றின் உள்ளுறையாகப் பிறிதொன்றைக் குறிப்பால் உணர்த்துவதாகும்

கருதிய பொருளைக் கூற்றின் சொற்றுணைகொண்டே சுட்டுவதும், சொற்பொருளின் புறத்தே குறிப்பால் உணரச் சுட்டுவதும் எனச் சுட்டு இருவகைத்தாம். இவை முறையே ‘சொல்லோடு முடிவு கொளியற்கை புல்லிய கிளவி’, (1) குறிப்பொடு முடிவு கொளியற்கை புல்லிய கிளவி, (2) எனக் கூறப்பட்டன.

(1) இவற்றுள் முன்னது கூற்றின் சொற்றுணைகொண்டே செய்யுளில் புலவன் உட்குறிப்பை உணர்த்துவதாகும்.

“ஒப்பொடு புணர்ந்த உவமத்தானும், தோன்றுவது கிளந்த துணிவினும்,” என்றிருவகைத்தாம் பிசி நிலைகளும் “சொல்லொடு முடிவு கொளியற்கையவாம் சுட்டி லடங்கும். ‘பிறை கெளவி மலை நடக்கும்’ என்னும் ஒப்பொடு புணர்ந்த உவமம், அக் கூற்றின் சொற்றுணையானே யானையைச் சுட்டுவதாயிற்று.

இனி, “நீராடான் பார்ப்பான் ; நிறஞ்செய்யான்
நீராடின் ஊராடும் நீரிற் காக்கை.”

எனும் “கூறுவோன் உள்ளத்திற் தோன்றுவது கிளந்த துணிவுறு” கூற்றும் அதன் சொல்லாற்றலாலேயே நெருப்பைக் குறிப்பதாயிற்று. இவ்வாறு இவ்விருகிறப் பிசினிலை வகையும் சொல்லொடு முடிவு கொளியற்கை புல்லிய கிளவியாதல் கண் கூடு. உற்று நோக்கின், உள்ளுறை உவமமும் எச்சம் அல்லது சொல்லொடு முடிவு கொளியற்கை புல்லிய உள்ளுறையேயாம்.

(2) இனி, “எழுத்தொடும் சொல்லொடும் புணராதாகிப் பொருட் புறத்ததுவே குறிப்பு மொழியாகும்” (செய். சூ. 172) என விளக்கப் பெற்றவை “குறிப்பொடு முடிவு கொளியற்கை புல்லிய” சுட்டு வகையாகும். ‘கற்கறிக்க நன்கட்டாய்’ என்பது போல்வன இவ்வகைச் சுட்டாகும். உறந்தையைப் ‘பறவாக் கோழி’ என்பதும் சேரர் பேரூரைப் ‘பூவா வஞ்சி’ என்பதும் போல்வனவும் இதன்பாற் படும். இவையே போல் இறைச்சி வகையும் “குறிப்பொடு முடிவு கொளியற்கை புல்லிய” உள்ளுறையே, யாகும்.

(iv) ‘நகை’ என்பது பழிசரக்கு மொழிகரந்து, வசையொடு புணர்ந்து வரும் அங்கதச் செய்யுளும், (செய். சூ. 122) அதுபோல்வன பிறவுமாகும். இது செய்யுளியலில் விளக்கப்பட்டுள்ளது.

(v) சிறப்பென்பது, “புகழொடும் பொருளொடும் புணர்ந்தன்றாகி”, வெளிப்பட விரியாது (124), கூற்றானந்திக் குறிப்பாய் உணர்த்தும், ‘நசையொடு புணர்ந்த அங்கதச்’ செய்யுளும், அன்ன பிறவுமாகும். இதுவும் செய்யுளியலில் “நசையொடும் புணர்ந்தன்றாயின், அங்கதச் செய்யுள் என்மனார் புலவர்” (செய். சூ. 12) “புகழொடும் பொருளொடும் புணர்ந்தன்றாயிற் செவியுறைச் செய்யுள் என்மனார் புலவர்” (செய். சூ. 124) எனும் சூத்திரங்களால் தெளிக்கப் பெற்றது.

III. இனி, உள்ளுறை உவமம், இறைச்சி, இவை தம்முள் அறியக்கிடக்கும் வேறு பாடுகளும் (i), இவற்றிற்கும் சுட்டு என்னும் உள்ளுறைக்குமுள்ள ஒற்றுமை வேற்றுமைகளும் (ii), பற்றிப் பல்காலும் பலவாறு மயக்கம் நேருகின்றது. அதனால் அவற்றின் இயல்பையும் சிறிதாராய்ந்து தெளிய முயல்வது ஈண்டு வேண்டப்படுவதேயாம். ஆகவே, இவற்றினியல் விளக்கும் தொல்காப்பியச் சூத்திரங்களால் தேறத் தகுவன வற்றைத் தேர்ந்து தெளிதல் இன்றியமையாதது.

III. (i) (1) உள்ளுறை உவமத்தை அகத்திணை இயலில் மூன்று சூத்திரங்களால் விளக்குவர். “உள்ளுறை உவமம், ஏனை உவமமெனத், தள்ளாதாகும் திணையுணர்வகையே” (அகத். சூ. 49).

குறிப்பால் வரும் உள்ளுறை உவமம், செவ்வொப்பணிபோலாது, காதலொழுக்கம் உணர்த்துதல் தவிராது, என இச் சூத்திரத்திற்குறி, இவ் வீருவமங்களுள் உள்ளுறை உவமத்தின் இயல்பை அடுத்த சூத்திரத்தாம் கூறுவர்.

(2) “உள்ளுறை தெய்வம் ஒழிந்ததை நிலனெனக் கொள்ளும் என்ப குறியறிந் தோரே.” (அகத்திணை சூ. 50)

என்பது அச் சூத்திரமாகும். இதனால் தெய்வம் தவிரப் பிற கருப்பொருள்களுள் ஒன்றைக் களஞ்சுக்கொண்டு உள்ளுறை உவமம் வரும் என்பது பெறப்படுகின்றது. கூறப்படும் கருப் பொருட் செய்தியே ஒப்பாய்க், கூறக் கருதிய பொருள் அவ் வொப்பின் உள்ளுறையாய், புலனன் குணர்வோர்க்கு உய்த்துணரத் தோன்றும் கூறுக்குறிப்பாய்க் கருப்பொருளில் மறைந்து தோன்றுவதே, உள்ளுறை உவமத்தின் இயலாதலின் கருப்பொருட் டொடர்பு இதற்கு இன்றியமையாததாகும்.

(3) “உள்ளுறுத்திதனோடு ஒத்துப் பொருள்முடிகென உள்ளுறு த்திருவதை உள்ளுறை உவமம்.” (அகத்திணை சூ. 51)

என்பது இவ் வுவமம் பற்றிய மூன்றாம் சூத்திரம்.

உள்ளுறை உவமத்துக்குக் கருப்பொருட்சார்பு இன்றியமையாததென மூன் சூத்திரத்திற்கு கூறி, பின் கூறப்படும் கருப்பொருட்செய்தியே வெளிப்படு பொருளாய் நிற்க, அதனகத்தடங்கி அச்செய்தியையே ஒப்பாக்கி, அதை ஒத்துக் கூறக் கருதும் பொருள் குறிப்பால் உணர நிற்பதே உள்ளுறை உவமம் என்பது இதில் விளக்கப் பட்டது.

எனவே, இச் சூத்திரங்களால் உள்ளுறை உவமம், (1) கருப் பொருட் செய்தியுள் கூறுக்குறிப்பாய் அடங்கி நிற்பதும், (2) அக் கருப்பொருட் செய்தியே ஒப்பாவதும், (3) அவ்வொப்புக் கேற்ப அதை உய்த்துணர்வோர்க்குக் கருதிய பொருள் புலப்படுமாறு அமைவதும், இவ் வுவம உள்ளுறையின் இயலெனத் தெளிக்கப்பட்டது. சுருங்கக் கூறின், உள்ளுறை உவமம் (1) ஒப்பு அல்லது உவமத்தின் ஒருவகை என்பதும், (2) அது தெய்வம் தவிர யாதானும் ஒரு கருப்பொருளைப் பற்றியே வருமென்பதும், (3) அமைவுபடக் கூறப்பட்ட கருப்பொருட் செய்தியினடங்கி அதுவே ஒப்பாக அவ் வொப்புக்கேற்ற பிறிதொரு பொருளாய்க் குறிப்பால் உணரத் தோன்றும் என்பதும், இம் மூன்று சூத்திரங்களின் கருத்தாகக் காண்கின்றோம்.

“இருஞ்சாயன்ன செருந்தியொடு வேழம்
கரும்பின் அலமரும் கழனி ஊரன்.”

(ஐங். 18)

‘செருந்திப் பூவொடு குறுக்காந்தட்டை கரும்புபோல அலமரு மூரன்’—என்றதனால் ‘தன் பாங்கியரொடு பரத்தையர் குலமகளிர் ஒப்பச் செம்மாக்க ஒழுகும் தலைவன்’ என்பது குறித்தலால், இது கருப்பொருளை நிலனாகக் கொண்டுவந்த உள்ளுறை உவமமாயிற்று.

III. (i) (2) இனி, இறைச்சியாவது ஒரு கூற்றின் புறத்தே அதன் மொழிப் பொருளின் வேறாய் அணித்து நோக்குவார்க்கு மட்டும் குறிப்பால் அறியத் தோன்றும்

மறைபொருளாம். இதனை ‘வியங்கியம்’ எனவும், ‘தொந்யார்த்தம்’ எனவும் கூறுவர் வடநூலார். இவ் விதைச்சியியல் (அ) “இறைச்சிதானே பொருட்புறத்ததுவே” எனும் பொருளியற் சூத்திரத்தால் பெறப்படுகின்றது. இதில் கூறப்பட்ட ‘பொருள்’ என்பது கூற்றின் சொற்பொருளையே குறிக்கும். “எழுத்தொடும் சொல்லொடும் புணராதாகிப்—பொருட் புறத்ததுவே குறிப்பு மொழியாகும்” என்பதனாலும் ஆசிரியரின் இக்கருத்து வலியுறுதல் காண்கலாம். இது கருப் பொருளைச் சுட்டுமென யாண்டும் தொல்காப்பியர் கூற்றானும் குறிப்பானும் உணர்த்தாமையின், அஃதவர்கருத்தன்மை அறிக. “இறைச்சிதானே உரிப்புறத்ததுவே” எனும் பாடம் ஏடு பெயர்த் தெழுதுவோர் பிறழக் கொண்டதாகத் தோற்றுகிறது. உரிப்பொருட்சிறப்பை விளக்குங் கருவிகளுள் அகப்பகுதிச் செய்யுளில் உள்ளுறை உவமம்போலவே பெருவழக்காய் ஆளப்படுவது இறைச்சி. இறைச்சியால் உணர்த்தப்படுவது உரிப்பொருளே யாகும். அதனால் உரியையே சிறப்பாய்க் குறிக்கும் இறைச்சியை ‘உரிப்புறத்தது’ எனக் கூறுவது அதனியலுக்கு முரணாவதால், அப்பாடம் பொருந்தாமை அறிக.

இச் சூத்திரத்தின் நேரிய பாடங்கொண்ட நச்சினார்க்கினியர், ‘உவமம் சுட்டாக் கருப் பொருளால் அதன் புறத்தே பிறிதொரு பொருளைக் குறிப்பது இறைச்சி’ என இச் சூத்திரத்திற்குப் பொருள் கூறுவர். கருப்பொருளின் சார்பு உள்ளுறை உவமத்துக்குப்போல இறைச்சிக்கு வேண்டப்படுவதான குறிப்பே இறைச்சிபற்றிய தொல்காப்பியச் சூத்திரங்கள் ஒன்றிலேனுமில்லாதது கருதற்பாலது. கருப்பொருட் சார்பு இறைச்சிக்கும் வேண்டப்படுவதாக இவர் கொண்டதனாலேயே, கருப் பொருளையே பற்றுக்கோடாய்க் கொண்டுவரும் உள்ளுறை உவமத்துக்கும், அது வேண்டப்படாத இறைச்சிக்கும் வேறுபாடு காணாமல் மயங்க நேர்ந்தது.

(ஆ) “இறைச்சியிற் பிறக்கும் பொருளுமாருளவே
திறத்தியல் மருங்கில் தெரியுமோர்க்கே.” (பொருளியல் சூ. 34)

எனும் பொருளியற் சூத்திரத்தையும், இறைச்சியினியல்பே கூறுவதாகக் கொண்டு வேறு பொருள் கூறுவர் நச்சினார்க்கினியர். இவர், இறைச்சி கருப்பொருளைச் சார்ந்தே வருமெனக் கருதினாராதலின், இச் சூத்திரம் கருப்பொருட் டொடர் புடைய உள்ளுறை உவமத்தினின்றும் இறைச்சியை வேறுபடுத்திக் கூறவந்தது போலக் கொண்டு இதற்கும் பொருந்தாப் பொருள் கூறுவாராயினர். அது சூத்திரச் சொற்போக்குக்கும், நூல் நோக்குக்கும் ஒவ்வாது. “முன்னேச் சூத்திரத்திற் கூறியாங்கு, ஒரு கூற்றில் அதன் சொற்பொருளின் வேறாய் இறைச்சி எனும் உள்ளுறை அல்லது மறைபொருள் தோன்றுவதும் தவிர, அவ்விதைச்சி அல்லது மறை பொருளினின்றும் நுணுகி ஆராயும் திறனுடையார்க்குப் புலனாகும் மற்றொரு மறைபொருட் குறிப்புத் தோன்றுவதும் உண்டு,” என்பதே இச்சூத்திரத்திற்குரிய நேரிய பொருளாகும். இதற்கு இளம்பூரணர் தரும் உரையும் இக்கருத்தையே வலியுறுத்தும். “இறைச்சிப்பொருள் வயிற் றேன்றும் (பிரிதுமோர்) பொருளும் உள, பொருட்டிறத்தியலும் பக்கத் தாராய்வார்க்கு” என்பது இதற்கு அவர் கூறும் உரையாகும். எனவே, (1) ஒரு கூற்றின் சொற்பொருளின் வேறாய், அதன் புறத்தே குறிப்பிற் றேன்றும் பிறிதொரு பொருளே உடனுறை அல்லது இறைச்சி எனப்படும் என்பதும், (2) அவ்விதைச்சியினின்றும் உய்த்துணர்வோர் அறியக் கிடக்கும் உட்கருத்து இன்னும் ஒன்றாவதுமுண்டு என்பதும், முறையே இவ்விரு பொருளியற் சூத்திரங்களானும் விளக்கப்படும் பொருள்களாகும்.

“அம்மவாழி, தோழி! இன்றவர்
வாராராயினோ நன்றே. சாரற்
சிறுதினை விளைந்து வியன்க ணிரும்புனத்து
இரவரி வாரிற் றெண்டகச் சிறுபறை
பானுள் யாமத்தும் கறங்கும்,
யாமங் காவல் ரவியா மாறே.”

(குறந். 375)

இதில், இரவுக் குறிபெற்று வரையாது வந்தொழுகும் தலைவன் சிறைப்புறத் தானாக, அவன் கேட்கத் தலைவிக்குக் கூறுவாள்போலத் தோழி, ‘யாமங் காவலர்’
• அவியாமாறு தினைக்கதிர் அரிவோரின் பறை யாமத்தும் கறங்குதலால் இரவு வரு தல் நன்றன்மேன அவனுக்கறிவுறுத்துவது இச்செய்யுட் கூற்றின் சொற்பொரு ளாகும்.

இனி, “சிறு தினை விளைந்து முதிர்ந்ததால் அதனை அரியப் பகல் போதாமல் இரவுமரிவாரின் பறை யாமத்தும் கறங்கு, அதனால் காவலர் அவியார் (அதாவது உறங் கார்) எனக்கூறி, அதனால் பகலுமவன் வருதல் ஒல்லாதெனவும், இவ்வாறு தினையரிந்து முடிந்ததும் தலைவி புனங்காவலொழிந்து இற்செறிக்கப்படுவாளாகவே “இனி நீ இராப்பகலிருபோதும் வாரற்க” எனவும் அறிவிக்கும் குறிப்பு இக்கூற்றின் சொற் புறத்தே தோன்றும் இறைச்சியாகும்.

இதனால், “இவ்வாறு கனவொழுக்கம் தடைப்படும்; இனி நீ இவணலம் நுகர விரும்புவையேல் தாழாது விரைந்து வரைந்தெய்துக” என வரைவு கடாவுங் குறிப்பு இக்கூற்றின் இறைச்சியில் உய்த்துணரக் கிடக்கும் பிறிதொரு பொருளாம் உட்கருத் தாகும்.

III. (i) (3) இறைச்சி, உள்ளுறை உவமம், இவற்றுள் வேறுபாடுகள் :—

(1) கருப்பொருட் சார்பே வேண்டாமல், சொற்களின் செம்பொருளின் புறத்தே ஒரு கூற்றில் புலன் நன்குணரும் புலவர்க்குக் குறிப்பாற்றோன்ற செய்யுளில் புலவன் கருதியமைக்கும் மறைபொருளே இறைச்சியாகும்.

(2) கருப் பொருட் சார்பு வேண்டாதாகவே, இறைச்சிக்கு எவ்வகை ஒப்பு அல்லது உவமத் தொடர்பும் இன்றாகும். இது இவற்றிடைபுள்ள மற்றொரு வேற்றுமை என்னலாம்.

(3) இன்னும் ஒரு வேறுபாடும் இவற்றிடைக் காணலாம். உள்ளுறை உவமம், கூறிய கருப்பொருட் செய்தியையே ஒப்பு அல்லது உவமையாகக்கொண்டு, தான் அதன் வெளிப்படக் கூறப்படா உபமேயமாகக் குறிப்பிற் புலப்படுவதாகலான், உள்ளுறை உவமம் கருப்பொருட் செய்தி கூறும் “சொல்லொடு முடிவு கொளியற்கைப் புல்லிய” கிளவியாகும். இறைச்சியோ, கூற்றின் சொற்பொருளின் வேறாய், அதன் புறத்தே தோன்றாமாதலின், அது “குறிப்பொடு முடிவு கொளியற்கை புல்லிய” கிளவி யாகும். (கிளவி என்னும், கூற்றென்னும் ஒக்கும் என்பது முன்னும் விளக்கப் பட்டது.)

“வார்கோட்டு வயத்தகர் வாராது மாறினும்
குருமயிர்ப் புருவை ஆசையின் அல்கும்
மாஅல் அருவித் தண்பெருஞ் சிலம்ப!

நீயிவண் வநுஉங் காலை

மேவரு மாதோ இவணலனே தெய்யோ.”

(ஐங். 238)

இச் செய்யுளில் முதன் மூன்றடியும் உள்ளுறை உவமம்; பின்னிரண்டும் இறைச்சி. முன் மூன்றடிகளில் நீண்ட கொம்புடைய வீறுகொள் பொருதகரான யாட்டுக்கடா தன்னிலவிரும்பி வாராமல் வேறுபட்டாலும், மென்மயிர்ப் பெட்டையாடு ‘கடாவரும்’ என்னும் நசையால் தங்கும், கரிய நீரருவி குளிர்விக்கும், பெருமலை யுடையோனே” எனக் கூறப்பட்டது. இதனால், “தலைவன் தலைவிபால் வாராமல் தவறிழைக்கும் தறுகண்மையன் ஆயினன் எனினும், தன் மலையருவிபோல் தட்ப முடையனாகவே தலைவி இன்னும் தன்னைத் தலையளிக்க வருவனென நம்பி உயிர்வாழா நின்றான்” எனக் குறிப்பாற் றேன்றும் உள்ளுறை உவமம், இச்செய்யுட் கூற்றினுள் ளடங்கியதாய், அக்கூற்றின் செய்தியோடொத்துப் பொருள் முடிவதாயிற்று. எனவே, இது உள்ளுறை உவமமாதல் காண்க.

இதன் பின்னிரண்டடியில், தலைவன் வரையா தொழுகும் வன்கண்மையைச் சுட்டி, விரைவில் தலைவியை அவன் வரையுமாறு தூண்டவேண்டும் தோழி “நீ வருங் கால் தலைவி உன்னைக் காணும் மகிழ்ச்சியினால் இழந்த அவள் பொலிவு உன்னுடன் வரும்” எனக்கூறி, “உன்பொருட்டே உயிர்வாழும் தலைவிபால் வந்து நீ காணுவது அவள் பொலிவொன்றே; நீ வாராமையால் இவள் நலனழிந்து மெலிவது நீ அறி யாய்; அவள் நலன் அழியாமற் பேண விரும்புவையேல், விரைவில் இவளை வரைவா யாக” எனக் குறிக்கின்றாள். இக்கருத்து, அத்தோழி கூறிய சொற்பொருளின் வேறாய், குறிப்பாகத் தோன்றுதலால், இஃது இறைச்சியாயிற்று.

இதில் கருப் பொருட் சார்பு ஒன்றுமின்மையும் கண்கூடு.

III. (i) (4) இவ்வாறு தம்முட் பல வேறுபாடுடைய வேனும், இவற்றிடை யுள்ள சில ஒற்றுமைகளும் கருதற்குரியவாம்.

(1) இவ்விரண்டும் உள்ளுறை வகைகளாதல் ஒன்று.

(2) இன்னும் இவை இரண்டும் அகப்பகுதியில் பெருவழக்காய் வழங்குவரும் செய்யுளுறுப்புக்களாம்.

III. (ii) (1) இனி, “எழுத்தொடும், சொல்லொடும் புணராதாகிப் பொருட் புறத் ததுவே குறிப்பு மொழி என்ப” என விளக்கப்பெற்ற “சுட்டு” என்னும் உள்ளுறையும் இருவகைத்தாம். (1) ஒன்று, உள்ளுறை உவமம்போல, ஒப்பொடு புணர்ந்த உவமத்தாய் வரும் பிசிபோல்வன “சொல்லொடு முடிவு கொளியற்கை புல்லிய கிளவி” மேற்றும். (2) மற்றொன்று, இறைச்சிபோலத் “தோன்றுவது கிளந்த துணிவினால்வரும் பிசி” போல்வனவும், “கூற்றிடை வைத்த குறிப்பாம்” அங்கதம் போல் வனவும், “குறிப்பொடு முடிவு கொளியற்கை புலிய கிளவி” மேற்றும்.

III. (ii) (2) சுட்டுக்கும், இறைச்சி உள்ளுறை உவமங்கட்குமுள்ள வேற்றுமை யாதெனின், (அ) உள்ளுறை உவமமும் இறைச்சியும் எழுநிலத் தெழுந்த செய்யுள் வகையில் பெருவழக்காய் அடிவரை கொள்ளும் பாட்டிற் பயிவது. குறிப்பு மொழி யாம் சுட்டு அவ்வாறன்றி உரை, பிசி, அங்கதம் முதலியவற்றிலும் வருவதாகும்.

(ஆ) இறைச்சியும் உள்ளுறை உவமமும் புறத்துறையில் விலக்கில்லை எனினும், அகத்துறைகளுக்கே சிறப்புரிமை கொண்டு வழங்கும். சுட்டு புறத்தும் அகத்தும் ஓராங்கு ஒத்தியலும்.

Bhartrhari A Pre-śaṅkara Advaitin

By

V. A. RAMASWAMI SASTRI,
(Annamalai University).

It was maintained¹ that Bhartrhari, the author of the *Vākyapadīya*, was not a Buddhist. It is proposed in this paper to show that he was one of the earliest *Pre-Śaṅkara* exponents of the doctrines of the Advaita system in Indian Philosophy.

The *Vākyapadīya*, though chiefly a treatise on sanskrit grammar, contains explanations of many genuine philosophical questions. What is the ultimate reality is the foremost question in philosophy that has puzzled and is puzzling still the mighty intellects of the world ; and the *Brahmakāṇḍa* of the *Vākyapadīya*, as the title suggests, deals with the *Śabdabrahman* as the ultimate reality. Bhartrhari refers to the ultimate reality by terms like *śabdabrahman* and *śabdatattva*. He describes it as devoid of beginning and end and as the origination of the *śabdaprapaṅca* and *arthaprapaṅca*, both being the manifestation of the Supreme Being when it assumes the power of *Kālaśakti*, with the result that the *śabda-brahman* is also known as the *vivartopādāna* of this phenomenal word—

“ अनादिनिधनं ब्रह्म शब्दतत्त्वं यदक्षरम् ।

विवर्ततेऽर्थभावेन प्रक्रिया जगतो यतः ॥ ”

(*Vākyapadīya*, kāṇḍa 1, verse 1)

The term *vivarta* is explained by Śāstrakāras in many ways.² Bhartrhari's explanation is contained in the following passage:—

“ एकस्य तत्त्वादप्रच्युतस्य भेदानुकारेणासत्यविभक्तान्यरूपोपग्राहिता विवर्तः ।

स्वप्नविषयप्रतिभासवत् ।

(*Ibid-Tīkā* on Verse 1, Cārudeva Sastri's edition p. 5).

The appearance which is called *vivarta*, has no reality other than that of its substratum, which is no doubt real. This is illustrated by the

1. Vide the writer's paper *Bhartrhari—a Buddha?* submitted to the eighth session of the All-India Oriental Conference, Mysore, 1935.

2. (1) अतात्त्विकान्यथाभासो विवर्तः ।

(2) स्वोपादानसत्तातिरिक्तसत्ताशून्यो विवर्तः ।

popular instance सप्तविषय—the objects of a dream. The objects of a dream are called *vivarta* of *caitanya* in that they have no reality separate from that of their substratum (*caitanya*), which has real existence. Similarly, the *nāmarūpaprapañca* is the *vivarta* of *śabdabrahman*, so much so, that the universe in its twofold form of *nāman* and *rūpa* has no reality other than that of its cause—*śabdabrahman*.

“ तत एव हि शब्दाख्यादुपसंहृतक्रमाद्ब्रह्मणः सर्वविकारप्रत्यस्तमये संवर्तदिना-
कृतात्पूर्वं विकारग्रन्थिरूपत्वेनाव्यपदेश्याज्जगदाख्या विकाराः प्रक्रियन्ते । ”

(*Ibid.*, Tīkā, C.D.S's Ed. p. 6).

The *śabdabrahman* is devoid of any property, when all seeming changes vanish ; and before the manifestation process comes into effect, it is not at all to be spoken of in terms of phenomenal objects, which are unreal. The *Bhrahmavivartatva* of this universe is one of the *fundamental doctrines* enunciated by all advaitins including Bhartṛhari and Śaṅkarācārya in order to establish their advaitic conception of ultimate reality.

This *vivartavāda* is viewed as better and more satisfactory solution of the question of world-creation than the two other well-known *vādas*—*pariṇāma-vāda* and *ārambha-vāda*. The advocates of these *vādas* admit of the reality of the phenomenal world. The *ārambhavādins* explain the creation of the *kāryaprapañca* out of eternal atoms which, on the will of God, begin to act, produce *dvyaṇukas*, which in their turn produce *tryaṇukas* (triads) and so on. They accept the view that the *Kārya* is a new entity when it is produced by its causes and that the very production implies its previous non-existence. It is in this sense that they are *asatkāryavādins* who accept separate existence of the effect from its cause. The *pariṇāma-vādins* are opposed to the *ārambhavādins* in that they are *satkāryavādins*. By *satkāryavāda* they mean that the *kārya* is the *kāraṇa* itself in a new garb and that its *utpatti* is nothing but *pariṇāma*—transformation of the cause into the effect. Hence there is no non-existence of the *kārya* even before it is made visible to us. Yet they differentiate *kārya* from its *kāraṇa* by the different properties they possess. Thus they establish separate existence of the *kārya* from that of its cause. So in this point the *pariṇāmavādins* agree with the *ārambhavādins* though the former differ fundamentally from the latter in their conception of *kāryotpatti* from *kāraṇa*, as noted above.

The *vivartavādins* are no doubt *satkāryavādins*. The advaitins among them attribute to the *vyāvahārika prapañca* a relative *satyatva*, which is superior to the *prātibhāsika satyatva* of the silver in nacre

(śūktirūpya). Since they have accepted one entity only as the real ultimate being, the phenomenal world is described by them as a seeming manifestation of that ultimate being, without any reality outside that of its *upādāna*. They are also *pariṇāma-vādins* in the sense that the phenomenal world is *avidyā-pariṇāma*—the transformation of *avidyā*, so much so, that the reality of the universe is only so long as *avidyā* exists or till the realisation of the Brahman.

The conception of one ultimate reality, be it *śabdabrahman*, *sattā-brahman*, *ātma-brahman* or *viññāna-brahman*, led all the exponents of advaita philosophy to conceive in it a power called *māyā*, *ajñāna*, *avidyā* or *kālaśakti*, which is unique in its nature and is capable of creating what we call the phenomenal world—the *bāhyaprapaṇca*. Bhartṛhari calls it by the term *kālaśakti* and *avidyā*,³ the chief function of which is to conceal the ultimate truth and present to us things unreal and different in form and essence. He is particular in saying that the *kālaśakti* is *aniruktā* or *anirvacanīyā* which cannot be said as identical with or different from the *śabdabrahman*, but is capable of presenting its own substratum in different forms of *bhoktr* (enjoyer), *bhoktavya* (enjoyable object) and *bhoga* (enjoyment). Here, it may be observed that the way in which Bhartṛhari equates *māyā* with *kālaśakti* would lead one to surmise that phenomenal existence (व्यावहारिकसत्ता) is to be understood as nothing more than time-relation (कालसम्बन्ध).

“ एकस्य सर्वबीजस्य यस्य चेयमनेकधा ।

भोक्तृभोक्तव्यरूपेण भोगरूपेण च स्थितिः ॥

एकस्य हि ब्रह्मणः तत्त्वान्यत्त्वाभ्यां सत्त्वान्यत्त्वाभ्यां चानिरुक्ताविरोधि शक्यु-
पग्राह्यस्यासत्त्वरूपप्रतिभागस्य स्वप्नविज्ञानपुरुषवदबहिस्तत्त्वाः परस्परविलक्षणाः भोक्तृ-
भोक्तव्यभोगग्रन्थयो विवर्तन्ते । तस्य च ग्रन्थ्यन्तररूपसमतिक्रमेण विवृत्त ग्रन्थिपरिच्छेदस्ये-
यमनेकधा लोके व्यवहारव्यवस्था प्रकल्पते ॥ ”

(C.D.S's. ed. *ibid.*, Verse 4. p. 12)

It is just like the mist in the horizon. The mist completely enshrouds the rising sun and though it cannot shine by itself it appears to be shining with the help of the sunshine behind it ; and people who

3. Vide Bhartṛhari's *Tikā*:—

१ “ एवं ग्राह—मूर्तिक्रियाविवर्तौ अविद्याशक्तिप्रवृत्तिमात्मम् । तौ विद्यात्मनि तत्त्वान्यत्त्वाभ्यां
अनाख्येयौ । एतद्वि अविद्यायाः अविद्यात्वम् । ”
(*ibid.*, ed. p. 5.)

look at it fancy that the mist shines—नीहारः प्रकाशते. This *Kālaśakti*, otherwise known as *avidyā*, is nothing but *Kāla*. So says Bhartṛhari in the *Kālasamuddeśa* of the *Prakīṛṇakāṇḍa* of his *Vākya-pāṇīya*—

“ निर्भासोपगमो योऽयं क्रमवानिव दृश्यते ।
अक्रमस्यापि विश्वस्य तत्कालस्य विचेष्टितम् ॥⁴ ”

(Trivandrum Ed. p. 66 V. 46.)

It has three properties or powers—*atītatva*, *anāgatatva* and *vartamānatva* ; by the first two *kāla* conceals or destroys objects while by the last it manifests or creates them—

“ एकस्य शक्तयस्त्रिभिः कालस्य समवस्थिताः ।
यत्सम्बन्धेन भावानां दर्शनादर्शने सताम् ॥⁵
द्वाभ्यां स किल शक्तिभ्यां भावानां वरणात्मकः ।
शक्तिस्तु वर्तमानाख्या भावरूपप्रकाशिनी ॥ ”

(*Kāla-Samuddeśa*, Verses 49-50).

Bhartṛhari further adds that the two *śaktis*—*atītatva* and *anāgatatva*—possess the properties of *tamas* in that they conceal objects, while the *vartamānatvaśakti* is of *sattvaguna* and so illumines the objects. The *Kāla* itself is said to possess the property of *rajas* in view of the fact that it acts persistently by the twofold power—*pratibandha* and *abhyānujñā*—

द्वौ तु तत्र तमोरूपौ एकस्यालोकवत्स्थितिः ॥

(*Kālasamuddeśa*, V. 53).

4. Vide Helārāja's Com., p. 66. ‘ कालाख्या हि ब्रह्मशक्तिरविधेयं क्रमावभासकारितया जीवात्मसु सफला । ’

5. Vide *ibid.*, p. 67— ‘ कार्यभेदे कारणभेदानुमानम् ; शक्तिभेदादेव च कार्यभेदोपपत्तेः, कालाख्यस्य जगत्कारणस्य मुख्यो भेदो नास्ति । तथाहि—वर्तमानशक्तिसम्बन्धेन भावानां सतामेवाभि व्यक्तिर्जन्म । अतीतानागतकालशक्तिसम्बन्धेन तु सतामेव तिरोभावः । अदर्शनमनभिव्यक्तिर्विनाशः प्राक् प्रध्वंसाभावश्च इति शक्तिभेदात्कार्यभेदोपपत्तौ कालभेदकल्पना निर्निमित्ता । ’

6. Vide *ibid.*, p. 67. ‘ अतीतानागतशक्तिभ्यां वरणं तिरोधापनं भावानां सतां कालः करोति । वर्तमानशक्त्या दर्शनं भावरूपप्रकाशनम् । ’

“ अतीतानागतावधानौ भावावरणहेतुत्वात्तमःस्वभावौ । आवरणं हि तमो-
धर्मः । गुरुवरणकमेव तम इत्युक्तम् । वर्तमानोऽध्वा प्रकाशतुल्यः सत्त्वसदृशः । सत्त्वं
लघुप्रकाशकमिष्टमिति । रजस्तु प्रवृत्तिसामान्यं कालस्वरूपं सर्वतानुवयि । प्रतिबन्धाभ्यनु-
ज्ञाभ्यां प्रवर्तकं प्रेरणानुरूपं रजः कालात्मकमेव । ”

(Helārāja's Com. Verse 53. Tri. Ed. p. 68).

These two powers of *Kālaśakti*—*pratibandha* and *abhyanuññā*—more or less correspond to the two powers—*āvaraṇaśakti* and *vikṣepaśakti*—of *avidyā* or *māyā*, as described by the later Advaitic writers. They say that *avidyā* is *anirvācya*—सदसद्ब्रह्मनिर्वाच्यां तामविद्यां प्रचक्षते—that which cannot be identified with *sat* (*caitanya*) and with *asat* (*śaśaśṛṅga*) but is *sadasadbhinna*, different from both *sat* and *asat*. This *avidyā*, they add, with its two powers—*āvaraṇaśakti* and *vikṣepaśakti*—is responsible for the creation of this entire universe which also thus acquires the property of its *pariṇāmikāraṇa* viz., *avidyā*. This explanation of the *bāhyaprapaṇca*, as *anirvacanīya* on a par with *avidyā*, is a necessary outcome of the *vivartavāda*, which the advaitins including Bhartṛhari have expounded. To them, *sat* ever exists and never becomes the object of negation, while *asat* never exists and never becomes the object of a valid cognition—सच्चैत्र बाध्यते ; असच्चैत्र प्रतीयेत । But the phenomenal world exists and at the stage of one's *Brahmasākṣātkāra*, becomes the object of negation—प्रपञ्चस्तु अस्ति, बाध्यते च. This idea is explained with some emphasis by Bhartṛhari in the *dravyasamuddēśa* of the third *kāṇḍa* of his *Vākyapadīya*—

“ न तत्त्वातत्त्वयोर्भेद इति वृद्धेभ्य आगमः ।

अतत्त्वमिति मन्यन्ते तत्त्वमेवाविचारितम् ॥ ”

(Chaukhamba Ed. Verse 7 p. 89).

7. Vide Helārāja's Commentary on verse 7, Chan., Ed., p. 89.

“ नेहाद्वैतनये सत्यासत्ये द्वे रूपे स्तः, अद्वैतहानिप्रसङ्गात् । किन्तु पारमार्थिकं एकमेवाद्वयम् । तच्चानादिसिद्धाविद्याविलमितसहं प्रमातृविषयतया यथातत्त्वं अनवभासमानमनेकविकल्पपरिघटिता-
काररूपतया व्यवहारमवतरति । तथा च तदेवाकारनानात्वोच्चीयमानस्वरूपभेदं चकास्ति, नान्यत् । तद्व्यतिरिक्तस्यान्यस्याभावात् । तत्र च योऽयं प्रकाशः स विद्या । अप्रकाशस्तु तमोऽविद्या । न च प्रकाशाभावोऽप्रकाशो नाम कश्चित्प्रमाणसिद्धो निरूप्यः । ततश्च योऽयं भेदप्रकाशः सैवैकघन प्रकाशाभावः प्रकाशविच्छेदोऽविद्या तत्त्वमेव यथाप्रतिभासं भेदेन चकासदविचारितरमणीयं प्रपञ्चोऽतत्त्वमिति व्यवहियत इति ब्रह्मविदः । ”

According to the Advaitins there cannot be two entities—*satya* and *asatya*, while they accept one ultimate reality which they call *satya*, the so-called *asatya* is explained by them as the manifestation of this *satya*-*vastu* in the diverse but unreal form of the deep-rooted *avidyā* that completely enshrouds its substratum, the *satya*; and when that veil of *avidyā* is removed for ever, the knower, the *satya*-*vastu*, reveals himself in his own form of illumination. Such an omniscient reality is known as *vidyā* (supreme knowledge) and its reverse is *avidyā* (ignorance), the latter of which resembles only a pitch of darkness. So *avidyā* is not true entity like *vidyā*.

How these manifestations are called unreal is explained by Bhartṛhari in the verse—

“ सत्यमाकृतिसंहारे यदन्ते व्यवतिष्ठते ।
तन्नित्यं शब्दवाच्यं तच्छब्दतत्त्वं न भिद्यते ॥ ”

(Ibid, Verse 11).

While commenting on this verse Helārāja says that this Kārikā is based on the passage in the *Mahābhāṣya*—

“ तदेव हि नित्यं यस्मिस्तत्त्वं न विहन्यते ” ।

He further explains that just as gold though it is given different shapes and is called by different names like *rucaka* is one entity, so also the eternal Brahman is the only uniformity in all experiences presenting different phenomenal objects. No doubt, the generalities like *gotva* (cowness) are eternal when all their substrata—individuals—perish; but when these particular generalities are ignored and a higher generality like *pṛthivī* (earthness) is predicated, it is understood that only *pṛthivī* is real; so when all high generalities are also completely ignored the objects are experienced as *mere vastus*. This uniformity in experiences is nothing but Brahman which is identical with the *Śabdatattava-parā* or *paśyanti*.

That one and the same Ātman is manifested through *avidyā* in diverse forms is pointed out by Bhartṛhari in the verse—

“ तन्नास्ति विद्यते तच्च तदेकं तत्पृथक् पृथक् ।
संसृष्टञ्च विभक्तञ्च विकृतं तत्तदन्यथा ॥ ”

(Ibid, Verse 13.)

This phenomenal world is a bundle of manifestations of Ātman. They possess diverse and sometimes inimical forms and properties like

bhāva and *abhāva* through the agency of *avidyā* which delimits *Ātman*. Hence the only truth is *Ātman* and *avidyā* and its *pariṇāmas* are illusions.

“ विद्या सा सर्वशब्दानां शब्दाश्च न पृथक् ततः ।
 अपृथक्त्वे च संबन्धस्तयोर्नात्मनोरिव ॥
 आत्मा परः प्रियो द्वेष्यो वक्ता वाच्यं प्रयोजनम् ।
 विरुद्धानि यथैकस्य स्वप्ने रूपाणि चेतसः ॥
 अजन्मनि तथा नित्ये पौर्वापर्यविवर्जिते ।
 तत्त्वे जन्मादिरूपत्वं विरुद्धमुपलभ्यते ॥ ”

(*Ibid* : Verses 16-18).

Even *śabda* and *artha* are the vivartas of *Ātman* and their separate existence is only empirical. As in a dream which presents *Ātman* with diametrically antagonistic properties like *priyatva*, *dvesyatva*, *vaktṛtva* and *vācya*, He, though ultimately eternal and devoid of states like birth, is known in the state of *vyavahāra* as possessing birth, existence, destruction and many other properties of mutually inimical character.

Thus all *Śāstras* including the *Vedas* describe in detail the nature of *avidyā* and its work in diverse ways by adopting different methods of explanation:—

‘ शास्त्रेषु प्रक्रियाभेदैरविद्यैवोपवर्ण्यते । ’

(*Vākyapadīya-kāṇḍa* 2, verse 136).

And the knowledge of *avidyā* and of its functions in making up the phenomenal world is quite essential for a distinct understanding and realisation of the ultimate truth, though *avidyā* and its work are ultimately unreal:—

“ उपायाः शिक्षमाणानां बालानामुपलालनाः ।
 असत्ये वर्त्मनि स्थित्वा ततः सत्यं समीहते ॥ ”

(*Ibid*, verse, 240).

The realisation of *śabdabrahman* by the total removal of the bondage of *avidyā* is the final aim of mankind; and *Bhartṛhari*, like other *āstika* *Ādvaitins*, exhorts people to study the *Vedas* which explain the true nature of this universe and the ultimate reality:—

“ प्राप्स्युपायोऽनुकारश्च तस्य वेदो महर्षिभिः ।
 एकोऽप्यनेकवर्त्मैव समान्नातः पृथक् पृथक् ॥ ”

(*Vākyapadīya*, *Kāṇḍa* 1, verse 5).

The Vedas are the only means of the knowledge of *śabda-brahman* ; hence they are called *anukāra—brahman in miniature*. Those who have realised the ultimate truth call these Vedas the first *vivarta* of *śabdabrahman* (compare thee Brahmasūtra, ‘‘शास्त्रयोनित्वात्’’ I. 1.3), which have, owing to the incapacity of mankind, subsequently been divided into four branches, each with numerous *śākhās* or recensions. So the formal manifoldness of the Vedas does not in any way hamper the inner unity in the text, namely, that they uniformly expound the nature of the ultimate reality :—

“ एकोऽयं वेदाख्यो दर्शनात्मनि स्थितो दृश्योऽर्थः, स महर्षिभिर्भेदेनाभेदस्य प्रतिपादयितुमशक्यत्वादभिव्यक्तिनिमित्ताल्लब्धक्रमे वागात्मरूपे प्रापितः एकत्वानतिक्रमेण संहितापदक्रमविभागेन प्रविभक्तमार्गोऽध्ययननिमित्तमध्येष्टां चरणसमाख्यां व्यवस्थापयद्भिः समाम्नातः । ”

(*Ibid.*, *Tīkā*, p. 14).

Even the different *darśanas* which seek to explain the true nature of this universe are started on the basis of some Vedic texts which the Darśanakāras interpreted differently. Bhartṛhari says that there cannot be different interpretations of the Vedic texts emphasizing dualism or monism and that those advocating dualism mistook some arthavādas for vidhis or took those Vedic passages in their literal sense in spite of the established fact that those arthavādas praise or condemn things that are enjoined or prohibited by the adjoining vidhis or niṣedhas. Even among the advocates of monism, Bhartṛhari adds, some have fancifully suggested on the basis of arthavādas like “असद्वा इदमत्र आसीत्” praising the *cayanasthāna*, that *asat* is the only reality and that this phenomenal world, being the manifestation of that *asat*, is also *asat*—unreal, in view of the fact that the properties of the cause are transmitted to its effect.

“ तस्यार्थवादर्रूपाणि निश्चिताः स्वविकल्पजाः ।

एकत्विनां द्वैतिनाञ्च प्रवादा बहुधा मताः ॥

अर्थवादानर्थवादप्रकाराणि श्रुतिवाक्यानि पौरुषेयाः प्रवादाः प्रायेणानुपतन्तो दृश्यन्ते । पुरुषबुद्धिभेदाच्च प्रवादभेदास्सम्भवन्ति ॥ ”

(*Ibid.*, *Tīkā*, Verse 8, *ibid*, p. 17).

While there is no agreement among the *darśanas* in their explanation of the nature of this universe, Bhartṛhari suggests the final solution that there is only one reality which appears in diverse forms, so much so, that the ultimate truth is *advaita* and that the *dvaita* is only

its vivarta. In the Vedas there are many passages like 'एकमेवाद्वितीयं ब्रह्म' and 'आत्मैवेदं सर्वं—expounding the nature of one ultimate reality. They cannot be set aside as mere arthavādas. The passages dealing with the dualistic aspect of this universe can be well taken in their literal sense in as much as they emphasise the empirical reality of the phenomenal world.

The ultimate truth, according to Bhartṛhari, is *Śabda-brahman*. Its true symbol is the *praṇava* (Ōmkāra) which contains the essence of the Vedas. It is only through the *upāsana* of Ōmkāra that mankind can aspire for the realisation of the ultimate Brahman. It admits of both *diversity* as found in the phenomenal world and *unity*, in the ultimate truth. Those who follow the *path of Karman* or *avidyā* view diversity as real while those who transcend *Karman* and march through the path of *jñāna* see the unity through diversity.

“ अत्र प्रणवः सर्वाभ्यनुज्ञाविषयः सर्वश्रुतिरूपः प्रकृतिसर्वनाम सर्वदर्शनोदय-
प्रत्यस्तमययोनिः सर्वविरुद्धार्थोपग्राही सर्वथेदं ब्रह्माभ्यनुजानाति । सर्वथा च प्रतिषेधति ।
न च प्रतिषेधाभ्यनुज्ञयोः अस्य प्रवृत्तितत्त्वं विकल्पते । तथाह्याहुः—

तदेतदेकं नैकञ्च तथोभे नाप्युभे न च ।

कर्मस्था विषमं ब्रूयुः सत्त्वस्थास्समदर्शिनः ॥ ”

(*Ibid.*, *Ṭīkā*, Verse 9, pp. 20 & 21).

The greatness of Ōmkāra, the essence of the Vedas, cannot be over-estimated. From it, not only all *darśanas* are developed, but also all other *vidyās*—the six *vedāṅgas* beginning with the *śikṣā* and the various *upāṅgas* like the *purāṇas* and *dharmaśāstras*—thus constituting the main basis of the Hindu culture and the sole means of supreme knowledge.

“ विधातुस्तस्य लोकानामङ्गोपाङ्गनिबन्धनाः ।

विद्याभेदाः प्रतायन्ते ज्ञानसंस्कारहेतवः ॥ ”

(*Ibid.*, *Kāṇḍa* 1, Verse 10.)

Ōmkara or the Vedas are called the very creator of this mundane world in that all *vidyās* of both spiritual and temporal utility do not transgress the path of the Vedas. “ वेदो हि लोकानां प्रकृतित्वेन चोपदेष्टृत्वेन च विवर्तेषु व्यवस्थासु च विधाता । प्रणव एव वेद इत्येके, स हि शब्दार्थप्रकृतिरिति । एतस्मिन् दर्शने विद्याभेदाः प्रणवात्मतया वेदतत्त्वनातिक्रामन्ति । तदाहुः—सर्वा वाचो वेदमनुप्रविष्टाः ; नावेदविन्मनुते ब्रह्म किञ्चित् । ”

(*Ibid.*, *Ṭīkā*, Verse 10, p. 21).

And mankind has to rely on the Vedas alone in order to seek the knowledge of the Absolute and consequently its eternal emancipation.⁸

Like other Āstika philosophers Bhartṛhari emphasizes the fact that all *smṛtis* including the chief *vedāṅga*, *vyākaraṇaśāstra*, codified by great Seers and the practices or customs of the Śiṣṭas are also authorities on dharma in that they are composed or practised by them after their understanding the hidden or scattered truths of the Vedas.

“ न चागमादृते धर्मस्तर्केण व्यवतिष्ठते ।

ऋषीणामपि यज्ज्ञानं तदप्यागमपूर्वकम् ॥ ”

(Ibid, Verse 30)

The knowledge of dharma and other supernormal things like Mokṣa can be obtained only by a careful study of Āgamas (Vedas, Smṛtis and śiṣṭācāras.) Logical arguments cannot enlighten mankind on the supernormal questions. Even on matters perceptible and inferable, Bhartṛhari says, human logic miserably fails in giving a proper explanation.

‘ को ह्यनवस्थितसाधर्म्यवैधर्म्येषु नित्यमलब्धनिश्चयेषु पुरुषतर्केषु विश्वासः ? ’

(Ibid., Tīkā, p. 46, V. 30) .

So superiority of Āgama to tarka (logical arguments) is one of the fundamental doctrines that all Advaitins have emphasised ; and Bhartṛhari, in the Brahmakāṇḍa of his *Vākyapadīya*, devotes a major section to this topic. Man generally relies on his special gift, viz., reason, but it fails in giving true solutions for the puzzling problems like the nature of the ultimate reality and its relation to the phenomenal world. Tarka leaves always a residue of doubt in man, with the result that he is disinclined to accept even the solution given by Āgama, which alone, as true revelations and invaluable records of truth, is the infallible authority on those supernormal matters. It is therefore laid down that on questions

8. Here some Vedic passages explaining the true nature of *Śabdabrahman* may be noted :

“ वागेवार्थं पश्यति वागेवार्थं ब्रवीति वागेवार्थमिहितं सन्तनोति । वाच्येव विश्वं बहुरूपमिदं तदेतदेकं प्रविमज्ज्योपभुङ्क्ते । ओमित्येददक्षरमिदं सर्वं, वाचो ह वाक् । ”

These explain the nature of the *śabda-brahman*, as *satya*, *eka*, and *ātman* and as the creator of this phenomenal world.

‘ तमेव भान्तमनु भाति सर्वं तस्य भासा सर्वमिदं विभाति । ’

describes the *svaprakāśatva* of Brahman.

of supernormal characters like dharma, Āgama, Vedas, smṛtis, etc., generally known as *śāstra*—is the only authority.

“ तस्माच्छास्त्रं ब्रमाणं ते कार्याकार्यव्यवस्थितौ ”

(Bh. Gītā. Chap. 16. Verse 24.)

and tarka—reasonable arguments chiefly in the form of syllogism—is unreliable, for, however great might be a man's intellectual attainments, his well-thought-out syllogism will in no time be proved fallacious by a greater intellectual giant.

“ यत्नेनानुमितोऽप्यर्थः कुशलैरनुमातृभिः ।

अभियुक्ततरैरन्यैरन्यथैवोपपाद्यते ॥ ”

(Vākya-pādiya, Kāṇḍa 1, V. 34.)

Bhartrhari compares the man who relies simply on his reason in *alaukika* topics to a blind person who, when he touches only with his hands the slope of a huge precipice and advances further, is doomed to death by an instantaneous fall—

“ हस्तस्पर्शादिवान्धेन विषमेऽप्यभिधावता ।

अनुमानप्रधानेन विनिपातो न दुर्लभः ॥ ”

(Ibid, Verse 42.)

Bhartrhari does *not*, however, completely set aside *tarka* as *apramāṇa*. His famous dictum is :—

‘ वेदशास्त्राविरोधी च तर्कश्चक्षुरपश्यताम् ॥ ’

Tarka which does not go against the Vedas and Śāstras, is really helpful to those who seek the realisation of the highest truth. It may be noted here that this doctrine, namely, that tarka which has the support of Āgama, is an authority, is further elaborated and used by all Advaitins as one of the powerful arguments against the exponents of *bhedavāda*—the doctrine of dualism. It is even said : “

“ यस्तर्केणानुसन्धत्ते स धर्मं वेद नेतरः—”

He alone understands dharma, who makes a judicious use of tarka. So tarka is of paramount importance in that it is of great use to mankind for understanding the true import of Āgama; but it must be remembered that it cannot enlighten mankind against the authority of Āgama on all matters on which it cannot be considered an infallible and ultimate authority.

Not only in the glorification of Āgama as an independent and infallible authority does Bhartrhari wax eloquent, but also in the glorification

of Śabda. It has already been said that Bhartṛhari conceives it as the ultimate reality. He says that Vedic seers call Śabda, the inner Soul of the speaker and the *Divine Bull* which has come down from heaven to bless mankind—

“ अपि प्रयोक्तुरात्मानं शब्दमन्तवस्थितम् ।

प्राहुर्महान्तमृषभं⁹ येन सायुज्यमिष्यते ॥ ”

(Vākyapadīya, Kāṇḍa I, Verse 131.)

Hence the importance of Śabdopāsti and Ōmkāropāsti which lead one to the spiritual path of the realisation of Śabda-brahman.

Equally important is Śabda in the *vyavahārāvasthā* also. Bhartṛhari emphasizes the fact that there is no cognition without the accompaniment of a Śabda and that all cognitions get their property of illumination through Śabda—

“ न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके यश्शब्दानुगमादृते ।

अनुविद्धमिव ज्ञानं सर्वं शब्देन भासते ॥ ”

(Ibid., Verse 124.)

The true nature of knowledge is *prakāśa*—illumination and this illumination of knowledge cannot be effective if all knowledge is deprived of its expressive element of Śabda—

“ वाग्रूपता चेदुक्तामेत् अवबोधस्य शाश्वती ।

न प्रकाशः प्रकाशेत सा हि प्रत्यवमर्शिनी ॥ ”

(Ibid., Verse 125.)

That Śabda is self-luminous and that it gives illumination to all objects is well explained in the following passage—

“ इह त्रीणि ज्योतीषि त्रयः प्रकाशाः स्वरूपपरस्परयोरवद्योतकाः । तद्यथा—
योऽयं जातवेदाः यश्च पुरुषेष्वान्तरः प्रकाशो यश्च प्रकाशाप्रकाशयोः प्रकाशयिता शब्दाख्यः
प्रकाशः तत्रैतत्सर्वमुपनिबद्धं यावत् स्थासु चरिष्णु चेति । ”

(Ibid., Tīkā, p. 24, Verse 12.)

The fact that all cognitions involve a word-element led all grammarians to believe, that all cognitions are only determinate cognitions ; but it must be said that this view has reference and application to cognitions of *vyavahārāvasthā* (empirical stage) and not to the *Brahmasākṣātkāra*.

9. Compare the Rk.

चत्वारि शृङ्गास्त्रयो अस्य पादा द्वे शीर्षे सप्त हस्तासो अस्य ।

लिधा बद्धो वृषभो रोरवीति महो देवो मर्त्यो आविवेश ॥

The Daśa-Prakaraṇas

By

B. N. KRISHNAMURTI ŚARMA
(Annamalai University)

CHAPTER IV.

i

'Daśa Prakaraṇas' is the name collectively given to ten minor philosophical tracts of Madhva. They are (1) the *Pramāṇalakṣaṇa* (PL), (2) the *Kathā-Lakṣaṇa* (KL), (3) the *Upādhikhaṇḍana* (UK), (4) the *Māyāvāda-Khaṇḍana* (MK), (5) The *Prapañcamithyātva-numāna-Khaṇḍana* (PMK), (6) the *Tattvasamkhyāna* (TS), (7) the *Tattva-viveka* (TV), (8) the *Tattvodyota* (TD), (9) the *Viṣṇu-Tattva-nirṇaya* (VTN), and (10) the *Karma-nirṇaya* (KN). They deal with various aspects of the Dvaita system, its logic and ontology, its theology, theory of knowledge, etc. Five of them are refutations of the monistic idealism of Śaṅkara from various points of view. Nos. 6-9 above, may be described as constructive works devoted to the exposition of Madhva's Cosmic scheme and ancillary matters. The language of these Prakaraṇas is throughout tough and terse. But for the lucid commentaries of Jayatīrtha on them, they would still have remained obscure. Excepting the VTN., all the other Prakaraṇas are short ones.

(9) The *Pramāṇa-Lakṣaṇa*.

In traditional accounts of systems of Indian philosophy, it is usual to begin with a statement of the number and nature of *Pramāṇas*, i.e., sources or guarantors of correct knowledge, recognised in any given system. Max Müller expresses great admiration for this practice of Indian writers as it removes a good lot of misunderstanding and makes the task of philosophical assessment of a given system, easy.

Following this time-honoured practice, Madhva indicates in his *PL*., the number of *Pramāṇas* admitted by him, their definitions, mode of functioning, and the nature of reality apprehended by them. We are told at the end of the work that the exposition has been based on the *Brahma-tarka* of Vyāsa, not now extant

ii

(1) The attacks made by the Advaitins pursuing the dialectic method of inquiry and refutation of the Buddhists, against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika

realism, its categories and thought—measuring devices, seem to have been responsible in turn, for the composition of such works as the *PL.*, by Madhva, in an attempt obviously at protecting his own system from similar attacks.¹ He has therefore taken due cognisance of the criticisms of Advaitic Dialecticians like Vimuktātman and Ānandabodha, against various types of realism and has endeavoured to discard much that was superfluous or illogical in the older systems of realism, while improving upon all that was of permanent value and metaphysical merit in them.

(2) The Naiyāyikas themselves had, as a result of outside criticism, introduced many new changes in the *minutiae* and methodology of their system. Much of the old looseness of thought and vocabulary had been shed and a new school of Logic inaugurated by Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya, with a staggering paraphernalia of technical jargon, had come into being.

(3) Tho' a realist himself, Madhva had his own differences with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas.² It was forced upon him therefore, to traverse the entire field of realism from a newer angle of vision. A certain amount of constructive exposition of one's own views becomes necessary in such cases. It is to these tasks then, that Madhva addressed himself in his Prakaraṇas.

iii

A Pramāṇa as originally understood is a means or guarantor of valid knowledge : प्रमाणं प्रमाणम् । But to Madhva it has another and a higher connotation also, viz., the core of reality itself : यथार्थं प्रमाणम् । प्रमाण embraces within its fold, both reality and knowledge as well as the means of such knowledge. True knowledge *per se* is "Kevala-Pramāṇa." What leads to it is "Anu-Pramāṇam." Sense perception, Inference and verbal testimony, come under the latter head.

Madhva accepts but *three*³ Pramāṇas as fundamental : प्रत्यक्ष (sense-perception), अनुमान (Inference) and आगम (Verbal testimony sic. Scripture). The additional Pramāṇas recognised in other systems such as the उपमान of Gautama and अर्थपिप्ति are subsumed under Inference. "अनुपलब्धि" of the Bhāṭṭas is subsumed partly under Inference and partly under sense-perception, and "सम्भव" and

1. It is significant that one of Vimuktātman's works bears the title of "*Pramāṇa-vṛtta-nirṇaya*". (See his *Iṣṭasiddhi*, p. 37, G.O.S.).

2. See Part III, Chap. i.

3. Like the Sāmkhyas (*Sāmkhya-kārikā*, 4) the Yogas and Bhāsarvajña among the Naiyāyikas.

‘परिशेष’ under Inference. The scheme of Pramāṇas is thus considerably simplified, and reduced to the barest limits of logical necessity. The subject of Fallacies is similarly treated. The number of अवयव s, terms or members indispensable for an adequate syllogistic statement, is cut down to the barest minimum. Madhva makes no fetish of the exact number of Avayavas that will have to be recognised for a complete syllogism. As a general rule, he is for three: प्रतिज्ञा हेतु and दृष्टान्त and dispenses with the well-known scheme of five-membered syllogism (Pañcāvayava-vākya) of the Naiyāyikas.⁴ Even a bare proposition implying a probandum (hetu) will do; or even an instance involving a major term (pratijñā) and a probandum. The subject of “Nigrahasthānas” (points for closure of a debate) is also similarly treated. The Nyāya definition of Pramāṇa as “सम्यगनुभवसाधनम्” is analysed and refuted. The validity of Smṛti (recollection) denied by some philosophers, is resolutely maintained.⁵ Madhva says in this connection that the very edifice of Experience must collapse if the validity of our recollections is impugned: अग्रामाण्याङ्गीकरे, अनुभूतं मयेत्यत्र प्रमाणभावात्”. To try to establish a validity for our past experience through Inference, involves needless strain and violence to facts: लिङ्गत्वेन प्रामाण्यकल्पने कल्पनागारवं, दृष्टहानिश्च । The domain of Prameyas is then exhaustively dealt with. The number of granthas in the PL., is 50.

(10) The Kathā-Lakṣaṇa.

This is a metrical monograph in 25½ anuṣṭubhs, devoted to an exposition of the art of debate, the rules and regulations governing its conduct. Here also, the exposition is said to follow the *Brahmatarka*.

Debates and disputations for the purpose of settling doctrinal differences and for the ascertainment of truth, were common enough in the intellectual life of the 12th and 13th centuries, in India. In the ancient days, the Buddhists, Jains and the Naiyāyikas had been the makers of Logic and the leaders in debate. Between the 10th and 12th centuries, the shield was entirely with the Advaitins. Madhva’s object in writing the *Kathālakṣaṇa* must have been to train his disciples to become adepts in the art of debate as well as to be able to carry fire and sword into the enemies’ camp. Some of his peculiar views on the different items of the subject also called for a suitable medium of presentation.

4. *Nyāyasūtra*, i, 1, 32.

5. On the validity of Smṛti-cognition see Umesh Miśra’s article in the *Pāṭhaka Com. Vol.*, pp. 177-86.

ii

Madhva insists upon the recognition of three species of Debate : वाद, जल्प and वितण्डा, rejecting the other classifications attempted by the Buddhists, Śrīharṣa and some Naiyāyikas. Vāda is the purest form of debate carried on solely for the ascertainment of truth. Jalpa is a less exalted form of it which may be indulged in either as a test of ability or for victory (जयपराजय)⁶ etc. "Vitaṇḍā" is cleansed of much of its bad odour and raised to the rank of an independent species of debate perfectly legitimate and laudable where an honest soul is confronted with a particularly vicious or villainous opponent : वितण्डा तु सतामन्यैः । It is merely an occasion where one refuses to throw pearls before swines. In such extremities, the Siddhāntin merely adopts a destructive attitude, demolishing the arguments of his adversary and exposing their hollowness, without in any way disclosing his own views : तत्त्वमेव निगूहितम्. Such a procedure may not be flattering to one's higher ideals of truth-determination, but it takes all sorts of men to make a debate. Vitaṇḍā is the honest man's armour against villainy and falsehood masquerading as goodness and truth. It is a safeguard against unscrupulous argument : कण्टकशाखावरणवत् (Nyāyasūtra, iv, 2,50).

(11) The Upādhi-Khaṇḍana.

This is a short metrical tract in 20 granthas, criticising the concept of "Upādhi" (the pluralising agency) which plays so large and necessary a part in the ब्रह्मज्ञानवाद of Śaṅkara. The world of plurality is believed by the Advaitin to be the outcome of fontal ignorance playing upon the One Real. The oneness of existence is the truth of things and all plurality is ascribable to this fontal ignorance : अनाद्यविद्या. Madhva naturally opens his attack by pointing out that the very idea of such a Nescience descending upon the Brahman is unthinkable, unaccountable and impossible : अज्ञताखिलसंवेतुर्घटते न कुतश्चन । If Brahman is the only thing that is, where and whence does Ignorance come in ? If it is to be rendered possible by the intervention of an Upādhi, the question naturally arises as to how this Upādhi itself is to be conceived of,—whether as a real and essential feature of the Brahman or as itself being due to an earlier layer of ignorance. A real Upādhi spells danger to a Monism. To rely upon a previous ignorance to create a subsequent Upādhi is court the double fallacy of a *regressus ad infinitum* and mutual interdependence in reasoning. It is thus impossible to make out any rational and intelligible relation between the Upādhi and the Brahman. The progress

of Ignorance being thus arrested at the very outset, there is no individual soul resulting therefrom. There is thus no ignorant Adhikāri, nothing unknown and no fit subject for metaphysical investigation.⁷

A Dualism has no such difficulties. In it, a spiritual aspirant (not identical with the Brahman) knowing *something* of the Brahman, and wanting to know *more*, is the proper person (Adhikāri) to undertake metaphysical quest, undergo the necessary discipline laid down in the Śāstras, and reap the benefit of his labours. Everything is thus intelligible in a Dualism.

(12) *Prapañca-Mithyātvānumāna-Khaṇḍana.*

The well-known syllogism of the monist: विमतं मिथ्या । दृश्यत्वात्, जडत्वात्, परिच्छिन्नत्वात्, शुक्तिरूप्यवत् । intended to establish the unreality of the world, is analysed and refuted, in minute detail, in this Prakaraṇa of twenty-nine lines.

The minor term of the syllogism itself is shown to be built on quicksands. The concept of Anirvacanīya is *avowedly* irrational^{7a} and no inference can be based upon it. Criticisms are urged from the point of view of both formal and inductive logic.

(13) *The Māyāvāda-Khaṇḍana.*

In this Prakaraṇa of 20 granthas, Madhva contends that none of the fourfold requisites of traditional system-building, viz., the अधि-कारी, विषय etc., can be satisfactorily made out on any kind of Monism, much less in the निर्विशेषाद्वैत of Śaṅkara. The identity of Jīva and Brahman which is the central thesis of Advaita, is shown to be riddled with contradictions. How is this identity to be conceived of? Is it anything *other* than the Brahman, or *one with it*? If the former, we have a dualism. In the latter case, there is a "Siddha-sādhana". For, the Brahman is conceived by the Advaitin as essentially self-revealed (स्वयंप्रकाश), in that it is outside the pale of Pramāṇas and unknowable : अवेद्यत्वे सति अपरोक्षव्यवहारयोग्यत्वं स्वप्रकाशत्वम्. (Citsukha).

If then, the identity that is the विषय (thesis) of Monism were *one* with the Brahman, it would, like the Brahman itself, be equally self-revealed and outside the pale of any Pramāṇa or Śāstra like

7. Cf. न निरोधो न चोत्पत्तिः न बद्धो न च साधकः ।

न मुमुक्षुर्न वै मुक्त इत्येषा परमार्थता ॥

(Gauḍapāda-Kārikā, ii, 31).

Also : यद्येवं प्रतिबुद्धोऽसि नास्ति कस्यचिदप्रबोधः ।

(Śaṅkara, B.S.B., iv, 1. 3.)

and : यद्यद्वैते न तोषोऽस्ति मुक्त एवासि सर्वदा ॥

(Vācaspati on *ibid.*).

7a. Cf. दुर्घटत्वमविद्याया भूषणं न तु दूषणम् ।

कथंचित् घटमानत्वेऽविद्यात्वं दुर्घटं भवेत् ॥

(Iṣṭasiddhi).

the Advaita-Vedānta. There would thus be no need or justification for any Śāstra of the monist. A Pramāṇa, moreover, is (admitted by the Advaitins to be) what makes the unknown, known :— अनधिगतार्थगन्तूः⁸ The Advaitaśāstra cannot surely be claimed to be valid (प्रमाण) in *this* sense. So long as Advaitism stands committed to the निर्विशेषाद्वैत of Śaṅkara, there is no way out of the difficulty. Since ऐक्य is necessarily characterless, there can be no point in saying that Scripture enables us to know those *aspects* of the Brahman which are not already known : निर्विशेषत्वादात्मनो नानधिगतो विशेषः⁹ | One can also raise the question if the identity preached by the monist is real or fictitious. Neither alternative can be welcome to him. The impossibility of Ignorance affecting the Brahman, vitiates the whole of monistic metaphysics : अज्ञानासम्भवादेव तन्मतमखिलमपि निरस्तम् | In view of the said identity, there can be no real Adhikāri entitled to philosophise or undergo spiritual discipline. For this same reason, Mokṣa cannot be the goal of metaphysics, as on the monistic doctrine, everybody if free *here and now* and release is not a state to be attained in the hereafter : स्वरूपत्वान्मोक्षस्य पूर्वमेव सिद्धत्वात् | Cf. Śaṅkara : मोक्षस्य अकार्यत्वात् (G.B. iii, 1). अस्माकं तु न मोक्षः साध्यः | अपि तु, ब्रह्मस्वरूपं, तच्च नित्यमिति || (Bhāmatī, II, 3, 40.)

Towards the close of the MK., Madhva refutes briefly the view of Śrīharṣa that अविद्यानिवृत्ति (cessation of Ignorance) is indistinguishable from the Ātman: आत्मवाङ्मनहानिः; as well as that of Vimuk-tātman that it belongs entirely to a fifth order of prediction : पञ्चम-प्रकारताः—

न सन्नासन्न सदसन्नानिर्वाच्योऽपि तत्क्षयः |¹⁰

यक्षानुरूपो बलिरित्याचार्याः प्रत्यपीपदन् ||

(Ānandabodha, Nyāyamakaranda).

These defects and pitfalls of Monism, force a Dualism upon us.

8. This is the Bhāṭṭa definition of Pramāṇa, which is admitted by the Advaitins for all "practical purposes": व्यवहारे भट्टनयः |—See also: Bhāmatī on B.S. II, 1, 14.

9. This disposes of the plea raised by Śaṅkara under B.S. i, l. 1. तत्पुनर्ब्रह्म प्रसिद्ध-मप्रसिद्धं वा and his reply to it.

10. Cf. न सन्नासन्न सदसन्नचाप्यनुभयरूपकम् |


चैतुष्कोटिर्विनिर्मुक्तं तत्त्वं माध्यमिका विदुः ||

(Buddhist Kārikā, quoted by Vedānta Deśika, in his Śatadūṣaṇi, p. 65, S. S. Mukṭāvali Series.)

(14) *The Tattvasamkhyāna*¹¹

The *Tattva-samkhyāna* (11 granthas), enumerates the categories recognised in the Dvaita system. Here, reality is dichotomised into "Sva-tantra" (Independent) and "Paratantra" (Dependent). This is the highest metaphysical *classification* in the Dvaita system, from which evidently it derives its name. Viṣṇu is the highest Independent Real. All else is dependent upon Him, including the Goddess Lakṣmī. Dependence does not mean unreality. The finite creation is always dependent on God, but is none the less real, even as *He* is. The inner ramifications of finite creation are then set forth in detail. The author emphasises that difference and disparity are found everywhere among the finite selves, in constitution and equipment which points to a hierarchy (तारतम्य) among gods, demons and men. A detailed cosmic scheme from the Supreme Lord down to inanimate creation is then put forth. Three classes of souls are distinguished among those that are *now in bondage*: Muktiyogya (salvable), Tamoyogya (those that will eventually qualify themselves for eternal perdition) and Nityasamsārins (those that will always be subject to transmigration). Those who want to be released from bondage must learn to look upon God as the One Being who is responsible in various ways, for the preservation, control, absorption, enlightenment, etc., of the world.

11. Not "Tattva-samkhyāna" as it is given in Dr. Saletore's *History of Tuluva*, p. 441, Poona, 1936.

(15) *The Tattvaviveka*

This, in 13 granthas (metrical), covers the same ground as the *TS.*, and need not therefore be separately noticed.

(16) *The Tattvodyota*¹²

This is one of the fighting treatises of Madhva in which he has discussed and refuted some of the leading doctrines and fundamental con-

12. Not "Tattvadyota" as it is called by Dr. Saletore : *History of Tuluva*, p. 441.

cepts of the Advaitavedānta. It is traditionally believed to embody some of the arguments actually employed by *Madhva* in his historic debate with the two celebrated Advaitins of his day : Puṇḍarīka Purī¹³ and Padma Tīrtha, recorded in the *Madhva-Vijaya*, xii, 1-54.

i

The author maintains at the outset that "Difference" (भेद) is the fundamental concomitant of nature. It persists even in Mokṣa, between the Brahman and the freed souls, and amongst the latter. The more should it hold sway on this side of release (saṃsāra-avasthā). It is hardly convincing to dismiss it as an unreal projection of the mind. The concept of Anirvacanīya is warranted neither by the facts of life nor by the force of logic. It is a figment of the monist's imagination having no support in the Scriptures. Madhva denies that there is any basis for this idea in the Nāsadiya Sūkta (R.V. X, 129). If what is left over (परिशिष्ट) after the denial of "Sat" and "Asat" (in R. V. x 129, 1) were to be viewed as necessarily अनिर्वचनीय, one would have to characterise the Brahman also as अनिर्वचनीय for, its existence is affirmed : आनीदवातं स्वधया तदेकम्। immediately after a series of denials : नासदासीन्नो सदासीत् तदानीम् '.....earlier.¹⁴

ii

Syllogisms advanced by the Monist in support of the unreality of phenomena (मिथ्यात्व) are shown to be full of fallacies and contradictions : दृश्यत्वाद्यनुमानेऽपि एतएव दोषाः। The minor terms and grounds of inductive generalisation in these cases, are refuted in great detail. The reality of the world which is borne in upon us by our own consolidated experience cannot be suppressed by any amount of specious reasoning. If the verdict of experience is to be set aside, it can only be on the strength of a more powerful and subsequent experience (बाधकानुभव) now and here. And we know only too well that such is never the case.

13. See also *Madhva-vijaya-bhāvaprakāśikā* and Jayatīrtha's com. on the Td. (end).

14. Cf. "Moreover, it ignores the previously postulated 'That' which by its terms eliminates non-being. The poet here unquestionably entangles himself in sham profundity." Bloomfield, *Religion of the Veda*, 1908, p. 238.

iii

Long before Madhva, the Advaitins had been suspected of inward leanings to Buddhism.¹⁵ Advaita was openly denounced as Buddhism in disguise, by such early writers as Bhāskara¹⁶, Parthasārathi Miśra¹⁷ Yādavaprakāśa¹⁸ and Rāmānuja.¹⁹ From the early days,²⁰ the Advaitins had been vehemently protesting²¹ that theirs was certainly not a Buddhism. The prejudice and antipathy to Advaita was very strong in Madhva's days. It is not to be wondered if he chose to exploit this prevailing antipathy of his times, to the Advaita, both in learned quarters as well as amongst the people,²² to further the interests of his own faith. What is important however is that unlike most of his predecessors, he took it upon himself to *substantiate his allegations* against the Advaita, *with chapter and verse*, in his *Tattvodyota* and to a lesser extent elsewhere. So much so that academically speaking, we have to look up to Madhva for a really exhaustive treatment of this question. The charge of crypto-Buddhism was certainly *not* invented by Madhva.²³ But he shared the general belief of scholars then as now, that it bore a very strong family-resemblance to Buddhism and that for all practical purposes, it was but a restatement of Buddhistic

15. See *Gauḍapāda-Kārikā*, iv. 99 and the remarks of Śamkara and Ānandagiri thereon.

16. विर्गातं त्रिच्छिन्नमूलं माहायानिकबौद्धगाथितं मायावादं व्यावर्णयन्तो लोकान् व्यामोहयन्ति । B.S.B., Chouk. S. S., 15, p. 85 and *op. cit.*, p. 124.

17. तद्वरं मायावादान्माहायानिकम् ।

18. वेदोऽनृतो बुद्धकृतागमोऽनृतः प्रामाण्यमेतस्य च तस्य चानृतम् ।

बौद्धानृतो बुद्धिफले तथानृते यूयं च बौद्धाश्च समानसम्पदः ॥''

quoted by Deśika, in his *Tattvamuktākalāpa*, Medical Hall Press, Benares, 1900, p. 363.

19. *Vedārtha-samgraha*, Pandit Rep., p. 86.

20. Vide *Gauḍapāda* : नैतद्बुद्धेन भाषितम् (iv, 99) already referred to, f.n. 15 above.

21. See *Vivaraṇa* : यस्तु कश्चिज्जल्पति—सुगतविज्ञानवादसमानोऽयं वेदान्तवाद इति..... Viz., S. S. 1892, p. 84 and *Samkṣepaśārīraka*, ii, 25-27.

22. As reflected in the verses of the *Padma-Purāṇa* : मायावादमसच्छास्त्रं प्रच्छन्नं बौद्धमुच्यते । etc.

23. Nor has Madhva used the odious expression प्रच्छन्नबौद्ध in any of his works, though he has made it quite clear that in his opinion, the Advaita is indistinguishable from Buddhism, in its metaphysics. So far as I am aware, the term first occurs in the *M. Vij.* (i, 51) of Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍita and secondly in the *Śatadūṣaṇi* of Vedānta Deśika who calls upon the followers of Rāmānuja to gird up their loins and fight the "Pracchanna-Bauddhas" to the finish : प्रच्छन्नबौद्धविजये परितो यतध्वम् ।

ideas in Upaniṣadic and Vedāntic phraseology. Madhva makes this the vantage-ground of his attacks on the Advaita. He quotes profusely from the standard Buddhistic works of his days²⁴ and from well-known Advaitic works like the *Samkṣepa-Sārīraka*²⁵ (i, 1) : अनृतजडविरोधिरूपमन्त-त्रयमलबन्धनदुःखताविरुद्धम् ।

Madhva contends²⁶ that the attributeless Brahman of the monist can hardly be distinguished from the शून्य of the Buddhistic Nihi-

24. Unfortunately, the names of these Buddhist works (metrical) from which Madhva has quoted passages in his *Td.*, are not ascertainable. It is thus difficult to trace the passages; but I have it on the authority of Syt. Vidhuśekhara Bhaṭṭācārya of Santiniketan, that though the passages cited by Madhva could not be traced in the Buddhist works now available to us, the ideas have many clear parallels in the extant literature of the Buddhists. One or two instances may be given:

अपरप्रत्ययं शान्तं प्रपञ्चैरप्रपञ्चितम् ।

निर्विकल्पमनानार्थमेतत् तत्त्वस्य लक्षणम् ॥

Mādhyamaka Kārikā, 24, p. 372, which may be compared with No. 8 of Madhva; द्वे सत्ये समुपाश्रित्य . . . (*Mādhyamaka Kārikā*) with No. 1; नैव भावो न वाभावः न पृथक्त्वैकलक्षणम् । *Madhyāntavibhāgasūtra*, i, 14(text) and Sthiramati's Com. thereon: तत्र लक्षणं भावाभावप्रतिषेधात्मकं शून्यतायाः C.O.S., 24, p. 38 ab. (cf. No. 5. of Madhva).

25. Not from "*Murāri Sataka*" as stated by Dr. R. Nagaraja Sarma in his *Reign of Realism in I. Phil.*, 1937, p. 207.

26. There are altogether eight verses quoted by Madhva from Buddhist sources. They are:

सत्यं तु द्विविधं प्रोक्तं सांवृतं पारमार्थिकम् ।

सांवृतं व्यवहार्यं स्यान्निरुक्तौ पारमार्थिकम् ॥ १ ॥

विचार्यमाणे नोऽस्तत्त्वं सत्त्वं चापि प्रतीयते ।

यस्य तत्सांवृतं स्यात् व्यवहारपदं च यत् ॥ २ ॥

निर्विशेषं स्वयं भातं निर्लेपमजरामरम् ।

शून्यं तत्त्वमिदं मनोवाचासगोचरम् ॥ ३ ॥

जाड्यसंवृतिदुःखान्तं पूर्वदोषविराधि यत् ।

नित्यभावनया भातं तद्भावं योगिनं नयेत् ॥ ४ ॥

भावार्थप्रतियोगित्वं भावत्वं वा न तत्त्वतः ।

विश्वाकारं च संवृत्या यस्य तत्पदमक्षयम् ॥ ५ ॥

नास्य सत्त्वं न वासत्त्वं न दोषो गुण एव वा ।

हेयोपादेयरहितं तच्छून्यं पदमक्षयम् ॥ ६ ॥

अवाच्यं सर्वशब्दैस्तल्लक्ष्यते चाखिलैः पदैः ।

अज्ञेयं ह्यानलक्ष्यं च तच्छून्यं पदमक्षयम् ॥ ७ ॥

यदखण्डं पदं लक्ष्यं सर्वैरपि विशेषणैः

सर्वैर्विशेषणैर्मुक्तं तच्छून्यं पदमक्षयम् ॥ ८ ॥

lism.²⁷ Both are अस्पृष्ट ; beyond thought and word (अवाच्य) ; and can only be expressed through negatives (व्यावृत्ति = अपोह). The so-called व्यावहारिकसत्य of the Advaitin is nothing but the संवृतिसत्य of the Buddhist,²⁸ writ larger. The ideal of “Nirvāṇa and the goal of Brahma-bhāva” are nearly the same. In view of so much striking affinity in doctrines, Madhva asserts that Advaita is indeed Buddhism: न च शून्यवादिनः सकाशाद्वैलक्षण्यं मायावादिनः । The Advaitins’ belief in the Veda turns out to be a veritable imposture when it is remembered that they dismiss the entire Karmakāṇḍa and all those dualistic texts in the Upaniṣads as “not-truth-declaring” (अतत्त्वावेदक).²⁹ Madhva naturally protests against such high-handed treatment to the Vedas which is worse than the Buddhists’ open abjuration of them. The attitude of the Advaitin is, moreover, inconsistent: (नहि कुक्कुट्या एको भागः प्रसवायापरः पाकाय कल्पते). If one part Scripture can speak untruth (अतत्त्व) what guarantee is there for the other parts alone? Madhva winds up with the observation that the refutation of Buddhist Idealism and nihilism in the *Vedānta Sūtras*, is thus tantamount to a refutation of Advaitism itself.³⁰ ‘नास्ततो दृष्टत्वात्’ ‘नाभाव उपलब्धेः’ ‘वैधर्म्याच्च न संप्रादिवत्’ इत्यादि भगवद्वचनेनापि निरस्ताः । न च शून्यवादिनः सकाशाद्वैलक्षण्यं मायावादिनः ॥

iv

There is a constructive side to the *Td.*, wherein Madhva quotes many passages to show that Theism is the only philosophy accepted by the Śāstras. Such texts as have been claimed by the Advaitin to support the अखण्डार्थवाद (Tattvam asi) according to which passages of the śruti are believed somehow to refer to an attributeless Absolute, are reinterpreted in conformity with Theism. The work concludes with a brief criticism of the एकजीवाज्ञानवाद। The last seven stanzas do not belong to Madhva. They are in the nature of a tribute paid to him by the admiring witnesses to his debate with Puṇḍa-

27. Das Gupta, *I. Phil.*, i, p. 493-4.

28. द्वे सत्ये सम्पाश्रित्य बुद्धानां धर्मदेशना ।

लोके संवृतिसत्यं च, सत्यं च परमार्थतः ॥ (*Mādhyamaka Kārikā*, xxiv, 492).

This *Kārikā* of Nāgārjuna is quoted by Jayatīrtha in his com. on *Td.* but the Buddhist verses quoted by Madhva do not, so far as at present ascertainable, appear to be those of Nāgārjuna as Dr. R. Nagaraja Sarma (*Reign of Realism in I. Phil.*, p. 209) would have us believe.

29. Vide *Samkṣepaśārīraka*, ii, 43; iii, 287.

30. Cf. Bhāskara on the *Sūtra* वैधर्म्याच्च न संप्रादिवत् ॥

ये तु बौद्धमतावलम्बिनो मायावादिनः, तेऽप्यनेनैव न्यायेन सूत्रकारिणैव निरस्ता वेदितव्याः॥ (p. 124).

rika Purī, and were incorporated into the body of the *Td.*, at the special request of these disciples.³¹

(17) *The Viṣṇu-tattva-Nirṇaya.*

i

This is the longest (540 granthas) and most important of the Prakaraṇas and contains an exhaustive refutation of Advaita. It is divided into three Paricchedas. The scope of the work is thus indicated at the beginning of the work :

सदागमेकविज्ञेयं समतीतक्षराक्षरम् ।
नारायणं सदा वन्दे निर्दोषाशेषसद्गुणम् ॥
विशेषणानि यानीह कथितानि, सद्गुक्तिभिः ।
साधयिष्यामि तानीह क्रमात्सञ्जनसंविदे ॥

Preparatory to establishing the thesis that Nārāyaṇa is the highest subject-matter of the Vedaśāstra, Madhva discusses the question of the place and importance of Śabda among the Pramāṇas, and argues a strong case for the infallibility of the Vedas. They are self-valid स्वतः प्रमाण and cannot be ascribed to any known author, human or divine.³² The eternity of the Vedas is built on the eternity of Śabda.³³ It is convincingly shown that no system of philosophy can do without some kind of 'Apauruṣeyavākya.' Even the Buddhists and the Cārvākas are forced to admit some kind of Śabda-pramāṇa which is incapable of being ascribed to any author.

ii

Madhva pleads strongly that ineradicable difference between God and Man is the central theme of the Śāstras :

अतः सर्वप्रमाणविरुद्धत्वान्नाभेदे तात्पर्यं वाक्यस्य । किन्तु, विष्णोः सर्वोत्तमत्वं एव महातात्पर्यं सर्वागमानाम् ।

With cogent reasons he repudiates the Advaitic view that all those Scriptural texts which speak of difference are to be looked upon as being merely अनुवादक, repetitive in spirit. Our knowledge of the existence of God is derived solely from Scripture (B.S. i, 1. 3).

31. See Jayatīrtha's com. on these verses (in his *Td.-tīkā*).

32. तत्प्रामाण्यं च स्वत एव सिद्धम् । वेदकर्तृप्रसिद्धेः । (VTN).

33. अत आकाशगुणे शब्दे व्यज्यमाना वर्णादयः तत्क्रमात्मको वेदश्च नित्य एवेति सिद्धम् ॥

(op. cit.)

Such being the case, it will never do for Scripture to cut the ground from under its own feet. The monistic texts are considerably weakened by their conflict with the consolidated experience अबाधितानुभव of humanity and Inference. Tho' it is no doubt true that Āgama has, as a rule, precedence over other means of proof, it cannot be considered valid when it goes against its very prop and support: उपजीव्यश्रुति—viz., those which establish the Brahman *ex hypothesi* to be Sarvajña (all-knowing), Sarva-vit, etc., in contra-distinction to the human soul. It is equally absurd to dismiss the difference between God and man taught in such Śrutis as द्रासुपर्णा as an ignorant doctrine. If śrutis can play false, what guarantee is there that the monistic texts can be relied upon to speak the truth? Madhva is honestly surprised how a person with such a low opinion of the Śruti can claim to be Veda-vādin! कथं चैवंवादिनो वेदवादित्वम्? It is thus extremely unlikely that the identity between God and man can be the ultimate teaching of Scripture. Texts which appear on a superficial view to favour such an identity, are shown on closer scrutiny to emphasise the unutterable majesty of God and the complete and absolute dependence of all else upon Him: तद्वशत्वमेवोक्तम् । तद्वशत्वज्ञापनार्थं च 'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्...' इत्यादि सुष्टिकथनम् ।

An implicit and ineradicable dualism is shown to underlie all the well-known Upaniṣadic texts paraded by the Monist. Madhva gives a brilliant analysis of the "Tattvam asi"³⁴ and "Vācārambhaṇa-texts"³⁵ and lays bare the defects in the Advaitic interpretation. Many other passages from several other Upaniṣads, are similarly discussed: अहं ब्रह्मास्मि । ब्रह्मवित् ब्रह्मैव भवति । परेऽन्ये सर्वे एकीभवन्ति । प्रपञ्चो यदि विद्येत³⁶....." etc.

iv

The reality of the world and of difference is clearly taught in many passages of Scripture, even as admitted by the monist. Madhva repudiates the suggestion that this reality is of a *lower order*: न चावान्तर-सत्यमिदम् । and cites passages to show that difference persists even in Mokṣa. Individual consciousness is inalienable and indestructible in release: अविनाशी वा अरे अयमात्मा अनुच्छिन्तिधर्मा (Brh. Up. iv. 5, 14) इति तद्वर्माणामप्यनुच्छिन्ते: प्रस्तुतत्वात् ।

34. See Part I, page 20-21, 177-80.

35. See p. 176 and Part III, Chap. 5.

36. See under *Māṇḍūkya Up.*

v.

The VTN., gives the most classical exposition of the concept of Bheda as developed by Madhva. A 'Pluralistic Universe' is grounded on the reality of difference. The concept of Bheda has been severely attacked by hosts of Absolutist writers from the days of Śamkara. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism had been the chief target of attack of the early Advaitic dialecticians. The *Iṣṭasiddhi* of Vimuktātman has a powerful critique of Bheda.³⁷ Other writers like Ānandabodha,³⁸ Śrī-harṣa^{38a} and Citsukha followed suit. Among the philosophers of the 10th-12th century, a heated controversy was raging over this concept. Madhva took note of the criticisms poured forth by the Advaitic dialecticians. He had to draw and defend the concept of Difference which was so near and dear to his heart and on which the entire edifice of his radical realism rested. The monists had placed many obstacles in the way of a really valid definition of the idea of difference. It was impossible said they, either to give a satisfactory and logically commensurate definition of Difference or demonstrate its reality in any metaphysical sense. Any attempt to conceive of it in a logical way is doomed to failure. The idea of difference is thus riddled with all kinds of fallacies and contradictions: अनवस्थादयो दोषाः सत्तां निघ्नन्ति वस्तुनः ।

Difference is *not cognised by itself but only in relation to its terms* either as qualifying them or as being qualified by them. It may be looked upon as residing in either or both the terms. But in any case, unless the terms are previously grasped, their difference from each other which is either attributive or is bound up with the cognition of the correlate and counter-correlate, cannot be. But then, the cognition of the terms is dependent on that of the difference referred to. There is thus mutual interdependence in any attempt to define the concept of difference.

Madhva refutes the contention by pointing out that difference is not an attribute of *both* correlates, but of only *one* of them *signalised* by the other. This difference is of the nature of the subject itself. To

37. भेदस्य वस्तुनो भेदे भेदाभेदे च तस्य तस्य, भेदात् वस्तुनश्चान्योऽन्यो भेद इति अनवस्थानाच्च कश्चिदभेदो वस्तु संस्पृशेत् । अभेदे तु, एकमेव ; तच्च वस्त्वेव, न भेद एव । वस्त्वभावे तस्याप्यभावात् ।
p. 23, G.O.S., lxv, '38.

38. भेदस्य विदारणात्मनो वस्तु स्वरूपत्वे, न किंचनेकं वस्तु स्यात्
एवं च, शून्यतैव तात्त्विकी विश्वस्यापश्येत् ॥ (Nyāyamakaranda, p. 45-6).

38a. यदि च स्वरूपं भेदः स्यात्, तदा धर्मिणि दृष्टे स्वरूपं दृष्टमिति क्वचिन्न सन्देहः स्यात् ।
(Khaṇḍana-Khaṇḍakhādyā, i, p. 210).

क्वचिदपि गत्वा भेदभेदाश्रययोः भेदास्वीकारे च तदैक्यद्वारिका मूलपर्यन्तमेकता धावेत् ।
(Khaṇḍana, i, p. 212).

know a subject is to know its difference from another. Hence there is no interdependence here.

It may be objected that a *subject* is cognised independently but *not so its difference from another*. If difference were the same as the subject, it should be capable of being perceived *independently of its relata*. Madhva answers this by pointing out that there is no such absolute necessity. The 'thing in itself' may be perceived independently but its difference from another may yet be cognisable only mediately thro' the relata. There is nothing illogical in this. The Advaitin himself recognises that the cognition of the self is immediate, but its identity with the Brahman, tho' not essentially different from the Self,³⁹ is yet only mediately realisable thro' the terms: Jiva and Brahman. What applies to identity can hold good in the case of Difference which is as much a relation as its opposite.

The Advaitin advances a further argument objecting to Difference as Dharmi-svarūpa, that if the thing and its difference are one and the same, they must always be cognised *together*. The admission of Viśeṣa however, helps Madhva to account for the perception of an object without involving a specific perception of its difference from another. Difference is only सविशेषामिन्न from its धर्मि। Even here, the monist can have no cause for complaint as he admits that tho' the self is established in all cognitions, its identity with the Brahman (which is the same as the self) is *not*: न च, धर्मिप्रतियोग्यपेक्षया भेदस्यास्वरूपत्वम्। ऐक्यवत् स्वरूपस्यैव तथात्वात्। स्वरूपसिद्धावपि तदसिद्धिश्च जीवेश्वरेक्यं वदतः सिद्धेव (VTN). This is indeed a penetrating argument that confutes the monist with one of his own admissions.

From one point of view it may be asserted, says Madhva, that when a subject is cognised, its difference also from other things, is cognised *in a general way, and for the most part*. Otherwise, one may even mistake his own self for any one of the numerous objects surrounding him. None ever falls into such an error. It therefore follows that difference is cognised *simultaneously with the perception of the subject*. It may be objected that if it were so, all doubts and misapprehensions would be impossible. Since doubts and imperfect cognitions *do* arise at times, it could not be that difference is part and parcel of the 'thing itself.' Madhva answers this by saying that Difference is only *one* in a given thing. But it has innumerable shades such as that of being the

39. cf. तच्चाद्वैतं—'ब्रह्मेवेदं सर्वं' इति श्रुत्यर्थेन सहेक्यमापन्नं ब्रह्मेव स्यात्।

(Khaṇḍana, i, p. 220).

counter-correlate of X or Y or Z. Where in a particular case, this *particular* shade of difference is missed with reference to a *particular* (counter)-correlate, on account of such factors as resemblance, doubts arise. The *particular* doubt however, does not mean that Difference in general has not been grasped at all.

It has been contended that if Difference were of the nature of the subject, it would in effect abolish either its own self or the subject or it may mean that difference is synonymous with the subject.⁴⁰ Madhva points out that such antinomies are avoided on his view which recognises only a *Sa-viśeṣābheda* " (colourful identity) between the subject and Difference conceived as *Dharmisvarūpa*. The *identity* prevents the possibility of such mutual interdependence in perception as has been referred to and the *Viśeṣa* guarantees the *existence and reality of both the subject and the difference*. *Viśeṣa* is just the *representative of Difference*, not difference by itself. भेदप्रतिनिधिः न तु स्वयं भेदः । There are reasons why such *Viśeṣas* should be recognised in all objects commonly regarded as undifferenced. Even the Advaitin cannot altogether evade them. For, in such texts as नेति नेति Brahman is said to be different from all else. This distinction can neither be *different* from the Brahman nor *partly different and partly identical* with it, as the judgment arising from the sentence is admitted to be in the form of an undifferentiated cognition : अखण्डार्थः. If therefore, in these circumstances, absolute and colourless identity were assumed it would be futile to have a number of terms in the negation (as in नेति नेति; सत्यज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म) Just as identity is recognised between Brahman and its attributes (whether negative or positive) to avoid conflict with the नेह नानास्ति text, even so, *Viśeṣa* must be recognised to prevent overlapping among the things negated and the faults of redundancy and synonymy (पर्यायत्व).

It can make no difference to the question of overlapping whether the Brahman is regarded as वाच्यं (expressible by words) or as merely लक्ष्य (only suggestible). For, in *any case of elimination*, there would be no point in resorting to more than one elimination if the subject thus marked off from its opposite does not *gain or assume a new aspect or additional significance every time a fresh elimination is brought about* :

व्यावृत्ते निर्विशेषे तु किं व्याकर्त्यबहुत्वतः ? ।

This argument of Madhva is hard to rebut.

Lastly when difference is presented to cognition, it cannot be denied altogether on the ground of interdependence : स्थितस्य गतिश्चिन्तीनीया.

40. अमेदे त्वेकमेव, न भेद एव । वस्तुभावे तस्याप्यभावात् ॥ (*Iṣṭasiddhi*, p. 23.)

Interdependence, even admitting there is one, cannot annul the reality of things so interdepending⁴¹: अन्योन्याश्रयस्य प्रमात्वाप्रतिबन्धकत्वात् (Jayatirtha Com. VTN.). One must try to explain the process of the perception of difference but failure or inability to do so cannot mean that the thing itself is unreal. There is of course no cause for anxiety or interdependence if Difference is recognised as धर्मिस्वरूप but yet “सविशेषाभिन्न” from it.

Madhva has thus really gone a long way in clarifying the concept of Difference and demonstrating its reality. He enunciates the doctrine that Difference is “Dharmi-svarūpa”,⁴² part of the ‘thing itself.’ It is perceived simultaneously with the perception of an object, a relation or a concept. In one and the same act of perception, the object and its *individuality* (which is the same as its difference from all else that is) are both perceived, *in a flash as it were*. If it were not so, the question will have to be answered why and where that individuality had been lurking and how it comes to be apprehended later on. Madhva says that because of this flash-like simultaneity of apprehension, there is hardly any time, at the moment, to frame linguistic expression for the adequate expression of the experience of individuality. When we *know* a thing we know it *qua* distinct from everything else, *in a general way*. Closer thought and ratiocination reveal further items of difference, light and shade. Otherwise, one may even expect to mistake the perceiving self to be something other than what it is: यदि न स्वरूपं भेदः, तदा पदार्थे दृष्टे प्रायस्तस्य सर्वतो वैलक्षण्यं न ज्ञायेत । अज्ञाते च वैलक्षण्ये, आत्मनि घट इत्यपि संशयः स्यात् । नहि कश्चित्था संशयं करोति । ज्ञातवैव प्रायः सर्वतो वैलक्षण्यं कस्मिंश्चिदेव सदृशे संशयं करोति..... (VTN.). [Vide *Khaṇḍana*, i, p. 210 : यदि स्वरूपं भेदः...

Śamkara has nowhere given any *evidence* in support of his doctrine of “Adhyāsa.” He merely *asserts* that erroneous transference of the qualities of the Ātman to the Anātman and *vice versa*,

41. The idea of “father” and “son” is for example intertwined. You cannot know X as *father* unless you know his son Y. But you cannot know Y as the *son* unless you know his father. But no one asserts from this that both the father and the son are unreal unaccountable beings !

42. This coupled with the doctrine of Viśeṣa with which the perception of difference is linked up in Madhva’s epistemology would be seen to effectively dispose of the difficulties and antinomies raised by Vimuktātman and others in their critique of Difference. The Advaitin is purposely perverse in his attitude to Bheda: भेदस्य वस्तुस्वरूपत्वं वा, तद्धर्मत्वं वा नास्माकं सम्मतम् । किन्तु वस्तुस्वरूपातिरिक्तो भेदः प्रामाणिको नास्तीति ॥ (Rāmātirtha, com. on *Samkṣepaśāriraka*, p. 59.)

“इतरेतराध्यास” is *natural* in life and is beginningless and endless : सोऽयमनादिरनन्तः नैसर्गिकोऽयं लोकव्यवहारः । When one asks for proofs, only excuses are given. Illusions and dream-phenomena have been cited by monistic writers *ad nauseum*. This is most unsatisfactory. Even these illustrations betray certain unmistakable realistic foundations. They are only exceptions to the rule. It is no use to say that because our senses have deceived us once or twice, they must altogether be put down as untrustworthy. In that case, even Scripture would be in no better position ; for some of its statements are according to the Advaitin, obviously untrustworthy at the ultimate resort.

vii

No scheme of illusions can be demonstrated *without* the aid of at least two *distinct* reals : भ्रान्तिकल्पितत्वे च जगतः सत्यं जगद्वयमपेक्षितम् (VTN., p. 286). As a matter of fact, illusions are as *impossible* without the *reality* of an आरोप्य (elsewhere) as without that of the अधिष्ठान । The Advaitin is thus guilty of an ‘अर्धजरतीय’ when he grants the necessity of the latter alone and denies the former : आरोप्यस्य प्रतीतिरुपयुज्यते न वस्तुसत्तति॥ (Bhāmātī introd., p. 17. Bby. 1917). On all occasions of normally constituted perceptions, the subject and the object are grasped distinctly. Madhva denies that there is any proof for the assumption that Adhyāsa is double-edged इतरेतर. The Ātman has never been mistaken for the not-self, in the wildest of our Adhyāsas : Na cātmani anātmabhramāḥ kvāpi dr̥ṣṭaḥ. Na hi kaścīd ‘Aham na bhavāmi’ iti bhrānto dṛṣyate” (VTN., p. 27). The bottom is thus knocked out of Śaṅkara’s sweeping remark : एवमविरुद्धः प्रत्यगात्मन्यन्यानामाध्यासः । अन्योऽन्यस्मिन्नन्योन्यात्मकता-मन्योन्यधर्माश्राध्यस्य । which is itself inconsistent with his own plea : सर्वोऽयमात्मस्तित्वं प्रत्येति, न नाहमस्मीति । The author concludes the first Pariccheda after criticism of the एवजीव and बहुजीवाज्ञानवाद ; मिथ्यात्वं ; उपाधि ; औपाधिकमेद and अविद्यादुर्घटत्वम् ।

viii

The last two Paricchedas deal with Madhva’s conception of God-head. The second Pariccheda emphasises the lordship of Viṣṇu over the kṣara (souls) and Akṣara (Prakṛti) Puruṣas. Passages from the Ṛg-Veda, the Taitt. Āraṇyaka, the Bhāllaveya and other Khilas are quoted.

In the last Pariccheda, God is taught to be absolutely free from all taint and imperfection [Cf. अपहृतपाप्मा विजरो विमृत्युः]. He is full of an infinite number of infinite attributes [Cf. सत्यसङ्कल्पः सत्यकामः सर्वस्य वशी सर्वस्थानः]. The limitations to divinity seen in the Avatars

are explained on the basis of certain widely accepted theological and Purāṇic fictions and conventions.^{42a}

ix

The question of the exact relation between the Personality of God and His moral and metaphysical attributes has always resisted the ingenuity of Theists all the world over. No close student of Madhva can fail to see in him one of the foremost of the world's Theistic Thinkers who has successfully tackled the problem of the Divine Person, its nature and constitution. God in Theism is *ex hypothesi* unlimited by Time and Space and Attributes. He is One; but many are His attributes. This raises the question of how far God is homogeneous in constitution. Is God different from His attributes? If not, what is the basis of the mutual distinction among His various attributes? If there is no such distinction, how is the multiplicity of the attributes to be established? By what law of harmony are these attributes equally poised and manifested at different times? How does God manage to retain His unity amidst a sea of attributes? These are some of the questions which confront all Theists and all kinds of Theistic approaches, be they logical, religious or metaphysical. Madhva has answered them in his own way with the help of his peculiar doctrine of Viśeṣas which he has developed in the last section of the VTN., and elsewhere and his solution is perhaps the best that could be thought of.

Viśeṣa is a distinct thought-category that is entirely self-sufficient and wholly self-determined and self-determining. It comes in handy in many a metaphysical exigency. It is Viśeṣa that bridges the gulf between Substance and Attributes, Kriyā and kriyāvat etc. It connects God with His Infinite attributes and the attributes mutually. But it is not different from the nature of God Himself or distinct from His personality. It is मेदप्रतिनिधि (*representative* of Difference) not मेद itself, in short, a thought-fiction. It is an altogether internal relation capable of working both ways. It is capable of connecting substance and attribute without being external to either. Madhva refuses to recognise any distinction between God and His attributes, activities and will. Absolute identity reigns between God and His innumerable attributes as well as among the attributes themselves. There is not even a *semblance of differentiation, no element of heterogeneity* in the Deity. He threatens those who set up such barriers between God and His attributes, with the horrors of hell-fire: नेहनानास्ति किञ्चन; मृत्योः स मृत्युमाप्नोति य इह नानेव पश्यति (*Kath. Up.*) एवं धर्मान् पृथक् पश्यन्तानेवानुविधावति

42a. See *Bhāgavata*, XI, 3, 39; V, 19, 3-6; IX, 10, 11.

The doctrine is known as सविशेषामेद or अचिन्त्यामेद and language secular and scriptural has many instances of it : राहोःशिरः ; पुरषस्य चैतन्यम् ; समवायस्य एकत्वम् ; सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म ; आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो विद्वान् and so on :

मेदहीने त्वपर्यायशब्दान्तरनियामकः ।

विशेषो नाम कथितः सोऽस्ति वस्तुस्वशेषतः ॥

Madhva shows that it would be impossible to do justice to such texts as : सत्यं ज्ञानम्.....without the help of the said Viśeṣas. For fear of synonymy (पर्यायत्व) even the Advaitin, says Madhva, would have to recognise Viśeṣa.⁴³ Viśeṣa in short is to be a सर्वतन्त्रसिद्धान्त । He has cited passages from the *Brahmatarka* and the *Paramopaniṣad* (Pāñcarātrika), elucidating “Viśeṣas.” Apart from the authorities quoted, the concept itself ranks as one of the important contributions of Madhva to Indian philosophic thought.⁴⁴

(18) *The Karma-Nirṇaya*

Next in extent to the VTN., comes the KN running to 270 granthas. Tradition has it that this work was composed by Madhva in reply to a challenge from certain contemporary Pandits to exhibit his proficiency in the ritualistic portions of the Vedas and their exegesis.⁴⁵ The ultimate object of the work is to work out and illustrate the attunement of the Karma-Kāṇḍa too, to the Brahman which the avowal of the Brahman as the highest and most intimate subject-matter of the Vedas, necessitates. The work deals thus with the higher interpretation of certain abstruse and complicated sacrificial hymns such as the Mahānāmni (A.Ā. IV)—verses to be recited in connection with the Prṣṭha-Stotra at the Niṣkevalya Śāstra, consisting of Khaṇḍas 1-4 of the IV *Pañcikā* of the XVI Adhyāya of the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* ; and various groups of ṛks to be used in the Śoḍaśī Śāstra : R. V. i, 16, 1-3 ; i, 82, 1-3 ; 4 ; viii, 12, 25-27 ; iii, 44, 1-3 ; vii, 34, 4 ; viii, 6, 21 ; vii, 29, 2 ; X, 96 1-3 ; ii ; 22, 1-3 ; X, 133, 1-3 viii, 58, 1-3 ; viii, 58, 8-10.

43. अस्मण्डवादिनोऽपि स्याद्विशेषोऽनिच्छतोऽयसौ ॥

व्यावृत्ते निर्विशेषेतु, किं व्याकृत्यबहुत्वतः ?

।सच्चिददेरपर्यायसिद्धयर्थं मायिनपि हि ॥

अङ्गी कार्यो विज्ञेयोऽयं ॥

(AV., p. 37b).

44. For further light on the doctrine of Viśeṣas see Part III, Chap. 4.

45. See *M. Vij.*, XVI, 42-5. The KN was evidently the last of the Ācārya's works and was probably composed while he was camping at Uccabhūti or Ujher in S. Kanara.

The author shows himself fully conversant with the genius of the Vedic language and its idiom. His interpretations have a ring of confidence and originality.

ii

Taking his stand upon the mystic doctrine enunciated in A. Ā. ii, 2, ता वा एताः सर्वा ऋचः सर्वे वेदाः सर्वे घोषाः प्राणऋच इत्येव विद्यात् ; एतं ह्येव बह्वचा (iii, 2, 3) etc., Madhva insists upon interpreting the whole of the Scripture (not excluding the so-called Karmakāṇḍa)⁴⁶ directly as a glorification of the Supreme Being. The Mahānāmni is but an instance in point, of the possibility of such an interpretation : तत्र 'विदा मघवन्' इत्याद्याः Once the general principles of such a higher interpretation are laid down, it would not be difficult to tackle particular hymns or groups of hymns. Let us take R̥g. Veda viii, 58, 8 for example:—

अर्चनं यज्ञादि । प्रार्चनं ज्ञानध्यानादि । 'श्रेयान्द्रव्यमयाद्यज्ञाज्ज्ञानयज्ञः' (Gītā iv, 33) इति भगवद्वचनात् । 'प्रियमेधासः' प्रियज्ञाना अर्चत । 'पुत्रका' अल्पज्ञाना⁴⁷ अप्यर्चत 'न बुद्धिर्मेदं 'जनयेत्' (Gītā iii, 26) इति च । 'उत' शब्दात् ज्ञानिनामर्चनं युक्तं स्वाश्रमाहुसारिण्येति— 'अधाते विष्णो विदुषा चिदर्ध्यः.... (R. V. 1, 156, 1) इति श्रुतेः । 'धृष्यु' वासुदेवाख्यं । 'पुरं' देहं नार्चत—प्रत्युद्गमप्रश्रयणाभिवादनं विधीयते साधु मिथः सुमध्यमे । प्राज्ञैः परस्मै पुरषाय वधसे गुहाशयायैव न देहमानिनः (iv, 3, 22) पुनरर्चंतेति तात्पर्यार्थः ॥

As a preliminary to such higher interpretation, Madhva vigorously assails the doctrine of the Nirguṇa Brahman, in the opening section of the KN. Passages ascribing various attributes to Brahman are quoted in profusion. There is good reason to suppose that an Intelligent Creator like the Brahman must indeed be Saguṇa : कर्तृत्वात्सगुणं ब्रह्म पुरुषं पुरुषर्षभ (Bhāg. iii, 33. 12). The denial of attributes to Brahman in certain passages of scripture must be interpreted in terms of the purely Prākṛtic attributes : न च—'एको देवः....| सत्त्वादिगुणाभावाक्तेरन्तेन । अन्यथा 'एकोदेवः सर्वभूतेषु गूढः इत्यादीनामपि गुणत्वात्, स्वोक्तिविरोधः ॥ (KN).

46. Cf. वेदैश्च सर्वैरहमेव वेद्यः । (Gītā)

वेदा ब्रह्मात्मविषयास्त्रिकाण्ड विषया अपि । (Bhāg.)

अवस्तराति गर्गरो..... ॥ (R.V. VIII, 69, 9).

47. Cf. Manu Smṛti, ii, 151.

The concept of "Nirviśeṣa" is then dialectically refuted. The predication of Nirviśeṣatva" involves a contradiction :—

निर्विशेषत्वेन विशिष्टं तत्, न वेत्युक्ते, यद्यपि विशिष्टं तर्हि न विशेषनिराकरणम्, विशेषत्वमेव भवति । यदि तेन विशिष्टं स एव विशेष इति व्याहृतिः ।

It cannot also be a negative elimination :—

व्यावर्त्यविशेषः तद्व्यावृत्ते ब्रह्मणि विशेषमापादयति चेद्विचित्रा वाक्यार्थता । न चेन्न ब्रह्मज्ञानार्थिने पदान्तरं वाच्यम् । असङ्गतत्वात् ॥

Madhva emphasises that Karma can never be regarded as the terminus of Scripture as is contended by the Pūrvamīmāṃsakas. The Veda, by its very nature, stands for the achievement of happiness eternal, by man and such eternal happiness is obviously and admittedly beyond the power of Karma. In this connection, Madhva repudiates tooth and nail, the Prābhākara doctrine of कार्ये व्युत्पत्ति The KN. shows Karma its proper place, remarking :

ध्यानं त्वखिलकर्मभ्यो ध्यानञ्च ज्ञानमुत्तमम् ।

न ज्ञानसदृशं किञ्चित्पुरुषार्थप्रसिद्धये ॥ इति प्रवृत्तं ॥

दूरेण ह्यवरं कर्म बुद्धियोगाद्धनञ्जय (Gītā, ii, 49)

अशेषकर्मपूगोऽपि न विष्णुध्यानलेशभाक् ।

तच्च ध्यानं हरं ज्ञानकोट्यंशाय न पूर्यते ॥ इति कर्मविवेके ॥

तस्माद्विरुद्धवत्प्रतीयमानानि प्रशंसादीनि ज्ञानसहकार्यपेक्षया योजनीयानीति ॥ (KN).

Rituals have to be performed in a spirit of devotion, discrimination and detachment : Bhagavad-bhakti-jñānavairāgya-pūrvakam Karma Kartavyam || The work is wound up with an indication of texts to this effect.

NYĀYAKULĪŚA

EDITED WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

By

R. RAMANUJACHARI

AND

K. SRINIVASACHARI

PREFACE

In preparing the text of *Nyāyakuliśa* for the press the following manuscripts have been collated.

1. R. No. 3290. Paper. Grantha script. 12 Vādas
 2. R. No. 4910. Devanagari script. 12 Vādas
 3. 36 A. 4. Grantha script pp. 368
 4. A. 355. Telugu script. pp. 75. 8 Vādas only
 5. 3727 Grantha script pp. 107. 8 Vādas only
 6. A palm-leaf MS. in Grantha script kindly supplied to us by Mr. D. T. Tatachariar, Principal, Śrī Venkateśwara Sanskrit College, Tirupati.
 7. A MS. in Telugu script obtained from Nellore.
 8. A transcript made for the use of His Holiness Paramahansa Parivrājaka Srinivasa Mahā Deśika.
- Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras.*
- Manuscripts Library, Adyar.*
- Mysore Manuscripts Library.*

Suggestions for filling up the many lacunae in the text have been made in square brackets ; and suggestions of better readings have been given in round brackets.

His Holiness Paramahansa Parivrājaka Rangarāmānuja swami, Tarkārṇava T. Viraraghavachariar, Professor of Nyāya, Śrī Venkateśwara Sanskrit College, Tirupati, Panditarāja D. T. Tatachariar, M.O.L., Principal, Śrī Venkateśwara Sanskrit College and Mr. T. E. Viraragavachariar, Professor, Rājāh's College of Sanskrit and Tamil Studies, Trivadi have throughout taken a very kindly interest in this work and helped us in manifold ways. To them we express our deepest sense of gratitude. We acknowledge also the very great debt we owe to Mahāmahopādhyāya Professor S. Kuppuswami Sastriar, M.A., I.E.S. (Retd), for the facilities he gave us for consulting the manuscripts lodged in the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras, for the helpful suggestions given to us from time to time and for his kindness in writing a Foreword to this book. Our sincere thanks are due to Professors M. R. Rajagopala Aiyangar, M.A., L.T., and K. R. Applachariar, M.A., L.T., for having read the Introduction and made valuable sugges-

tions. Our grateful thanks are due also to Dr. B. V. Narayanaswami Naidu, Editor of the Annamalai University Research Journal for the helpful interest he evinced in the publication of this treatise in the Journal.

We cannot adequately thank the Rt. Hon'ble V. S. Srinivasa Sastriar, P.C., C.H., LL.D., Vice-Chancellor of the Annamalai University, for the kind permission he gave us for editing this work.

Annamalainagar,
November 18, 1938.

R. R.
K. S.

FOREWORD

By

Mahāmahopādhyāya Vidyāvācaspati

PROF. S. KUPPUSWAMI SASTRIAR, M.A., I.E.S. (RETIRED).

The *Nyāyakulīśa* is a rare, authoritative and scholarly handbook of the Viśiṣṭādvaita school of Vedānta. Its author, Śrī Ātreya Rāmānuja, otherwise known as Vādihamśāmbuvāha, was the maternal uncle and teacher of Śrī Vedānta Deśika, who flourished in the last quarter of the thirteenth century and the first half of the fourteenth century A.D. If Bhagavad Rāmānuja is the leading exponent of the Viśiṣṭādvaita doctrine and the great Bhāṣyakāra of the Vedānta-darśana in the Viśiṣṭādvaita setting and if the credit of preparing his way belongs to Bhagavad Yāmunācārya, it may be said that, in a closely similar manner, Śrī Vedānta Deśika stands out as the greatest champion of Viśiṣṭādvaita polemics and Śrī Deśika's mainstay in his polemics is the unfailing *Lightning-shaft of dialectic*, which his elder contemporary and teacher, Śrī Ātreya Rāmānuja, has provided in the *Nyāyakulīśa*.

Any systematic study of Vedāntic thought would be impossible without a comparative study of at least the three chief schools of Vedānta—Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita and Dvaita. The *Nyāyakulīśa* is very useful for this purpose. This treatise discusses the chief tenets of the Viśiṣṭādvaita school under thirteen dialectic heads, in a polemical style. The incisive logic of the author's criticisms, particularly where he deals with the views of the Advaita school, is admirable and compels a very respectful consideration.

This important and valuable treatise was hitherto known only through a few manuscripts here and there. The credit of bringing out a reliable and carefully prepared edition of this rare Viśiṣṭādvaita manual, for the first time, belongs to my learned colleagues—Pandit K. Srinivasachariar of the Sanskrit Department and Professor R. Ramanujachariar of the Philosophy Department, Annamalai University; and the world of scholars and all interested in Indian culture ought to feel grateful to the learned editors for the substantial contribution they have made to the study and appreciation of the Vedānta, by bringing out a good edition of this important work, the *Nyāyakulīśa*. The lucid summaries in English and Sanskrit, which the editors have prepared with great care and prefixed to the text of the work, will considerably enhance the usefulness of this publication.

Annamalainagar,

1—8—1938.

S. KUPPUSWAMI SASTRI.

INTRODUCTION

Nyāyakuliśa occupies a prominent place in the development of Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy after Rāmānuja. Its author, Ātreya Rāmānuja, was the *guru* and the maternal uncle of the famous Vedānta Deśika (1268-1369). He was the fifth in the succession of illustrious Viśiṣṭādvaitic teachers (*guruparamparā*) commencing from Bhagavad Rāmānuja, the author of *Śrī Bhāṣya*. It is noteworthy that, in the apostolic succession, the great Rāmānuja was followed by three members of the family to which Ātreya Rāmānuja belonged, namely, his great-grandfather, his grandfather and his own father. Thus Ātreya Rāmānuja and his lineal ancestors enjoyed the proud privilege of being the accredited exponents of Viśiṣṭādvaitic thought to the four successive generations that followed Bhagavad Rāmānuja. Some of the most eminent thinkers and men of letters of later days were also scions of this illustrious stock. The celebrated Gopala Deśika of Kumbakonam and the poet Venkaṭādhvarin may be cited as examples. Among the chief contributions of the former to philosophic thought the most important are *Sārāsvādīnī*, a brilliant commentary on *Rahasya-traya-sāra*, a classic exposition of Viśiṣṭādvaitism, and *Niksepacintāmaṇi*. Śrī Gopāla Deśika had the unique distinction of being the preceptor of three *sannyāsins*. Venkaṭādhvarin, the author of the justly famous *Viśvaguṇādarśa*, so original in its conception and execution, was a prolific writer. *Mīmāṃsā-makaranda*, *Vidhitraya-paritrāṇa*, *Śravaṇānanda*, *Lakṣmīśahasra* and *Uttara-campū* are among his compositions.

The materials for writing Ātreya Rāmānuja's biography are disappointingly scanty. It is, however, learnt on reliable authority that he was born at Conjivaram in the year 1220 A.D. (Kali era 4322; month of Citra in the year Vikrama). At the close of each chapter of *Nyāyakuliśa* he mentions himself as the son of Padmanābhārya. His father must also have been known as Raṅga Rāmānuja, as is evident from the traditional account.

caitrārdrāsambhavam kāñcyām Raṅgarājagurossutam |
supraṭiṣṭhāmśamātreyam Rāmānujagurum bhaje ||

His great-grandfather, Praṇatārthiharācārya, also called Kaḍāmbi Ācchān, was an able exponent of Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy. So great were Praṇatārthiharācārya's scholarship and his powers of argument and exposition that he was named 'Vedāntodayana' (the Udayana of Vedāntic thought). He was the most trusted and loyal disciple of Śrī Rāmānuja, the author of *Śrī Bhāṣya*. Finding that his enemies were

something to be done (*kārya*) is the ultimate significance of every proposition, the Veda must have such a thing (*kārya*) or an action for its final import. The entire body of the upaniṣadic texts dealing with Brahman or Ātman would lose all validity, and the ground would be cut from under the feet of the Vedāntin. Hence, the first chapter addresses itself to the task of refuting the Prābhākara view.

The Prābhākaras maintain that each word denotes not, as it is commonly supposed, the thing standing by itself, but always the thing as related in some manner to action. And the proposition which is merely a group of such words must, if it is to be intelligible at all, refer to some action. The aim of the proposition is not to communicate an idea, but to convey a command or injunction directly leading to the accomplishment of something. Those who believe that words do also denote existent entities must say that in the child's presence the father, mother, teacher or other elderly person points with the finger to different objects in the environment and at the same time also utters their respective names; the observant child learns in course of time that these words of themselves denote the several objects in the environment and that the application of such and such words to such and such things is based on the denotative power of words and that the meanings of words do not include a reference to actions. But this view, say the Prābhākaras, is not tenable. Of the three factors involved here—(i) the uttering of a name, (ii) the action of pointing with the finger, and (iii) the meaning conveyed—it has to be considered whether the sound uttered must be included, along with the significance conveyed, in what is to be taught (*bodhya*) or whether it is to be classed, along with the act of pointing, in that which teaches (the *bōdhaka*). As it is accepted by both the parties that pointing with the finger is the instrument for denoting existing things, it is needless to regard śabda also as an instrument (*bōdhaka*) serving the self-same purpose. It would appear from this that śabda does not convey any significance. Hence, in respect of existent things (*siddhārtha*), śabda is not authoritative.

Again, the view that each word denotes an existing entity comes into conflict with the doctrine which we have accepted already, namely, that every word conveys a significance related to that of the other words in the sentence. For example, in the proposition 'Lift the table', 'table' does not denote the bare table as such, but the table associated with the act of lifting, and 'lift' does not refer merely to lifting in general, but to lifting as related to the table.

It is observed that a child gets to know the meanings of individual words by comparing and contrasting commands like 'Fetch the cow'

(gām ānaya), 'fetch the horse' (aśvam ānaya) and 'tie up the cow' (gām badhāna) and so forth which elderly persons use in daily intercourse. Since this is the natural process of learning a language the meaning of every word comes to be associated in the child's mind with some action or other. It follows, therefore, that every word has the power to signify an action, but never the mere capacity to signify existent things.

As against this view the author urges that it is not without a purpose that when an elderly person tries to teach the young the significance of words he both points to objects and utters their names. It is only when the object denoted by the word, rather than the utterance of the word itself, is considered as the *bodhya* (what is made known), entering upon any activity in regard to that object or refraining therefrom would be possible. Therefore, śabda cannot legitimately be treated as the *bodhya*; it can only be regarded as the *bodhaka*. While the act of pointing with the finger will quite suffice for awakening a knowledge of the object, the utterance of the word is not altogether superfluous. It serves to fix the matter durably in the mind; just as the use of different synonyms helps to din the idea into the mind of the pupil.

There is no truth in the charge that the belief that words denote matters of fact comes into conflict with the doctrine of *anvitābhidhāna* (i.e. the view that any word in a sentence conveys something, not as an isolated unit, but as closely bound up with that of other words in the same sentence). For what really happens is this: each word in a sentence at first recalls to mind something. E.g., in the judgment 'Fetch the cow', the term 'fetch' recalls to mind some significance and 'cow' revives some past impressions. Whether the revived elements fit into an intelligible whole of meaning is next considered by taking note of factors, such as *yogyatā* (congruity), *ākāṅkṣā* (the demand for a word or words to complete the sense) and *sannidhi* (proximity). It is only after the syntactical, logical and phonetic connections of words have been taken into account that each word in the sentence can be said to express a meaning—a meaning associated with what the other word has recalled. 'Fetch,' for example, conveys a meaning associated with what 'cow' has recalled; and 'cow' denotes something related to what 'fetch' has revived.

A similar explanation holds good of assertive propositions also. In the proposition 'This cow is white,' 'this cow' denotes something related to the significance recalled by the term 'white'; and the word 'white' has a meaning closely bound up with what the term 'cow' has recalled to mind. Thus, in no case need we give up the doctrine of *anvitābhidhāna*.

2. *Svataḥ-prāmāṇya-vāda.*

To prove that the Vedas are in their very nature (*svataḥ*) valid, the author, in the manner of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas, seeks to establish in this chapter the doctrine known as *svataḥ-prāmāṇya-vāda* (the self-validity of knowledge). In demonstrating this position the main controversy is with the Naiyāyikas who are advocates of *parataḥ-prāmāṇya-vāda* (the theory of validity from outside).

The Naiyāyika contends that both in respect of its origin (*utpattau*) and in respect of discovery (*jñaptau*) validity is extrinsic, and not intrinsic, to the judgment. Taking the question of how knowledge comes to be true or false (*utpattu*) it must be conceded, says the Naiyāyika, that validity or invalidity depends respectively upon the honesty and competence of the speaker (*vaktr-guṇa*) or his ignorance, deceit and other defects (*vaktr-doṣa*). It is of the very nature of knowledge to be revelatory of reality (*arthaprakāśatva*); and this character of revealing the reality is a general feature (*sādhāraṇa-dharma*) found in valid and invalid cognitions alike. Validity and invalidity, however, are special features (*viśeṣa-dharmas*) met with in certain judgments alone. Though each of these may co-exist with *jñānatva*, each is yet different from the latter. Hence it follows that whether a given judgment is true or false depends entirely upon circumstances other than those that account for the genesis of the the judgment itself. The following analogy illustrates this position. While *vrkṣatva* (tree-ness) is a wider generality present alike in the *śimśapā*, *palāśa* and other trees, *śimśapātva* and *palāśatva* are narrower generalities present only in a limited area. Tree-ness may co-exist with *śimśapātva*. None the less, the two are considered distinct.

Coming to the question of how we become aware of truth and falsity, in order to ascertain the validity of a judgment it is necessary to take note of external considerations, such as awareness of (i) the honesty and competence of the speaker (*guṇa-jñāna*), (ii) the consensus of opinion (*samvāda-jñāna*) and (iii) its capacity to lead to fruitful actions (*artha-kriyā-kāri*).

The Naiyāyika goes on to point out that on the view that the very factors which enable us to apprehend the knowledge itself must also reveal its *prāmāṇya*, there would be no possibility of doubt regarding the validity of judgments.

He thinks that there is no danger of the authoritativeness of the Vedas being sacrificed if the doctrine of self-validity is not accepted. For on the doctrine of *parataḥ-prāmāṇya*, invalidity must result from the defects of the source. Since the omniscient Lord, the author of the Vedas,

possesses infinite perfections and can have no defects of any kind, the Vedas cannot be invalid. Therefore, in order to establish that the vedic teaching is valid, it is needless to subscribe to *svataḥ-prāmāṇya-vāda*.

This may be expressed in syllogistic form as follows :—Validity is dependent upon circumstances other than the causes of knowledge ; for, while being an effect, validity, like invalidity, is a particular mode of knowledge.

The main point of the refutation is that *jñānatva* and *prāmāṇya* are not separate, but identical. *Prāmāṇya* is merely the power of revealing the thing as it really is. In other words, it consists in taking note of the thing possessing qualifications (*viśeṣya*), the qualifications (*viśeṣaṇas*), and the relation between these (*sambandha*). Just as the power to burn things is inherent in fire, even so *prāmāṇya* belongs to the very essence of *jñāna*. It is present in true judgments as also in false ones ; for even in the illusion 'idam rajatam' (this is silver), so far as the subjective element 'idam' is concerned there is *prāmāṇya*.

Even if *jñānatva* and *prāmāṇya* were different, it could not be suggested on reasonable grounds that *prāmāṇya* is a special feature (*viśeṣa-dharma*) like *palāśatva* or *śimśapātva*. For, just as a certain bodily form or structure (*samsthāna*) is present in all cows and serves to manifest *gotva*, *prāmāṇya* is present in knowledge and serves to reveal *jñānatva*. Even when the form or structure of a particular cow does not conform in every detail to the type, for the reason that the given animal is hornless, blind or otherwise defective, the name 'cow' is not denied to it. Similarly, in the case of the illusory cognition, even in the absence of *sambandha*, the remaining two factors do suffice for manifesting *jñānatva*. Just as a certain structure or form (*samsthāna*) which serves to reveal *gotva* is considered a general quality, even so *prāmāṇya* which helps to manifest *jñānatva* may quite well be a common feature. But for *prāmāṇya*, knowledge would cease to be knowledge.

Next it is shown that the analogy of 'treeness' is not apposite. In the *śimśapā* tree there are two aspects—(1) certain features common to all trees indicative of *vrkṣatva* (treeness) and (2) certain features peculiar to the *śimśapā* tree revealing *śimśapātva*. But in the case of *jñāna* apart from the general feature, namely, *prāmāṇya* which reveals *jñānatva*, no special feature revealing *prāmāṇya* is met with. Therefore, on the analogy of tree-ness and *śimśapātva* which stand respectively for wider and narrower generalities, we cannot treat *jñānatva* and *prāmāṇya* as *sādhāraṇa* and *viśeṣa dharmas*. Hence, in respect of origin (*utpatti*), besides the causes of knowledge no other factors are needed to account

for *prāmāṇya*. In a word, *prāmāṇya* is inherent in the very nature of knowledge.

Again, the truth of a judgment cannot be said to be discovered from a knowledge of the merits (*guṇa*) of the speaker. When the knowledge of an object arises in the self, the object comes to be endowed with an illumination, known as *jñānatva*, *prakāśa*, or *artha-prakāśa*. Validity is simply the power of *jñāna* to produce this *artha-prakāśa*. From the *artha-prakāśa*, the effect, its cause, namely, *jñāna* is inferred. The inference which reveals *jñāna* must also make known its *prāmāṇya* (validity). When the discovery of truth is said to be intrinsic (*svataḥ*) all that is meant is that the validity of knowledge is understood from the very inference whereby knowledge itself is inferred, and that no additional factor is required therefor.

The charge that on *svataḥ-prāmāṇya-vāda* there would be no room for any doubt regarding *prāmāṇya* (validity) in any circumstances is met by saying that one may believe in self-validity and still entertain doubts. Belief in self-validity does not obviate doubt. As long as there is room for suspecting that there may be factors leading to *aprāmāṇya*, doubts are bound to arise even though there is belief in validity. To illustrate the point.—Even though it is well known that the seed has the power to produce the sprout, one may yet entertain doubts about a particular seed, for who knows it has not lost its power to germinate on account of its proximity to fire. It is only when the person can be sure that the seed could not have been placed by the side of the fire that he could give up this doubt. This doubt does not lead one to abandon the general belief in the power of the seed to sprout. Similarly, even when it is known that judgments are in their innate nature valid, yet doubts concerning the validity of particular judgments may arise, so long as the possibilities of their being invalid are not ruled out. The existence of doubts does not necessarily lead to the rejection of the belief that the discovery of validity is intrinsic (*svataḥ*).

In conclusion, it is shown that the argument advanced by the opponent is liable to be charged with the fallacy of *hetva-siddhi*. *Prāmāṇya*, as indicated already, is a general feature and not a special quality requiring a special cause.

3. *Khyāti-nirūpaṇa-vāda*.

In this chapter the author repudiates the *akhyāti* of the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas and the *Anirvacanīya-khyāti* of the Advaitins and maintains the *Anyathā-khyāti* of the Naiyāyikas and *Yathārtha-khyāti* advocated by the Viśiṣṭādvaitins.

The Prābhākara contend that in the erroneous cognition 'This is silver' there is no sensory contact with silver. 'This' is a presented fact; and 'silver' is a memory experience. There are thus two elements—(i) experience of present object and (ii) memory—and not a single psychosis as the Naiyāyika supposes. But against this, the Naiyāyika urges that, if the representative element concerns silver in the shop (*āpanasta*), there could only be the judgment 'There is silver in the shop' and not 'This object on the roadside is silver.' The Prābhākara answer is that owing to certain defects (*doṣa*) the real location of silver is lost sight of. A person proceeds to pick the object on the road side, not because he perceives the silver element therein, but because he fails to notice the difference between the memory of silver and the presented object.

The very existence of differences of opinion among rival thinkers may be said to point to *anyathā-khyāti*. Take the two statements: "Sound (*śabda*) is eternal' and 'Sound is non-eternal.' Since two mutually contradictory qualities cannot reside in the self-same object, the person who believes in the eternity of sound thinks that eternity is present in sound, and that, consequently, his opponent has understood the nature of sound differently from what it is. Similarly, the believer in the perishability of sound thinks that 'non-eternity' dwells in sound and that, therefore, his opponent has misunderstood the nature of sound. Hence the quarrel between the two. But on the Prābhākara view that error is not a unit of knowledge but a composite of two *jñānas*, the judgment 'sound is eternal' would consist of two items of *jñāna*—(i) *śabda* and (ii) eternity; and the judgment 'sound is non-eternal,' conveys knowledge of sound and also knowledge of non-eternity. In either case, the judgment does not assert that eternity or non-eternity is present in sound. And so long as this is not so, there is no room for dispute.

A consideration of the way in which the subsequent judgment falsifies the earlier but erroneous cognition would serve to show that in the first cognition the mind must have understood the thing differently from its real nature (*anyathā*). The sublating cognition, 'This is not silver; it is only shell' presupposes an earlier judgment 'This is silver', where the silver element is erroneously synthesised with 'this'.

Further, so long as the silver element is not perceived in 'this' that is, so long as the nature of the object on the roadside is not grasped differently from what it is (*anyathā*), there will not arise the activity of picking the object. On the Prābhākara account the activity of picking the object, as though it were silver, is due merely to our failure to notice the difference between the memory element (i.e., silver) and the

perceived element (*bhedāgrahaṇa*). If so, we must also react to it as shell, because in it we do not perceive the difference from the shell. Should it be said that the difference from the shell is perceived, clearly there is *anyathā-khyāti* or wrong synthesis.

Bhrānti or illusory cognition is a particular mode of knowledge and is a mistake of commission, and not one of omission. It is the mere failure to apprehend difference. If so, as there is non-apprehension of difference in deep sleep, deep sleep would have to be treated as *bhrānti*. Hence, it follows that illusion involves *anyathā-khyāti*.

It is *anyathā-khyāti* rather than *akhyāti* that does justice to the nature of experience. When a person realises his mistake, he is found to confess 'I mistook shell for silver'; he is never found to say "I failed to keep apart the memory of silver from the perceived object on the road."

The advocates of *anirvacanīya-khyāti* assert that *jñāna* is the only ultimate reality. Since it is quality-less, the character of apprehending the object which is ordinarily ascribed to *jñāna* cannot, strictly speaking, be attributed to it. The objects apprehended are neither *sat* nor *asat*. For, if they were unreal, they would not be perceived; and if they were real, they would not be sublated. But they are perceived and later sublated. Hence, they are indescribable or *anirvacanīya*. This pure consciousness or *jñāna* is no other than the substrate (*āśraya*) of illegitimate transference (*adhyāsa*).

In refutation of *anirvacanīya-khyāti* it is first pointed out that as knowledge is said to partake of the characters of being *parokṣa* (indirect), *aparokṣa* (immediate), *anubhava* (experience), *smṛti* (memory) and so forth, *jñāna* cannot be said to be *nirdharmaka* (without qualities). Secondly, as objects of experience are known, they are *sat*; and as they are later contradicted, they are *asat*; and they would thus be both *sat* and *asat* and not *sadasad-vilakṣaṇa* or *anirvacanīya*. Moreover, it cannot be said that *jñāna* is merely the *āśraya* of illegitimate transference (*adhyāsa*). On the contrary, it really points to an object outside. It is the very nature of knowledge to point to really existent things.

The doctrine of quintuplication (*pañcī-karaṇa*), according to which all objects of the perceptible world contain all the five elements (*bhūtas*) though in varying proportions, lends support to *yathārtha-khyāti*. On this view, the object concerning which the illusory judgment 'This is silver' arises contains silver as also shell. The silver element is, however, very slight, the shell element predominating. It is the failure to

note the slightness (*alpatva*) of the silver element and the preponderance of the shell element that accounts for the illusion. The subsequent judgment "This is not silver" arises when the dominance of the shell element is realised, and it inhibits the activity which was prompted by the failure to notice this dominance. The assertion that the erroneous cognition 'this is silver' disappears when the subsequent judgment "This is shell" arises does not mean that the former judgment is abandoned; it only signifies that the activity prompted by the earlier cognition is arrested. Thus, all judgments reveal only what exist.

4. *Svayamprakāśa-vāda*.

The fourth chapter is devoted to the establishment of the doctrine that jñāna is self-luminous (*svayamprakāśa*). The ground is prepared for this doctrine by the refutation of the views of Kumārila, Murāri Miśra and the Naiyāyikas in regard to this matter.

According to Kumārila jñāna has the power to reveal other objects excepting itself. It does not, however, mean that it is unknowable. Though it cannot be grasped by the senses, it is inferred from the illumination (*prākāṣya*) which it generates in objects that are known. Thus it is not self-luminous. This view is rather far-fetched. For explaining why vision apprehends only the colour of objects and not their smell, even though colour and smell are equally inherent in the objects that are seen, the aid of *prākāṣya* (power of manifestation) is invoked. It is said that the visual mechanism has a power in virtue of which the knowledge it generates has the peculiar property of producing an illumination with regard to colour alone. A simpler explanation, says Murāri Miśra, would be to recognise that visual knowledge has merely the power to apprehend colours, and dispense with the notion of *prākāṣya*. Even after positing this mysterious *prākāṣya* for which there is no warrant, it may be asked why *prākāṣya* is generated in regard to colour and not to smell. The only possible answer would be that visual knowledge has this special power of producing an illumination in colour alone. With the denial of *prākāṣya*, the theory that knowledge is inferred therefrom falls to the ground.

Nor can it be contended that knowledge is self-luminous. For if it is self-luminous, it must illumine itself, just as it manifests other things; that is to say, it will be its own object (*viṣaya*). Since the object (*viṣaya*) is considered the cause of perceptual knowledge, this line of argument would lead to the self-refuting position that knowledge is the cause of itself. Therefore, it has to be concluded that jñāna is grasped by *anuvyavasāya* (reflection upon experience). This reflection is of the form 'I know the pot'.

The view defended by the author is that *jñāna* is like the lamp which dispels darkness and reveals objects and does not require for its own manifestation another lamp. Similarly, by its conjunction with objects, *jñāna* reveals objects ; but in regard to its own manifestation, *jñāna* does not require another *jñāna*. The objection that, since *jñāna* is a quality, it cannot come into conjunction with objects is not valid ; for, as it is said to be subject to expansion and contraction, *jñāna* must be treated as a substance. When *jñāna* is said to be self-luminous what is really meant is that *jñāna*, unlike other objects, does not require for its own manifestation conjunction with another *jñāna*. This may be expressed in syllogistic form. This *jñāna* does not require for its manifestation anything other than itself ; for, like the lamp, it manifests objects.

5. *Īśvarānumāna-bhanga-vāda*.

Unless the view that God is inferred (*ānumānika*) is abandoned the scriptures would lose their authority. On the well-known principle that the *śāstras* are valid only with regard to matters lying beyond the scope of the other *pramāṇas* (*aprāpte śāstram arthavat*), if God is known through inference, then, in respect of God, the scriptures are futile. It is not helpful to point out that, while reason establishes only the existence of God, the scriptures are necessary for giving information about those who attend upon him (*parijana*), his dwelling place and so on. For the scriptures would then be dependent upon reason and cannot contradict its verdict. It is only after the existence of God has been established by reason that one may proceed to inquire into His attendants, abode etc., from the study of the scriptures. When reason tells us that God is endowed with infinite perfections, how can the scriptures convey the opposite teaching that his attendants, abode and so on add to his glory ? Nor is it possible to obviate this difficulty by saying that while God's existence is inferred from reason, His being the material cause of the world is learnt only from the scriptures and that, in this sense, the scriptures are not robbed of their usefulness. For if so, He must act as the material cause of the world either by being endowed with a body or by remaining without one ; and either alternative would lead to an unwelcome result. On the former alternative, He would become a *samsārīn* ; on the latter, the view accepted by us, namely, that God is the material cause only through His body, would have to be abandoned. Thus, so long as it is not admitted that the scriptures teach the existence of God, they cannot be assigned an intelligible purpose. To establish their prime usefulness it is necessary to demolish the view that God is *ānumānika*.

The main argument by which the *Naiyāyika* attempts to prove God's existence is the following:—Like the jar, earth and other objects

are effects ; because they point to an agent. As the finite soul is incapable of producing them, this agent must be a competent maker, that is, God. That these objects are effects is vouched for both by perception and by inference. The argument takes the following form :—Earth and the like are effects ; for, like the jar, they possess parts. Against this argument it may be urged that the relation between ‘ being an effect ’ and ‘ pointing to an agent ’ is far from being universal and that it is really dependent upon the accidental feature (*upādhi*), namely, *śakyakriyatva* (capacity for being produced), and that consequently the argument is liable to be charged with *vyāpyatvāsiddha*.

But this objection is valueless, because *śakyakriyatva*, though not perceptible, is yet inferred to exist wherever the *sādhana*, ‘ being an effect,’ is present. Therefore, the argument is free from the charge of *vyāpyatvāsiddha*.

The futility of the argument advanced by the Naiyāyika is exposed by showing that when he argues that earth and other objects point to an agent, he must mean by ‘ agent ’ either the bare self as such or the self endowed with volition (*yatna*) alone or the self endowed with a volition which is associated with auxiliary causes, such as, knowledge and power. On the first alternative, his argument becomes vitiated by the defect of *bādhya*, in as much as it would only establish that the cause of the world is a self devoid of volition and other qualities and not an Omnipotent Lord. A further defect of the argument is that the *sādhya* is not present in the illustrative example cited. The second alternative fares no better ; for on this view the self is the cause of the world either in virtue of its bare volition or through the outward activities in which the volition expresses itself. If the former is correct, there is the old difficulty of the *sādhya* not being present in the illustrative examples adduced. The mere volition of the potter, for example, would not suffice for the production of the jar. If the latter view is advocated, the Naiyāyika would be guilty of contradicting his theory that the tendency of fire to proceed upwards or that of wind to blow side-ways is all due to *adrṣṭa* and not to any volition and its expression in outward act. Even if it be conceded for the sake of argument that a self endowed with such a volition as expresses itself in outward activity is the cause of the world all that the argument could prove is that the maker of the cosmos is an intelligent person and not that he is omniscient. Volition could only indicate that its possessor is endowed with intelligence ; it need not point to omniscience. Should it be said that since volition takes different forms according to the effects intended to be produced, and is dependent on the knowledge of the particular thing to be produced and that, in the case of the creation of the world, its maker should be all knowing, it is replied that volition need not depend upon knowledge. Take for example, the

case of deep sleep ; here the effort to live is not dependent upon any knowledge. The third alternative is equally faulty. There is no point in saying that the maker of the world is a self endowed with volition found along with knowledge, power and so on which are auxiliary thereto ; because, as pointed out already, volition is not necessarily dependent upon knowledge. If it be said that, as volition exists along with knowledge, knowledge is inferred from volition, it is replied that by parity of reasoning one should infer the existence of a body, since volition is associated with the presence of a body.

Not only this ; there are arguments proving an opposite conclusion. Eg., if earth and other objects point to an agent at all, that agent must be an embodied person, an individual possessing knowledge which is non-eternal and an ordinary person like any one of us, and not possessed of omniscience.

6. *Dehādyatiriktātma-yāthātmya-vāda*

That the soul is an entity different from the body, senses, mind (manas), vital breath (prāṇa) and intellect (buddhi), that it is distinct from the Supreme Soul, that each soul is distinct from every other soul, that it is an agent (kartā), a knower and the object of self-consciousness (*aham-pratyaya*) is the teaching of this chapter. As a preliminary to the establishment of this thesis, the Cārvāka and the Advaitic conceptions of the soul are subjected to a rigorous examination.

The Cārvāka accepts the view that the soul is the object of self-consciousness (*aham-pratyaya*), but draws therefrom the conclusion that the soul is identical with the body ; for there arises the cognition 'I am a man', 'I am a deva' and so on. The soul is not to be identified with the senses ; for no one ever gets the cognition 'I am the nose', or 'I am the ear'. Nor is it to be equated with the mind (manas) ; for the mind, being an instrument of knowledge, cannot also be its agent (*kartā*). The soul is not the vital breath (prāṇa) either ; for when vital breath continues to be active even when the body is at rest, there arises the cognition 'I am wholly inactive'. It is equally impossible to equate the soul with consciousness (buddhi) ; for, since jñāna comes from the root jñā (to know), it refers to something to be accomplished and not to the soul which is an existent entity (*siddhārta*). Thus by a process of elimination also it is shown that the soul is no other than the body. It may be asked : Does not the cognition 'This is my body' mark off the soul from the body ? The Cārvāka replies that this difficulty is not peculiar to him, but that the cognition 'This is my self' creates a similar difficulty for his opponents also ; and that the escape open to them, namely the device of understanding this proposition in a figurative sense, is open to him too.

Though the elements (*bhūtas*) which compose the body are severally insentient, consciousness, the Cārvāka argues, may still emerge from their peculiar concatenation. It may be likened to the emergence of the intoxicating quality from the mingling of certain ingredients which separately do not possess it. As infancy, youth, manhood and so on are merely different states of the self-same body, there is nothing improper in a person in middle age remembering what he experienced in infancy and youth.

The Advaitins assert that the soul is an inner (*pratyak*) principle distinct from the body and that it is not to be confounded with the knower. To say that the soul is *pratyak* is to assert that it is self-luminous. As knowledge alone is self-luminous, the soul must be identified with *cit* (consciousness). If the soul is described as a knower, it would be the possessor of knowledge. In other words, it would be different from *jñāna*. If so, the soul would become external (*parāk*); for whatever is different from *jñāna* is *parāk*.

Some of the outstanding difficulties in the way of the Cārvāka doctrine are the following.—On the view which identifies the soul with the body, either the body is an aggregate of parts or it is something additional to the parts that enter into its composition. In any case, consciousness must be admitted to reside in the parts; because it is well-known that the special qualities of the whole (*avayavī*) are dependent on those of the parts (*avayava*); and because there could be no consciousness in the aggregate when the parts composing it are devoid of consciousness. But the parts do not possess it; for, if they did, they would be equated with the self and there would arise cognitions such as 'I am the foot,' 'I am the hand'. Judgments such as 'I feel pain in the eye', 'I have a comfortable feeling in the head' cannot be said to indicate the presence of consciousness in the bodily parts; for they only show that the self experiences pleasure or pain in the regions mentioned. Further, if some part of the body alone possessed consciousness, with the loss of that organ, consciousness would be altogether lost. If each of the bodily parts were to possess consciousness, there would be several conscious entities in the same body and these would, like the residents of a village, be constantly warring with one another. For the conscious entity is notorious for its self-regarding impulses.

It is untenable to argue that just as the betel leaf, areca nut and lime, which do not separately possess redness, yet produce the red colour when they are chewed together, consciousness may emerge from out of the factors that constitute the body, even though taken severally these factors are insentient. What really happens is the particles of the betel

leaf, the nut and lime first acquire the red colour on account of the heat engendered in the act of chewing. Thus the red colour in the effect is accounted for by the causes themselves acquiring it. It cannot, therefore, be maintained that a property not present in the causal factors severally may well emerge when they combine together in certain special ways.

Besides, if this materialistic doctrine were true, all religious duties such as, *yāga* (sacrifice) and *dāna* (gift), performed for the sake of rewards to be reaped after bodily death would be labour wholly lost, and the *śāstras* prescribing such duties would become meaningless.

In refutation of the Advaitic doctrine the author points out that knowledge cannot be the self, because the judgment 'I know' clearly shows that knowledge is an attribute of 'I' rather than the self itself. Again, knowledge is well-known to have a beginning and an end; and it cannot, therefore, be identified with the eternal self. The real meaning of *pratyak* is not 'being self-luminous' as the Advaitins contend, but 'shining forth for the sake of oneself'. As *jñāna* shines forth for the sake of the self and not for its own sake, it must, with pots and other objects, be treated as *parāk*. The self alone can be said to shine for its own sake. Therefore, it alone is *pratyak*. Again, if the *śāstras* which prescribe several duties for the realisation of different benefits are not to be robbed of their meaning, the soul must be admitted to be an agent and an enjoyer. *Kartṛtva* (being an agent) and *bhokṛtva* (being an enjoyer) cannot be explained away as being due to limiting conditions.

7. *Sāmānādhikaraṇya-vāda*

For a proper understanding of Vedāntic passages, such as 'satyam jñānam anantam Brahma', it is essential that the true nature of *sāmānādhikaraṇya* (the grammatical co-ordination of words in a sentence) must be grasped at the very outset. Consequently, the author takes up for consideration the definition of *sāmānādhikaraṇya* laid down by the grammarians, examines the interpretations put on it by the *Bhedābheda-vādins* and *Advaitins*, and in the end establishes what he considers the correct interpretation.

Sāmānādhikaraṇya is defined by the grammarians as follows. Words having different *pravṛtti-nimitta* (reasons of application or significations) but referring to an identical object (i.e. words having connotational difference and denotational identity) may be said to stand in the relation of *sāmānādhikaraṇya*. The *Bhedābheda-vādins* believe that this definition accords best only with their own fundamental philosophical creed—the doctrine that a substance is different and yet non-different

from its *viśeṣaṇas* (qualifications). Take, they say, the judgment 'This is a cow'. The words 'this' and 'cow' have different reasons of application or significations (*binna-pravṛttinimitta*); 'this' stands for a particular object (*vyakti*) and 'cow' for the *jāti*, 'cow-ness'; and they refer to an identical object, since *jāti* and *vyakti* are not altogether different. In the judgment 'This is white', the words 'this' and 'white' have different meanings, the first word referring to an object in front of the speaker and the second to whiteness; and both refer to the identical object, since *guṇa* and *guṇi* cannot be said to be altogether different.

A possible objection to this view is that in the judgment examined the term 'cow', like the word *daṇḍi* (person wielding a stick), refers to a *vyakti* (a particular animal possessing 'cow-ness') and not to mere *jāti* (cow-ness), and that, consequently, this equation cannot teach that *vyakti* and *jāti* are non-different. The *Bhedābheda-vādin* meets this objection by pointing out that *jāti* is nowhere found separately from the *vyakti* in the manner in which the stick is found in isolation from the person wielding it, and that the word 'cow' does not denote an entity possessing cow-ness. Further, if *vyakti* and *jāti* were different, they must, like the stick and its possessor, be known in isolation from each other. But as they are not apprehended separately, they must be identical.

Moreover, since two objects having different shapes cannot occupy the same place, the whole (*avayavī*) and part (*avayava*) residing in the same region must be understood to be non-different. The *Bhedābheda-vādin* claims that on the basis of the doctrine of simultaneous difference and non-difference it is easy to assign an intelligible meaning to the *upaniṣadic* passages equating Brahman with man and material nature.

Briefly stated, the *advaitic* position is this.—A statement of co-ordination is incapable of expressing the fact of one thing possessing several attributes (*viśeṣaṇas*); on the other hand, it aims at teaching the bare existence of an indivisible whole of reality (*akhaṇḍasvarūpa*). It cannot signify the qualifications alone; for in that case the qualifications being numerous, the belief that the statement refers to a single object must be abandoned. Nor can it refer to an object possessing *viśeṣaṇas*. Since it is the very nature of a *viśeṣaṇa* to mark off or distinguish one object from another, the several qualifications must differentiate the objects qualified by them. And, as a consequence, the view that the statement expresses one object must be given up. Hence it follows that a statement of co-ordination refers to a partless whole of reality.

If the statement refers to *akhaṇḍasvarūpa*, what becomes of that part of the definition of *sāmānādhikarāṇya* which insists that the differentiated words must have their separate significations? The *Advaitin*

brushes aside this difficulty by saying that this part of the definition is merely intended to exclude tautologous statements like 'The jar is a pot'. It is unnecessary, he contends, that the words should convey different meanings within the given statement. It is enough if they are already understood elsewhere to have different connotations. Therefore, vedic texts such as 'satyam jñānam anantam Brahma,' must be taken to teach the existence of an indivisible, featureless (nirguṇa) Brahman, rather than a Brahman possessing qualities.

The main counts in the indictment against the Bhedābheda-vādin are—(i) Since *bheda* and *abheda*, which respectively take on a positive and a negative expression 'This is x' and 'This is not x', are contradictory features, they cannot be attributed to the selfsame object. (ii) It is unreasonable to contend that for the reason that *jāti* and *vyakti* are not observed separately from each other, the term *cow* does not denote an animal possessing cow-ness. For in order that anything may be treated as a *viśeṣaṇa* it is not essential that it should be observed separately or that it should have a shape of its own different from that of the object which it qualifies. When the *viśeṣaṇa* is known to have an independent existence and is found to qualify an object only occasionally, the suffix *matup* is added to the word denoting this *viśeṣaṇa*. But when the *viśeṣaṇa* has no independent existence of its own and is always found along with the thing which it qualifies, there is no need of that suffix. Therefore, in the statement 'This is a cow' the term 'cow' may quite well signify an animal possessing the *viśeṣaṇa*, 'cow-ness'. (iii) The belief that the invariable presentation of *jāti* and *vyakti* together points to their non-difference (*abheda*) is erroneous; for the very fact of their universal concomitance would only establish their separateness. (iv) For the simple reason that there is no warrant for positing a whole (*avayavi*) over and above the parts (*avayava*), the argument that since the whole and part occupy the same area they must be at once different and non-different is unsustainable. These considerations suffice to show that the attempt to interpret the definition of *sāmānādhikaraṇya* from the standpoint of Bhedābheda is thoroughly unconvincing.

The Advaitic interpretation of *sāmānādhikaraṇya lakṣaṇa* also labours under great difficulties. For one thing, on the view that the different words co-ordinated do not refer to the relation of several attributes to the unitary reality, but signify only the thing itself, any one word out of the group would suffice, and there would be no sense in employing several words. Again, of the two requirements mentioned in the *sāmānādhikaraṇya lakṣaṇa*—(1) that the words should have different significations and (2) should refer to an identical object—it is not known why the advaitin accepts the second and slurs over the first.

Nor is it reasonable to contend that if the several co-ordinated words refer to different *viśeṣaṇas*, they would mark off the *viśeṣyas* (things qualified by them) from one another. For only contradictory qualities (e.g. having crumpled horns and having straight horns) which cannot reside together in the selfsame object differentiate their *viśeṣyas*. But where the different qualities are not opposed to one another, but may well exist together in the same object, there is no danger of their pointing to different objects. Take for example the proposition 'Devadatta is dark-complexioned, young, red-eyed, not stupid, not poor, of irreproachable character'. There is nothing contradictory in the several attributes being present in a single individual. Thus co-ordination expresses the fact of one thing being characterised by several attributes. The upaniṣadic text 'satyam jñānam anantam Brahma' must be interpreted to teach that the unitary reality, Brahman, is characterised by several attributes, and not to assert that Brahman is *nirguṇa* (without qualities).

After a critical consideration of the views of the *Bhedābheda-vādin* and *Advaitin*, the author sets forth what he considers to be the proper interpretation of *sāmānādhikaraṇya lakṣaṇa*. Different words may stand in the relation of co-ordination, if there are different reasons for their application and if they refer to one and the same object. The first part of this definition aims at showing that there can be no co-ordination between synonyms like 'pot' and 'jar'; because the reason for applying the term 'pot' to an object is not different from that prompting the use of the word 'jar'. The second part serves to point out that there can be no co-ordination between words referring to wholly different objects, e.g., pot and cloth. It rules out such meaningless co-ordinations as 'The pot is cloth'.

8. *Sat-kārya-vāda*

The problem of causality which has evoked very keen controversy is next tackled. The *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* view of causality known as *asat-kārya-vāda* (the view that the effect has no existence before it is brought into existence, but originates afresh) is subjected to a penetrating criticism and *sat-kārya-vāda* (the doctrine that the effect pre-exists in its cause in a latent form) established.

Asat-kārya-vāda teaches that the cause and effect are wholly disparate. Of the several arguments advanced in support of this thesis one is that the cause and the effect give rise to altogether distinct cognitions (*buddhi*). If the cause and the effect were different names for what is substantially the same, the cognition of any one of them must mean the cognition of the other. But, as a matter of fact, their cognitions are quite

different. The cause and the effect are referred to by different words (*śabda*). Their number varies ; e.g., the threads are many, but the cloth is one. They serve different purposes ; e.g., threads are serviceable for producing cloth, while the cloth is useful for wearing. They have different forms (*ākāra*) and exist at different instants of time (*kāla*) ; the cause (e.g. threads) is an earlier occurrence ; but the effect (e.g. cloth) is a subsequent event. They arise from different causes ; e.g. threads have cotton for their cause, while the cloth has threads as its cause.

A second argument is that if the effect pre-exists in the cause, there will be no need to admit several factors conducive to the production of the effect. If, for example, the cloth exists in the threads, the weaver would have no function.

A third reason is that if effects do not come into being but always prefigure in their causes, there will be no basis for the familiar distinction between things eternal and things non-eternal. The Naiyāyika thinks that there is no force in the objection that differences of *buddhi*, *śabda*, and so on existing between the cause and the effect do not indicate that they are altogether distinct, but only show that such differences arise only from the different states (*avasthās*) assumed by what is substantially the same entity. For the opponent must say either that a given *avasthā* is present in both the cause and the effect, or that it is present in the one or the other, there being no fixity in regard to this matter, or that it is present as a definite rule in one of them. On the first alternative, the identical state will exist in both, and cannot, therefore, account for differences in *jñāna*, *śabda*, etc. On the next alternative, *kāraṇāvasthā* may as well be found in the effect and the *kāryāvasthā* in the cause, and there will, thus, be no basis for the differences in question. On the last alternative, *kāraṇāvasthā* will always be met with only in the cause and the *kāryāvasthā* in the effect ; and hence there would be no warrant for asserting the substantial identity of cause and effect. To say that they are one would amount, it is alleged, to attributing contradictory qualities (*kāraṇāvasthā* and *kāryāvasthā*) to the self-same object.

In reply to the Nyāya arguments it is first urged that the Naiyāyika assumes it as a self-evident fact that we have two wholly different cognitions about cause and effect, and that, on the strength of this gratuitous assumption, he argues that they are different. This argument falls to the ground when it is shown that we do not get two wholly distinct cognitions about them, but usually experience them as being non-different. We often remark " what was once a lump of clay has now become this pot ", " what was formerly a bundle of threads has now become this cloth." This co-ordination of cause and effect and the fact that no one

is ever found to say "This is a new substance where, however, the *upādāna-kāraṇa* (material cause) persists" clearly point out that there is no warrant for saying that the effect (e.g. cloth) does not pre-exist in the cause (threads), and that it is really a new substance wherein, however, threads continue to exist.

Again, there is little difficulty in accounting for differences of *jñāna*, *śabda* and the like on the basis of differences of state (*avasthā*). The cause has, as a definite rule, a state of its own, and the effect its own particular *avasthā*. To say so would amount, it was urged, to ascribing contradictory qualities to the selfsame thing, and would only strengthen the case for the distinctness of the cause from the effect. But this difficulty is wholly imaginary. For, unlike the mutually opposed attributes of white and not white which cannot reside in an identical object but point to two different substrates, *kāraṇāvasthā* and *kāryāvasthā* may well belong to the identical object but at different times. Hence, there is no need to assert that cause and effect are wholly different.

Further, the conjunction (*samyōga*) of threads is admitted by the Nyāya-Viśeṣika to be the *asamavāyi-kāraṇa* of cloth. The Viśiṣṭādvaitin contends that, since this conjunction itself suffices to explain the differences of *jñāna*, *śabda* and the like, it is unnecessary to posit for this purpose an effect (cloth) wholly different from its cause (threads). It is only in virtue of this conjunction that the threads so conjoined get the name, and occasion the knowledge of, 'cloth'.

Besides, *sat-kārya-vāda* has the support of the scriptures. The upaniṣadic text declares that by knowing one thing everything becomes known; and, in illustration of this, takes the case of clay and says that by understanding it all objects made out of clay, such as pot and cups, are understood. Clearly, the idea conveyed here is that when the material cause is known, its manifold effects are thereby known. And this would be impossible if the cause and the effect were totally different.

9. *Samsthāna-sāmānya-samarthana-vāda*

The question of the precise nature of *sāmānya* (universal) has long been the battle-ground of philosophers. The Viśiṣṭādvaitins have identified *sāmānya* with *samsthāna* (structure). But the Naiyāyika has elevated *jāti* to the rank of a distinct principle. On his view, *jāti* is the generic property perceptible equally in all the particulars (*vyaktis*) of a class. It is eternal, unitary, ubiquitous (*anekānugatam*) and directly apprehended. It is not a mere product of the imagination as the Buddhists contend, but a factor of reality existing out there in the objective world. When we describe an animal as a cow

we are said to affirm the presence therein of a generic feature called *gotva* (cow-ness), a feature present in all cows, whatever be their colour, stature and the like, and absent in all animals other than the cow (*gavētara*).

A person perceiving an animal for the first time, e.g. an elephant, tells his friend, "Look here ! this is a strange animal." Though the latter has not seen this particular elephant before, he replies, on the strength of his knowledge of other elephants, "Why, there is nothing strange in this ; it is an elephant and I have seen this before." This reply is intelligible, we are told, only on the view that he is acquainted with elephant-ness as a *jāti* distinct from the *vyaktis* wherein it is present.

On meeting several instances of a class, e.g. cows, a person remarks 'This is a cow', 'That is a cow', 'That other is a cow' and so forth. The rise of such a cognition can be explained, it is said, only on the hypothesis that he recognises 'cow-ness' (*gotva*) as being present in each of these instances. If, however, he does not notice 'cow-ness' in the different particulars and has merely learnt that a given *vyakti* (object) is a cow, he will not be in a position to say 'That also is a cow', 'That other also is a cow', and so on. A possible objection is that in order to account for this cognition it is unnecessary to posit the category of *jāti* and that the *upādhi* (same adventitious feature which does not amount to a *jāti*) would quite suffice. E.g., to say X, Y, Z and so on are cooks it is needless to posit a *jāti* called *pācakatva*. These persons could be treated as forming a class merely with the aid of the *upādhi*, namely, 'engaged in cooking'. This objection is lacking in force, because, so long as the concept of *jāti* existing in *dravya* (substance), *guṇa* (quality), and *karma* (action) is not admitted, the *upādhi* (adventitious circumstance) alone would be incapable of bringing together several particulars under a common head. Taking the very example adduced by the objector, it could be shown that the act of cooking could not bring together all persons engaged in this act into a single class, until the *jāti* of *pākatva* is admitted to exist in the several acts of cooking. Therefore it must be concluded that terms, such as cow and horse, are employed for the reason (*pravṛtti-nimitta*) that in the objects in question 'cow-ness', 'horse-ness' and the like are present. It cannot be contended that the reasons for employing these words is the presence of certain appropriate forms (*samsthāna*) in the objects. For this view would imply that the *samsthāna* is either one or many. If the former, *samsthāna* would merely be *jāti* under a different name, and the dispute would centre round the name alone. If the latter, there would be a plurality of reasons for employing the same word (*pravṛtti-nimittabheda*). Thus either alternative leads to an unwelcome result. To obviate this difficulty if it is said that any one of the several sams-

thānas constitutes the *pravṛtti-nimitta*, then, the position is liable to be charged with *vyabhicāra doṣa*. For, taking each one of the *saṁsthānas* it could be shown that in its absence the name could still be employed.

The Naiyāyika further urges that the very possibility of inference would be jeopardised if *jāti* is not accepted. For the *vyāpti* (universal relation) which is the very basis of inference is not the statement of relation between one particular and another, but an expression of universal connection between two sets of particulars, each set having same common property (*jāti*).

An examination of the way in which children learn the significance of words from the commands of elderly persons is said to reveal the fact that children come by concepts (*jāti*) by the abstraction of particular features and the fixing up of common qualities.

The *siddhāntin* is of opinion that *jāti* or *sāmānya* is closely similar *saṁsthāna*. *Sāmānya* literally means 'the nature shared in common by similar objects' (*saṁānānām bhāvassāmānyam*); it denotes the nature of objects coming under a common group. Since it is possible to account for the cognition 'This is a cow' 'That is a cow' 'That other is also a cow', with the aid of the closely similar feature present in several *vyaktis*, a *jāti* distinct from *saṁsthāna* need not be posited. Even those who hold *jāti* to be something distinct, admit that there is such a thing as form.

When *saṁsthāna* is said to constitute the *pravṛtti-nimitta* of a word what is really meant is this. At the time the second, third or subsequent instance of a class is perceived, there is, in addition to the awareness of the *saṁsthāna* of that *vyakti*, the recollection of closely similar instances perceived before and their *saṁsthānas*. The *saṁsthāna* perceived together with those recalled constitutes the *pravṛtti-nimitta*. Any one of these taken in isolation cannot serve as a *pravṛtti-nimitta*. Hence, the charge that there would be a plurality of *pravṛtti-nimittas* for each word falls to the ground. Since objects belonging to different classes (e.g. *go* and *gavaya*, or *cat* and *tiger*) may exhibit structural similarity, it will not do to say that having a similar *saṁsthāna* is the *pravṛtti-nimitta* of a word. Hence the insistence on 'very close similarity in structure'. Otherwise, there is the danger of mixing up objects resembling one another only remotely. That the *saṁsthāna* of different classes of objects admits of several degrees of similarity has to be accepted by those who believe *jāti* to be a distinct category; otherwise they cannot satisfactorily explain why, for example, *gotva* is not present in the *gavaya*.

By *saṁsthāna* is meant the peculiar or distinctive structure or pattern of anything. In the case of objects endowed with form, the con-

junction of the several component parts constitutes the *saṁsthāna*. E.g. the collection of the dewlap is the *saṁsthāna* of the cow. But in the case of formless entities, their peculiar properties (*asādhāraṇa-dharma*), which mark them off from other things, constitute the *saṁsthāna*. E.g., *jñāna* and other qualities of the soul form its *saṁsthāna*.

The doctrine identifying *sāmānya* with *saṁsthāna* has not only the merit of economy of thought (*lāghava*), but has also the support of the scriptures. The famous *Chāndogya* text, 'eka vijñānēna sarva vijñānam', teaching *sat-kārya-vāda* shows unambiguously that effects, e.g., pots, cups, plates and so forth, are in substance one with their cause, namely clay. The underlying substance being unitary, the plurality of bases required for positing *jāti* does not exist. Hence it is concluded that *sāmānya* and *saṁsthāna* are identical.

10. *Sakti-Vāda*.

The tenth chapter takes up the question whether *śakti* (potentiality) should be recognised or not, and answers it in the affirmative, after refuting the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika arguments in favour of the opposite view. In this regard the Viśiṣṭādvaitin is at one with the Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras. The Nyāya denial of *śakti* as a separate entity is mainly based on the following considerations.

1. The absence of the effect when apparently all the causal factors are present is explicable, it is sometimes said, only on the hypothesis that the *śakti* present in the cause is rendered inoperative by counter-agents (*pratibandhaka*). Rather than positing a *śakti* and saying that it is counter-acted by impediments it would be more reasonable, says the Nyāya-Viśeṣika, to trace the absence of the effect to the absence of one of the elements constituting the full complement of causal factors (*kāraṇa-sāmagri*). The absence of counteracting circumstances (*pratibandhakābhāva*) is an essential factor included in the totality of causal conditions. Hence, in its absence (i.e. when counter-acting forces prevail), the effect cannot occur. The mere presence of fire, for example, does not suffice to account for burning. There is need of the negative factor, namely, the absence of counter agents. That is why in the presence of *maṇi* (a gem which is fire-proof) fire fails to burn objects.

2. The believer in *śakti* as a distinct category cannot give a consistent account of its origin. For, when counter-acting circumstances destroy *śakti*, it is possible to revive it with the aid of the *uttambaka* (factors that could override the counter-agents). In such a situation, he must treat the *uttambaka* as the cause of *śakti*. But when both the *pratibandhaka* and the *uttambaka* are absent, he must maintain that the very thing which causes an object also generates its *śakti*.

Since the effect may quite well occur even in the presence of the *pratibandhaka*, provided it is associated with the *uttambaka*, the negative condition may be expressed in more comprehensive terms as follows : "The absence of the *pratibandhaka* which is not associated with the *uttambaka* (*uttambhakābhāva-viśiṣṭa-pratibandhakābhāva*)."

This view of śakti is subjected to severe scrutiny, and it is first pointed out that the negative factor, 'absence of the *pratibandhaka*' cannot be included among the causal conditions ; for it will be shown presently that significant negation is never purely negative, but always carries a positive import. Again, if the absence of the *pratibandhaka* is an essential causal factor, it must, with consistency, be maintained that the absence of the person who could apply the *pratibandhaka* is also a causal condition ; for, equally with the *pratibandhaka*, the person bringing it into operation prevents the occurrence of the effect. Not only that ; but the *uttambaka* also must be included in the cause ; for it overrules the *pratibandhaka* and facilitates the occurrence of the effect. If it is said that it cannot be a causal factor, because it is not invariable (i.e., in its absence too the effect occurs, on the strength of the absence of the *pratibandhaka*), the answer is that the effect produced by the *uttambaka* and that produced by the absence of the *pratibandhaka* are distinct from each other ; even as the fire generated by rubbing *araṇi* sticks must be distinguished from that produced by *maṇi* (the lens), or straw. Thus, there are difficulties in including a negative circumstance among the causal factors.

Secondly, if a negative circumstance must be treated as a cause, when there are alternate causes for the same effect (when *araṇi* sticks or *maṇi* (lens) or *ṭṛṇa* (straw) can produce fire), instead of admitting differences in the effects produced by them, you might as well account for the fire arising from any of these causes by the single negative formula, namely, 'the absence of the non-existence of *maṇi* qualified by the absence of *araṇi* and *ṭṛṇa*'.

If the causal factor is expressed in this negative fashion when a positive formulation is possible, universally accepted inferences, such as the inference of smoke from fire, would be upset and it would be impossible to infer causes from a consideration of effects. The point of the criticism could be brought out with the aid of the following illustration. While common-sense thinks that fire is the cause of smoke, it is 'the absence of the non-existence of fire qualified in a specific way'. If the Naiyāyika is right, smoke must be inferred even when fire is absent ; for when there is *vanyabhāva*, this causal condition is fulfilled (i.e. there is the absence of the non-existence of fire thus qualified). And if smoke could arise even in the absence of fire, the every day inference of fire from smoke would fall to the ground. Hence it has to be concluded

that only positive entities endowed with potency can be treated as causes. The tendency to make an object of this *śakti* must be resisted. Each object has a two-fold aspect—a perceptible and an imperceptible (latent) aspect. *Śakti* is to be identified with the latter aspect.

11. *Bhāvāntarābhāva-vāda*

In this chapter the Nyāya conception of *abhāva* (non-existence, negation) is criticised and the view that *abhāva* is not distinct from, and is merely a variety of, *bhāva* (existence, affirmation) is upheld. The *pūrvapakṣin* says non-existence is relative in its conception. Negation is of something or other, and never absolute nothing (*śūnya*), which is merely a meaningless concept. One may speak of the non-existence of a jar or cloth, but never of mere non-existence. Again, non-existence is expressible by negative judgments involving the use of the negative particle *na*. But the idea of existence is conveyed by affirmative judgments, and it does not presuppose a *pratiyogin* (counter-correlative). How, it is asked, can non-existence with its dependence upon the *pratiyogin* be treated as being on a par with *bhāva* which does not presuppose the *pratiyogin*?

If the objector says that the expression *nāsti* (does not exist) does not purport to convey the idea of non-existence, but really aims at denoting the presence of an *upādhi* (something positive), he must explain what precisely that *upādhi* is. Is it the bare region (*deśa*), or its awareness, or bare time, or space in association with time? On the first alternative, as the region (e.g. *bhūtala*) exists even in the presence of the *pratiyogin* (e.g. the jar), one must speak of the object as non-existent. Should it be said that mention of non-existence arises only when the *pratiyogin* is absent, it may be replied that, so long as the concept of *abhāva* is not admitted, there is no basis for speaking of *pratiyogin* at all. In fact, it is only from negative statements, such as 'There is no jar on the ground', 'This is not a cloth' that we come to speak of the jar or the cloth as the *pratiyogin*. It is no argument to say that an object comes to be regarded as a *pratiyogin*, not because of its non-existence, but because it is not adjacent; for 'not adjacent' (*asannihita*) itself involves a negative element. Thus the concept of non-existence is inescapable. The objector might still argue that an object could be treated as a *pratiyogin*, not because it is *asannihita* (not close by), but because it is in contact with a different region. This attempt to explain the *pratiyogin* on a purely positive basis, without referring to *abhāva* at all, is futile; because, if contact with a different region suffices to make anything a *pratiyogin*, then all-pervasive substances such as *ākāśa* would come to be treated as the *pratiyogin*. In other words, if the existence of the jar elsewhere suggests the judgment 'There is no jar on this spot',

the contact of *ākāśa* with a different region should lead to the judgment 'There is no *ākāśa* here'. The second alternative which identifies the *upādhi* with cognition of space fares no better; for cognition, being momentary, cannot be regarded as non-existence, because it is recognised on all hands that reciprocal non-existence (*anyonyābhāva*) is eternal. Nor can the expression *nāsti* denote *kāla* (time); for time being present universally in an identical form there would be no point in the negative judgment referring to the existence of bare duration.

The last alternative which says that *nāsti* denotes space associated with time is open to all the objections to which the first and second alternatives are liable. As the expression *nāsti* cannot be said to refer only to some *upādhi*, be it *deśa* or *kāla* or both, and as it is open to perception, it must be recognised, say the Naiyāyikas, that *abhāva* is a distinct category.

In disproof of this theory the author first urges that it is liable to be charged with the defect of multiplying entities. As the negative judgment may well be said to refer to particular spaces, instants of time and states associated with the cognition of the *pratiyogin*, it is needless to posit *abhāva* as a separate category. He who accepts *abhāva* as a different category thinks that non-existence relates to a particular place and time. For the sake of economy of thought the *siddhāntin* considers the very place and time as the significance of the negative judgment. Again, if the *siddhāntin* is guilty of treating what is negative as though it were positive, the opponent is equally guilty of the same mistake. Does he not say that *abhāvābhāva* (the negation of a negation) is positive? Even as the Naiyāyika does not treat *dhvamśa-prāgabhāva* as another kind of non-existence different from the four varieties already admitted and tries to show that it amounts only to the existence of the jar or its posterior non-existence, and just as he does not treat *prāgabhāva-dvamśa* (the subsequent non-existence of posterior non-existence) as being other than the jar or its subsequent non-existence, even so the *siddhāntin* says that the posterior non-existence of the pot amounts to the unending series of previous states, and subsequent non-existence is merely the unending series of successive states. If it be said that the Naiyāyika draws the line at these four varieties and refuses to admit further kinds of *abhāva* only for fear of being landed in an infinite regress, it could be said that it would be more sensible not to admit a few varieties and refuse to go further. Hence it is but reasonable to maintain that *prāgabhāva* is only another name for the unending series of previous states, and *dhvamśa* as the name for the unending series of subsequent states. If this theory is borne in mind, the scriptural passage "In the beginning this was non-existent (*asat*)" could be assigned its primary meaning.

12. *Śarīra-lakṣaṇa-vāda.*

The most prominent among the doctrines that differentiate Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta from all other schools of Vedāntic thought is its view that the entire cosmos comprising souls and matter constitutes the body (*śarīra*) of Brahman. For understanding the exact significance of this description of the cosmos it is necessary to know what precisely is meant by the term *śarīra* (body). In the *Srī Bhāṣya* the body is defined as follows—"that substance which, in respect of the activities in which it can engage, is capable of being completely controlled and supported by a conscious entity, and whose nature consists in being a source of glorification to that conscious entity is the body of that conscious entity." The question raised in this chapter is : Is this a single definition, or a collection of three definitions ?

The *pūrvapakṣin* prefers the latter alternative, because he thinks that the three points mentioned in the definition *dhāryatva*, *niyantr̥tva* and *śeṣatva* are not at once necessary, and that any one of them suffices for making anything a body. He thinks that it can be resolved into the following three definitions.—(i) That substance which, in respect of the activities in which it can engage, is capable of being controlled by a conscious entity, is the body of that conscious entity. (ii) That substance which is supported by a conscious entity is the body of the latter. (iii) That substance whose nature consists in being a source of glorification to that conscious entity is the body of the latter. A close examination of these alternative definitions reveals that each word therein has a definite function to fulfil and none is superfluous. Take the first definition. But for the word *cetanasya* (conscious entity), *dharmabhūtajñāna* (attributive consciousness) would have to be regarded as the body of the soul. For *dharmabhūtajñāna* is controlled by the soul in itself, and not by the soul endowed with consciousness. The term *dravya* (substance) clearly shows that all other categories, such as attribute (*guṇa*), and activity (*karma*), cannot be treated as bodies. From the qualification *sarvātmanā* (always), it follows that the body of another, which a person may occasionally control, cannot be treated as his own body. The expression *svārthe*, meaning in respect of the activities in which it can engage, shows that the body cannot be controlled in regard to activities which lie beyond its powers. The human body, for instance, cannot be expected to fly. 'Capable of being controlled' (*śakyam*) suggests that the control need not always be exercised. In the second definition, the term *sarvātmanā* (always) precludes the possibility of our treating anything as the body which we may occasionally support. Similarly, in the last definition the word *sarvātmanā* serves to exclude the possibility of our treating servants and others, who occasionally minister unto their master, as body.

The view advocated here is that it is a single definition ; for each of these three parts of the definition, taken in itself is found to be defective in some respect or other. Take the first definition which asserts that any substance can be treated as a body if it is capable of being controlled by a conscious entity in regard to activities which it can perform. This definition is liable to be charged with the defect of being too broad (*ativyāpti*). If this definition were acceptable, the axe would have to be regarded as the body of the person wielding it, since it fulfils the requirements of this definition. On rigorous scrutiny, the other two definitions are likewise found to be severally defective. Hence, it follows that *ādheyatva*, *vidheyatva* and *śeṣatva* are all essential elements in the definition of the body. That this is so would follow from a close study of the celebrated Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa where the doctrine that the universe is the body of God is clearly formulated. Take for example the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text : “He who stands in the earth (*pr̥thvī*), who is within the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body the earth is and who controls it from within—He is thy Self, the Inner Controller, the Immortal.” Here the expression “He who stands in the earth and who is within the earth” teaches *ādheyatva*. By suggesting that ‘the earth does not know Him’ (i.e., does not know that it exists for the sake of the Indweller), *śeṣatva* is indicated. “Who controls from within” emphasises *vidheyatva*.

13. *Kaivalya-vicāra*.

Is it at all possible for the soul whose intrinsic nature is to be self-luminous (*svapṛakāśa*) to be entangled in *samsāra* ? What precisely is the nature of *kaivalya* ? These are the two questions raised in this chapter. Those who object to our view may argue that the soul (*ātman*) is, in its essential nature, blissful (*svatassukhī*) and self-luminous (*svapṛakāśa*) ; and that there is therefore no possibility of its ever being involved in the miseries of earthly existence. They might also consider it impossible that when the blissful nature of the self is clouded, it should come to be implicated in matter. For, they may ask, “Will not the obscuration of the nature of the self-luminous entity amount to its destruction (*svarūpanāśa*) ? How could the Viśiṣṭādvaitin object to the advaitic view and say that if *māyā* were to cloud *ātman*, the latter would be destroyed thereby ; when the same objection would apply with equal force to his own contention ?”

The author’s reply to this objection is that on the advaitic conception *ātman* is a *nirviśeṣa-vastu*, pure consciousness, and, hence, with the obscuration of this consciousness, its very nature is in danger of being destroyed ; but that, on the *viśiṣṭādvaitic* theory, the *ātman* is *saviśeṣa* (endowed with qualities). Among other things its essential nature, viz., *jñāna*, is the most agreeable kind (*anukūla*). This *ānukūlya* admits of several degrees, and is always present in some degree, however slight. Hence the soul does not run the risk of being destroyed. When *ānukūlya*

is present only in slight degrees, it is self-revealed, but is unable to arrest samsāric life. *Ānukūlya* of the most intense degree is apprehended from the scriptures. When it is veiled by *karma* and thereby reduced in intensity, mundane existence arises.

In the state of *kaivalya* (realisation of the nature of one's own self) the *Antaryāmin* (the Indweller) shines forth, but not as being the object of the utmost enjoyment. True, even the aspirant after self-realisation (*kaivalya*, *ātmāvalokana*) has to follow the path of self-surrender (*prapatti*) or loving devotion to God (*bhakti*) in order to remove the obstacles standing in the way of the successful fruition of *karma* and *jñāna*, the direct means to *kaivalya*. The devotion involved here is, however, only a means to an end (*auṣādhika*). Long after *kaivalya* has been attained a person may experience *bhakti* in the true sense of the term as a result of either direct perception of the spotless nature of the self (*ātman*), or the merit accumulated through countless births. Thus the essentially blissful nature of the Lord is experienced in the fullest measure only in the state of final release (*mokṣa*), and not in the penultimate state (i.e. *kaivalya*). Hence the distinction between *kaivalya* and *mokṣa*. Though the former falls short of the ideal state, it may justifiably be spoken of as release; for in *kaivalya* the soul has experience of its own blissful nature, has no births and deaths and has obtained complete freedom from all bondage to *karma* which is the root cause of all the pleasures and pains of worldly life.

Since the thought of the Lord's blissful nature does not enter into the meditation (*upāsana*) of a person who has set up *kaivalya* as his goal, when his *upāsana* bears fruit he has an intuitive perception of the Lord, but does not yet grasp His blissful nature in accordance with what is known as *tatkratunyāya*. The case is otherwise with the person who meditates upon the Lord as a blissful entity.

Bhagavad Rāmānuja, however, does not countenance the view that in the state of *kaivalya* the person is denied *Brahmānanda-anubhava*, and is confined only to *Brahmānubhava* or the direct perception of the Lord. For the realisation of one's own nature must, certainly, at some stage include the realisation that one exists only for the sake of the Lord. This must inevitably lead up to a fuller experience of the blissful nature of the Supreme Self. Since the scriptures say that he who follows the *arcirādi-mārga* is led up to the final goal, there is no warrant, he says, for asserting that the person aspiring for *kaivalya* is for ever condemned to an inferior type of *mokṣa*. In short, the distinction between these two forms of release may be expressed thus:—The soul may carry on meditation (*upāsana*) in one of two ways: It may meditate either on Brahman having the soul for its body or on the soul having Brahman for its self. The first type of meditation leads the *upāsaka* straight to *mokṣa*; the second leads up to it only after having traversed the stage of *kaivalya*.

॥ श्रीः ॥

॥ विषयानुक्रमणिका ॥

सिद्धार्थव्युत्पत्तिसमर्थनवादः प्रथमः (१-१५)

PAGE

मङ्गलाचरणम्	३
सिद्धे व्युत्पत्त्यनुपपत्तिरिति पूर्वपक्षः	॥
साङ्गुळिनिर्देशं शब्दप्रयोगे निर्देशस्यैवार्थप्रतिपत्तिहेतुतया शब्दस्यातत्परत्वशङ्का	॥
प्रत्येकपदव्युत्पादनाङ्गीकारेऽन्विताभिधानसिद्धान्तविरोधप्रदर्शनम्	४
सिद्धान्तारम्भः	५
प्रत्येकपदार्थज्ञानस्य स्मृत्याकारतया अन्विताभिधानाविरोधसमर्थनम्	॥
शब्दस्य बोधकत्वेनैव विवक्षा न बोध्यत्वेनेति निरूपणम्	॥
अव्युत्पन्नानां शब्दानां वाक्यार्थप्रत्यायकत्वप्रसङ्गस्तत्परिहारश्च	७
अभिहितान्वयकटाक्षेणापि भाष्यनिर्वाहः	॥
शब्दस्यानुमानाद्वैलक्षण्यनिरूपणम्	॥
शब्दस्य कार्यान्वितार्थपरत्वासम्भवप्रदर्शनम्	८
शब्दचेष्टयोरेकजातीयप्रमाणत्वनिरसनम्	॥
लिपेरनुमानविधया अक्षरप्रतिपादकत्वोपपादनम्	१०
शब्दस्यानुमानात्मकत्वनिरासः	॥
भाषान्तराणामारोपितं बोधकत्वमुपजीव्य व्यवहारसमर्थनम्	११
अनादिशब्देषु सङ्केतासम्भवोपपादनम्	॥
नित्यानित्यशब्दविवेचनम्	॥
साङ्केतिकशब्देषु सङ्केतयितुरवश्यज्ञेयत्वनिरूपणम्	१२
ईश्वरसङ्केतनिषेधः	१३

	PAGE
वेदशब्दस्य सर्वत्राविसंवादित्वम्	१४
वेदे स्वतःप्रामाण्यायतो विश्वासभूमा	”
अन्विताभिधानपक्ष एव शब्दप्रामाण्यमिति निरूपणम्	१५

स्वतःप्रामाण्यनिर्णयवादो द्वितीयः (१७-४०)

प्रामाण्यादौ स्वतस्त्वपरतस्त्वयोर्वादिविप्रतिपत्तिनिरूपणम्	१७
प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्ययोर्द्वयोस्त्वतस्त्वमभिप्रयतां साङ्ख्यानां निरासः	”
नैयायिकमतरीत्योभयोः परतस्त्वप्रतिपादनम्	१८
गुणात्प्रामाण्योत्पत्तिकथनम्	१९
प्रामाण्यज्ञप्तिः गुणसंवादार्थक्रियाज्ञानानामन्यतमेनेति निरूपणम्	”
प्रामाण्यस्य स्वतस्त्वानुपपत्तिप्रदर्शनम्	२०
स्वतःप्रामाण्यस्य वेदोपयोगाभावप्रदर्शनम्	२१
वेदस्य नित्यत्वे प्रामाण्यानुपपत्तिप्रतिपादनम्	२२
प्रमायाः परतस्त्वानुमानप्रयोगः	२३
अर्थप्रकाशरूपं प्रामाण्यं स्वत उत्पद्यत इति सिद्धान्तारम्भः	”
वस्तुप्रकाशत्वस्य ज्ञानलक्षणत्वसमर्थनम्	२५
वस्तुप्रकाशत्वस्य ज्ञानलक्षणत्वाक्षेपस्तत्परिहारश्च	२६
प्रमाणत्वाप्रमाणत्वयोः ज्ञानावान्तरविशेषत्वनिरासः	२८
सत्तया गुणानां प्रामाण्योत्पादकत्वनिराकरणम्	३३
प्रामाण्यज्ञानस्य परमनुव्यवसायापेक्षणान्नानवस्थेति निरूपणम्	३४
अनवस्थापरिहारार्थस्य परकीयानुमानस्य निरासः	३५
उदयनाचार्योक्तानुमानदृषणम्	३६
स्वतःप्रामाण्यस्य श्रीभाष्यकाराभिमतत्वप्रदर्शनम्	”
क्वाचित्कप्रामाण्यसन्देहोपपादनम्	३८
अप्रामाण्यस्य स्वाभाविकत्वनिरासः	३९

ख्यातिनिरूपणवादः तृतीयः (४२-६८)

	PAGE
गुरुमतानुसारेण यथार्थख्यातिनिरूपणमन्यथाख्यातिनिरसनञ्च	. ४१
अन्यथाख्यातौ सामग्र्यभावनिरूपणम्	. ४२
इदं रजतमिति बुद्धेः अनुभवस्मृत्युभयरूपत्वोपपादनम्	. ४३
शुक्तिरजतप्रवृत्तिनिर्वाहः	. ”
वादिविप्रतिपत्त्यादिभिर्हेतुपञ्चकैरन्यथाख्यातिसमर्थनम्	. ४४
प्रतिज्ञानन्तरं हेतूपन्यासोऽन्यथाख्यातिपक्ष एव युज्यत इति निरूपणम्	. ४६
बाधादन्यथाख्यातिसमर्थनम्	४७-५१
भेदाग्रहणस्वरूपशोधनम्	. ४८
असंसर्गाग्रहस्वरूपशोधनम्	. ”
व्यवहारादन्यथाख्यातिसमर्थनम्	५१-५३
भेदाग्रहात्प्रवृत्तौ शब्दाप्रामाण्यप्रसञ्जनम्	. ५२
भ्रान्तिशब्दात्प्रतीतिस्वारस्याच्चान्यथाख्यातिसमर्थनम्	. ५३
इन्द्रियासन्निकृष्टस्यापि दोषाद्भानोपपादनम्	. ५४
संशयात्मकज्ञानस्थापनम्, ज्ञानयाथार्थ्यानुमाननिरासश्च	. ”
सिद्धान्त्यभिमतयथार्थख्यातिनिरूपणम्	. ५५
ज्ञानसामान्यस्य यथार्थत्वेऽपि बाध्यबाधकभावव्यवस्थोपपादनम्	. ”
भेदाग्रहात्प्रवृत्त्युपपादनम्	. ५७
संसर्गज्ञानोपयोगनिरूपणम्	. ५८
प्रतिज्ञानन्तरं हेतूपन्याससमर्थनम्	. ”
अनिर्वचनीयख्यात्युपन्यासस्तन्निराकरणञ्च	६०-६८
प्रपञ्चस्य सद्विलक्षणत्वनिरासः	. ६१
विशेषतोऽनिर्वचनीयख्यातिपक्षानुपपत्तिप्रदर्शनम्	. ६२
प्रपञ्चमिथ्यात्वस्य अनित्यत्वे पर्यवसानम्	. ६५

	PAGE
स्वप्नप्रपञ्चस्यापि पारमार्थिकत्वसमर्थनम्	६६
विश्वमिथ्यात्वानुमानदूषणम्	६७
अनिर्वचनीयख्यात्यनुपपत्तिनिगमनम्	६८

स्वयंप्रकाशवादः चतुर्थः (६१-८६)

ज्ञानस्य स्वप्रकाशत्वखण्डनम्	६९
ज्ञाने सत्ताप्रकाशयोर्भेदः	७०
ज्ञानं स्वप्रकाशमित्युक्तेरेवानुपपन्नत्वप्रदर्शनम्	७०
ज्ञानस्य स्वप्रकाशत्वे व्यवसायानुव्यवसाययोरर्थज्ञानयोश्चावैलक्षण्यप्रदर्शनम्	७१
ज्ञाततया ज्ञानानुमानमिति भाट्टमतोपसंहारः	७१
मतान्तरेणापि ज्ञानस्य स्वप्रकाशत्वखण्डनम्	७२
ज्ञानस्य स्वप्रकाशत्वानुमानदूषणम्	७३
ज्ञानं मानसप्रत्यक्षवेद्यमेवेति निगमनम्	७४
स्वयम्प्रकाशत्वसिद्धान्तारम्भः	७५
ज्ञाने सत्ताप्रकाशयोरैक्यम्	७५
जीवाणुत्वज्ञानविभुत्वयोरुपपादनम्	७५
स्वप्रकाशत्वस्वरूपनिरूपणम्	७६
स्वप्रकाशत्वेऽनुमानोपन्यासः प्रकाशशब्दार्थवर्णनञ्च	७६
अनुभूतिरनन्याधीनप्रकाशा इति प्रयोगस्य सम्भावनामात्रपरत्ववर्णनम्	७७
अस्वयम्प्रकाशत्वस्थापकवस्तुत्वानुमानखण्डनम्	७८
भाट्टाद्यभिमतास्वयम्प्रकाशत्वप्रतिक्षेपः	७९
ज्ञानस्य मानसप्रत्यक्षवेद्यत्वेऽनुपपत्तिप्रदर्शनम्	८०
अस्ति नास्तीति सन्देहाभावाज्ज्ञानस्य स्वप्रकाशत्वसमर्थनम्	८१-८२
व्यवहारविसंवादाभावात् स्वप्रकाशत्वस्थापनम्	८३
ज्ञानस्य स्वप्रकाशत्वेऽर्थज्ञानयोर्भेदप्रसक्तिपरिहारः	८३

ज्ञानस्येवात्मनोऽपि स्वप्रकाशत्वस्थापनम्	. ८४
सुखमहमस्वाप्समिति परामर्शस्वरूपनिरूपणम्	. ८५

ईश्वरानुमानभङ्गवादः पञ्चमः (८७-२०३)

ईश्वरस्यानुमानिकत्वे शास्त्रप्रामाण्यासम्भवोपपादनम्	. ८७
अनुमाननिषेधपरतया सूत्रं व्याकुर्वतां श्रीभाष्यकारमिश्राणामाशयाविष्कारः	. ८८
नैयायिकाभिमतस्येश्वरानुमानस्य निर्दुष्टत्वनिरूपणम्	८९-९०
ईश्वरानुमाने प्रतिप्रयोगसम्भवनिरासेन पूर्वपक्षोपसंहारः	. ९१
ईश्वरानुमाननिराकरणम्, विकल्प्य सकर्तृकत्वदूषणञ्च	. ९२
कार्यस्य विलक्षणात्मान्तरसमवेतगुणान्तरानुमापकत्वनिरासः	. ९४
सकर्तृकत्वानुमाने सिद्धसाध्यताप्रदर्शनम्	. ९५
आनुमानिकेश्वरस्य सार्वज्ञ्ये प्रमाणाभावोपन्यासः	. ”
नित्यप्रयत्नस्य विषयव्यवस्थार्थं न ज्ञानापेक्षेति निरूपणम्	. ९६
अजसंयोगसमर्थनम्, नित्यप्रयत्ननिराकरणञ्च	. ९७
सकर्तृकत्वानुमाने विशेषविरोधसमर्थनम्	. ”
सकर्तृकत्वानुमाने सोपाधिकत्वनिरूपणम्	. ९८
कार्यत्वात्कारणविशेषरूपकर्तृत्वानुमानप्रतिक्षेपः	. ९९
तस्मिन्नेवानुमाने व्यतिरेकव्याप्त्यसम्भवप्रदर्शनम्	. १००
प्रतितर्कोद्भावनम्	. १०१
शास्त्रगम्येऽर्थे प्रतितर्काणामदूषकत्वोपन्यासः	. १०२
ईश्वरस्य श्रौतत्वे सङ्कटराहित्यवर्णनम्	. ”

देहातिरिक्तात्मयाथात्म्यवादः षष्ठः (१०५-१२६)

आत्मन इन्द्रियातिरेकसमर्थनम्	. १०५
आत्मनो मनःप्राणबुद्ध्यतिरेकसमर्थनम्	. १०६
चार्वाकमतेन देहस्य ज्ञातृत्वसमर्थनम्	. ”

सर्वत्र भौतिके सूक्ष्मचैतन्यस्वीकारः	. १०७
साङ्ख्यानमानदूषणम्	. १०८
पूर्वजन्माभावेऽपि प्रथमप्रवृत्त्यादिनिर्वाहः	. ”
आत्मनो देहाद्यतिरिक्तत्वसिद्धान्तारम्भः	. ”
अवयवेषु चैतन्यासम्भवनिरूपणम्	. १०९
एकावयविशेषतया अवयवानामविवादस्सम्भवतीति शङ्काया निरासः	. ११०
अवयवचैतन्यनिषेधः, अवयविनिरासश्च	. १११
प्रकृतिपरिणामभूतपृथिवीजलादिदृष्टान्तेन अवयवेष्वसमवेतमपि चैतन्यमवयविनि जायतामिति शङ्काया निराकरणम्	. ११२
अवयवेषु सूक्ष्मचैतन्यनिरासः	. ”
संस्कारोन्मेषकारणादृष्टाधिकरणतया शरीरातिरिक्तात्मसमर्थनम्	. ११३
स्मृतिवैशद्यादिना देहातिरिक्तात्मसाधनम्	. ”
प्रथमप्रवृत्त्यन्यथानुपपत्तेः मम शरीरमिति व्यतिरेकनिर्देशाच्च शरीरातिरिक्तात्मसमर्थनम्	. ११४
स्वाम्नाहम्प्रत्ययबलाददृष्टार्थप्रवृत्त्यन्यथानुपपत्तेश्चात्मनश्शरीरातिरिक्तत्वसमर्थनम्	. ११५
अद्वैतिमतेन ज्ञातुः प्रत्यत्त्वाद्याक्षेपः दृशः प्रत्यत्त्वनिरासश्च	. ”
ज्ञातुः प्रत्यत्त्वे तार्किकसंवादप्रदर्शनम्	. ११६
परमात्मन एकस्यैव प्रत्यत्त्वमित्याक्षेपः, तत्परिहारश्च	. ११७
जीवस्य कर्तृत्वोक्तिः	. ”
परमात्मपारतन्त्र्येण जीवस्य स्वातन्त्र्याक्षेपः	. ११८
स्वातन्त्र्यपारतन्त्र्ययोरविरोधसमर्थनम्	. ११९
ईश्वरे वैषम्यनैर्घृण्यपरिहारः	. १२०
प्रेरयितृत्वश्रुतितात्पर्यवर्णनम्	. १२१
एकात्मवादजीवाद्वैतवादादीनां तात्पर्यवर्णनम्	. १२२
भेदस्योपाधिकत्वं न शास्त्रेणेति निरूपणम्	. ”
अविद्याज्ञानादिशब्दार्थवर्णनम्	. ”

	PAGE
भेदस्यौपाधिकत्वं न प्रमाणान्तरेणेति निरूपणम्	. १२३
भेदस्यान्तःकरणोपाधिकत्वभङ्गः, तस्यैव अविद्योपाधिकत्वनिरासः	. १२४
अविद्याया आश्रयानुपपत्तिप्रदर्शनम्	. १२५
जीवानां परस्परं परमात्मनश्च भेदस्वाभाविक इति सिद्धान्तनिगमनम्	. १२६

सामानाधिकरण्यवादः सप्तमः (१२७-१४२)

सामानाधिकरण्यलक्षणाक्षेपः	. १२७
भेदाभेदमतेन सामानाधिकरण्यलक्षणवाक्यार्थवर्णनम्	. "
बाधकाभावेन भेदाभेदयोरविरोधोपपादनम्	. १२८
शुक्तिरजताभेदाद्वैलक्षण्यनिरूपणम्	. १२९
विशेषणविशेष्यभावाच्च भेदाभेदोपपादनम्	. "
समवायनिरासः	. १३०
सहोपलम्भनियमाद्भेदाभेदवर्णनप्रस्तावे पृथक्सिद्धिशब्दार्थशोधनेन पृथक्सिद्धे- रूपाधित्वनिरासः	. "
अयमपि गौरिति प्रत्ययादवयवावयविनोस्समानदेशत्वादनुमानोदयाच्च भेदाभेदो- पपादनम्	. १३१
प्रत्यक्षस्य भेदाभेदाविषयकत्वस्थापनम्	. १३२
निर्विकल्पस्य सम्मुग्धविषयकत्वनिरासः	. १३३
विशेषणविशेष्यभावस्य अभेदसाधकत्वासम्भवप्रदर्शनम्	. "
पृथक्सिद्धवस्तुनः स्वरूपवर्णनम्	. १३४
विशेषणानां मत्वर्थीयप्रत्ययसापेक्षत्वनिरपेक्षत्वयोः व्यवस्थितत्वं उपपादनम्	. "
शुक्तिरजतवद्भेदाभेदयोर्विरोधप्रदर्शनम्	. "
सहोपलम्भनियमस्य भेदसाधकत्वोपन्यासः	. १३५
अयमपि गौरिति प्रत्ययादवयवावयविनोस्समानदेशत्वादनुमानोदयाच्च भेदाभेदयोर- विरोध इति पूर्वपक्षस्य निरसनम्	. १३६

	PAGE
समानाधिकरणवाक्यस्य अखण्डार्थपरत्वोपन्यासः	१३७
सत्यं ज्ञानमित्यादीनां अखण्डार्थपरत्वप्रतिपादनम्	"
समानाधिकरणवाक्यस्य अखण्डार्थपरत्वनिरासः	१३८
समानाधिकरणवाक्य इव व्यधिकरणवाक्यस्थानाच्च पदानामैकार्थ्यप्रसञ्जनम्	१३९
समानाधिकरणवाक्यस्य विशिष्टैकार्थपरत्वाभावे लक्षणायाः प्रसञ्जनम्	१४०
लक्षणवाक्यसिद्धयोर्निमित्तभेदैकार्थ्ययोरविरोधप्रदर्शनम्	१४१
सत्यं ज्ञानमित्यादौ व्यावृत्तिलक्षणाया निरासः	"
कारणवाक्यैकार्थ्यादखण्डार्थपरत्वशङ्का, तत्प्रतिक्षेपश्च	"
समानाधिकरण्यलक्षणवाक्यस्य सिद्धान्त्यभिमतार्थवर्णनपूर्वकं तत्तद्गुणविशिष्ट एव परमात्मा सत्यज्ञानादिवाक्यैस्सिद्धयतीति निगमनम्	१४२

सत्कार्यवादोऽष्टमः (१४३-१५२)

एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानं वदन्ती श्रुतिः सत्कार्यवादं प्रस्तौतीति प्रतिज्ञा	१४३
तस्यां श्रुतौ हेतुहेतुमद्भावस्य अविवक्षेति निरूपणम्	"
तार्किकमतेन बुद्धिशब्दान्तरादिभिः कार्यकारणयोः भेदोपपादनम्	१४४
अवस्थाभेदेन बुद्धिभेदादिरूपपद्यत इति शङ्कायाः परिहारः	"
अवस्थाभेदस्य संयोगादिरूपत्वेऽनुपपत्तिप्रदर्शनम्	१४५
कार्यकारणयोरभेदेऽणूनां स्थूलानाञ्च प्रत्यक्षत्वाप्रत्यक्षत्वयोः प्रसञ्जनम्	१४६
सत्कार्यवादे पृथिव्यादीनां परस्परभेदानुपपत्तिप्रदर्शनम्	"
प्रत्यभिज्ञाबलेन कार्यकारणयोरैक्यस्थापनम्	१४७
पूर्वपक्षोपन्यस्तबुद्धिभेदादिहेतोरसिद्धत्वप्रतिपादनम्	"
कार्यद्रव्येष्वेकत्वस्थूलत्वयोस्समर्थनम्	१४८
विरुद्धधर्माध्यासाद्भेद इति पक्षस्य निरासः	"
अणूनां स्थूलानाञ्च प्रत्यक्षत्वाप्रत्यक्षत्वयोस्समर्थनम्	१४९
अवस्थातद्वतोर्भेदवर्णनम्	"

कार्यकारणयोरैक्ये भेदाभेदप्रसङ्गपरिहारः, नित्यानित्यविभागोपपत्तिनिरूपणञ्च	. ,,
असत्कार्यवादेऽमूर्तानां महदादीनामुत्पत्त्यनुपपत्तिप्रदर्शनम्	. १५०
उपादानाभेदे आकाशाद्वायुरिति श्रुत्यर्थानुपपत्तिशङ्का	. ,,
तस्याश्शङ्कायाः परिहारः	. १५१

संस्थानसामान्यसमर्थनवादो नवमः (१५३-१६०)

अनुगतौ जातेः प्रत्यक्षत्वोपन्यासः	. १५३
शब्दानुमानप्रवृत्तीनां सामान्योपजीवित्वनिरूपणम्	. १५४
सादृश्यसदृशसंस्थानयोः प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तत्वनिरासः	. १५५
सिद्धान्तारम्भः	. १५६
अयमपि गोरिति प्रतीतेरतिरिक्तजात्यविषयकत्वसमर्थनम्	. ,,
संस्थानस्य प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तत्वे आनन्त्यव्यभिचाराभ्यां व्युत्पत्त्यनुपपत्तिशङ्का, तत्परिहारश्च	. १५७
गोगवययोस्सदृशसंस्थानयोरैकजातीयत्वप्रसङ्गपरिहारः	. १५८
संस्थानस्वरूपनिष्कर्षः	. १५९
सादृश्यपदार्थशोधनम्	. ,,
संस्थानजातिपक्षे श्रुत्याद्युपपत्तिप्रदर्शनम्	. १६०

शक्तिवादो दशमः (१६२-१७४)

शक्तिपदार्थस्यावश्यकत्वोपपादनम्	. १६१
उदयनाचार्यमतेन अतिरिक्तशक्त्यभावपूर्वपक्षः	. ,,
अभावस्य कारणत्वोपपादनम्	. १६२
मण्यादेः प्रतिबन्धत्वमेव न प्रतिबन्धकत्वमिति निरूपणम्	. १६३
शक्त्यनुमानखण्डनम्	. १६४
कारणत्वं भावानामेवेति समर्थनम्	. १६५

अभावस्याकारणत्वोपपादनम्	. १६६
सम्प्रतिपन्नकारणस्वभावातिक्रमान्नाभावस्य कारणत्वमिति प्रतिपादनम्	. १६७
अकरणस्य प्रत्यवायजनकत्ववाचोयुक्तितात्पर्यम्	. ”
उत्तेजकाभावविशिष्टाभावस्य कारणत्वासम्भवनिरूपणम्	. १६८
मण्यादेः प्रतिबन्धकत्वस्थापनम्	. १७०
शक्तिनाश इत्यादिव्यवहारनिर्वाहभेदाः	. १७३

भावान्तराभाववादः एकादशः (१७५-१८५)

भावान्तरमेवाभाव इति सिद्धान्तोपक्षेपः	. १७५
नञर्थस्य भावातिरिक्तत्वपूर्वपक्षः	. ”
भावात्मक उपाधिरभाव इति पक्षस्य विकल्प्य दूषणम्	. १७६
ज्ञानकालादिरूपस्योपाधेः नञर्थत्वनिराकरणम्	. १७७
देशसम्भिन्नस्य कालस्य कालान्वितस्य वा देशस्य नञर्थत्वनिराक्रिया	. १७८
कालभेदविशिष्टस्य देशभेदस्य नास्तिशब्दप्रयोगगोचरत्वसमर्थनम्	. ”
अभावस्य भावान्तररूपत्वप्रतिपादनम्	१७९-१८५
सिद्धान्ते ‘ असद्वा ’ इत्यादि श्रुतिर्मुल्यार्था भवतीति निगमनम्	. १८५

शरीरलक्षणवादो द्वादशः (१८६-१९०)

यस्य चेतनस्य यद्द्रव्यं सर्वात्मना स्वार्थे नियन्तुं धारयितुं च शक्यं तच्छेषतैक- स्वरूपञ्च तत्तस्य शरीरमिति शरीरलक्षणोपक्षेपः	. १८६
व्यवच्छेद्यासिद्धेः यस्य चेतनस्येत्यादिवाक्यस्यानेकलक्षणाभिप्रायकत्ववर्णनम्	. १८७
प्रथमलक्षणे दोषोद्भावनपूर्वकमनेकलक्षणत्वासम्भवनिरूपणम्	. १८८
द्वितीयतृतीयलक्षणयोर्दोषप्रदर्शनम्	. १८९
समुच्चितान्येवैकं लक्षणमिति सिद्धान्तोपसंहारः	. १९०
अस्य लक्षणस्य श्रुतिप्रसिद्धत्वनिरूपणम्	. ”

त्रयोदशो वादः (१९१-१९८)

	PAGE
स्वप्रकाशस्याप्यात्मनस्संसारोपपादनम्	. १९१
आत्मगतानुकूल्ये तारतम्योपपादनम्	. ”
आनुकूल्यविशेषसङ्कोचाज्ज्ञानसङ्कोचवर्णनम्	. ”
स्वप्रकाशात्मगतस्य स्वरूपानुकूल्यविशेषस्याप्रकाशसमर्थनम्	. १९२
अन्तर्यामिनिष्ठानुकूल्यस्य कैवल्येऽप्रकाशवर्णनम्	. १९३
कैवल्ये निःशेषकर्मक्षयोऽस्ति नेति विकल्पः	. १९४
पञ्चाभिविदो ब्रह्मप्राप्तिः ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारमात्रमेव, न ब्रह्मानन्दानुभव इति निरूपणम्	. ”
तस्यापि ब्रह्मानन्दानुभवोपपादनम्	. १९७

॥ श्रीगुरुभ्यो नमः ॥

। बोधविमर्शः ।

। वे. सुब्रह्मण्यशास्त्री ।

। अण्णामलैविश्वविद्यालयः ।



शक्त्या लक्षणया वा पदैः स्मृतानां पदार्थानां संसर्गं वाक्यार्थाभिधमवगाहते शाब्दबोधः यं वाक्यार्थबोधं संप्रचक्षते । स च बोधः लिङादिघटितादिव तदघटितादपि वाक्याज्जायते इत्यनुभवसिद्धोऽयमर्थः । तत्र प्राथमिकशाब्दबोधकारणतालाघवं मूलयुक्तिमवलम्बमानाः केचन दार्शनिकाः आख्यातार्थमुख्यविशेष्यकमेव सर्वत्र बोधं मन्यन्ते । अन्ये तु निरुक्तमहाभाष्यादिवचनं प्रमाणीकुर्वन्तः तदुपोद्बलकयुक्तिजातञ्च निरूपयन्तः प्रायः धात्वर्थमुख्यविशेष्यकं बोधं नञ्घटिताच्च वाक्यान्तर्जर्थमुख्यविशेष्यकं बोधं प्रतिपन्नाः । परे तु व्यवहारातिप्रसङ्गाप्रसङ्गवारणे बद्धदृष्टयः पदोपस्थापितानां अनेकधा एकशाब्दबोधीयसांसर्गिकविषयताविद्वेषिणः योग्येन साक्षात्संबन्धेन तत्तत्पदार्थस्य तत्र तत्रान्वयं स्वीकुर्वन्तः अनुभवञ्च प्रमाणीकुर्वन्तः प्रथमान्तपदसमभिव्याहारे प्रायः प्रथमान्तार्थमुख्यविशेष्यकं कचिन्निपातार्थमुख्यविशेष्यकं कचिच्च धात्वर्थमुख्यविशेष्यकं कचिदाख्यातार्थमुख्यविशेष्यकञ्च बोधमुपपादयन्ति । वर्णयन्ति च तात्पर्यं तदनुसारेणानुशासनादीनाम् ।

सर्वदार्शनिकानाञ्च बोधः आख्यन्यतमामेव सरणिं गाहते इति स्वमतिशुद्धये पक्षत्रयमपि संगृह्यते । अत्र मीमांसकाः,

तण्डुलमित्यादीनि द्वितीयाद्यन्तानि पदानि क्रियापदं विना न निराकांक्ष-
शाब्दबोधं जनयन्तीत्यविवादम् । न हि तण्डुलमिति पदेनैव वाक्यपरिसमाप्तिर्दृश्यते ।
अतो ज्ञायते क्रियापदं द्वितीयान्तादिपदार्थस्य विशेष्यसमर्पकमिति । द्वितीयाद्यर्थश्च
प्रातिपदिकार्थस्य विशेष्यः प्रकृतिप्रत्ययौ सहार्थं ब्रूतः तयोस्तु प्रत्ययः प्राधान्येन इति

व्युत्पत्तेः । तिङन्ते च धात्वर्थस्य आख्यातार्थ एव विशेष्यः निरुक्तव्युत्पत्तेरेव । आख्यातस्य च कालः संख्या कृत्यपरपर्यायभावना कर्तृत्वादिरिति सन्ति बहवोऽर्थाः । तेष्वपि भावनैव विशेष्यः । तत्रैव आख्यातार्थकालसंख्यादिकं विशेषणतया भासते ‘भावप्रधानमाख्यातम्’ इति निरुक्तात् । इदञ्च न प्रत्ययार्थभावनायाः धात्वर्थनिरूपितविशेष्यत्वं बोधयितुं प्रवृत्तम् । प्रकृतिप्रत्ययौ सहार्थं ब्रूतः तयोस्तु प्रत्ययः प्राधान्येन इत्यनेनैव सिद्धत्वात् । नापि ‘धात्वर्थः केवलश्शुद्धो भाव इत्यभिधीयते’ इत्युक्तभावपदार्थताकस्य धात्वर्थस्य तिङ्ार्थापेक्षया प्राधान्यं बोधयितुं प्रवृत्तमिति शक्यते वक्तुम् । तयोस्तु प्रत्ययः प्राधान्येन इति व्युत्पत्तिविरुद्धार्थकल्पनायाः अयुक्तत्वात् । अपि च भावपदं धात्वर्थे वैयाकरणैः परिभाषितम् । सा च परिभाषा व्याकरणशास्त्र एव भावे घञ् इत्यत्र प्रवर्तते न भावे त्वतलावित्यत्र । निरुक्तस्थभावपदञ्च धात्वर्थपरमित्यत्र नास्ति प्रमाणम् । तस्मात् तत्र णिजन्तभूधातोरच्प्रत्ययान्तत्वव्युत्पत्त्या भवनानुकूलव्यापाररूपा भावनैव भावपदेनोच्यते । आख्यातार्थेषु भावनाकालसंख्यादिषु कस्य प्राधान्यं कस्य गुणत्वं इति विचिकित्सायां भावप्रधानमिति निरुक्तमृतिः भावनातिरिक्ताख्यातार्थं प्रति आख्यातार्थभावनाया एव प्राधान्यं ब्रूते । एवञ्च धात्वर्थादीनां विशेष्यभूता भावनैव वाक्यजन्यबोधे मुख्यविशेष्यतया भासते । न च द्वितीयाद्यन्तपदस्य क्रियापदसाकांक्षत्वेऽपि प्रथमान्तपदस्य तदाकांक्षायां प्रमाणाभावेन प्रथमान्तार्थस्य क्रियाविशेषणत्वं नास्तीति वाच्यम् । यतः चैत्रः इत्येतावन्मात्रोक्तौ न निराकांक्षशाब्दबोधो जायते । किं करोति इत्याद्याकांक्षाया नियमेनोत्पादात् । न च चैत्रः इत्येतावन्मात्रस्य शाब्दबोधाजनकत्वेऽपि चैत्रः पण्डितः इति वाक्यात्पण्डिताभिन्नश्चैत्रः इति निराकांक्षबोधोदयात् प्रथमान्तार्थस्य क्रियासाकांक्षत्वे प्रमाणाभावः इति वाच्यम् । ‘अस्तिर्भवन्तीपरः प्रथमपुरुषः अप्रयुज्यमानोऽप्यस्ति’ इति कात्यायनस्मरणस्यैव प्रथमान्तपदस्य क्रियापदसाकांक्षत्वे प्रमाणत्वात् । न च तत्र तत्र योग्यतानुसारेण अस्त्यतिरिक्तक्रियापदाध्याहारस्यावश्यकत्वात् अस्तिर्भवन्तीपरः इति व्यर्थमिति वाच्यम् । वेदे अस्त्यध्याहारनियमार्थत्वात् । सर्वत्र क्रियापदमस्ति प्रथमान्तपदमपि क्रियापदसाकांक्षमेव अतः प्रथमान्तार्थः न वाक्यार्थबोधे विशेष्यः इति सूचनेन प्रथमान्तार्थमुख्यविशेष्यकत्वभ्रमनिरासस्यैव तदनुशासनफलत्वाच्च । न चोक्तानुशासनबलात् चैत्रः इत्यादिप्रथमान्तपदानां

अस्तिपदसाकांक्षत्वेऽपि अहं पण्डितः, त्वं पण्डितः, इत्यादौ प्रथमपुरुषभिन्नस्थले प्रथमान्तपदस्य क्रियापदसाकांक्षत्वे प्रमाणाभावः इति वाच्यम् । प्रातिपदिकार्थप्रकारकशाब्द-बुद्धित्वावच्छिन्नं प्रति विशेष्यतासंबन्धेन सुवजन्योपस्थितिः कारणं, लिङ्गसंख्याव्यतिरिक्त-सुवर्धप्रकारकशाब्दबुद्धित्वावच्छिन्नं प्रति क्रियापदजन्योपस्थितिः कारणं, इति क्लृप्त-कार्यकारणभावयोरेव तत्र क्रियापदसाकांक्षत्वे प्रमाणत्वात् ।

प्रथमाप्रकृत्यर्थः प्रथमार्थे विशेषणम् । प्रथमार्थश्च क्रियायां विशेषणतया भासते । न च प्रथमा न संख्यातिरिक्तार्थवती संख्या च प्रकृत्यर्थे विशेषणतयैवान्वेति इति प्रथमाप्रकृत्यर्थः कस्मिन्प्रथमार्थे विशेषणतयान्वेतीति वाच्यम् । प्रातिपदिकार्थलिङ्गपरिमाणवचनमात्रे प्रथमा इत्यनुशासनबलात् प्रथमायाः संख्यातिरिक्तार्थवत्त्वात् । ये मन्यन्ते प्रथमा साधुत्वसंपादिकेति तैरपि तस्यास्संख्यावाचकत्वं स्वीकृतमेव । एवञ्च लिङ्गसंख्या-वाचिका प्रथमा, प्रातिपदिकार्थे प्रातिपदिकेन विवक्षिते तदुत्तरं प्रथमा भवति इति चार्थवर्णने वैरूप्यापत्तिः । तस्मात्प्रातिपदिकार्थ एव प्रथमार्थः । न च तस्य प्रातिपदिकेनैव लाभात् प्रथमायाः तदर्थे साधुत्वार्थं तदर्थानुवादकतेति युक्तम् । चैत्रपदोत्तरप्रथमायाः चैत्ररूपार्थविशेषतात्पर्यग्राहकं चैत्रपदम् । अवश्यञ्चैवं स्वीकरणीयम् । अन्यथा प्रकृति-प्रत्ययार्थयोः न भेदसंबन्धेनान्वयः अभिन्नत्वात् । नाप्यभेदसंबन्धेन, तयोरभेदेनान्वयस्या-व्युत्पन्नत्वात् । उद्देश्यतावच्छेदकविधेयतावच्छेदकवैलक्षण्याभावेन तथा बोधासंभवाच्च । एवञ्च प्रथमार्थ एव चैत्रादिः आख्यातार्थभावनायां प्रकारतया भासते ।

अपि च, प्रातिपदिकस्य व्यर्थत्वापरपर्यायतात्पर्यग्राहकत्वकल्पनममृप्यमाणो वातिककारः ‘अभिहिते प्रथमा’ इत्यनुशशास । अभिहितकारकवाचिनी प्रथमा इति तदर्थः । एवञ्च चैत्रः पचति इत्यादौ कर्तृत्वं प्रथमार्थः । तत्र चैत्रः प्रकृत्यर्थः आधेय-तासंबन्धेनान्वेति । कर्तृत्वञ्चाख्यातार्थभावनायाम् । न च कर्तृत्वादेराख्याताभिहितस्य भावनायामन्वितत्वात्पुनः प्रथमया कर्तृत्वबोधनं व्यर्थमिति वाच्यम् । आख्यातेन न चैत्रत्वा-वच्छिन्नवृत्तित्वेन कर्तृत्वं बोध्यते । अतश्चैत्रवृत्तित्वेन कर्तृत्वबोधाय प्रथमया कर्तृत्वाभि-धानमावश्यकम् । न च प्रथमान्तपदेन चैत्रत्वावच्छिन्नवृत्तित्वेन कर्तृत्वबोधनात् आख्यातेन

सामान्यतः कर्तृत्वबोधो निष्फल इति वाच्यम् । आख्यातेन कर्तृत्वे अभिहित एव चैत्रादिपदोत्तरप्रथमायास्साधुत्वात् । यद्वृत्तिकारकत्वं स्वान्वयिक्रियाप्रतिपादकेन पदेन वृत्त्या प्रतिपाद्यते तत्त्वं प्रथमाप्रयोजकमभिहितत्वमित्युक्तं भाट्टदोषिकायाम् । अतश्च प्रथमायाः साधुत्वाय आख्यातेन सामान्यतः कर्तृत्वाभिधानमावश्यकम् । कर्तृत्वञ्चाखण्डो धर्मः नानुकूलकृतिमत्त्वम् । तथा सति चैत्रेण पाकः क्रियते इत्यत्र चैत्रेण पाकः इत्येतावतैव पाके चैत्रकर्तृत्वबोधसंभवात् क्रियते इति पदप्रयोगोऽनर्थकः स्यात् । अखण्डस्य कर्तृत्वस्य तृतीयाबोध्यत्वे तु कृतिसाध्यत्वं क्रियते इति पदेन बोध्यते इति तत्प्रयोगो नानर्थकः । कृत्यभिधानञ्च न प्रथमाप्रयोजकं चैत्रेण सुप्यते इत्यत्रापि चैत्रपदात्प्रथमापत्तेः । तत्रापि चैत्रेण स्वापः क्रियते इति विवरणानुसारेण आख्यातस्य कृतिरूपभावनाबोधकत्वावश्यकत्वात् । अतः अखण्डकर्तृत्वाद्यभिधानमेव प्रथमाप्रयोजकम् । आख्यातेन बोधितं कर्तृत्वं प्रथमार्थः । सुबर्थप्रकारकशाब्दबुद्धित्वावच्छिन्नं प्रति क्रियापदजन्योपस्थितिः विशेष्यता-संबन्धेन कारणं इति कार्यकारणभावबलेन तदपि भावनायामन्वेति ।

(१) एवञ्च सुबन्तपदानां स्वार्थविशेष्यसमर्पकं क्रियापदम् । तत्रापि धात्वर्थस्य आख्यातार्थो विशेष्यः तयोस्तु प्रत्ययः प्राधान्येन इति व्युत्पत्तेः । आख्यातार्थेषु च भावनाया विशेष्यत्वं भावप्रधानमाख्यातमिति निरुक्तस्मृतिबोधितम् । अतः वाक्यजन्यशाब्दबोधे भावनैव मुख्यविशेष्यतया भासते ।

(२) अपि च ओदनं पचति इत्यत्र प्रथमान्तपदाभावेन भावनाप्रकारकशाब्द-बोधासंभवेन सामग्रीवशात् भावनाविशेष्यकबोधे बाधकाभावः । एवञ्च भावनायाः कुत्रचित् मुख्यविशेष्यतया भानस्य सिद्धत्वात् सर्वत्रैव बोधे तस्या एव मुख्यविशेष्यतया भानं युक्तम् ।

(३) ‘तद्भूतानां क्रियार्थेन समाम्नायः’ इति सूत्रयन्महर्षिर्जैमिनिः क्रिया-पदबोध्यभावनामुख्यविशेष्यकं बोधं स्वानुभवसिद्धं ब्रूते ।

ननु तिङुपात्तसंख्या तावत्प्रथमान्तपदोपस्थाप्ये चैत्रादावन्वेतीत्यत्र नास्ति विवादः । चैत्र इव मैत्रो गच्छति इत्यत्र इवशब्दार्थसादृश्यविशेषणीभूते चैत्रे तादृशसंख्या-न्वयो नास्ति । अतः तिङुपात्तसंख्या अन्याविशेषणीभूतप्रथमान्तपदोपस्थाप्ये अन्वेतीति

फलितम् । एवञ्च आख्यातार्थभावनाया अपि आश्रयतासंबन्धेन तत्रैवान्वयो युक्तः । कालादिव्यतिरिक्ताख्यातार्थप्रकारकशाब्दबुद्धित्वावच्छिन्नं प्रति अन्याविशेषणीभूतप्रथमान्त-पदजन्योपस्थितिः विशेष्यतासंबन्धेन कारणमिति कार्यकारणभावकल्पने लाघवात् । तथा च चैत्रः पचति इति वाक्यात् पाकानुकूलकृतिमानेकत्वविशिष्टश्चैत्रः इति प्रथमान्तार्थमुख्य-विशेष्यक एव बोधः स्वीकरणीयः ।

अपि च पण्डितश्चैत्र इत्यत्र पण्डिताभिन्नश्चैत्रः इत्याकारकः प्रथमान्तार्थमुख्य-विशेष्यको बोधः अकामेनापि स्वीकरणीयः । नह्यत्राख्यातमस्ति यस्यार्थो मुख्यविशेष्यतया भासेत । चैत्रादिपदोत्तरप्रथमा च न विशेष्यतया प्रातिपदिकार्थान्वययोग्यमर्थमभिधत्ते । एवञ्च प्रथमान्तार्थमुख्यविशेष्यकबोधस्य सिद्धत्वात् सर्वत्रैव तस्य मुख्यविशेष्यतया भानमु-चितमिति चेत् ।

(१) न, यथा आख्यातार्थो वर्तमानादिकालः आश्रयतासंबन्धेन तदर्थकृता-वन्वेति । तथा प्रथमान्तार्थश्चैत्रादिरपि तेन संबन्धेन कृतावेवान्वेतीत्यपि वक्तुं शक्यम् । एवञ्च आख्यातार्थकृतिः प्रथमान्तपदार्थे विशेषणतयैव भासते इत्यत्र नियामकाभावात् निरुक्तकार्यकारणभावो निष्प्रमाणकः । न चास्माकमनुभव एव नियामक इति वाच्यम् । जैमिन्यादिमहर्ष्यनुभवविरुद्धानुभवस्य शपथैकनिर्णयत्वात् । न हि न्यायदर्शनकारो महर्षिः प्रथमान्तार्थमुख्यविशेष्यकबोधस्य स्वानुभवसिद्धतां सूचयत्यपि ।

(२) किञ्च तिङुपात्तसंख्या प्रथमान्तपदार्थे अन्वेतीत्येवासङ्गतम् । चैत्रः इति सुबेकवचनादेकत्वस्य शीघ्रमुपस्थितत्वात् तस्य चैत्रे अन्वयेनैव निराकांक्षत्वात् तिङुपात्तसंख्या-न्वये आकांक्षाविरहात् । न च चैत्रो मैत्रश्च गच्छतः इत्यत्र सुब्विभक्त्या द्वित्वस्यानुपस्थितेः आख्यातोपात्तद्वित्वस्य प्रथमान्तार्थे अन्वय आवश्यक इति वाच्यम् । तत्र आख्यातेन द्वित्ववत् सुपा एकत्वमपि बोध्यते । एकत्वान्वयानुभवस्य द्वित्वान्वयानुभवस्य वा अशाब्दत्वं वक्तव्यम् । तत्र च सुबुपात्तैकत्वान्वयबोध एव शाब्दः । न पदान्तरोपात्तद्वित्वान्वयानुभवः इत्येव कल्पयितुमुचितम् । वस्तुतः आख्यातार्थसंख्यायाः निरूढलक्षणया आख्यातेनोप-

स्थापिते कर्तर्येवान्वयः एकपदोपात्तत्वादिति न कुत्रापि आख्यातार्थसंख्यायाः प्रथमान्तार्थेऽन्वयः । अतश्च निरुक्तकार्यकारणभावकल्पनं न युज्यते ।

(३) अपि च कालाद्यतिरिक्ताख्यातार्थनिष्ठप्रकारतानिरूपितविशेष्यतासंबन्धेन आख्यातपदजन्यशाब्दबुद्धित्वावच्छिन्नं प्रति प्रथमान्तनामपदजन्यान्याविशेषणीभूतार्थविशेष्यकोपस्थितिः विशेष्यतासंबन्धेन कारणमिति कार्यकारणभावो न संभवति । तथा सति चैत्रो न पचति इत्यत्र आख्यातार्थभावनयाः चैत्रे अन्वयापत्तिः । भवन्मते हि पाकानुकूलकृत्यभाववांश्चैत्रः इत्याकारकस्तत्र बोधः । तत्र च भावनाविशेष्यत्वं नवार्थाभावस्यैव न चैत्रस्य । आख्यातार्थसंख्या च चैत्र एवान्वेति । अतः आख्यातार्थसंख्याभावनोभयसाधारण्येन निरुक्तकार्यकारणभावो न संभवति । न च निरुक्तकार्यकारणभावे कार्यतावच्छेदककोटौ आख्याते निपातासमभिव्याहृतत्वं दीयते । तथा च कालादिव्यतिरिक्तनिपातासमभिव्याहृताख्यातार्थनिष्ठप्रकारतानिरूपितविशेष्यतासंबन्धेन शाब्दबुद्धिं प्रति तादृशप्रथमान्तपदजन्योपस्थितिः कारणमिति फलितम् । एवञ्च चैत्रो न पचति इत्यत्र न प्रथमान्तार्थस्य भावनाविशेष्यत्वापत्तिरिति वाच्यम् । एवं सति निपातसमभिव्याहृताख्यातार्थसंख्यायाः प्रथमान्तार्थेऽन्वयो न स्यात् । तत्स्थलोयसंख्यान्वयबोधस्य प्रथमान्तपदजन्योपस्थितिकार्यतावच्छेदकानाक्रान्तत्वात् । न च निपातसमभिव्याहृताख्यातार्थसंख्यानिष्ठप्रकारतानिरूपितविशेष्यतासंबन्धेन शाब्दबोधे प्रथमान्तपदजन्योपस्थितिः कारणम् । तादृशाख्यातार्थभावनानिष्ठप्रकारतानिरूपितविशेष्यतासंबन्धेन शाब्दबोधे निपातजन्योपस्थितिः कारणमिति कल्पयित्वा संख्याविशेष्यत्वं प्रथमान्तार्थस्य भावनाविशेष्यत्वञ्चाभावस्योपपादयितुं शक्यमिति वाच्यम् । तथा सत्यनेककार्यकारणभावकल्पनया गौरवात् । अस्मन्मते तु नामार्थभिन्नः सुवर्थलिङ्गसंख्याव्यतिरिक्तस्सर्वोऽपि भावनायामेवान्वेतीति लाघवम् । एवं निपातसमभिव्याहारस्थले सर्वत्र नेयं रीतिस्संभवति । चैत्र एव पचति इत्यत्र निपातसमभिव्याहृते आख्यातार्थसंख्याभावनयोरुभयोरपि प्रथमान्तपदार्थे चैत्रेऽन्वयात् । एवञ्च तत्तत्स्थलानुरोधात् अन्यादृशकार्यकारणभावकल्पनाया आवश्यकत्वेन अनेककार्यकारणभावकल्पनाया आवश्यकत्वेन अनेककार्यकारणभावकल्पनागौरवं न केनापि परिहर्तुं शक्यम् ।

(४) अपि च चैत्र इव मैत्रो गच्छति इत्यत्र चैत्रे संख्यानन्वयात् अन्याविशेषणीभूतप्रथमान्तपदोपस्थाप्ये संख्यान्वयः स्वीकृतो भवद्भिः । इष्यते च चैत्र एव पचति इत्यत्र आख्यातार्थसंख्याभावनयोरुभयोरपि चैत्रेऽन्वयः । तत्कथं संगच्छते । चैत्रस्य एवकारार्थान्ययोग्यवच्छेदैकदेशे भेदे प्रतियोगितया विशेषणत्वात् । न च विशेष्यत्वाभाव-विशिष्टविशेषणत्वाभाववत्त्वमेव अन्याविशेषणत्वपदेन विवक्षितम् । निरुक्तवाक्याच्च चैत्रः पाकानुकूलकृतिमान् चैत्रान्यः पाकानुकूलकृत्यभाववानिति बोधो जायते । तत्र च विशेषणत्व-विशेष्यत्वाभ्यां चैत्रस्य भानात् विवक्षितान्याविशेषणत्वमस्तीति तत्र संख्याभावनयोरन्वयोनानुपपन्न इति वाच्यम् । तथा सति मुख्यविशेष्यस्य चैत्रस्य तदन्यस्य च भेदेन वाक्यार्थ-भेदात् वाक्यभेदः प्रसज्येत । किञ्चैवं बोधस्वीकारे, चैत्रे पचति सति मैत्रे चापचति कीदृशौ चैत्रमैत्रौ इति प्रश्ने चैत्र एव पचति इत्युत्तरापत्तिः । न च निरुक्तवाक्यान्मैत्रत्वेन बोधाभावात्कथं तस्य उत्तरत्वमिति वाच्यम् । तथापि कीदृशौ चैत्रतदन्यौ इति प्रश्नोत्तरत्वा-पत्तेर्दुर्वारत्वात् ।

(५) किञ्च ओदनं पचति इत्यत्र भावनाप्रकारकबोधप्रयोजकस्य प्रथमान्त-पदस्याभावात् कथं प्रथमान्तार्थमुख्यविशेष्यको बोधः । न चानुभवानुसारेण भावनाप्रकारक-बोधत्वावच्छिन्नं प्रत्येव आख्यातपदज्ञानं कारणमिति कल्प्यते । तादृशबोधनिर्वाहाय च प्रथमान्तपदं तत्राध्याहियते इति वाच्यम् । भावनाप्रकारकबोधस्य शपथैकनिर्णयत्वेन तादृशकार्यकारणभावस्यैवाकल्पनात् । एवं तादृशकार्यकारणभावस्वीकारे चैत्रेण सुष्यते इत्यादौ भावाख्याते आख्यातार्थभावनाप्रकारकबोधनिर्वाहाय प्रथमान्तपदमध्याहियेत । यदि च तत्र आख्यातार्थविशेष्यक एव बोधः भावनाप्रकारकबोधं प्रति च भावभिन्नाख्यातपदज्ञानं कारणमित्युच्यते । तदा गौरवम् ।

(६) अपि च चैत्रः पचति इति वाक्यं यदि पाकानुकूलकृतिमांश्चैत्रः इत्याकारकं भावनाप्रकारकं बोधं प्रसूते । तदा चैत्रः कीदृशः इति प्रश्ने इदं वाक्यमुत्तरं प्रसज्येत । न च भावनाविशेष्यकबोधपक्षेऽपि कीदृशी कृतिः इति प्रश्ने चैत्रकर्तृका या पाककृतिः तद्बोधकं चैत्रः पचति इति वाक्यमुत्तरं स्यादिति वाच्यम् । स्त्रीलिङ्गविशिष्ट-

कृतिविषयकप्रश्नस्य स्त्रीलिङ्गविशिष्टकृतिबोधकपदघटितमेवोत्तरवाक्यं भवितुमर्हति । आख्या-
तोपात्ता कृतिस्तु लिङ्गानन्वयिनीति न तादृशवाक्यं उत्तरम् । अनया च सरण्या नापत्तिर्भव-
त्यक्षे वारयितुं शक्यते । मुख्यविशेष्यस्य चैत्रस्य लिङ्गसंख्यादिविशिष्टस्यैव चैत्रः पचतीति
वाक्येन बोधनात् । तस्मादाख्यातार्थभावनाप्रकारकप्रथमान्तार्थमुख्यविशेष्यको बोधः न
संगच्छते ।

अपि तु आख्यातार्थभावनामुख्यविशेष्यक एव बोधः समुचितः । आख्यातार्थ-
संख्यापि सामानाधिकरण्यसंबन्धेन तस्यामेवान्वेति । एवं कालोऽपि आधेयतासंबन्धेन
तत्रैवान्वेति । नश्यतोत्यत्र तु निरूढलक्षणया आख्यातेनोपस्थापिते प्रतियोगित्वे (भावनायां)
वर्तमानः कालः स्ववृत्त्युत्पत्तिकनाशनिरूपितत्वसंबन्धेनान्वेति । चिरध्वस्ते घटे नश्यतीति
प्रयोगविरहात् । एवञ्च संबन्धभेदेऽपि कालः भावनायामेवान्वेति । न च सर्वत्र विशेष्य-
भावनाया एकत्वेऽपि तत्र तत्र संबन्धानां विलक्षणत्वात् तत्तत्संसर्गकबोधे तत्तत्समभिव्याहार-
ज्ञानस्य कारणताकल्पनेन कार्यकारणभावनन्त्यं दुर्वारमिति वाच्यम् । यथा वस्तुतः
संबन्धानां भेदेऽपि घटवद्द्रव्यमिति वाक्यात् मत्वर्थद्रव्यविशेष्यकः घटप्रकारकशब्दबोधो
जायते । तत्र च संबन्धः संबन्धत्वेन संसर्गमर्यादया भासते । न तु विशिष्य संयोगत्व-
समवायत्वादिना । अत एव संयोगेन घटाभाववद्द्रव्यमिति ज्ञानदशायामपि घटवद्द्र-
व्यमिति बुद्धिरनुभवसिद्धोपपद्यते । एतादृशवाक्यात्संबन्धसामान्यसंसर्गकशब्दबोधे जाते
संबन्धस्य विशिष्य जिज्ञासायां प्रमाणान्तरेण तात्पर्येऽवधृते तत्र तत्र संबन्धे शब्दबोधः
पर्यवस्यति । एवमेव वर्तमानकालवती भावना इति शब्दबोधे संबन्धः विशिष्य न संसर्ग-
मर्यादया भासते अपितु संबन्धत्वेन । ततश्च विशिष्य संबन्धावगतौ बोधस्तत्र पर्यवस्यति ।
एवञ्च संबन्धसामान्यसंसर्गककालप्रकारकभावनाविशेष्यकबोधे तादृशसमभिव्याहारज्ञानं कारण-
मित्येक एव कार्यकारणभाव इति न तदानन्त्यम् ।

एवं कर्त्राख्यातस्य कर्तरि कर्माख्यातस्य कर्मणि च निरूढलक्षणा । पचतीत्ये-
तावन्मात्रश्रवणेऽपि पाककर्ता एको न वेति संशयो नोदेति । उदेति च पाककर्ता कः
इति जिज्ञासा । पचतीत्यतः पाककर्तृबोधं विना नैतदुपपादयितुं शक्यते । अतः कर्तृबोधाद्य

आख्यातस्य कर्तरि लक्षणास्वीकारः आवश्यकः । कर्तरि लकारबोधकं अनुशासनमपि संगतं भवति । कर्तृत्वश्चाखण्डो धर्मः न कृत्याश्रयत्वमिति पूर्वमेव निवेदितम् । अत एव दम्पत्योः कर्तृत्वं व्यासज्यवृत्ति इति सिद्धान्तः सङ्गच्छते । अन्यथा कृत्याश्रयत्वस्य पतिनिष्ठस्य पत्नीनिष्ठस्य च भिन्नभिन्नत्वात् व्यासज्यवृत्तित्वं नोपपद्येत । आख्यातलक्ष्यः कर्तापि स्वनिष्ठकर्तृतानिरूपकत्वसंबन्धेन भावनायामेवान्वेति ।

एवं पचतित्यादौ धात्वर्थः पाकः भावनायां कर्मतासंबन्धेनान्वेति । न त्वनुकूलता-संबन्धेन पचतीत्यस्य पाकं करोति इति विवरणात् । ओदनं पचतीत्यादौ ओदनस्य कर्मत्वेनान्वितत्वात् पाकः करणत्वेन भावनायामन्वेति । पाकेनोदनं करोति इति विवरणात् । न च पाकं प्रति कृतेः कारणतया कृतिनिरूपितं करणत्वं पाके न संभवति । अतश्च कथं करणत्वेन भावनायां पाकान्वयः इति वाच्यम् । स्वनिष्ठकरणतानिरूपकोदनोद्देश्य-कत्वसंबन्धेन पाकः भावनायामन्वेति । करणत्वस्य संसर्गघटकत्वात्संसर्गत्वव्यवहार उपपद्यते । एवञ्च धात्वर्थः यथायथं कर्मत्वकरणत्वान्यतरसंसर्गेण भावनायामन्वेति ।

ओदनं पचति इत्यत्र द्वितीयार्थः कर्मत्वम् । तच्च परसमवेतक्रियाजन्यफलशालि-त्वसमनियतमखण्डम् । तत्रैव द्वितीयार्थसंख्यापि सामानाधिकरण्यसंबन्धेनान्वेति समानपदो-पात्तत्वात् । कर्मत्वे च प्रकृत्यर्थः आधेयतया अन्वेति । तच्च स्वनिरूपकपाकानुकूलत्व-संबन्धेन भावनायामेवान्वेति ।

न च द्वितीयार्थकर्मत्वं निरूपकत्वेन साक्षात्संबन्धेन धात्वर्थ एवान्वेतु इति वाच्यम् । पाकं करोति, पाकेनोदनं करोति इत्यादिविवरणात् धात्वर्थः करोत्यर्थभावना-कारकम् । धात्वर्थसाधारण्येन कारकप्रकारकशाब्दबुद्धित्वावच्छिन्नं प्रति भावनाविशेष्यता-संबन्धेन लिङ्गानन्वयिपदजन्योपस्थितिः कारणमित्येककार्यकारणभावकल्पने लाघवात् कर्म-त्वादीनामपि भावनायामेव योग्येन संबन्धेनान्वयो युक्तः । अन्यथा अनेककार्यकारण-भावकल्पने गौरवात् । एवं धात्वर्थपाकान्वयार्थमुपस्थितं भावनाविशेष्यत्वमिति तस्यैव कर्मत्वादिप्रकारतानिरूपितत्वं कल्पयितुमुचितम् । न त्वनुपस्थितस्य धात्वर्थविशेष्यत्वस्य । एवं काष्ठैरोदनं पचति इति वाक्यं काष्ठैः पाकेन ओदनं करोति इति विवृण्वते । तत्र च

काष्ठकरणत्वादीनां करोत्यर्थान्वयित्वं संप्रतिपन्नमिति विव्रियमाणवाक्येऽपि विभक्त्यर्थकरण-
त्वादीनां करोत्यर्थभावनायामन्वयो युज्यते । एवमेव कर्तृत्वकरणत्वसंप्रदानत्वादिकमपि
अखण्डमेव तत्तद्विभक्त्यर्थः स्वनिरूपकधात्वर्थानुकूलत्वसंबन्धेन भावनायामन्वेति ।

न चानुभवमनुसृत्य व्युत्पत्तिभेदमङ्गीकृत्य तस्य तस्य पदार्थस्य योग्येन साक्षा-
त्संबन्धेन स्वस्वविशेष्ये अन्वयः समीचीन इति वाच्यम् । तथा सति राजपुरुषः इति
समासस्थले नामार्थयोरपि भेदेनान्वयव्युत्पत्तिं स्वीकृत्य राज एव स्वस्वामिभावसंबन्धेन
पुरुषेऽन्वयस्वीकारसंभवात् नैयायिकैः तत्र पूर्वपदस्य राजसंबन्धिनि लक्षणा न स्वीक्रियेत ।
यजेत स्वर्गकामः इत्यादौ यागे प्रतीयमानस्य स्वर्गसाधनत्वस्य मानसबोधविषयत्वं स्वीकृत्य
कूलसव्युत्पत्तिबलात् इष्टसाधनयागानुकूलकृतिमान्स्वर्गकामः इति शाब्दबोधस्य स्वीकारोऽपि
नैयायिकानां न संगच्छेत । तस्मात्प्रथमकूलसव्युत्पत्तिभङ्गेन व्युत्पत्त्यन्तरकल्पनं न
प्रामाणिकम् ।

चैत्र ओदनं पचति इत्यत्र चैत्रकर्तृका (अभिहितकारकं प्रथमार्थ इति पक्षे
चैत्रवृत्ति यत्कर्तृत्वं स्वनिरूपकपाकानुकूलत्वसंबन्धेन तद्विशिष्टा) सामानाधिकरण्यसंबन्धेन
एकत्वविशिष्टं यदोदनवृत्ति कर्मत्वं निरुक्तेन धात्वर्थघटितसंबन्धेन तद्विशिष्टा स्वनिष्ठकरण-
तानिरूपकोदनोद्देश्यकत्वसंबन्धेन पाकविशिष्टा सामानाधिकरण्येन एकत्ववती वर्तमानकालिकी
भावना इति बोधः ।

चैत्रेणोदनः पच्यते इत्यत्र एकत्वविशिष्टं यच्चैत्रवृत्तिकर्तृत्वं स्वनिरूपकपाकानु-
कूलत्वसंबन्धेन तद्विशिष्टा एकत्वविशिष्टं यदोदनवृत्ति कर्मत्वं निरुक्तसंबन्धेन तद्विशिष्टा
स्वनिष्ठकरणतानिरूपकोदनोद्देश्यकत्वसंबन्धेन पाकविशिष्टा स्वाश्रयोदनवृत्तिविकूलत्तिजनक-
पाकानुकूलत्वसंबन्धेन एकत्वविशिष्टा वर्तमानकालिकी भावना इति बोधः ।

चैत्रेण सुप्यते इति भावाख्यातस्थले चैत्रकर्तृका एकत्वविशिष्टस्वापवती
स्वापभावना इति संक्षिप्तो बोधः । भावाख्यातादपि भावना बोध्यते चैत्रेण स्वापः क्रियते
इति विवरणात् । धात्वर्थस्वापश्च आख्यातार्थः भावे चाकर्मकेभ्यः इत्यनुशासनबलात् ।
सोऽपि भावनायामन्वेति । द्वितीयवारं धात्वर्थस्वापबोधः साधुत्वार्थः ।

चैत्रो न पचति इत्यत्र चैत्रकर्तृका भावना अभावप्रतियोगिनी इति संक्षिप्तो बोधः । नञर्थः अभावोऽपि प्रतियोगितासंबन्धेन भावनायामन्वेति । न चैवं सति पचत्यपि चैत्रे चैत्रो न पचति इति प्रयोगापत्तिः चैत्रकर्तृकपाकभावनायाः अन्यनिष्ठाभावप्रतियोगित्वेन विषयाबाधादिति वाच्यम् । नञा लक्षणया चैत्रनिष्ठाभावो बोध्यते । स च प्रतियोगितया भावनान्वयी । चैत्रकर्तृका पाकभावना चैत्रनिष्ठाभावप्रतियोगिनी इति बोधः । इत्थञ्च न पूर्वोक्तदोषः प्रसरति । अथवा नञ्समभिव्याहारस्थले आख्यातस्य कृत्यभावे लक्षणा । नञ्पदं तात्पर्यग्राहकम् । प्रथमान्तपदार्थोऽपि आधेयतासंबन्धेन अभावे अन्वेति । वर्तमान-पाकानुकूलकृत्यभावः चैत्रनिष्ठः इति बोधः निरुक्तदोषास्पर्शी ।

चैत्र एव पचति इत्यत्र चैत्रवृत्तिश्चैत्रान्यावृत्तिश्चैत्रकर्तृका पाकभावना इति बोधः ।

नीलो घटः इत्यत्र अस्तीति क्रियापदमध्याहार्यम् । आख्यातार्थः आश्रयत्वम् । नीलपदार्थः घटपदार्थश्च स्वकर्तृकस्थितिनिरूपितत्वसंबन्धेन भावनायां (आश्रयत्वे) अन्वेति । नीलघटयोरभेदबोधो मानसः । यदि अभेदबोधस्य शाब्दत्वे आग्रहः । तदा नीलविशिष्टस्य स्वाभिन्नघटकर्तृकस्थितिनिरूपितत्वसंबन्धेन भावनायामन्वयः । नीलविशिष्टा घटविशिष्टा च स्थितिभावना इति बोधः ।

घटः पटो नेत्यत्र भवतीति क्रियापदमध्याह्रियते । घटपदस्य घटभिन्ने लक्षणा । नञ्पदं तात्पर्यग्राहकम् । तस्य च स्वाभिन्नपटनिष्ठकर्तृत्वघटितसंबन्धेन आश्रयत्वे (भावनायां) अन्वयः । पटोऽपि स्ववृत्तिकर्तृत्वघटितसंबन्धेन तत्रैवान्वेति ।

एवञ्च प्रातिपदिकार्थव्यतिरिक्तः सुबर्थलिङ्गसंख्याव्यतिरिक्तश्च सर्वोऽपि भावना-यामन्वेतीति व्युत्पत्तिलाघवस्य केनाप्यपलपितुमशक्यत्वात्सर्वत्र भावनामुख्यविशेष्यक एव बोधः महर्ष्यनुभवसिद्धो युज्यते इति निरूपयन्ति ॥

वैयाकरणास्तु, सुबन्ततिङन्तचयात्मकं वाक्यं वदन्त्यभिज्ञाः । सुबन्तश्च नाम-पदेन व्यवह्रियते । नमत्याख्यातार्थं प्रति विशेषणीभवतीति नाम इति, वाक्येह्याख्यातं प्रधानं तदर्थत्वाद्गुणभूतं नाम इति च निरुक्तभाष्यकारो वभाषे । सुबन्तार्थश्च आख्यातशब्दित-

तिङन्तार्थविशेषणतया भासते । तिङन्तजन्यबोधे च धात्वर्थो भाव एव विशेष्यः । तिङर्थस्तु कर्त्रादिः तत्र विशेषणम् । यद्यपि प्रकृतिप्रत्ययौ सहार्थं ब्रूतः तयोस्तु प्रत्ययः प्राधान्येन इति व्युत्पत्तेः तिङर्थ एव धात्वर्थविशेष्यो भवितुमर्हति । तथापि भावप्रधान-
माख्यातं इति निरुक्तस्मृतेः धात्वर्थस्य भावस्यैव विशेष्यत्वं सिद्धयति । तथाहि चत्वारि पदजातानि नामाख्यातोपसर्गनिपाताः इत्युपक्रम्य सत्वप्रधानानि नामानि इति नामलक्षणं, भावप्रधानमाख्यातं इत्याख्यातलक्षणञ्च न्यरूपयन्निरुक्तकारः । “ प्रकृतिः प्रत्ययो विभक्तिरित्ये-
तावन्नाम, सत्ता द्रव्यं लिङ्गं संख्येति नामार्थः ” इति तद्भाष्यात् सुबन्तं नामपदेन बोध्यते इति गम्यते । भावप्रधानमाख्यातमित्यत्र आख्यातशब्दः तिङन्तं बोधयति । आख्यात-
माख्यातेन क्रियासातत्ये इत्यादौ तिङन्त एवाख्यातपदप्रयोगात् । सर्वमाख्यातजं नाम इत्यत्र तु आख्यातशब्दः लक्षणया तदर्थकदेशे धातौ वर्तते । न्यायवार्तिककारश्च ते विभक्त्यन्ताः पदम् इति न्यायसूत्रविवरणे ‘ द्वयी विभक्तिः स्वादयः तिबादयश्च । तत्र स्वाद्यन्तं नाम तिबाद्यन्तमाख्यातम् ’ इत्यसन्दिग्धं ब्रूते । पदजातं चतुर्धा विभज्य आख्यात-
लक्षणप्रतिपादकस्य तदाख्यातं येन भावं सधातुः इति प्रातिशाख्यस्य विवरणावसरे सधातुरिति तृतीयार्थे प्रथमा इति तद्भाष्यकारो निरूपयति । ततः येन सधातुना भावमभिधाति (पुरुषः) तदाख्यातमित्यर्थेलाभात् तिङन्तमाख्यातपदबोध्यमिति स्पष्टमेव ।
‘ भावकालकारकसंख्याश्चत्वारोऽथा आख्यातस्य, तेषु भावः प्रधानम् ’ इति निरुक्तभाष्यात् कारककालसंख्याविशेषणकभावविशेष्यकबोधजनकत्वमाख्यातस्य लक्षणमिति फलति । प्रत्य-
यार्थप्राधान्यन्यायः सुबर्थविषयत्वेन संकोचनीयः भावप्रधानमिति विशेषस्मृतेः । न च भाव-
प्रधानमित्यस्य धात्वर्थापेक्षया यत्र कृतिः भावना (भावः) प्रधानं तदाख्यातमित्यर्थः । अतश्च नैतद्वचनं धात्वर्थविशेष्यत्वे प्रमाणमिति वाच्यम् । प्रत्ययार्थः प्रधानं स्यात्प्रकृत्यर्थो विशेषणम् इति न्यायसिद्धत्वाद्वचनमिदं व्यर्थमापद्येत । अपि चास्य आख्यातलक्षणत्वे भावाख्याते अव्याप्तिः स्यात् । सुप्यते इत्यादिभावोख्यातात् धात्वर्थविशेष्यतया भावनाया
अबोधात् । तस्माद्धात्वर्थप्राधान्यपरमेवेदं वचनम् । एवं निरुक्तसमानार्थकं क्रियाप्रधानमाख्यातं इति महाभाष्यमपि धात्वर्थप्राधान्ये प्रमाणं बोध्यम् ।

न्यायभाष्यकारोऽपि पञ्चमेऽध्याये ‘ प्रकृतादर्थसंबद्धानर्थमर्थान्तरम् ’ इति सूत्रे

‘ क्रियाकालयोगाभिधाय्याख्यातम् धात्वर्थमात्रञ्च कालाभिधानविशिष्टम् ’ इत्याख्यात-
लक्षणमाचष्टे । तत्र कालेन अभिधानेन—कारकेण च विशिष्टं धात्वर्थमात्रमाख्यातार्थः इति
धात्वर्थमात्रमिति भाष्यार्थः । न्यायवार्तिककारः ‘ ते विभक्त्यन्ताः पदम् ’ इति सूत्रे ‘ क्रिया-
कालयोगाभिधायि क्रियाप्रधानमाख्यातं यथा पचति ’ इति निरूपयन् पञ्चमाध्यायस्थं
निरुक्तं भाष्यं व्याचष्टे इव । अत्र निरुक्तसमानार्थकमहाभाष्यसमानाकारेण क्रियाप्रधानमिति
शब्देन निरुक्तभाष्यरीत्या प्रत्ययार्थकालकारकसंख्याद्यपेक्षया धात्वर्थस्य प्राधान्यं सूचितं
भवति । अतः भावप्राधान्यं प्राचीननैयायिकाभिमतमेव । किञ्च ‘ पचति भवति इत्यादौ
पचादिक्रियाः भवतिक्रियायाः कर्त्र्यो भवन्ति ’ इति भाष्याद्धात्वर्थस्य प्राधान्यं सिद्धयति ।
धात्वर्थस्य तिङर्थविशेषणत्वे एकत्र विशेषणतयोपस्थितस्य अन्यत्र स्वातन्त्र्येणान्वयस्य व्युत्पत्ति-
विरुद्धत्वेन भवत्यर्थक्रियायां पचिक्रियायाः विशेषणतया अन्वयो न स्यात् । एवञ्च पूर्वोक्त-
भाष्यादपि धात्वर्थस्य प्राधान्यं लभ्यते ।

न चाख्याताद्भावप्रधानशब्दबोधजननेऽपि प्रथमान्तपदसमभिव्याहारे एककर्तृ-
विशिष्टपाकाश्रयो देवदत्तः इति प्रथमान्तार्थमुख्यविशेष्यक एव बोध उपेयतामिति वाच्यम् ।
तादृशस्य बोधस्याननुभवात् । ‘ यत्रोभे भावप्रधाने भवतः ’ इति समनन्तरनिरुक्तविरोधाच्च ।
अत्र निरुक्तभाष्यम् “ नामाख्यातयोः परस्परविनाभूतयोः स्वस्वपदार्थोक्तौ एकस्य भाव-
प्राधान्यं अन्यस्य सत्वप्राधान्यम् । अथ पुनः यत्र वाक्ये ते उभे (नामाख्याते) भवतः । तत्र
वाक्ये भावप्रधाने आख्यातार्थप्रधाने । वाक्येह्याख्यातं प्रधानम् । तदर्थत्वाद्गुणभूतं नाम ।
तदर्थस्य भावनिष्पत्तावङ्गत्वात् । एवं तावद्वाक्ये आख्यातं प्रधानम् ” इति । अतश्च ज्ञायते
नामाख्यातसमुदायरूपवाक्यजन्यबोधे भावो धात्वर्थः प्रधानं विशेष्यः इति । एवञ्च धात्वर्थ-
मुख्यविशेष्यकबोधः महर्षिसंमतो युज्यते न तु प्रथमान्तार्थमुख्यविशेष्यकबोधः ।

अपि च धात्वर्थः सर्वत्र प्रथमान्तार्थे विशेषणमिति पक्षे पाकक्रिया भवतीत्यर्थे
पचति भवति इति प्रयोगो महाभाष्यसिद्धो न स्यात् ।

किञ्च क्रियाविशेषणकप्रथमान्तार्थविशेष्यकबोधाङ्गीकारे पश्य मृगो धावति इत्यत्र
एकवाक्यता न स्यात् । धावति मृगः इत्यनेन धावनानुकूलकृतिमान्मृगः इत्यवान्तरवाक्यार्थ-

बोधो जायते । धावनञ्च आख्यातार्थविशेषणत्वान्न दर्शनक्रियायां कर्मतया अन्वेतुं शक्नोति । एकत्र विशेषणतयेति व्युत्पत्तिविरोधात् । तथा च धावनानुकूलकृतिमान्मृगः दर्शनाश्रयस्त्वमिति बोधो वाच्यः । वाक्यार्थस्य भेदात् एकमुख्यविशेष्यकबोधजनकत्वरूपमेकवाक्यत्वं न स्यात् । न च धावनानुकूलकृतिमान्मृगस्य विषयतापर्यवसितेन कर्मत्वेन दर्शनक्रियायामन्वयः । धावनानुकूलकृतिमान्मृगविषयकदर्शनाश्रयस्त्वमिति एकमुख्यविशेष्यकबोधजननादेकवाक्यत्वं संभवतीति वाच्यम् । मृगस्य दर्शनकर्मत्वविवक्षायां मृगपदात् द्वितीयापत्तेः । कर्मणि द्वितीया इत्यनुशासनात् । न च प्रातिपदिकार्थविशेष्यतया कर्मत्वे विवक्षित एव द्वितीया भवति न तु कर्मत्वस्य संसर्गतया विवक्षणेऽपि । मृगस्य च कर्मतासंबन्धेनैव दर्शनेऽन्वय इति न द्वितीयापत्तिरिति वाच्यम् । तण्डुलस्य कर्मतासंबन्धेन पाकेऽन्वयतात्पर्येण तण्डुलः पचति इति प्रयोगवारणाय नामार्थधात्वर्थयोः साक्षाद्भेदेनानन्वयव्युत्पत्तिः स्वीकरणीया । तादृशव्युत्पत्तिविरोधात् मृगस्य नामार्थस्य कर्मतासंबन्धेन धात्वर्थे दर्शनेऽन्वयो न संभवति । एवञ्च मृगस्य कर्मत्वविवक्षायां मृगपदोत्तरं द्वितीया दुर्वारा । न च मृगपदोत्तरं द्वितीयाप्रसङ्गे अप्रथमासमानाधिकरणत्वात् लटः शत्रुशानचावप्रथमासमानाधिकरणे इति सूत्रेण शत्रुप्रत्ययापत्तिरिति वाच्यम् । यतः शत्रापत्तिर्न द्वितीयावाधिका । अपि तु कर्मणोऽभिधानमेव द्वितीयां बाधते । तदभावादत्र द्वितीया दुर्वारैव । एवञ्च मृगस्य कर्मतया धात्वर्थे दर्शनेऽन्वयोपगमे धावन्तं मृगं पश्य इति वाक्यमुचितं न पश्य मृगो धावति इति । न च तमित्यध्याहृत्य बोधो वर्णनीय इति वाच्यम् । तथा सति वाक्यभेदप्रसङ्गात् । अपि च वाक्यभेदेनापि निरुक्तरीत्या बोधवर्णने भाष्यसिद्धं धावनस्य दर्शनक्रियाकर्मत्वं नायाति । तथा हि भाष्यम् “ क्रियापि कृत्रिमं कर्म । क्रियापि हि क्रिययेप्सिता भवति । कया क्रियया । सन्दर्शनादिक्रियया ” इति ।

ननु नात्र नामार्थो मृगः कर्मतया दर्शनेऽन्वेति । अपि तु धावनविशिष्ट-मृगरूपो वाक्यार्थः । वाक्यार्थस्य कर्मत्वे न द्वितीयापत्तिः । कर्मबोधकस्य वाक्यत्वात्तस्य प्रातिपदिकसंज्ञाविरहात् अप्रातिपदिकाच्च सुबुत्पत्तेरसंभवात् । एवं वाक्यार्थस्य कर्मतासंबन्धेन धात्वर्थे दर्शनेऽन्वयोऽपि न व्युत्पत्तिविरुद्धः । नामार्थस्यैव भेदसंबन्धेन साक्षाद्भात्वर्थेऽन्वयं बाधते सा व्युत्पत्तिः न तु वाक्यार्थस्य । एवमेव ‘ जानामि सीता जनकप्रसूता ’ ‘ श्रुत्वा

ममैतन्माहात्म्यं तथाचोत्पत्तयश्शुभाः' इत्यादयः प्रयोगा उपपद्यन्ते । वाक्यार्थस्य कर्मत्वा-
द्वाक्याच्च द्वितीयाया अयोगात् । धावनविशिष्टमृगस्य दर्शनकर्मत्वबोधे विशेषणीभूतधावन-
स्यापि दर्शनकर्मतया बोधस्सिद्ध इति महाभाष्योक्तं धावनक्रियाया दर्शनक्रियाकर्मत्वं
उपपद्यते इति चेन्न ।

एवं रीत्या वाक्यैकवाक्यताया उपपादनेऽपि भाष्यसिद्धायाः पदैकवाक्यताया
असंभवात् । किञ्च नीलविशिष्टघटस्य दर्शनकर्मत्वे प्रतिपिपादयिषिते नीलं घटं जानाति
इति प्रयोगो न साधुः स्यात् । विशिष्टस्य वाक्यार्थत्वात्तद्बोधकस्य पदसमुदायरूपवाक्य-
स्याप्रातिपदिकत्वेन द्वितीयाया अनुपपत्तेः । तस्मात्प्रथमान्तार्थविशेष्यकबोधस्वीकारे पश्य मृगो
धावति इत्येकं वाक्यं न स्यात् ।

अस्मन्मते तु मृगो धावति इत्यतो मृगकर्तृकं धावनं बोध्यते । धावनञ्च
कर्मतासंबन्धेन दर्शने अन्वेति । मृगकर्तृकधावनकर्मकं दर्शनमिति बोधः । अत्र च न
कापि व्युत्पत्तिर्विरुद्ध्यते । कर्मबोधकस्य धातुत्वेन प्रातिपदिकसंज्ञाविरहान्न द्वितीयापत्तिरपि ।
न च मृगीयधावनस्य विशिष्टस्य कर्मत्वे विशेषणीभूतमृगस्यापि कर्मत्वात् मृगपदस्य प्राति-
पदिकत्वात्तदुत्तरं द्वितीयापत्तिरिति वाच्यम् । मृगस्य धावनविशेषणत्वेन तत्प्रयुक्तस्यान्तरङ्ग-
संस्कारस्य प्रथमारूपस्यानिवृत्तेः । श्रुत्वा ममैतन्माहात्म्यं तथाचोत्पत्तयश्शुभाः इत्यादि-
प्रयोगास्त्वार्थाः ॥

एतेन दृशिधातोः धावनकर्तृमृगकर्मकदर्शने, मृगकर्तृकोत्कटधावने वा लक्षणा ।
इतराणि पदानि तात्पर्यग्राहकाणि । अत्र च न कोऽपि व्युत्पत्तिविरोधः इति परास्तम् ।
उत्तरीत्या विनैव लक्षणां निर्वहे लक्षणाश्रयणस्यानुचितत्वात् । अनेकेषां पदानां व्यर्थत्वा-
परपर्यायतात्पर्यग्राहकत्वकल्पनाया अयुक्तत्वाच्च ।

न च भवन्मते आनय मृगो धावति इत्येकं वाक्यं न स्यात् । मृगकर्तृकधावनस्य
आनयनक्रियाकर्मत्वेनान्वयायोगात् । अस्मन्मते तु धावनकर्तृमृगस्य आनयनकर्मतयान्वय-
संभवाद्भवत्येकवाक्यतेति वाच्यम् । यतः सविशेषणे हि विधिनिषेधौ विशेषणमुपसंक्रामतः

सति विशेष्ये बाधे इति न्यायेन मृगविशिष्टस्य धावनस्य आनयनकर्मत्वान्वयबोधः मृगकर्म-
कानयने पर्यवस्यति । तस्मात्प्रथमान्तार्थमुख्यविशेष्यकबोधो न समञ्जसः ।

अपि च स्वस्वामिभावसंबन्धेन राजविशिष्टः पुरुषः स्वस्वामिभावसंबन्धेन
भार्याविशिष्टः इति बोधतात्पर्येण राजपुरुषो भार्यायाश्च इति न प्रयुज्यते । एवं घटत्वविशिष्टे
समवायेन द्रव्यत्ववैशिष्ट्यतात्पर्येण घटो द्रव्यत्वस्य इत्यपि न प्रयुज्यते । अतः
एकविशेषणवैशिष्ट्येनोपरिहृते तज्जातीयसंबन्धेन विशेषणान्तरान्वयो नेति व्युत्पत्तिः
स्वीकरणीया । स्वस्वामिभावसंबन्धेन राजविशिष्टे पुरुषे सजातीयस्वस्वामिभावसंबन्धेन
भार्यावैशिष्ट्यं बोधयितुं न शक्यते इति तादृशप्रयोगो न प्रमाणम् । एवञ्च चैत्रः पचति
इति वाक्यात् समवायेन पाकानुकूलकृतिप्रकारकः चैत्रत्वविशिष्टविशेष्यकः शाब्दबोधो
न संभवति । उक्तव्युत्पत्तिविरोधेन समवायेन चैत्रत्वविशिष्टे सजातीयसमवायेन कृतिवैशि-
ष्ट्यस्य बोधयितुमशक्यत्वात् ।

किञ्च धात्वर्थप्रधान्याभावे पचति व्रजति इति वाक्यं साधु संपद्येत । धात्वर्थ-
प्राधान्ये तु पाककर्तृकव्रजनस्य बाधान्न तद्वाक्यं साधु । अतः निरुक्तमहाभाष्यकारादि-
महर्षिसंमतः धात्वर्थमुख्यविशेष्यक एव बोधः समञ्जसः ।

चैत्रः तण्डुलं पचति इत्यत्र तण्डुलपदोत्तरद्वितीयाया आश्रयोऽर्थः । कर्मणि
द्वितीयेत्यनुशासनात्कर्म द्वितीयावाच्यम् । क्रियाजन्यफलाश्रयः कर्म । क्रिया फलञ्च धातुत
एव लभ्यते । जन्यत्वञ्च विनैव पदार्थतां संसर्गमर्यादया । अतः अनन्यलभ्यः आश्रयः
द्वितीयार्थः । तत्र प्रकृत्यर्थः अभेदेनान्वेति । देवतातद्धितादिस्थले प्रकृतिप्रत्ययार्थयोरभेदा-
न्वयस्य सर्वसिद्धत्वात् । आश्रयश्च स्ववृत्त्याश्रयत्वनिरूपकत्वसंबन्धेन विकृतिरूपे
अन्वेति । तच्च जनकतासंबन्धेन कृतिपर्यन्तव्यापारे धात्वर्थे अन्वेति । कर्त्राख्यातस्य
पूर्वोक्तन्यायादाश्रयः संख्या वर्तमानकालश्चार्थः । प्रथमान्तचैत्रपदार्थः अभेदेन आख्यातार्थे
आश्रये, संख्या समानपदोपात्ताश्रये, वर्तमानकालश्च धात्वर्थव्यापारे अन्वेति । तिङर्थश्च
धात्वर्थे इति तण्डुलाभिन्नाश्रयकविकृत्यनुकूलः एकचैत्राभिन्नाश्रयकः वर्तमानो व्यापारः
इति तद्वाक्याधीनो बोधः ।

चैत्रेण तण्डुलः पच्यते इत्यत्र कर्माख्यातस्य कर्तृतृतीयायाश्चाश्रयोऽर्थः निरुक्त-
न्यायात् । तृतीयार्थः धात्वर्थे व्यापारे, प्रथमान्ततण्डुलपदार्थान्विताख्यातार्थाश्रयश्च धात्वर्थे
फले अन्वेति । फलं च व्यापारे इति तण्डुलाभिन्नाश्रयकविकृत्यनुकूलः चैत्राभिन्नाश्रयकः
वर्तमानो व्यापारः इति शब्दबोधः ।

चैत्रेण सुप्यते इत्यत्र तिङ् धात्वर्थानुवादकः लट्त्वादिना वर्तमानकालबोधकः ।
चैत्राभिन्नाश्रयकः वर्तमानस्वापः इत्यन्वयबोधः ।

चैत्रो न पचति इत्यत्र चैत्रकर्तृकपाणिभावः इति बोधः प्रकारतासंबन्धेन
नञर्थविशेष्यकबोधं प्रति धातुजन्यभावनोपस्थितेः विशेष्यतासंबन्धेन हेतुत्वात् । नीलो घटः
इत्यत्र प्रकृत्यर्थान्वितः नीलपदोत्तरप्रथमार्थः प्रातिपदिकार्थः अमेदेन घटपदार्थेऽन्वेति इति
प्राचीनवैयाकरणानुसारिणी बोधसरणिः ।

द्वितीयायाः कर्मत्वशक्तिमान्, विशेषणत्वं, क्रियाकारकभावसंबन्धश्चार्थः ।
क्रियाजन्यफलाश्रयत्वातिरिक्तैव कर्मत्वशक्तिः अखण्डा । अत एव क्रियाजन्यफलाश्रयत्वा-
त्कर्मत्वमिति प्रयोग उपपद्यते । अन्यथा कर्मत्वात्कर्मत्वमितिवदयोगं तादृशवाक्यं स्यात् ।
कर्मणि द्वितीया इति सूत्रस्वरसात्कर्मत्वशक्तिमानर्थः । ‘ कष्टं श्रितो भवतीत्यत्र क्रिया-
कारकयोरभिसंबन्धस्य द्वितीया वाचिका भवति ’ इति समर्थसूत्रभाष्यात् क्रियाकारक-
भावसंबन्धोऽर्थः । भेदसमानाधिकरणविशेषणत्वज्ञान एव संबन्धाकांक्षा जायते इति विशेषण-
त्वमपि द्वितीयावाच्यम् । कर्मत्वादिशक्तिश्च द्वितीयाद्योत्या प्रकृत्यर्थविशेषणमेव । पञ्चकं
प्रातिपदिकार्थ इति व्यवस्थापितत्वात् । आख्यातस्यापि कर्तृत्वादिशक्तिमानर्थः । कर्माभूत-
तण्डुलविशिष्टदेवदत्ताभिन्नकर्तृको वर्तमानः पाकः इति देवदत्तः तण्डुलं पचति इति
वाक्याधीनो बोधः ।

कर्माख्याते च धातुतः व्यापारावच्छिन्नफलमुपस्थाप्यते । धात्वर्थफलमुख्य-
विशेष्यकश्च बोधो जायते । अत एव ‘ इष्यते पुत्रः इत्यर्थे पुत्रीयतीति न । भिन्नार्थकत्वात् ।
किन्तु पुत्रमिच्छतीत्यर्थ एव ’ इति सुप आत्मन इति सूत्रस्थं भाष्यमुपपद्यते । उभयत्रापि


व्यापारमुख्यविशेष्यकबोधस्वीकारे तयोर्मिन्नार्थकत्वाभावात् । न पचति इत्यादौ धात्वर्थपाक-
प्रतियोगिकाभाव एव बुद्ध्यते । चैत्र एव पचति इत्यत्र एवकारार्थः अवधारणम् । तच्च
ज्ञानविशेषः अवधारणत्वेन भासते । अवधारणविषयचैत्रकर्तृकः पाकः इत्यन्वयबोधः इति
नव्यवैयाकरणानुसारी पन्थाः इति निरूपयन्ति ॥

चैत्रो न पचति इति वाक्यस्य चैत्रकर्तृकपाकाभावः इति शब्दबोधजनकत्वे पचत्यपि चैत्रे
तथा प्रयोगापत्तिः । तादृशपाकाभावस्यान्यनिष्ठत्वात् । अतः नञः चैत्रनिष्ठाभावे लक्षणा स्वीकरणीया ।
चैत्रकर्तृकपाकप्रतियोगिकः चैत्रनिष्ठाभावः इति बोधः । चैत्रे च पचति सति चैत्रनिष्ठस्य तदभावस्य
बाधान्न तथा प्रयोग आपादयितुं शक्यते । एवमपि यत्कर्तृकः पाक एवाप्रसिद्धः तादृशो राजा न पचति
इति वाक्यस्य प्रामाण्यं न संभवति । राजकर्तृकपाकरूपप्रतियोगिनोऽप्रसिद्ध्या तदभावाप्रसिद्धेः तद्वो-
धकत्वासंभवात् । अतः नञ्समभिव्याहृतपचधातोरेव पाकाभावे लक्षणा नञस्तात्पर्यग्राहकता च
स्वीकरणीया । राजाश्रयकः पाकाभावः इति बोधः संभवति । राज्ञि पाकाभावस्य प्रसिद्धस्याबाधितत्वात् ।

परन्तु नव्यवैयाकरणैः प्रतियोग्यप्रसिद्धावपि बौद्धप्रतियोगिप्रसिद्धिमुपादाय अभावबोधो
समर्थयितुं शक्यते । शशशृङ्गं नास्ति इति वाक्यस्य बौद्धप्रतियोगिप्रसिद्धिमुपादाय शशशृङ्गाभाव-
बोधकत्वस्य तैर्व्युत्पादनात् ।

इयञ्च रीतिः वैयाकरणसंप्रदायाविरुद्धा नवेति विद्वद्भिः परिचिन्तनीयम् ।

(अनुवर्ति ।)



University Notes

FOUNDER'S DAY

The ninth Founder's Day was celebrated on the 30th September, 1938 under the presidency of Sir M. Venkatasubba Rao, Retired Judge, High Court, Madras. Lady Venkatasubba Rao distributed the prizes.

CONVOCATION

The Eighth Convocation of the University was held on Tuesday the 1st November, 1938. His Excellency, the Governor of Madras, the Chancellor of the University, presided. The address to the graduates was delivered by Mr. K. Natarajan, Editor, *Indian Social Reformer*, Bombay.

CONFERENCE

Prof. C. S. Srinivasachariar and Mr. R. Satyanatha Ayyar were sent by the University as delegates to the Historical Conference held at Allahabad in October.

RESEARCH

Mr. C. Jagannathachari, who was working as a special Research Scholar to study the working of Prohibition at Salem, has submitted his report.

Reviews

Brahmavidyā—The Adyar Library Bulletin, Vol. I, Part I.

This recent recruit to the ranks of journals devoted to Oriental culture is a vigorous infant and likely to thrive. It aims at making the priceless treasures of the Adyar Library known to the lovers of Oriental learning all over the world by publishing in its pages some of the rare manuscripts found therein. This number contains the first instalment of Ṛgvedavyākhyā Mādhavakṛta and Āśvalāyanagr̥hyasūtra with Devasvāmibhāṣya. It also includes a translation of a few minor upaniṣads and a valuable article on 'The Name Kalki' by Prof. F. Otto Schrader. Research workers will be greatly interested in the manuscript notes given at the end.

R. R.

New Catalogus Catalogorum. Provisional Fasciculus. University of Madras. Editor-in-Chief: Mahāmahopādhyāya Prof. S. Kuppuswami Sastriar, M.A., I.E.S., (Retd.)

When the late Dr. A.C. Woolner, Vice-Chancellor of the Punjab University, suggested that there was need of a complete up-to-date New Catalogus Catalogorum of Sanskrit manuscripts that have been brought to light during the three decades that have elapsed since Dr. Aufrecht completed his monumental Catalogus Catalogorum, the University of Madras readily fell in with the idea and wisely entrusted this stupendous work to Mahāmahopādhyāya Vidyāvācaspati Prof. S. Kuppuswami Sastriar, who was for several years the Curator of the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras. The fact that the New Catalogus Catalogorum is to be prepared under his supervision is itself sufficient guarantee that the work will bear the stamp of thoroughness, accuracy, reliability and usefulness. If this Provisional Fasciculus gives any foretaste of the work to be published, it indicates that the New Catalogus would for long be an invaluable guide to research workers all over the world.

R. R.

JOURNAL

OF THE

ANNAMALAI UNIVERSITY

VOL. VIII.

MARCH, 1939

NO. 2.

The Madras Agriculturists' Debt Relief Act

By

DR. B. V. NARAYANASWAMY NAIDU

AND

P. VAIDYANATHAN, M.A.

“Princes and Lords may flourish or may fade ;
A word can mar them as a word hath made ;
But a bold peasantry, their country's pride ;
When once destroyed can never be supplied”.

—GOLDSMITH.

The central fact in Indian rural economy is the appalling poverty and the grinding need of the population ; and the extent of indebtedness is the index of the alarming condition to which poverty has reached. The average income of the agriculturist in Madras is estimated at Rs. 15 per head. It is not an exaggerated remark when the Royal Commission on Agriculture said “In India agriculture is, with most cultivators, with uneconomic holdings, more a mode of living than a business.” The observations of the Simon Commission made in 1929 is more true to-day than it was then. “The low standard of living to which the mass of India's population attains is one of the first things that strike a Western visitor. Wants are few, diet is simple, climate is usually kind, and a deep rooted tradition tends to make the countrymen content with things as they are. But the depth of poverty, the pervading presence of which cannot escape notice, is not so easily realized.” In spite of his inability to pursue agriculture as a profitable business, the agriculturist will not abandon his calling out of his own free will ; for the abandonment of the farm means the abandonment of the home. Forced to live a squalid life with his poor income, which has been made poorer by the severe depres-

sion in the prices of agricultural commodities, he is groaning under a heavy load of debt, which is staggering. No real progress is possible, no new policy of planned economy for the development of the country can be successfully launched, unless the agriculturist classes, the custodians of our national wealth, who form 80% of the population are relieved of their distress by removing the ever crushing burden of indebtedness and by devising means to increase their income and consequently their purchasing power.

Mr. W. R. S. Sathyanathan, Special Officer, appointed by the Government of Madras to enquire into the question of rural indebtedness in the Presidency has made a modest estimate of the volume of debts at Rs. 200 crores. Debt per head of population is Rs. 42 and this has no relation to the income of the agriculturist which is only Rs. 15 per annum. Interest at 12% per annum calculated on the entire debt of the Presidency will amount to Rs. 24 crores a year, while the net agricultural income (after deducting from the gross income, the cost of cultivation and the land revenue) comes only to Rs. 40 crores. The agriculturist cannot be expected to pay the whole of the interest due annually and the accumulated interest swells the volume of indebtedness. The total landed assets of the Presidency are now only five times the debts. Hence the seriousness of the problem of indebtedness which deserves our first and foremost attention before any scheme of reconstruction. Before any remedy is prescribed to this chronic disease, the real causes of indebtedness must be analysed.

CAUSES OF INDEBTEDNESS

The root cause of the indebtedness of the Indian peasant is the insufficiency of his income which is the result of uneconomic holdings, lack of attention to improved methods of cultivation, manuring, irrigation or the introduction of seasonal crops, lack of marketing facilities, the high mortality and the low vitality of the Indian cattle and the frequent failure of crops due to bad seasons. The size of the average holding in Madras is ridiculously low compared with other countries.

	Average size of holdings.	
Madras	..	3 to 4 acres.
England and Wales	..	62 "
Denmark	..	40 "
Germany	..	21.5 "
France	..	20.5 "
Holland	..	26 "
U. S. A.	..	148 "

While the holding of the Madras peasant is uneconomic, the return from his land averages only from 2 to 5% in a normal year with average

prices. But in India normal seasons are not very common. Mr. Darling reckons that a cycle of five years will give one good year, one bad year and three normal years. In a survey conducted recently in some of the villages of the Cuddalore Taluk, it has been found that in a large number of families crop expenses have increased over the income from the land. When a ryot borrows, especially, in a bad season, he is not able to repay the debt and the debt gradually mounts up with the accumulated interest. In course of time a pro-note debt is converted into a mortgage debt and finally the creditor takes possession of most of the ryot's lands. The result is the Indian peasant is "born in debt, lives in debt, dies in debt and bequeaths debt". The effect of this burden of ancestral debts is inefficient production. The feeling that he will have to sow for others to reap damps the ardour even of the most enthusiastic. At present the small returns from land and ancestral debts are not causes and results but are of mutual causation.

Unproductive expenditure on marriages, social ceremonies, factions and litigations contributes to the rapid growth of the volume of debt. It is usual to exaggerate the expenses on marriages. Normally marriages and ceremonies come at long intervals in an individual's life. It is but natural that the miserable peasant should have some diversion. The percentage of this kind of debt compared with others is very low.

Lack of cheap credit facilities accentuated the pace of growth of the debt. In Madras secured debts usually carry 12% interest but the rate on unsecured loans is 18% to 24%. The Marwaris usually charge 18% to 50% simple or compound interest and penal interest at a higher rate. During the investigation in some of the villages in Cuddalore Taluk it has been found that the sowcars of Kurinjipadi who supplied the villagers with money, usually charged 6 pies for a rupee for a month or 37½% but 9 pies for a rupee for a month or 56¼% was not uncommon. It is only the usurious rates of money-lenders that have swelled the volume of debts. While Government taccavi loans and Co-operative Societies accounted for only 7% of the total debts, the money-lenders are responsible for 93% of the debts. It is no wonder, then, that agriculturists are so heavily indebted.

The growth of population has some effect on indebtedness. Madras now holds more people than Great Britain and between the years 1921-31 recorded a lead of 10·4% while Bengal and the U. P. registered only an increase of 7·3% and 6·7% respectively. The increase in population is outstripping the increase in the area of cultivation and this results in the dwindling of the area of holding per individual.

To a certain extent the incidence of land revenue influences indebtedness. This is true especially during the depression when there

is a fall in prices and the value of money has increased. The half net theory of the Government according to one writer has become the 'all net theory.'

The following table showing the purposes for which debts were incurred in some of the villages of the Cuddalore Taluk will be useful and clear.*

Purpose of borrowing.	Rs.	Per cent.
Ancestral debts ..	10,155	53
Agricultural expenses ..	2,622	13·7
Trade ..	1,000	5·2
Domestic expenses ..	1,015	5·3
Marriages and social functions ..	1,505	7·9
Buying land ..	300	1·6
Other purposes including payment of land revenue which forms a big proportion ..	2,557	13·3
Total debt of 50 families ..	19,154	100

The money income of the agriculturists fell appreciably as a result of economic depression and this aggravated the burden of indebtedness on the poor ryot. It is a danger to society if the agriculturist, who is engaged in the noble profession of raising the foodstuffs for the nation, breaks down under an intolerable burden. The prosperity of the entire nation is dependent on the well-being of the agriculturist. Therefore, the need is great for scaling down this debt.

CONCILIATION OR COMPULSION.

If relief is to be given to the agriculturists by scaling down debts, is it by compulsion or by mutual agreement that debts are to be scaled down? It is said that arbitrary scaling down of debts by the State will lead to a great curtailment of credit and only if voluntary conciliation fails compulsion should be tried as a last resort. Though the effect of compulsory legislation in frightening away credit cannot be minimised, the economic depression itself has impeded credit. Such measures should be looked upon as an attempt to solve a deadlock and if they are successful they will not only be beneficial to the debtor but also to the creditor. The Premier believes that voluntary conciliation will be of no avail in our Presidency for the creditors will never come to terms with the debtors. Moreover, almost every agricultural country in the world has found it necessary during the depression to adopt some compulsory measure of this kind. So long as the people realise that these are only emergency devices they are more

* Figures were collected from the survey conducted by Dr. B. V. Narayana-swamy Naidu and P. Vaidyanathan.

likely to do good than harm. In Madras passive attempts were made to redeem the agriculturist by passing in his favour several legislative measures such as the Land Improvement and the Agriculturists Loans Acts, the Co-operative Societies Acts, the Land Mortgage Bank Act, the Insolvency Act, the Debtors' Protection Act, the Usurious Loans Act, the Agriculturists Loans Amendment Act of 1935 and the Debt Conciliation Act of 1936. But these measures did not touch even the fringe of the problem. There is a general complaint that the Debt Conciliation Act was not given a fair trial. Mr. Ramalingam Chettiar rightly replied to this criticism. "Debt conciliation on the basis proposed in the Act is very complicated and relief can be given only in those cases where an application is made by a creditor or debtor. If a large number of applications come in the agency will break down." As conciliation and other voluntary methods have failed the adoption of the principle of compulsion has become inevitable.

LEGISLATION IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES AND IN INDIA

A study of the various attempts made to solve the problem of indebtedness of the rural population in other countries and in our own will be necessary and useful for a proper perspective of the relief measure in Madras. It has been contended that "the nature of the debt of the South Indian peasant and the conditions of South Indian rural economy are very different from those of the Western Countries" and the time and circumstances under which those measures were adopted also differ from ours. Though much of the debt of the central European farmers was contracted for the re-construction of farms devastated by the war, one cannot be blind to the enormous suffering of the agriculturists due to the catastrophic fall in agricultural prices after the depression, the heavy interest charges and the increased cost of production which was the result of improvements in farming effected at a time when market conditions were favourable. The result was the farmer was working on a deficit economy. In Greece, the average income per family was 19,398 drachmas and the average expenditure considered to be indispensable 25,055 drachmas. The condition was similar in most of the European countries. In India poverty and not improvement of agriculture has been the chief cause of indebtedness and the agriculturist was paralysed by the economic depression. But whatever may be the general or specific causes of indebtedness it is a well known fact that excessive indebtedness is a common evil. It is injurious at the same time to debtors and creditors and its effects are felt by the whole community. So a study of the measures adopted to eradicate this evil in foreign countries will be of use.

The different measures adopted in foreign countries may be divided into three categories. Certain countries of Central and Eastern Europe

adopted radical measures which aimed directly at relieving the farmers from debts. These measures partook of the nature of compulsory conversion of farmers' debts, reduction of the rate of interest and in certain cases the principal by the imposition of law. The second type of legislation pursued a policy of direct intervention but confined itself to narrower limits. This type of legislation is characterised by the repayment of loans by instalments over a series of years, the suspension of the measures of distraint against debtors, repayment by the State of part of the debts and the imposition of minimum prices for the sale of expropriated property. The last type of measures seeks to help the debtors through indirect means by the provision of cheap credit facilities and through measures adopted with a view to raising the prices of principal crops and improving agriculture.

In Germany as a result of the crisis numerous legislative measures were rendered necessary between 1931-32. The floating debts of the needy farmers were replaced by a special loan granted by the Bank for German Industrial Securities. The funds were drawn from the levies imposed on the industries while the Reich guaranteed 25% of the loan granted. Orders were also issued offering protection against distraint by creditors. Where voluntary agreement failed, creditors and debtors were subject to legal process which remitted arrears of interest, reduced interest for the future and even made possible compulsory reduction of principal by 50%. In addition to these and some other measures of the National Socialist Government, there was a proposal for raising to a remunerative level, the prices of agricultural products which, in part, had remained appreciably below the cost of production.

In Italy by a law of 1930 extinction of onerous agricultural debt is facilitated by a conversion of short term loans into long term loans payable in 25 years. The State undertook to pay a part of the instalments. Where there are scientific improvements in farming the Minister can grant contributions not exceeding $3\frac{1}{2}\%$ interest repayable in twenty-five years. Mortgage credit institutions were called upon to replace bonds bearing more than 4% interest by bonds bearing interest at 4%.

In Switzerland the Government found it necessary to develop a Peasants' Aid Bank, which, would give help to the distressed farmers in the form of loans with or without interest and subsidies towards interest; to develop protective measures of a legal nature taken in favour of distressed farmers by the suspension of the repayment of capital, reduction of the rate of interest on secured loans, reduction or suppression of interest on capital sums not secured and extinction of interest due in certain cases; and to prevent new indebtedness by a bill aimed at reducing mortgage debts to a tolerable amount, i.e., to enable the far-

mer to have a subsistence income for him and his family. In the adjustment of debt proceedings the debtor, creditor and the community would collaborate. While the community would subscribe a certain amount for some years to a fund, the creditor would renounce a part of his credit. The creditor would be bought out by a redemption bond. The Federal Council would have control over the farms and would limit indebtedness in future.

Measures adopted in Denmark, Norway and Sweden were more or less similar to those in Switzerland. But in Finland short term loans were converted into long term loans and the land mortgage bank was reorganized. The State not only guaranteed the bonds but subsidised them. Loans were granted up to 90% of the value of the farm. If the farm was forcibly sold in auction it was bought by the bank and restored to the original owner in case he was found fit to assume responsibility. The French legislation was characterised by postponement of repayment to the various classes of debtors.

By a law of 1934 debts of the agriculturists of Bulgaria could be reduced by 40%. The difference resulting from the reduction of debts would be made up out of an amortization fund formed at the Public Debt Office to which the State would assign the proceeds of the tax on vocations and the supplementary tax on total income. The limit of exemption of property for distraint of debts was increased. Some other features of the Bulgarian legislation are spreading of the instalments of repayment over longer periods, postponement of repayment from 2 to 15 years and reduction of the rate of interest. Greece declared a moratorium for agricultural debts in 1930 and followed up to a large measure the legislation in Bulgaria.

Certain debtors in Hungary who got their debts inscribed in the land register of their country were protected from the sale of their property for three months. The State contributed a sum towards the payment of interest on debts of those persons. The legal rate of interest was fixed at $5\frac{1}{2}\%$. An amortization fund was set up for the reduction of debts of certain farmers.

Arrears due to the treasury and other public bodies in Poland were reduced in 1932 on condition of the payment of current taxes within a certain period. Long term debts to credit institutions were converted and were repayable in 55 years at a reduced rate of $4\frac{1}{2}\%$. Long term debts due to private individuals need not be repaid for a certain period and the rate of interest was also reduced. Short term debts both to credit institutions and private individuals were converted. In the matter of repayment of instalments and in the reduction of the rate of

interest, greater concession was always shown to small land-holders than to big land-holders.

While Roumania and Czechoslovakia followed up the main principles of the Swiss legislation in the reduction of capital and interest, they supplemented those measures with a policy for the reorganization of production at a cost that would leave a margin of profit to the agriculturists. For then only could reduced debt be paid back in future. In Roumania agricultural centres were established and furnished with modern technical equipment for every branch of production with a view to increasing the yield of land. The course of foreign commerce was regulated to find extended markets for Roumanian agricultural products and to increase the price of cereals. Czechoslovakia prevented speculation in the commodity exchanges of grain by fixing the price of cereals.

Legislation pertaining to moratorium and amendment of civil laws to prevent sale of lands of debtors by auction are characteristic of the measures adopted in Yugoslavia and Latvia. In these two countries and in Estonia and Lithuania provision was made for the conversion of short term loans to individuals, co-operative societies and private banks into long term loans. Land Mortgage Banks in certain cases and State Agricultural Banks in others were established to take over these reduced debts of farmers. Rate of interest on mortgage loans was reduced considerably.

Only voluntary conciliatory methods in the reduction of debts were adopted in Japan. Associations were formed for that purpose in villages. Passive conciliatory machinery was established in Canada by a law of 1934 to enable farmers, over burdened with debts but not desperate, to remain on their farms. Farm Loan Laws were amended to increase the total amounts that could be lent by the Dominion Farm Loan Board and to raise the sum that could be advanced to any borrower from 50% of the value of security to 60%.

The agricultural credit policy of the U.S.A. was entrusted to the Farm Credit Administration, whose aim was to create a system of completely unified credit institutions on a permanent basis, to supply farmers and their organizations credit at the lowest cost and to facilitate the adjustment of the heavy burden of mortgage debts by emergency financing and reduction of the rates of interest. Debt Adjustment Courts would go into each case to decide the deserving farmers. To enable the farmers to make voluntary arrangements with their creditors the Credit Act allowed a flotation loan the proceeds of which could be utilised for the purpose.

It must be noted that when drastic measures are adopted in most countries it is only to give adequate relief to small holders. Ordinary law and the conciliatory machinery give relief to big landowners. Measures which are popular are those which respect contractual obligations. Where radical measures are adopted credit unduly contracts and public opinion strongly reacts rendering necessary the adoption of new measures to calm the people. But in spite of popular agitation various countries have adopted radical measures because they must have found out the futility of conciliation and mediation in the case of small holders.

In the Indian Provinces excluding Madras much attention is being paid to the question of tenancy legislation. In Bihar, Orissa, the United Provinces and Bombay bills are introduced in the legislatures to relieve the tenants from the oppression of Zemindars chiefly for arrears of rent and debts and to enforce their occupancy rights on lands. Regulation of money lending has been attempted with full or partial success in the Punjab, Bombay, Bengal, Orissa and some other Provinces. Debt conciliation boards have been formed in the Central Provinces, Bengal and Bombay. Acts to prevent land alienation were passed in other provinces.

In the Bhavanagar State a Commission was appointed to assess the causes of indebtedness and the volume. On the basis of its report the Durbar, by a debt redemption scheme, sought to liquidate the past debts of agriculturists by advancing loans to each individual ryot at easy rates of interest. The awards of the Debt Liquidation Committee are binding on the sowcars and the ryots. It is interesting to note that while the nominal indebtedness in the sowcar's books was Rs. 86,38,874, the amount that was actually paid in composition was Rs. 20,59,473. The reason for this successful liquidation is the immediate cash payment by the State to the sowcars. For the liquidation scheme to be effective and permanent, the system of village panchayats was introduced by which the villagers took on themselves the management of their own affairs and were made responsible for the development of the economic welfare of the ryot. In Hyderabad the Land Alienation Act has been made more stringent; and registration of moneylenders was enforced to prevent usury. Debt conciliation boards established for the benefit of a certain class of agriculturists were based on voluntary effort with a small element of coercion for effective working. Further there are proposals to start land mortgage banks and to provide the bankrupt debtors with a rural insolvency Act.

In no Province or State compulsory methods are adopted to scale down debts. Where voluntary methods have failed the State must

intervene and compel the creditors to renounce a portion of their claims. The Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act is unique in this respect.

FROM THE MORATORIUM TO THE DEBT RELIEF ACT

The first measure of the Congress Government was a Moratorium Bill passed in the middle of September, 1937. The Bill was intended to give temporary relief to indebted agriculturists till comprehensive measures were formulated for dealing with indebtedness. Both the period of the Moratorium and its applicability were restricted. The Bill laid down that for a year no suits or proceedings could be instituted against agriculturists whose liabilities under the heads of land revenue, rent and taxes and liabilities to local authorities did not exceed Rs. 400 ; who had saleable interests in lands ; and who derived $\frac{3}{4}$ of their income from lands. Sums due to Provincial and Central Governments, to co-operative societies, joint stock banks and land mortgage banks were excluded from the operation of the Bill. It was made clear that agriculturists should not be entitled to transfer any immovable property so as to defeat the rights of their creditors.

Though substantial measures of relief were to follow the Moratorium there was great opposition to it. It was said that moratorium was a desperate remedy to which Governments resorted to when their banking systems were threatened with crash by a war or other serious calamity. But in the west such moratory legislation is common. In the Co-operative Conference a resolution was passed that the Moratorium Bill that was introduced in the legislature should be either ancillary to the Agriculturists' Relief Bill or be immediately followed by such a bill. In the latter case the interval should not be more than three months. But in Greece a moratorium for five years was declared and one year was not too long a period. It was contended that the definition of agriculturists worked great hardship in the case of certain deserving agriculturists, whose income from land was not $\frac{3}{4}$ of their total income. A fear was expressed that there would be a shrinkage of credit for seasonal agricultural operations. But such complaints were always made against all radical measures.

Great agitation against the Moratorium forced the Government to drop the idea and to publish in the beginning of December, 1937 the Debt Relief Bill. This Bill is simple and quite different from the Debt Relief Act that has actually come to stay on the statute book.

The object of the Bill is to rehabilitate agriculture, the basic industry of the Province, by relieving the producers of food from the incubus of indebtedness. The main principle of the Bill is that all arrears of

interest outstanding on the 1st October, 1937, shall automatically stand cancelled, in the case of all debts incurred by the classes of debtors defined as agriculturists. Where simple interest has been charged at more than 9% or compound interest charged or provision made for penal interest, the debt shall be deemed to be discharged in full if the total sum paid to the creditor, whether for interest or principal, amounts to twice the amount of the principal of the loan. If the amount paid till 1st October, 1937, falls short of twice the principal, such amount as will make up this shortage or the principal amount alone, whichever is less, will be paid to the creditor.

For the purposes of the Bill an agriculturist is one who had a saleable interest in land under the ryotwari or other tenures or a lessee of such lands. The Moratorium Bill did not include the lessees within the scope of agriculturists. Unlike the Moratorium Bill no upper limit of income from land is fixed in this Bill to qualify an agriculturist for the benefits conferred on him by this measure, though such limits are fixed for landholders under the Estates' Land Act and the Malabar Tenancy Act. Those who pay income-tax or profession tax of more than a rupee a year or property or house tax exceeding Rs. 600 a year are excluded from the operations of the Bill. These provisions are intended to ensure that persons following occupations other than agriculture do not benefit by the Bill. The Bill exempts the debts due to Governments, Local Bodies, Co-operative Societies and Joint Stock Banks with a membership of more than 500 share-holders. The rate of interest on all future loans is 6%.

Arrears of rent payable in areas under the Estates' Land Act and the Malabar Tenancy Act except arrears of the last two faslis shall be wiped out according to the Bill. But the tenant must pay within 15 months of the passing of the Act arrears of the last two faslis in full. Otherwise the old arrears will be deemed to be discharged only proportionately to the extent rents are discharged for faslis 1346 and 1347.

The provisions of the Bill can be applied to decreed debts. Where a decree is in execution it can be stayed till it is again amended. Sales of movable or immovable property of the agriculturists can be set aside if such sales are made in execution of a decree after 1st October, 1937. The amount in excess of the scaled down amount received by the decree-holder as a result of the sale shall be refunded to the debtor.

The Bill was referred to a Select Committee on the 21st of December. The most fundamental changes made in the Bill by the Select Committee are those regarding interest clauses. The Committee has made a distinction between the pre-depression period and the post depression period i.e., debts incurred before 1st October 1932 when the

value of money was less than now and those incurred after that date when the value of money appreciated owing to a fall in prices. The provisions regarding the wiping out of interest were retained in the case of pre-depression debts, while for debts incurred between 1st October, 1932, to 1st October 1937, the rate of interest was fixed at 5%. Where a debt after 1st October, 1932 was found to be a renewal of a debt incurred prior to that date, the debt or any part of it renewed will be dealt with as a debt incurred prior to 1932. Thus the principle of *damdupat* has been retained for pre-depression debts.

The payment of the rent for fasli 1347 before 30th September, 1938, was made a condition precedent to the grant of relief to a tenant from arrears of old rent. The rent for fasli 1346 must be paid before 30th September, 1939, if the tenants want a full discharge in respect of all arrears of rent accrued for previous years.

Minor changes have been effected in the definition of agriculturists. Women who own no property but who have lent out sums less than Rs. 3,000 are exempt from the Bill. Personal belongings of a woman, viz., jewels and household furniture should not be taken into consideration when computing the value of the property. Wages due to agricultural and rural labourers were exempted. A mortgagee in possession of the property mortgaged not taking any interest is exempted from the Bill.

For the sake of easy calculation the Committee has changed the rate of interest from 6% to 6¼% or 1 pie for a rupee for a month.

Before the Bill was passed into an Act the Government made certain amendments in the Bill and this has resulted in two important changes in the Bill. Whereonce creditor companies with 500 shareholders and more were exempted, this concession was now limited to scheduled banks of the Reserve Bank provided the interest charged by them was within 9%. In the case of post depression debts past payments in excess of 5% shall be appropriated only to arrears of interest while formerly reduction of principal also was possible.

THE UPPER LIMIT

The main object of the Act is to rehabilitate agriculture the basic industry of the Province and not so much to give relief to individual agriculturists. It is true that the land is the source from which the food for the people and the raw materials for the factories are produced. It is argued that as the prosperity of other sections of the people is dependent upon the agriculturist and his land, agriculture as an occupation is sought to be relieved from indebtedness. The Premier has often said that it was intended to relieve the industry of agriculture by relieving

the burden on land. The burden is actually felt by the man and some ryots feel the burden while others do not. By the occupation test relief will be distributed indiscriminately to both big and small land-holders, to those who need relief and those who do not. A study of foreign legislation will reveal that radical measures were adopted only to save the small holders while the big owners of land availed themselves of the voluntary agreements and other ordinary laws of the land. Even from the occupational test, which pays more attention to the impersonal than to the personal aspects involved, the denial of relief to Jenmies, Zamindars and Inamdars who pay above a certain sum to the Government is not based on correct principles of economics. From this standpoint there is no case for excluding produce-sharing tenants and labourers. In the Tanjore district and other southern parts of the Presidency there are a large number of absentee landlords who lease out their lands and spend their time in the town. While this class of landowners is relieved there is no justification for excluding Zemindars and Inamdars. To avoid this anomaly an upper limit is essential.

Where are we to draw the line between the big and small land-owners? An investigation by Mr. Sathiyathan into 564 families throughout the Presidency has given the following results.

	No. of families.	Extent of holdings & lands taken on lease.	Assessment paid.	Total debt.	Debt per head.	Debt per Re. of Assessment.	Debt per Acre.	Debt per family.
		Acs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
1. Farm labourers owning no lands and paying no assessment or rent ..	23	1,739	15	76
2. Registered landholders and tenants paying land revenue or rent of Re. 1 to Rs. 100 ..	306	4,483·03	11,143-8	3,23,438	211	72	29	1,057
3. Registered landholders and tenants paying land revenue or rent of Rs. 100 and above ..	235	24,738·0	1,35,453-4	10,79,186	918	44	8	4,592

Similar results have been arrived at by an investigation conducted by us in some of the villages of the Cuddalore Taluk. Figures given below are only for 50 families in two hamlets of Ellayappenpettai, Cuddalore Taluk.*

	No. of families.	No. of members.	Assessment.	Holdings.	Total debt.	Debt per family.	Debt per head.	Debt per Ac.	Debt per Re.
			Rs.	Ac.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
1. Farm labourers owning no lands ..	9	62	932	103-9	15
2. Registered landholders paying a land revenue between Re. 1 to Rs. 100 ..	38	223	473	170	16,322	420-0	73	96	35
3. Registered holders paying land revenue above Rs. 100. ..	3	20	395	99½	1,900	633-0	95	19	5

The burden of debt should not be determined by the amount borrowed alone; for a man with a larger amount of debt may not feel the burden so much as a man with a smaller amount. For the one may be rich while the other poor. The burden of debt is, therefore, to be judged by a comparison of indebtedness to assets. Judged from this standard both Mr. Sathyanathan's figures and the figures collected in our survey lead us to the same conclusion that the hardest hit are the small and medium land-holders paying a land revenue between Re. 1 to Rs. 100. While debt per acre and per rupee of assessment of this class according to our survey is Rs. 96 and Rs. 35 respectively, for those paying a land revenue of Rs. 100 and above the corresponding figures are only Rs. 19 and Rs. 5. But if we take into consideration debt per head they give a false idea of the position. In fact the position is reversed. Debt per head for those paying a land revenue of above Rs. 100 is 95, while for those who pay land revenue between Re. 1 to Rs. 100 it is Rs. 73. So the unwary are liable to be misled. A perusal of the table from Mr. Sathyanathan's report will convince one of the

* Figures calculated from the Survey in the Cuddalore Taluk conducted by Dr. B. V. Narayanaswamy Naidu and P. Vaidyanathan in June, 1938.

correctness of this conclusion. These small and medium land owning class (paying land revenue between Re. 1 and Rs. 100) who form the largest number of the rural population have settled on land and are the actual tillers of the soil. It is they who really feel the actual burden of indebtedness. It will not be an exaggeration if we call them the backbone of our agricultural industry. If they are freed the industry itself will get great relief. When it is said that relief should be given to this class of agriculturists, it does not mean that the big holders are not suffering. They too are badly hit though not so badly compared with the small-holders. Debt conciliation boards and land mortgage banks are the proper machinery through which they should get relief. The upper limit for this radical measure should be limited to those who pay an assessment of land revenue to Government not exceeding Rs. 100.

EXCLUSION OF LABOURERS

It is an imperative necessity that the debts of farm labourers should be scaled down. Though their position is not so grave apparently as can be seen from the tables given above, yet even the small debt per head cannot be repaid by them. A special provision for wiping off their debts supplementing such a measure by exempting movables, i.e., the materials used in husbandry in addition to dwelling house, livestock and the minimum produce for subsistence should be introduced. While there is a case for inclusion of arrears of rent in this Act, the debts of labourers might have also been included. The Premier has promised to introduce a separate measure for the purpose at the earliest opportunity.

SANCTITY OF CONTRACT

Too much emphasis has been placed on the sanctity of contract. It is said that any legislation that destroys this sense of sanctity of contract destroys the roots of social life. But it is an important fact that justice is the basis of contract and in the relation between debtors and creditors where an unconscionable rate is charged by the debtor the sacredness of the contract vanishes into thin air. The debtors and creditors have never been on equal terms and all the Governments of the World have in one way or other violated this principle. The various relief measures in many foreign countries are examples of the violation of the contracts. Even in India the rate of interest was always regulated and laws were passed to enable courts to reopen old transactions. The Deccan Relief Act in many ways transgressed this principle of contracts. The return from agriculture varies from 2 to 5%. To borrow for that industry at a rate ranging from 6% to 50% is very bad economy indeed. If violation

of the contract is unjust, the usurious rate of interest is criminal and suicidal. A revision of contract with every change in the volume of money is necessary. Even nations were obliged to violate contracts entered into when, owing to various economic causes, they were unable to respect such obligations. What is true of nations is true of individuals also. After all, men are responsible for these contracts and when these contracts threaten the economic position of the individuals, it is but right that these contracts should be abrogated. So there is a justification for the Debt Relief Act.

THE POST AND THE PRE-DEPRESSION DEBTS

Not only the most contentious but the most important clauses in the Act are clauses 8 and 9, which provide for the compulsory scaling down of debts and wiping out of arrears of interest. Before proceeding to discuss the provisions it is necessary to see what kind of debts compose the major portion of the indebtedness of the agriculturists. In discussing the causes of indebtedness it has been proved conclusively that ancestral debts form the highest percentage of the volume of debts compared with other debts. (Vide figures given from the survey of the villages in the Cuddalore Taluk Page 82). Statistics given below regarding the purpose of borrowing from three different sources will corroborate the truth that ancestral debts are the heaviest burden on the agriculturists and will also supplement the account given from an investigation in the Cuddalore Taluk.

TAMARAIPATTI VILLAGE—MADURA TALUK.¹

Debts classified according to purpose :	Rs.
Cultivation expenses	.. 4,950
Purchase of bulls	.. 7,010
Purchase of lands	.. 8,825
Improvement to lands	.. 1,100
Discharging prior debts	.. 37,225
Building new houses	.. 11,100
Family expenses	.. 11,810
Litigation expenses	.. 1,000
Trade	.. 2,000
Purchase of a motor car	.. 2,500
Payment of kist or lease amount	.. 1,110

1 The Madras Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee—Investigators' Report.

SIVAPURI AND GAVARAPET VILLAGES—CHIDAMBARAM TALUK.²

Purposes of borrowing :	Amount.	Percentage.
	Rs.	
Maintenance	.. 4,925	11·16
Purchase of lands	.. 9,900	22·43
Agricultural improvements	.. 2,960	6·71
Purchase of cattle	.. 460	1·04
Land revenue	.. 690	1·56
Liquidation of old debts	.. 10,450	23·68
Marriage and funeral	.. 3,705	8·04
Education	.. 2,700	6·12
Interest payments	.. 850	1·93
Medical	.. 169	0·39
Current interest due	.. 6,025	12·65
Miscellaneous	.. 1,295	2·93

Results from 141 selected villages in the Madras Presidency³—

Purposes of borrowing :	Amount.	Per cent.
Payment of prior debts	.. 44,85,400	25·1
Marriage and other ceremonies	.. 18,80,761	10·5
Land revenue	.. 5,84,173	3·3
Relief of distress	.. 10,88,377	6·1
Agricultural expenses	.. 17,87,457	10·0
Improvements to land	.. 7,88,709	4·4
Education of children	.. 2,47,337	1·4
Trade	.. 23,01,937	12·9
Purchase of land	.. 24,74,715	13·8
Construction of houses	.. 10,08,416	5·6
Other expenses	.. 12,38,384	6·9
Total	.. 1,78,85,666	100

The following table prepared from Mr. Sathyanathan's Report gives an idea of the number of cases in which lands were sold or money was borrowed for different purposes. The figures are for the years 1930-34 taking two typical villages for each district of the Presidency except South Kanara and Malabar.

2. The Problem of Rural Indebtedness—Dr. B. V. Narayanaswamy Naidu and Mr. V. Venkataraman.

3. Report on Agricultural Indebtedness—W. R. S. Sathianathan.

Year.		Agricultural purposes.	Trade.	Kist.	Marriage expenses.	Discharging of old debts.	Other purposes.	Purposes not ascertainable.
1930 : Sales	..	72,705	21,413	5,424	24,743	10,67,453	1,38,475	2,35,274
Borrowings	..	66,575	46,802	2,656	33,042	8,25,425	1,60,630	1,20,169
1931 : Sales	..	22,741	5,314	1,380	10,109	13,84,426	70,306	2,09,252
Borrowings	..	31,406	66,182	1,577	17,934	8,85,695	85,592	80,659
1932 : Sales	..	43,941	16,046	5,091	11,966	15,29,892	92,063	1,95,002
Borrowings	..	46,831	38,798	1,115	32,988	7,64,965	96,878	2,02,530
1933 : Sales	..	46,290	17,662	8,803	11,940	13,54,389	61,546	1,94,726
Borrowings	..	29,064	27,231	3,049	24,492	6,40,839	1,32,634	69,166
1934 : Sales	..	33,218	11,473	3,539	22,805	1,15,235	72,816	1,79,168
Borrowings	..	70,664	27,934	975	27,667	6,36,660	75,099	55,483

The number of sales and the number of cases in which money was borrowed by mortgaging property or through promissory notes are disproportionately large in the discharging of old debts when compared with other purposes of borrowing. Extreme pains are taken to show that ancestral debts form the largest proportion ; for, then only there is a justification for clauses 8 and 9.

In the scaling down of debts the Act draws a line at 1st October, 1932 to divide pre-depression from post-depression debts. It is often asked what is the sanctity of the date 1st October, 1932 ? There is every justification for fixing that date as the dividing line. The following index numbers of wholesale prices in the Madras Presidency will clarify the point.*

Year.		Rice.	Groundnut.	Cotton.
1928-29	..	100	100	100
1929-30	..	90	85	85
1930-31	..	72	55	62
1931-32	..	60	63	56
1932-33	..	56	59	57
1933-34	..	48	39	58
1934-35	..	56	57	63
1935-36	..	59	58	62
1936-37	..	56	62	60

The effect of the depression began to be felt in 1931. It reached its lowest point in 1934-35. As the effect of a pricefall is not immediately.

* Dr. P. J. Thomas, *Hindu*, January 28, 1938.

felt the year 1932 may safely be taken as the dividing line of pre-depression from post depression debts.

But the principle adopted in the scaling down of debts is the principle of 'damdupat' which says that when a creditor receives twice the amount of principal by way of principal or interest towards debts contracted before 1st October, 1932, the whole of the debt will be deemed to be discharged. Thus the principle of 'damdupat' which is intended to be applied in the case of usurious rates of interest is wrongly applied to slump in prices. If scaling down of debts is to be related to fall in prices alone a ratio between prices and debts should be established and on this basis debts should be scaled down. This has been the principle in some foreign countries. But in Madras it has been proved conclusively that ancestral debts with usurious rates of interest are the heaviest burden on the agriculturists. If this burden is to be removed the principle of 'damdupat' should be correctly applied.

The second class of debts—the post depression debts—are dealt with differently. In the case of these debts past payments in excess of 5% interest shall go to cover only arrears of interest and not principal though the Select Committee recommended that it should cover the principal also. Here again it is difficult to relate the reduction of interest to any principle. It has no relation either to changes in the price level or capacity to pay. Moreover, the rate of interest for all future debts is 6¼% and as prices are gently rising there is no justification for a lower rate of interest fixed for post-depression debts.

The scaling down of debts on the basis of slump in prices can be justified if the scaling down were to be followed by immediate discharge of the debts. But in the absence of any such facilities debtors will be put to great hardship. For creditors may wait for a rise in prices or they may press for immediate settlement of debts by taking over the lands of debtors. This can, to a certain extent, be mitigated if provisions are made to transfer lands to creditors at the pre-slump prices and to exempt a minimum holding in the case of agriculturists who cultivate their own lands.

But as there are many difficulties in the way of scaling down debts in relation to fall in prices, as conditions in Madras are favourable mainly for the application of the principle of 'damdupat', it will be right to revert to the principle of scaling down embodied in the original bill. It may be laid down that all debts contracted before 1st October, 1937, and which carry more than 5% interest simple or compound shall be scaled down on the basis of the principle of 'damdupat'. For all debts contracted after that date and for all future debts the rate of interest shall be

5% and not 6¼% as is laid down in the Act. The Government should have power to change the rate of interest whenever very bad seasons occur. The merit of this principle is that a large amount of old debts will be wiped out and the agriculturist will be very much relieved.

FUTURE INTEREST

The power of the Provincial Government to change the rate of interest from time to time is viewed with suspicion. It is feared that it would introduce an element of uncertainty in credit. The principle that a Central Bank or a Reserve Bank should regulate the bank rate and the rates of the money market is correct. The Government should not interfere in the regulation of such rates. But this principle can be applied in India only to organized credit institutions. The money-lenders in the villages who have no connection with the money market and who have no knowledge of the principle of the money market continue to charge usurious rates of interest. Their rates of interest are not affected either by the rate in the money market or by fall or rise in prices but only by the personal character of the man. Such usurious rates can be regulated only by executive fiat and the Act rightly allows the Government to fix the rate from time to time.

ARREARS OF RENT

These form the third class of debts that are scaled down by certain clauses in the Act. Relief that will be given to the tenant will not be immediate because the prompt payment of rent for fasli 1347 and 1346 before 30th September, 1939 is a condition for wiping out of arrears of previous faslis. It is curious that while the same principle for the prompt payment of scaled down debts is not adopted in the case of ryotwari landowners, such a principle is applied to the poor tenants on the ground that if arrears were wiped out unconditionally, current and future rents would not be easily realized. Moreover, this provision is not related either to fall in prices or capacity to pay. A recalcitrant tenant who can pay his old arrears will refuse to pay them when once he pays the dues for faslis 1346 and 1347 within the due date. A poor tenant who has not the capacity to pay the rent for the two faslis (1346 and 1347) is pressed hard for his old arrears. Thus great hardship is caused to poor tenants by this clause.

CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES AND JOINT STOCK BANKS.

The exclusion of the Co-operative Societies is a right move on the part of the Government. Co-operative Societies are associations of borrowers themselves and their object is the advancement of the members and not the earning of usurious rates of interest by exploiting the

borrowers. But in the case of credit by money lenders the interests of lender and borrower are in a manner opposed and the special interests of these men are the exploitation of borrowers for the sake of private gain. If only the Act had included the Co-operative Societies it would have defeated its own purpose. Moreover, the recent policy of the Co-operative Department is the introduction of controlled credit in the Societies in order to improve the repaying capacity of the agriculturists. The inclusion of these societies will result in a set back to agriculture. The Registrar of Co-operative Societies has already issued a circular to all co-operative institutions that in respect of D class societies no member shall be asked to pay more than double the principal originally borrowed by him ; no member shall pay more than the principal plus interest calculated at $6\frac{1}{4}\%$ from the date of the disbursement of loan ; and that 25% of the amount outstanding now may be remitted. Simple interest at $6\frac{1}{4}\%$ is charged on awards by arbitrators on outstanding loans. But the Registrar's proposals are not mandatory and some central banks and co-operative societies have not given effect to his suggestions. The matter can be set right if the Registrar or the Provincial or the Central Bank enforces these proposals on the societies.

While there was a great agitation for excluding joint stock banks with less than 500 share-holders from the Bill, the Government amendment limiting the exemption only to scheduled banks was a great shock to many banks and individuals. A large number of funds, *nidhis* and small banks are relegated to the same position as the private money-lenders are. In the finance needed to raise crops these institutions form an important link in the chain of rural credit. If institutional credit is to be preserved these institutions should be exempted. To prevent a few big money lenders forming themselves into joint stock banks a limit may be placed on the number of share-holders. But that limit should not be so high as 500. The provision that past payments in the case of post-depression debts will be appropriated only to interest, has to a certain extent mitigated the serious wrong done to these institutions.

SOME MINOR CRITICISMS.

A beneficial feature of the Act is that some women who live solely on a small amount within Rs. 3,000 lent out, are exempted from the provisions of the Act. Orphans and infirm men are in the same position as these women are and they should also be exempted. The Act does not touch usufructary mortgages. It is but just that when a person enjoys the property for twenty years for the sums he has lent out, the mortgagor should get back his property and the whole amount should be

deemed to have been discharged. In the tenancy legislation of some provinces provision is made more or less on the above lines for the discharging of arrears. The Zemindar will be in possession of the lands of the occupancy tenant for some years in lieu of the arrears of rent. After that period lands will be returned to the tenant and the arrears will be wiped out. No provision has been made to save the debtor from being sold up. As has been already pointed out a minimum holding should be exempted from being attached and a schedule of prices should be prepared at which alone lands could be sold. The Act has no provision to afford relief to the large number of insolvents. The present law of insolvency is so hopelessly complicated and expensive that few agriculturists can take advantage of it to avoid harassments. Provision should be made in the Act for a certain minimum of produce or lands for the subsistence of the insolvent debtor and his family.

A CONSTITUTIONAL POINT.

A question has been often raised whether the provincial legislatures, according to the Government of India Act, could legislate in the matter of business carried on by banks. While the regulation of money lending belongs to the provincial list of subjects, the regulation of banking comes under the sphere of the federal legislature. No doubt Government would have taken legal advice on this matter before proceeding to legislate. But recently a crop of cases has arisen in the various courts of the Presideency questioning the validity of the Debt Relief Act in the case of promissory notes, which are negotiable instruments. A subordinate judge of Kumbakonam in his judgment delivered on September 19th said "Considering the relevant sections of the Government of India Act 1935 together with the legislation in respect of promissory notes and bills of exchange, under the Negotiable Instruments Act, it seems to me clear that the promissory note is a subject matter which is outside the province of the legislative powers of the Provincial Legislature and therefore it is we do not find any mention of promissory notes or other documents representing notes while we find the word "debt" alone in the Act IV of 1938. The question is whether "debt" coming within that definition of the Act will cover a debt under a promissory note or any negotiable instruments and upon this point there can be no doubt that all debts affected by the provisions of Act IV of 1938 of the Madras Provincial Legislature cannot comprise the debts due under a promissory note or other negotiable instrument coming under the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act." If the Act is held not to apply to negotiable instruments the relief that could be granted to agriculturists becomes so small as to make the Act practically a dead

letter. Everything depends on the decision of the High Court, which is keenly awaited by many debtors and creditors.

FUTURE OF CREDIT.

The first effect of the Act will be a drastic curtailment of credit and the seasonal agricultural operations will suffer through the drying up of credit. During the survey of some of the villages in the Cuddalore Taluk, it has been found that a good number of agriculturists have left their lands fallow on account of their inability to get credit. Conversation with the village folk of Ellayappanpettai has revealed that the society in Kurinjpady under whose jurisdiction they came was very shy to lend them. The collection of kist became very difficult in the villages. A sowcar in Kurinjpady said that business became very slack after the Debt Relief Act. Even the sowcar thinks twice before he lends out. The Revenue Inspector of Kurinjpady received as many as 15 applications for taccavi loans during the course of 15 days in the month of May. This is a very uncommon feature ordinarily. An inspection of the taccavi loan ledger in the Chidambaram Taluk Office clarifies certain doubts.

Taccavi loans granted by the Revenue Department in the Chidambaram Taluk.

Fasli or year.		Applications received.	Number sanctioned.	Number rejected.
1344	(1934-35)	9	4	5
1345	(1935-36)	3	1	2
1346	(1936-37)	8	2	6
1347	(1937-38)	10	(Under consideration 1)	9
1348	(1938-39)	15	3	12
From 3-7-1938			(Under consideration)	
to 20-9-1938.				

Chidambaram being a wet area, taccavi loans are not popular. In spite of it the number of applications received for only two months after the passing of the Debt Relief Act is nearly double the number of applications received in previous years. We are not concerned here with the rejection of the number of applications or the amount sanctioned. The large number of rejection may be attributed to the inherent defect of the Land Improvement and Agriculturists' Loans Act and the administrative difficulties felt by the subordinate officers. We are interested only to show that due to the shrinkage of credit supplied by money lenders there has been a rush even to the unpopular taccavi loans.

An inspection of the loan ledger of the Chidambaram Loan and Paddy Sales Society supplements this evidence—

Village Centres.	Amount of loans granted 1937 (January to December)			Amount of loans granted 1938 (Jan. to Novr.)		
	Rs.	A.	Ps.	Rs.	A.	Ps.
1. Kattumannarkoil	..	740	0 0	2,795	0 0	
2. Vlakam	..	3,330	0 0	7,620	0 0	
3. C. Sathamangalam	..	1,150	0 0	1,960	0 0	
4. Orathur	..	1,610	0 0	5,419	0 0	
5. Maduranthakanallur	..	3,599	0 0	6,077	0 0	
6. Maiyathur	..	1,895	0 0	2,802	0 0	
7. Naivasal	..	2,662	8 0	1,854	0 0	
8. Lakshmigudi	..	4,378	0 0	4,560	0 0	
9. Keelnedumbur	..	3,507	0 0	4,347	12 0	
10. M. Odayur	..	5,548	0 0	7,523	0 0	
11. Suravilandur	..	6,474	0 0	3,875	0 0	
Total	..	34,893	8 0	48,832	12 0	
11. New centres started in 1938				20,199	0 0	
Grand Total	..	34,893	8 0	69,031	12 0	

This feverish increase in the amount of loans advanced cannot be attributed merely to the expansion of the activities of the Society. If it had not been for the Debt Relief Act, the amount of loans advanced this year would not have doubled. From the figures derived from this Society it cannot be generalised that there is a great turnover of business in the Co-operative Societies. In fact, examination of some of the societies in the Cuddalore Taluk gives a contrary result.

Facts have proved that there is a shrinkage of credit supplied by money lenders. The question arises whether it is beneficial to the agriculturists. To a certain extent shrinkage of credit will do some good to the improvident agriculturists. But when the co-operative societies and other small banks restrict their credit, then the agriculturists will be at a loss to find money for the seasonal needs of agriculture. To that extent the repercussions of a shrinkage of credit are detrimental to agricultural production. So it is the duty of the Government to rectify the Co-operative movement and consolidate their position in order to enable them to meet the increased demands on their resources.

It is often said that the funds of money lenders would not be kept idle but would soon find an outlet. Those who are eager to invest will invest their funds in fixed capital in urban areas. Investment in banks, especially at a time when there are bank failures, will not be popular. Many illiterate ryot money lenders will begin to hoard or buy lands. When the investor becomes a burnt cat, it will take a long time for him to recoup and one cannot expect the money lender to lend easily to the agriculturists in the near future. In many cases the poor agriculturist who is in dire need of credit will conspire with the money lenders to evade the law. Investigation in some of the villages has brought to light cases where the professional money lenders execute pronotes with statutory rate of interest but pay the agriculturists only half the sum mentioned in the bonds. It is doubtful whether pawn-broking comes under the scope of the Act. A number of families have pledged their jewels with the sowcars of Kurinjipady for small sums which carry very high rates of interest.

REPAYMENT OF SCALED DOWN DEBTS.

One of the most sensible criticisms of the Act is that there is no provision to enable the agriculturist to repay his scaled down debts. While on the one hand the creditor who is adversely affected is not redressed by immediate payment of the scaled down debts, on the other, the debtor will be harassed by the infuriated creditor who will prefer claims in the Court against him. Naturally there will come to stay a large number of landless agriculturists as a result of the Act. A ryot of the Kottavancheri village of the Cuddalore Taluk said during the enquiry that the repayment of loans should be based on instalment basis as in the case of land mortgage banks and that the Revenue Department should take the responsibility of collecting the instalments regularly for the creditors as arrears of land revenue are collected. This method would avoid expenses that would be incurred otherwise if the creditor were to go to a Court of law. The Revenue Department is already saddled with too much work and cannot go into the affairs of private transactions. Another suggestion is the time limit of one year for the repayment of scaled down debts. After that period the civil Court on application by the debtor or creditor, shall decide that the debtor shall convey and the creditor shall accept in full satisfaction of the debt, such property as is equal in value to the debts due by him. The value of the property is to be decided on a proportion that is fixed in the case of lands to assessment, in the case of houses and buildings the net annual rental value taken for the assessment of property tax and in other cases the capitalised value of the net income from properties. Where

the assets of a debtor are less than his liabilities, the creditor shall accept only such proportion of the scaled down debts that the total assets of the debtor bear to his total liabilities. While this proposal is fine on paper, it does not give an opportunity to the debtor to pay his debts in instalments. The anxiety of the Government to preserve the land from passing on to non-agriculturists will be defeated by this proposal. A proposal is made that the Government should issue bonds to creditors in full settlement of the debts by the debtors and thus transfer the claim on debtors to itself. Debts will be collected in instalments over long periods when the land revenue falls due. But the difficulty is the entire responsibility of liquidating indebtedness falls on the Government. Huge amounts by way of interest should be paid to bondholders irrespective of the debtors paying the instalments. More than this, it will lead to a prolonged enquiry into each and every case before a settlement is made.

It is gratifying to note that Government is making attempts to organise debt conciliation boards throughout the length and breadth of this Presidency to give effect to the relief that is foreshadowed in the Debtors' Relief Act. It is necessary for the Government to issue a notification calling upon all debtors and creditors to file in a prescribed form their claim before the village munsiff of their villages within an appointed date. This will give an idea of the amount of conciliation work that is to be undertaken, the number of centres where they are to be started and the amount of loans the Government would have to supply to the small and medium holders. Suitable amendment should be made in the Debt Conciliation Act if necessary, or rules should be framed both under the Agriculturists' Relief Act and the Debt Conciliation Act to enable the latter to effectively undertake the spreading of relief that is thought of in the former.

The Government has provided a sum of Rs. 50 lakhs in the budget for the disbursement of loans to the small ryots in order to enable them to take full advantage of the provisions of the new Act. Moreover, the Government has increased the guarantee in respect of debentures issued by the Central Land Mortgage Bank to a total face value of Rs. 250 lakhs. This is exclusive of such debentures as the Bank from time to time may redeem. The debentures should be issued for periods not exceeding twenty five years bearing interest at 5% and less. It is hoped that this will give a scope for money lenders to invest their funds in these debentures. This increased guarantee goes a long way in providing funds to the big land-holders to pay off their scaled down debts. But the enormous delay in the grant of loans by land mortgage banks must be ended.

CURATIVE MEASURES.

Though the Act needs improvement in many ways it cannot be gainsaid that this measure is a bold one and unique in its character. No previous Government either in this Province or elsewhere in India has taken so serious a view of the indebtedness of the agriculturists and has been so earnest in bringing forward a measure of compulsory relief. But this Act by itself cannot bring about the economic rehabilitation of the agriculturists. Indebtedness is the result of poverty and in turn aggravates poverty. So the curative methods that are adopted should aim at rooting out poverty. Otherwise debts once wiped out may yet return.

Some of the causes of poverty of the Indian agriculturist are the low yielding capacity of the land, the steep fall in prices and the heavy incidence of land tax. Under adverse conditions due to fall in prices the half net theory of land tax has been violated. The frequent resort by Government to coercive processes for the recovery of its dues in recent years is an index of the growing distress of the people.

FASLI				
* Coercive processes.	1342.	1343.	1344.	1345.
Demand notices ..	1,174,528	1,499,500	1,527,296	1,382,465
Distrain or attachment of notices ..	132,310	192,160	135,479	125,473
Sale notices ..	82,048	143,344	96,347	94,826
Sale (number of defaulters) ..	11,244	14,655	13,414	13,588

It must be noted that the actual sale on account of default is the index of the capacity of the ryot to pay land revenue to Government. The figures are highest for fasli 1343 when the depression reached the lowest depth. While fasli 1344 registered some recovery, the condition has worsened in fasli 1345.

It will be a great boon to the agriculturist if he is relieved of this tax burden to a certain extent. Committed to the programme of Prohibition, which if extended to the whole of the Presidency within three years will involve nearly $\frac{1}{3}$ (4 crores) of the total revenue, Government cannot think of changing the system of land tax.

An improvement in the income of the agriculturist by raising the commodity prices as in Roumania and Czechoslovakia will prevent the recurring of indebtedness. A devaluation of the rupee will increase the income of the Indian agriculturist. But devaluation is beyond the competence of the Provincial Government and there is little chance of the Central Government supporting such a policy.

* Report of the Settlement of the Land Revenue in the Madras Presidency (Fasli 1345).

The only method possible for the Provincial Government to enable the agriculturist to get an increased income from land is by the improvement of the methods of agriculture and thereby increasing the productive capacity of the land. Better irrigation facilities should be provided to the agriculturist by devising new irrigation projects. Minor irrigation schemes throughout the Presidency should be carefully investigated and efforts made to conserve rain water by adding to the tanks and by improving and repairing them. Fragmentation and consolidation of holdings retard agricultural development to a great extent and land consolidation societies should be formed to undertake successfully the work of consolidation. Provision of subsidiary industries will go a long way in augmenting his income. The full results of an increase in agricultural production can be achieved only by proper marketing facilities.

The primary co-operative society must undertake the above schemes. But the rural society must be re-constructed and re-vitalised by a process of rectification and consolidation before it takes up this work of improvement. For some time it is necessary to invest the Government with the power of control and supervision over these societies. The society should be organised on a multi-purpose basis embracing the whole life of the village—i.e., not only credit, but methods to improve the yield of land, better marketing facilities and purchase of necessities. "Every avenue of waste should be checked and production should be developed". The system of controlled credit should be introduced in the society. Before a loan is granted by the society the supervising staff and the agricultural demonstrator should go round the area and ascertain the amount necessary for cultivation. The Society should grant the loan to the agriculturist at the proper time on a cash credit basis. The supervising staff should be careful that the instalments granted are utilised properly. The produce of the ryot should be sold through the sale section of the society. Loans for the improvement of land should be got from the land mortgage bank to which the rural society is affiliated. The sale section of the society will be responsible for repayment of the instalments both to the credit society and land mortgage bank. The society should aim at the controlled expenditure of its members through the recognised stores. This has a salutary effect of lessening the chances of loans being misapplied. An attempt has already been made in our Presidency to start a multi-purpose society on these lines. If the relief given to the agriculturists by the new Act is to be permanent, if debts once wiped out should not accumulate again, Government should encourage the formation of these multi-purpose societies, which will devise means to increase the income of the agriculturists and improve their life.

A Reconstruction of the Hormic Theory of Sentiments

BY

P. S. NAIDU,
(Annamalai University.)

I

INTRODUCTION

Professor McDougall's theory of instincts, the outstanding contribution of the hormic school to psychological theory, has passed through three stages in the course of its evolution from its very promising and clear beginnings in his *Social Psychology* to its rather doubtful ending in the *Energies of Men*. The central affective or emotional aspect of the instinctive structure of the mind, which occupies a very prominent place in the earliest formulation of the hormic theory, is slowly but steadily pushed to the background. Finally, in the Supplementary Chapter VIII, which was added to the twenty-third edition of the *Social Psychology* published in 1936, the emotional aspect is merged in the conative part, and is made to lose its individuality completely. Should such a fate have overtaken the emotions? We contend, in this paper, that not only such a fate need not have overtaken the central part of the instinctive structure of the human mind, but that the threefold scheme should be made the foundation for the analysis of the highly evolved and complex structure of the adult mind called 'sentiment' in hormic psychology. We shall also indicate how that which is most valuable in hormic psychology for aesthetics and sociology could be preserved from disintegration only by keeping intact the three-fold analysis of *Social Psychology*.

II

THE THREE STAGES IN THE EVOLUTION OF THE HORMIC THEORY OF INSTINCTS.

(Stage I) Professor McDougall's earliest description of the structure of the human mind as inferred from its functioning is clear and precise ".....an instinct (is) an inherited or innate psycho-physical disposition which determines its possessor to perceive, and to pay attention to, objects of a certain class, to experience an emotional excitement of a particular quality upon perceiving such an object, and to act in

regard to it in a particular manner, or at least to experience an impulse to such action."¹ This three-fold analysis of the instinctive structure of the mind into its *perceptive*, *emotional* and *executive aspects* is maintained with considerable erudition and wealth of example in the main body of the treatise referred to already. In the detailed discussion that follows the definition of 'instincts,' considerable emphasis is laid on the central or emotional aspect of mental structure. This aspect is considered to be of greater value to the psychologist and the sociologist than the other aspects. In an illuminating foot-note on p. 26 of his *Social Psychology* Professor McDougall says,

'.....any definition of instinctive action that does not insist upon its psychical aspect is useless for practical purposes, and worse than useless because misleading. For, if we neglect the psychical aspect of instinctive processes, it is impossible to understand the part played by instincts in the development of the human mind and in the determination of the conduct of individuals and societies, and it is the fundamental and all pervading character of their influence upon the social life of mankind which alone gives the consideration of instinct its great practical importance.'²

The importance of the emotional aspect in instinct is further stressed by the Professor when he points out that it is this central part alone that remains constant in the varied and complex development of mental structure, while the afferent and efferent parts are subjected to extensive conditioning processes. 'The emotional excitement, with the accompanying nervous activities of the central part of the disposition, is the only part of the total instinctive process, that retains its specific character, and remains common to all individuals and all situations in which the instinct is excited.....each kind of emotional excitement is always an indication of, and the most constant feature of, some instinctive process.'³

In the light of this convincing analysis Professor McDougall attacks, with notable success, several intricate sociological problems. The theory of sympathy, and the explanation of group behaviour based on the theory, are valuable deductions from this threefold analysis. So, one would expect the further development of the theory of instincts to strengthen its foundations. But the learned professor has unfortunately undermined the foundations of the theory in his two outstanding works, *An Outline of Psychology* (1923) and *The Energies of Men* (1932).

(1) McDugall, *Social Psychology*, p. 25.

(2) Italics ours.

(3) McDougall, *Social Psychology*, p. 29.

(Stage II) In "*An Outline*," there is an emphatic and formal re-affirmation of the position taken up in the '*Social Psychology*,' and yet there is visible already a tendency to shift to another position which harbours the potentialities for developing into the contradictory of the first. Instinct, we are told, should be defined 'by the nature of the goal, the type of situation, that it seeks or tends to bring about, as well as the type of situation or object that brings it into activity.'⁴ We do not object to this new way of defining instinct. This definition has considerable validity as a principle for the objective identification of instincts. But what we object to is the manner in which the central affective aspect of instinct has been ignored completely. A little farther on in the treatise, Professor McDougall mentions the possibility of instinct and emotion being put forward as alternative principles of explanation of animal behaviour. Elsewhere he says, 'It is true that we become introspectively aware of the impulse, only when we do not give ourselves up to it, but arresting or suspending it, turn our attention from the object to ourselves. . . .'⁵ This is a distinct climb-down from the level of *Social Psychology*.

(Stage III). We notice a very drastic overhauling of the entire scheme of instincts in the *Energies*. Instead of the original three-fold analysis we are presented a two-fold one into cognitive abilities and conative propensities, the relation between the two being conceived in terms of a highly artificial mechanical analogy. In the preface to the book Professor McDougall admits that his peculiar usage of the term 'instinct' has involved him in endless controversy. 'In this book' he says, 'I have used the word in a stricter sense, and have preferred the good old word 'propensity' to designate those factors of our constitution which I formerly called instincts.' It is not merely a change in terminology but a very sweeping change in the conception of the nature of instincts that attracts our attention here. The Professor is also prepared to admit that there is 'just a grain of truth in the James-Lange theory.' This change is revolutionary, and the abandonment of the original position is complete when we read the confession 'I have become convinced that, in describing a typical instinctive disposition as consisting of three distinguishable parts, I was in error in one respect, namely, in drawing the line of separation between the second and third parts. As I now see, *there is no sufficient ground for regarding a conative part as distinguishable from the emotional or affective part.*'⁶

(4) McDougall, *An Outline of Psychology*, p. 119.

(5) *Ibid.*, p. 321.

(6) McDougall, *Social Psychology* (1936), p. 495, italics ours.

II

THE EVOLUTION OF THE THEORY OF SENTIMENTS.

Two reasons for the radical change in Professor McDougall's analysis of instincts have been suggested in an article recently published by the author of this paper.⁷ It was there pointed out that the change is the result of the Professor's attempt to accommodate himself to the views of his critics, hostile and friendly. Another plausible reason, the vagueness of the hormic analysis of sentiments, will be discussed here. This vagueness is, however a remediable defect in the system. By carrying the three-fold analysis into the realm of sentiments, it is possible not only to rescue the original theory from deterioration, but also to make use of it for explaining some of the obscure phenomena in the realm of higher aesthetic experience.

Unlike the old-fashioned faculty psychology, hormic psychology recognises the dynamic nature of the human mind. The innate mental structure undergoes continuous and often progressive modification as the result of its living contact with the environment. In the course of this steady modification, the elements of mental structure, called (instinctive dispositions or) propensities, get organised round 'objects' of various kinds. The natural excitant of an instinct or propensity (before the afferent side gets conditioned in various ways) is an 'object' in the environment. The same 'object,' because it is itself a complex entity, may excite two or more elementary propensities. When several propensities are thus organised round a single 'object' a 'sentiment' is said to be formed.

Professor McDougall defines sentiment as 'an organised system of emotional dispositions centred about the idea of some object.....a sentiment is a growth in the structure of the mind that is not natively given in the inherited constitution.....it is the organisation of the affective and conative life....'⁸ Even at this early stage, where the three-fold distinction between the perceptive, the affective and the conative aspects is clearly drawn, we notice a tendency to neglect the afferent and efferent aspects, and to speak of the sentiment as an organisation of emotional dispositions. In the next paragraph the Professor includes the conative aspect, but makes no mention of the cognitive aspect. Emphasis is laid on the central aspect in the *Social Psychology*. 'It is only through the systematic organisation of the emotional dispositions in sentiments that the volitional control of the immediate prompt-

(7) Naidu, McDougall's Hormic Theory of Emotions, Phil. Quarterly, July '38.

(8) McDougall, *Social Psychology*, p. 137.

ings of the emotions is rendered possible.⁹ This emphasis shifts to the afferent aspect in the *Energies*. We are told that 'the distinctive feature of each sentiment is the cognitive ability (or system of cognitive abilities) which is its centre or nucleus.'¹⁰ This shift from the central and efferent parts to the afferent part is worthy of note, because it indicates a certain degree of haziness surrounding the very conception of sentiment. 'The essential nature of a sentiment' says McDougall 'the scheme or plan of it is, then, a mental system in which a cognitive ability.....has become, through the individual's experience, functionally linked with one or more native propensities.....The centre of any such system (of any sentiment) is the cognitive ability....and this may grow into an extensive system of abilities....'¹¹ Herein we find a recognition of the need for the three-fold analysis, but the need is felt after a partial abandonment of the very object which will satisfy it. It is therefore necessary to make a clearer analysis (of sentiments) which will conform to the scheme formulated in the *Social Psychology*.

IV

RECONSTRUCTION OF THE THEORY OF SENTIMENTS

In its normal course of development the human mind organises the elements of its innate structure round objects, persons, and ideas, and generates sentiments. The sentiment of hatred, directed towards a bully for example, is the result of the organisation of the propensities of combat, escape and repulsion round the (visual image of the) person or round the 'idea' of the person. This bully excited in the first instance, in the mind of the person who has organised the sentiment of hatred for him, the propensity of repulsion by his mean, cowardly and brutal treatment of a defenceless victim. Witnessing such acts of cruelty repeatedly and sympathising with the victim, the person next had his combative propensity excited. And in the fight that ensued, he realised the physical superiority of the bully. The escape propensity was the last to be called into action. All the three propensities were then welded into the sentiment of hatred.

In attempting to understand Professor McDougall's theory of sentiments the following diagram, an adaptation from the diagram in *Social Psychology* (facing page 440) will be helpful.

(9) McDougall, *Social Psychology*, p. 137.

(10) McDougall, *Energies of Men*, p. 223.

(11) *Ibid*, p. 223.




Fig. I. Diagrammatic Representation of the formation of the Sentiment of Hatred.

The three circles in a line represent the component propensities and the single circle at the top stands for the sentiment. The weak point in the diagram is the representation of the propensities (which have a three-fold structure) and of the highly complex sentiment, by figures which suggest simplicity of structure.

We have to raise a very significant question now. Are we to understand by a sentiment the result of the organisation of emotions or of instinctive propensities? Is *hatred* the result of the organisation of *anger*, *fear* and *disgust*, or of the propensities of *combat*, *escape* and *repulsion*? After scanning the pages of Professor McDougall's outstanding works we feel that this question cannot be answered in an unambiguous manner. The impression that we get is that the learned professor uses the term sentiment sometimes for the resultant of the interaction of emotions, and at other times for that of propensities. There is, no doubt, a reason for this. In his *Social Psychology* the professor uses two distinct terms—instinct and emotion—to indicate the innate mental structure and its central aspect, whereas the afferent and efferent parts do not receive any specific names. In the case of each individual instinct too we find the same state of affairs. Corresponding




Fig. II. Schematic Representation of the Formation of Sentiments
(as analysed in this paper).

HATRED.

h_1 — the afferent or cognitive aspect of sentiment, being in this case the Bully or the 'idea' of the Bully as the blend of $r_1 \times c_1 \times e_1$.

h_2 — the SENTIMENT proper, the affective aspect, the resultant of r_2 (disgust) $\times c_2$ (anger) $\times e_2$ (fear).

h_3 — the resultant of $r_3 \times c_3 \times e_3$ —; keeping at a safe distance, the facial expressions of all the propensities, vocal expression, etc.

REPULSION.

r_1 — the meanness and cruelty of the bully ; r_2 — disgust ; r_3 — wry face, retreat, spitting, etc.

COMBAT

c_1 — the bully as a hindrance to assertion and sympathy ; c_2 — anger ; c_3 — fighting.

ESCAPE.

e_1 — the bully as a source of pain ; e_2 — fear ; e_3 — flight.

to each major instinct there is a specific emotion, both receiving clear cut names, while the cognitive and conative parts are not so named.

If now we go back to our analysis of hatred, we find that the bully who presented different aspects of his own person when he excited the propensities of repulsion, combat and escape separately and at different times, now appears as the blend of all three aspects when he serves as the 'object' of and excites the sentiment of hatred. The perceptual aspects of the three elementary propensities are blended in the corresponding aspect of the sentiment. As the result of this complex excitant, the psychic central or affective aspect of the sentiment is aroused and experienced by the organism. This affective blend of disgust, fear and anger, the sentiment *par excellence* of hormic psychology, has received adequate treatment at the hands of Professor McDougall. But the final activity is as vague and unanalysed as the afferent aspect. The course of action to which the sentiment of hatred leads is very complex. It is neither fight nor flight, but a curious blend of the facial expressions (sometimes of the vocal too) of combat and repulsion with a tendency to retreat from the 'object' of hatred. The following diagram sets forth clearly the facts as analysed by us.

We notice clearly the advantage which this diagram has over Fig. I. Our contention is that, since there are three distinguishable aspects of sentiments as well as of propensities, these aspects should receive distinct names. The absence of such a clear cut terminology has led to a certain degree of confusion of thought. We are alive to the obstacles in the way of framing such a precise terminology. Professor McDougall has pointed out in his *Social Psychology* that the emotional aspect alone is unchanging, while the afferent and efferent aspects are subject to infinite varieties of change through conditioning. Moreover, the excitant of a propensity is not a specific object, but a class of objects, not ordinarily grouped together in any scientific scheme of classification, but only thought together in this context because they have this common capacity for stimulating the innate mental structure of the organism. A similar difficulty besets the 'executive' aspect of propensities. Even so it should be possible to frame a terminology which would keep the three aspects separate. If this be accomplished in the case of propensities, it would be easy to extend the scheme to sentiments. For here, as Professor McDougall has clearly pointed out, the excitants are specific individuals or ideas, and the activity is more clearly defined than in the case of propensities. When we secure a precise and comprehensive terminology on the lines suggested above, we shall have rescued the hormic theory from the tragic fate to which it seems to be drifting now.

V

THE SUGGESTED RECONSTRUCTION JUSTIFIED ON
AESTHETIC GROUNDS.

The clarification of the analysis of sentiments along the lines suggested in the above section is necessary in the interests of the very important hormic theory of *sympathy*. The sympathetic induction of emotions, as understood by psychologists, is the key note to the explanation of all the obscure phenomena in our aesthetic experience. The concept of 'induction' demands the maintenance of the three-fold analysis.

On the afferent side the innate mental structure (propensity) is so constituted that it is excited not only by the 'object' or 'group of objects' peculiar to it, but also by the perception of the expression of the emotion




Fig. III. Sympathetic Induction of Fear.

pertaining to the propensity when a member of the same species is under the influence of that propensity. The wild horse is afraid not only when he sees a terrifying object, or hears a fearful noise, or is afflicted with sudden pain, or smells the characteristic odour emitted by his enemy, but also when he perceives the neigh of fear given out by another wild horse.

Not only the group of 'objects' comprised in E_1 but also e_0 , the expression of the emotion of fear in an animal of the same species, is the excitant of 'escape'. This sympathetic induction in animal mind of any propensity by the expression of the emotion belonging to that propensity operating in another animal is the foundation for the explanation of '*rasas*'. If now the central aspect be omitted or merged in the efferent or conative part then e_0 should also be merged in e_3 . The expression of the emotion will then cease to have an independent status in the psychological analysis, and will certainly cease to have any special significance for aesthetics. If in our analysis we confine ourselves to cognitive abilities and conative propensities, it will not be possible for us to speak of 'sympathetic induction', because the expression of emotion is natural and constant, while the final efferent activity is varied and individual. We should postulate, on the afferent side, such an extensive modification of the original mental structure as would admit of the possibility of the perception of each individual efferent activity serving as the excitant of the propensity concerned. This is out of the question.

This difficulty increases in magnitude when we consider sentiments. Here the afferent (or cognitive) and efferent (or conative) aspects are complicated by the union of the corresponding parts of the propensities that enter into the constitution of the sentiment. And as the *rasas* in their concrete setting are the result of the sympathetic induction of sentiments in the audience by the 'expression' of the central aspect in the hero or heroine, it would be impossible to throw any light on the difficult problems relating to aesthetic experience (and to empathy in particular) if the central be merged in final aspect.

The bodily 'expression' of the emotion of anger, in dog for example, specially the snarl or growl of anger, induces the same emotion in other dogs within hearing of the angry bark. The energy released works forward and results in appropriate activity, and also works backward, by a kind of back-stroke as it were, and arouses the 'idea' of the 'object' or 'class of objects' which constitutes the natural excitant of the combative propensity. The same process occurs in the case of sentiments also. The perception by the well informed and cultured audience of the expression of 'love' (in the courtship scene in *Sakuntalam* for example) excites the same sentiment (understanding sentiment as the product of the organisation of the central or emotional aspects of the several propensities that

enter into this compound, in their minds. The energy works backward and arouses the 'idea' of the 'object' which, for each individual member of the audience is the unique excitant of 'love'. (We know that the excitant for a sentiment is a specific object, and not a class of objects) The sympathetic induction of this sentiment does not (and should not) result




Fig. IV.

in the audience falling with the hero or the heroine. If it did result in such an abnormal situation, as it might in the case of depraved minds it would cause intense pain, since the last aspect would have to be forcibly suppressed. In the normal course of its working, the sentiment sympathetically induced in the audience would recall to the mind of each member his or her own unique past experiences relating to the final aspect. Such recall need not necessarily be pleasurable.

The favourable reception of the lover's advances will recall similar experiences resulting in pleasure, while rebuffs may put the audience in mind of similar painful experiences. The affective tone of a *rasa* need not always be pleasurable.

We have tackled here only one small problem connected with the psychology of *rasas*. Several others, more obscure and puzzling may also be successfully resolved if the three-fold analysis be preserved. In the absence of the three-fold distinction we shall be at sea when we are confronted with difficult sociological and aesthetic problems demanding psychological solutions.

VI

CONCLUSION.

We have indicated the direction of the evolution of the hormic theory of instincts, stressing the important stages in its course. The reason why the last stage appears to us to be a set-back has been indicated. Attempts have been made to maintain the three-fold analysis of propensities and to reconstruct the theory of sentiments. Three aspects of sentiment corresponding to those of instinct have been distinguished, each from the others. It has been suggested that the term sentiment may be used exclusively for the central or affective aspect, and that two other suitable terms may be coined for the other aspects. Finally, it has been shown that the three-fold distinction is absolutely necessary for a psychology which would be of help to aesthetics and sociology.

The Madras Land Revenue System

A Statistical Study in relation to prices.

By

S. SUBRAMANIAN,

AND

B. SITARAMAN,

(Annamalai University)

INTRODUCTION

The question of correlating the land revenue demand with the prices prevailing is at present engaging the attention of the Madras Government. The experiment that is being tried by the Punjab Government at Lyallpur is closely watched by all students of land revenue systems in India. A close study of the details of the Lyallpur experiment tempted us to examine whether the system at present prevailing in Madras comes anywhere near the desired goal, though unconsciously. We took up for investigation the figures pertaining to the period comprising Faslis 1324-1343. The results are set forth in section 1, 2, 3 of Part I of this paper. Section 1 is concerned with the total yearly assessment and the prices from year to year. Section 2 brings out the concla-tion between the revenue assessment per acre of cultivated area and price. Section 3 deals with the growth of the burden on each acre of cultivated area and of occupied area separately ; the results are illustrated by graphs. Part II of the paper examines whether the fluctuations in the prices have any effect on the acreage under cultivation.

PART I

1. Index numbers were first constructed for the prices and for the revenue demands for several years with Fasli 1324 as base. The prices taken into consideration are those of the chief food grains of the province, namely rice, cholam, ragi and cumbu. The method and computation are as in Reference I. The revenue demand considered is confined to the ryotwari lands and is made up of (1) Assessment on holding, (2) Water-rate and (3) Miscellaneous revenue calculated as in Ref. II. The figures for the several years and the respective index numbers are given below.

Year.	Total Revenue in lakhs of Rs.	Index number a	Index Number of prices. p	Time. t
1324	566.32	100	100	-19
1325	571.35	100.9	98.9	-17
1326	575.27	101.6	103.1	-15
1327	572.96	101.2	106.4	-13
1328	586.05	103.5	149.4	-11
1329	589.51	104.1	194.4	- 9
1330	588.82	104.0	167.9	- 7
1331	591.05	104.4	155.9	- 5
1332	595.89	105.2	143.8	- 3
1333	603.62	106.6	143.7	- 1
1334	610.34	107.7	161.5	+ 1
1335	618.31	109.1	148.7	+ 3
1336	618.56	109.2	150.5	+ 5
1337	619.13	109.3	150.3	+ 7
1338	624.32	110.3	138.7	+ 9
1339	627.53	110.9	126.1	+11
1340	629.25	111.1	95.9	+13
1341	638.78	112.8	83.1	+15
1342	640.98	113.2	76.6	+17
1343	646.87	114.2	64.0	+19
Mean		Ma=106.965	Mp=127.945	$\sigma t=11.53$
Standard Deviation		$\sigma a=4.305$	$\sigma p=33.843$	Mt=0

The total correlation between revenue and price [r_{ap}] works out to be -- .2839. Fisher's z test for significance yields,

$$z = - .292, \sigma z = 1/\sqrt{17}, z/\sigma z = 1.2.$$

This value is well within the limits of random sampling. The correlation is therefore not significant.

If the trend were eliminated by the partial regression method, the unit of time being taken as half a year, we get the partial correlation between revenue and price ;

$$r_{ap \cdot t} = \frac{r_{ap} - r_{at}r_{pt}}{\sqrt{(r = r_{at}^2)(1 - r_{pt}^2)}} = + \cdot 176.$$

Now $z = \cdot 178$; $\sigma z = \frac{1}{4}$; $z/\sigma z = \cdot 712$. Again the correlation is not significant.

The conclusion is that the revenue system has been quite inelastic. It is interesting to find a negative total correlation between revenue and prices, though not significant.

2. The index numbers of assessment per acre of cultivated area and prices, with Fasli 1324 as base, are given in the table below.

Year.	Assesment in Rs. per acre.	Index Number a'	Index Number of prices p
1324	2 11 11	100·0	100·0
1325	2 12 6	101·4	98·9
1326	2 12 11	102·3	103·1
1327	2 10 7	97·0	106·4
1328	2 15 0	107·0	149·4
1329	2 15 2	107·4	194·4
1330	2 15 4	107·7	167·9
1331	2 15 8	108·6	155·9
1332	3 0 1	109·6	143·8
1333	3 2 1	114·1	143·7
1334	3 0 7	110·7	161·5
1335	3 0 8	110·9	148·7
1336	3 1 2	111·9	150·5
1337	3 0 2	109·6	150·3
1338	3 0 0	109·4	138·7
1339	3 0 1	109·4	126·1
1340	3 0 3	109·8	95·9
1341	3 1 9	113·2	83·1
1342	3 0 10	111·4	76·6
1343	3 1 8	113·2	64·0
Mean		Ma'=108·23	Mp=127·945
Standard Deviation		$\sigma a' = 4 \cdot 516$	$\sigma p = 33 \cdot 843$

The total correlation $[r_{a'p}]$ between assessment per acre and the prices works out to be $\cdot 0114$. $z = \cdot 0114$; $\sigma z = \cdot 0114 \times \sqrt{17} = \cdot 0470$.


Therefore the correlation is not significant. It is not necessary in this case to eliminate the trend because the time factor as such has no influence on the correlation between the two variables studied,

3. The burden of revenue on each acre of cultivated area and of occupied area is shown below separately.

Year. (1)	Total Assessment in lakhs of Rs. (2)	Cultivated area in lakhs of acres (3)	Assessment per acre of cultivated area (4) = (2) ÷ (3)	Occupied area in lakhs of acres (5)	Assessment per acre of occupied area. (6) = (2) ÷ (5)	Index No. of prices p
1324	566.32	206.0	2.744	255.5	2.217	100.0
1325	571.35	205.4	2.782	256.5	2.225	98.9
1326	575.27	204.8	2.809	257.9	2.231	103.1
1327	572.96	215.3	2.661	258.9	2.213	106.4
1328	586.05	199.6	2.936	259.7	2.257	149.4
1329	589.51	200.0	2.948	260.3	2.265	194.4
1330	588.82	199.1	2.958	261.3	2.253	167.9
1331	591.05	198.4	2.979	262.3	2.253	155.9
1332	595.89	198.2	3.007	263.2	2.260	143.8
1333	603.62	192.8	3.131	264.4	2.283	143.7
1334	610.34	201.0	3.037	265.8	2.296	161.5
1335	618.31	203.3	3.041	267.1	2.315	148.7
1336	618.56	201.4	3.071	270.8	2.284	150.0
1337	619.13	205.8	3.008	272.0	2.276	150.3
1338	624.32	208.0	3.002	273.6	2.282	138.7
1339	627.53	209.0	3.003	275.0	2.282	126.1
1340	629.25	208.7	3.015	276.1	2.279	95.9
1341	638.78	205.6	3.107	277.0	2.306	83.1
1342	640.98	209.8	3.055	278.1	2.305	76.6
1343	646.87	208.3	3.106	278.8	2.320	64.0
1344	659.21	201.6	3.270	279.1	2.362	..

A remarkable feature of columns (4) and (6) is the steady growth of the revenue demand per acre in contrast to the almost steady fall in prices. Moreover the assessment per acre of cultivated area shows a steeper gradient than that per acre of occupied area, as can be seen from

the graphs ; this may perhaps be due to a faster growth of occupied area than of cultivated area.



PART II

It is an essential feature of crop restriction schemes in America that the cultivator is persuaded by an assurance of minimum price and other means to restrict the acreage under specified crops. Such schemes have been tried without much success among the cultivators of jute in Bengal. The reasons for the failure of these schemes in India are said to be that the average holding of a cultivator is too small for further restriction and the fact that there are very few alternative crops. When the price of food grains began to fall steadily in our province, acreage restriction was suggested by some, but not carried out. In this connection it may be of interest to know whether the Madras cultivator at all reacts to the

fluctuation in prices. The study in this section concerns the cultivated areas and the prices for twenty years. Since it is the previous year's price which should have any influence, if at all, on the area cultivated in a given year, a time lag of one year has been given to the figures for the acreage. The acreage statistics relate to the period Faslis 1325-44, whereas the prices are for 1324-43. The figures and the index numbers are as under :—

Fasli	in lakhs of acres Cultivated area	Index Number c	Index Number of grain prices of previous year= p'
1324			
1325	205.4	100.0	100.0
1326	204.8	99.7	98.9
1327	215.3	104.8	103.1
1328	199.6	97.2	106.4
1329	200.0	97.4	149.4
1330	199.1	96.9	194.4
1331	198.4	96.6	167.9
1332	198.2	96.5	155.9
1333	192.8	93.9	143.8
1334	201.0	97.9	143.7
1335	203.3	99.0	161.5
1336	201.4	98.0	148.7
1337	205.8	100.2	150.5
1338	208.0	101.3	150.3
1339	209.0	101.7	138.7
1340	208.7	101.6	126.1
1341	205.6	100.1	95.9
1342	209.8	102.1	83.1
1343	208.3	101.4	76.6
1344	201.6	98.2	64.0
Mean		Mc=99.225	Mp'=127.945
Standard deviation		Mc=99.25	$\sigma p'$ =33.843

The correlation co-efficient $r_{cp}' = - .4473$.

$$z = - .4815; z/\sigma z = - 1.985.$$

It is not possible to say anything definite on the significance of the total correlation. Eliminating the trend as in Sec. 1. Part I of this paper, we get the partial correlation

$$r_{cp \cdot t} = \frac{r_{cp}^1 - r_{ct}r_p^1}{\sqrt{(1 - r_{ct}^2)(1 - r_p'^2)}} = - .4020$$

Though the correlation is not significant, the presence of a negative correlation is intriguing. In conclusion, it seems to be established that

the Madras cultivator is not influenced very much by changes in the prices of agricultural produce.

The converse problem of determining the influence of acreage on prices will depend in a large measure on the total yield, for which reliable statistics are not available. It is unfortunate that the effect of total production on prices could not be studied statistically ; but it is hoped that when the statistical machinery of the province puts the required figures in our hands, it will be possible to complete the study.

SUMMARY.

1. The growth of the total ryotwari land revenue demand in the province bears no significant relation to the fluctuation of prices, even after allowing for the time factor.

2. The increase of assessment per acre has been out of all proportion with the changes in the prices.

3. The average assessment per acre of cultivated area has been rising faster than that per acre of occupied area..

4. The Madras cultivator has not shown a capacity to adjust the acreage to the prices prevailing before.

Ref. I. S. Subramaniam and S. Ramakrishnan, Sixty Years of Madras Cereal Prices—*Jour. Annamalai University*, Vol. XI, No. 1.

Ref. II. S. Subramaniam and N. S. Sivasubramaniam, The Madras Land Revenue System—*Indian Journal of Economics*, Vol. XVI, Part III.

The Passive Voice in Tamil

By

A. CHIDAMBARANATHA CHETTIYAR

(Annamalai University.)

APPENDIX I.

KALITTOGAI

Pālai by Pālai Pāḍiya Peruṅkaḍuṅkō.

1. Taṇṇalaṅkaḍai koḷappaḍutaliṇ. St. 7.
2. Kaiteṛappaṭṭu. St. 12.
3. Mayakkappaṭṭayarttāyō. St. 14.
4. Nalaṇuṇappaṭṭōr. St. 23.
5. Kuṇaṇ unappaṭṭōr. St. 23.
Kuṇiñci by Kapilar.
6. Pēṇiṇareṇappaḍutal peṇmaiyumaṇru. St. 47.
7. Kaippaḍukkappaṭṭāy cirumi Nī. P. 77. St. 65.
Marutam by Marutan Iḷanākanār.
8. Aṇṇilaṇṇaṇilaṇ eṇappaḍāṇ eṇavēṭṭi. P. 88. St. 74.
9. Kaṇaveṇappaṭṭātōr kārikai nīrttē. P. 111. St. 92.
Mullai by Nallurittiranār.
10. Eppoḷutum collārṛarappaṭṭavaḷ. P. 130. St. 102. Line 12.
Neytal by Nallantuvaṇār.
11. Tērai tiṇappaḍal ōmbu. P. 202. St. 147. L. 33.
12. Palkatir sāmbippakal oliyappaṭṭimō
Selkatir ṇāyirē nī. P. 202. St. 147. L. 34.

APPENDIX II.

1. Viḷappaḍuvār keḷiiiyalar tām viḷvār
Viḷappaḍāar eṇiṇ. (Kuraḷ. 1194)
2. Cuṭṭappaḍuṇ katirōṇukkuṇ cūḷkkalai
Kaṭṭappaḍum ireṭṭāku matikkalai.
(Tirumantiram—V. Visvanatha Pillai edition, 1912. 13th Chapter.
P. 175. St. 5.)
3. Añciṇāliyaṛṛappaṭṭa ākkai peṛṛatanuḷ vāḷum
Añciṇāḷaḍarkkappaṭṭiṅkuḷitarum ātaṇṇai.
(Tirunāvukkarasu Swamigaḷ Tēvāram—Madras Saiva Siddantamaha-
samājam, 1930 edition. P. 43. St. 5.)
4. Viṇṇuḷārum virumpappaḍupavar
Maṇṇuḷārum matikkappaḍupavar.
(*Ibid.*, P. 187. St. 7.)

5. Kattappattuk kavalaiyil vīlātē
Poṭṭavalluyir pōvatan muṇṇam nīr
Ciṭṭanār tiruvēt kaḷam kaitolap
Paṭṭa valviṇai āyinaṇpārumē.
(*Ibid.*, P. 228. St. 6.)
6. Pārār paravappaḍuvār pōlum
Cīrāl vaṇakkappaḍuvār pōlum.
(*Ibid.*, P. 344. St. 2.)
7. Pēsappattēṇṇaḍiyārīl tiruṇīrē
Pūsappattēṇ pūtalarāl unṇaḍiyāṇ eṇru
Ēsappattēṇ iṇippaḍukinṇatamaiyātāl
Āsappattēṇ āṭpattēṇ uṇ aḍiyēnē.
(Tiruvācakam—Ceyyūr M. Subramaniya Mudaliyār, (1929) edition
P. 48. St. 82.)
8. Neykkīlī vaikkappattār
Neyppattīr kiḍattappattār
Irumpiṇāl pōlappattār
Mānilattu uhukkappattār
Kaikkīlī koḍukkappattār
Kalampala nalkappattār.
(Cintāmaṇi—Kāntaruvatattai Ilampakam. St. 326.)
9. Ulakelām ariyappattatu.
(Cūḷamaṇi—Iraṇanūpurac carukkam. P. 33. St. 104.)
10. Piḷlappattāṇa nutalōḍaikkari piṇāl porrēr
Aḷlappattālī kuruttiṇṇoru puṇāl ārākap paḍi cērāka
Vaḷlappattāṇa makarakkaḍalena matilsurriya pati maṇalikkōr
Koḷḷaippattūḷa uyi eṇṇumpaḍi koṇṇāṇ aimpulan venṇānē.
(Kambarāmāyaṇam—Sundarakāṇḍam—Atcakumāraṇ vatai. St. 28.)
11. Mayakkappaḍāvalla vaṇcimarunṇiṇ
.....kaliyiṇuḷḷāl
Muyakkappaḍum mutarkāḷirupāvum.
(Yāpparunkalakkārikai Oḷipiyal St. 53).
12. Pārttipan oruttiḍappattōr
Piḍuṇu kuravan meyyaḍiyavarār
Pirittiḍappattāvarkkellām.
(Tanikaippurāṇam—C. R. Namacciṇayamudaliar edition—Agattiyaṇ
aruḷ peṇu paḍalam. P. 213. St. 254.)
13. Tattamakku aṇanta kōḍippakaivirāyt tākkappattum
Poṭhiya paṇiyirpaṭṭum pōḷutiruntuḍaṇṇappattum.
(*Ibid.* P. 226. St. 325.)
14. Eṇṇiyidu ceytiḍiṇ itanāl eytappaḍuvatihtu eytātu
Iriyappaḍuvatihtunmai eytappaḍalār payaṇiṇrē.
(Sēkkilār pillait tamīl in Meenakshisundaram Pillai's works. P. 18. St. 4.)
15. Koḷḷappaḍātu . . . mataṇaḷlappaḍātu . . .
Koḷḷappaḍātu . . . aḷlappaḍātu.
(Tirukkūḍantait tiripantāti in *op. cit.* P. 458. St. 67.)

16. Aruḷ eṇappaḍuvatu.....iruḷeṇappaḍuvatu
 . . . maruḷeṇappaḍuvatu . . . poruḷeṇappaḍuvatu.
 (Pālaivanappatiṟruppattantāti—op. cit. P. 478. St. 12.)
17. Orṟiyil unṇāl taṇḍikkappaṭṭaṇaṇ. aṇṟō.
 (Tiru arutpā—R. Mudr. edn. 1927. P. 223. St. 1.)
- | | | |
|-----|-----|----------------|
| 18. | Do. | P. 223. St. 2. |
| 19. | Do. | Do. St. 3. |
| 20. | Do. | Do. St. 4. |
| 21. | Do. | Do. St. 5. |
| 22. | Do. | Do. St. 6. |
| 23. | Do. | Do. St. 7. |
| 24. | Do. | Do. St. 8. |
| 25. | Do. | P. 224 St. 9. |
| 26. | Do. | Do. St. 10. |

APPENDIX III.

1. Avvuyirul, eṇṇuyirum eṇṇappaḍumāyiy.
 (Muttollāyiram—Madura Tamil Sangam Press, 1935. P. 13. St. 59.)
2. Nalaṇuṇappaṭṭa nalkūr pēḍai.
 (Narṟinai, St. 178.)
3. Uḷlatu citaippōr ulaṇeṇappaḍār.
 (Kuruntogai—Velūr Vidyaratna Printing Press, P. 235. St. 283.)
4. Nī nayantu uraiyappaṭṭōḷ Yāvaḷōḍum.
 (Ainḱuṇūru, Second edition, 1920. P. 111. St. 10.)
5. Eṇṇeṇappaḍuṅkol tōḷi.
 (Akanānūru, St. 206.)
6. Tōṇalamuṇḍu turakkappaṭṭōr.
 (Kalittokai, St. 23.)
7. Pasalaiyāl uṇappaṭṭāl.
 (Ibid. St. 48.)
8. Collāṟṟarappaṭṭavaḷ. (Ibid. St. 102.)
9. Uḷḷiḍappaṭṭa arasaṇai.
 (Ibid. St. 139. L. 35.)
10. Vittōrai viḍāal tiruvē
 Viḍātōr ivaḷ viḍappaṭṭōrē.
 (Puranānūru, St. 358.)
11. Emmāl viyakkaḍūu mōrē.
 (Ibid. St. 197.)
12. Muyalun toḷappaḍūm.
 (Nāladiyār. St. 176.)
13. Tokkirunteṇṇiṇāṇeṇṇappaḍum.
 (Nānmaṇikkaḍikai. St. 76.)
14. Immūvar nalkuravu cērappaṭṭār.
 (Tirikaḍukam. St. 84.)

15. Yānaiyiṇ kai tuṇikkappaṭṭu.
(Kaḷavaḷi nārpaḍu. St. 14.)
16. Eyppuḷ vaippām eṇappōṟrapaṭṭavar
Uṟṟuḷi oṇṟukkutavār.
(Paḷamoḷi. St. 136.)
17. Viṇṇōrāl, iṇmoḷiyāl ēṭtappaḍum.
(Sirupaṇca mūlam. St. 82.)
18. Eriyār cuḍappaḍiṇum uyvundām
(Tirukkuraḷ. St. 896.)
19. Viḷunar viḷappaḍuvārkkamaiyumē
vāḷunam ennuñ cerukku.
(Tirukkuraḷ. St. 1193.)
20. Aḷappaḍum ūnamaittār imaiyavarāl
Viḷappaḍuvār viraintu.
(Ēlāti. St. 36.)
21. Mikkamayaṇāl iḷaikkappaṭṭa
Sakkaravāḷak kōṭṭam.
(Maṇimēkalai, VI. L. 201.)
22. Tēḍiya tēvar tammāl iṟaiṇcappaḍum
Tēvarpirān.
(Sambandar Tēvāram—S. I. S. S. W. P. S. Publication, 1927. P. 670. St. 10.)
23. Vēḷalār kāyappaṭṭa virarumillai.
(Tirunavukkarasar Tēvāram—Madras 1930. S. S. Samaja edition.
P. 65. St. 7.)
24. Pārūr palarum paravappaḍuvāy.
(Sundarar Tēvāram. *ibid.* P. 91. St. 4.)
25. Puntti koḷappaṭṭa pōṇkoḍiyār.
(Tiruvācakam—Cheyyur Mudr. edn., 1929. P. 166. St. 9.)
26. Tillaiyāṇaruḷāl vantāl ikaḷappaḍumē.
(Tirukkōvaiyār. St. 12. L. 2.)
27. Puṇarṅkappaṭṭa kaḷaccakaḍu kalakkaliya.
(Periyālvār Tirumoḷi—Second ten—Second Tirumoḷi. St. 4.)
28. Kāmattiyuḷ pukuntu katuvappaṭṭu.
(Nācciyār Tirumoḷi—Eighth Tirumoḷi. St. 2.)
29. Eḷappaḍāk kalikku iṟiraṇḍākum.
(Yāpparuṅkalak kārikai uṟuppiyal. St. 14.)
30. Iyaṟappaḍātana innisai veṇpā
(Yāpparuṅkalam ceyyūḷiyal. § 61.)
31. Vaiyakam muḷutum niṇ vaḍivu eṇappaḍumē.
(Paṭṭinattuppiḷaiyār. St. 7.)
32. Kōṭṭappaḍu paṇilam āṟppa.
(Aḷuḍaiya piḷaiyār Tiruvulāmālai by Nampiyāṇḍār Nampi. P. 323. L. 4.)
33. Kauvappaṭṭa piṇaṅkaḷ paranta kāṭṭil.
(Eleventh Tirumurai—Madras Ārumuga Nāvalar—Tiruvāḷaṅkāṭṭu mūṭṭa
tiruppadiḡam by Kāraikkāl Ammaiṇyār. P. 4. St. 1.)

34. Uṇṇappaḍā nañca muṇḍārku.
(Kailai pāti kālatti pāti antāti by Nakkīra Tēvar. P. 82. St. 75.)
35. Tuykkaḍum poruḷaik kūṭṭutum
Maṇṇavar kāṭṭu uykkappaḍuvatañcūtu.
(Sivaperumāṇ Tiruvantāti by Kapilatēvanāyaṇār. P. 156. St. 86.)
36. Tuṇṇattāl tukaikkappaṭṭār.
(Chintāmaṇi Patumaiyārilampakam. St. 227.)
37. Vēṇṇāl viḍukkappaṭṭār.
(Ibid. St. 245.)
38. Pakaliyāl aḷuttappaṭṭān.
(Cūlāmaṇi—C. V. Damōdaram Pillai edition—Suyamvaraccarukkam.
P. 234. St. 71.)
39. Pālenkum ṭappaḍukiṇṇa paḍapporuṭku.
(Nilakēsi—Edited by Mr. A. Chakravarti, M.A., I.E.S. 1936. P. 292. St. 63.)
40. Ariṇṇattāl ariyappaṭṭān.
(The 14 Meykaṇḍa Shāstrās—S. I. S. S. W. P. S.—Sivagnānabōdham
P. 48. St. 5.)
41. Eṇṇil ariyappaḍum poruḷum
Ariṇṇum oṇṇum palavāmō.
(op. cit. Sivagnāna Siddhiyār parapakkam. P. 128. St. 1.)
42. Kāṇappaḍum poruḷum aṇṇiyē.
(op. cit. Tirukkaḷiṇṇappaḍiyār by Uyyavanta Tēvaṇār. P. 15. St. 27.)
43. Tambiyār camaikkappaṭṭa iniya pūñcālai eyti iruṇṇaṇ Irāmaṇ ippāl.
(Kamba Rāmāyaṇam—Āraṇyakāṇḍam, Sūrppanakaippaḍalam. St. 7.)
44. Viḷukkuṇṇappaṭṭa kuṇṇiyāvum viḷa.
(Takkayākappaṇaṇi—Dr. V. Swaminathayyar's edition, 1930. P. 183.
St. 292.)
45. Muṇivaṇōḍu mūvarum viḷuṇkappaṭṭār.
(Mēru Mantira purāṇam—Madras Sādhu press, 1923. P. 346. St. 743.)
46. Viḷṇta vēṇṇārāl vilakkappaṭṭa tāṇaṇam tattan.
(Periyapurāṇam—Mr. T. V. K. Edition. P. 191. St. 17.)
47. Moliyappaṭṭa aṇi pala tammul taḷuva uraippatu sangīraṇamē.
(Daṇṭiyalaṇkāram—A. Kumaraswami Pulavar edition. 1926. P. 152. § 87.)
48. Uraikkappaḍumporuḷ uḷḷattamaittu.
(Nannūl. § 13.)
49. Ceyyappaṭṭa evarkkum periyavaṇ
(Tiruppugal—Samajam edition—P. 555. St. 721.)
50. Veṇṇiṇṇu ākaṇāl nōkkappaṭṭu aṇukiyatu.
(Villiputtūrār Bhāratam—Madura Tamil Sangam edition, 1926—Āraṇya
Paruvam. P. 155. St. 89.)

51. Kumaraṇḍuraikkappaṭṭa yāṇ.
(Sivadharmōttaram by Maṇaiṇāṇa Sambandar—Ripon press, 1919—
P. 263. St. 57.)
52. Vēṇṇumai kāṇappaḍukalāmaiṇ.
(Sikālattippurāṇam—Nakkiraccarukkam. St. 29.)
53. Uḍan eṇiyappaḍu kavāṅkal.
(Sirāppurāṇam, 1908. Madras. P. 463. St. 196.)
54. Tiṇamē pukaḷappaḍuvāy nī.
(Tēmbāvaṇi—Putuvai 1927—Mutar kāṇḍam—Mahavarul paḍalam—
P. 341. St. 144.)
55. Ticcudappaṭṭu meyvembi.
(Prabodha Chandrōdayam—Second edition—Vivēkaṇḍṇuk kēḷvic-
carukkam. P. 36. St. 11.)
56. Uṇaiṇ pōṇṇap paccilaiyūṇ kiḷappaḍumō.
(Tāyumāṇavar Pāḍal, Madras 1930. Tirumakaḷ Vilasa press. P. 611. St. 92.)
57. Kaḍaliḍai vīḷttiḍappaṭṭu.
(Tiru Aruṭpā—Ramaswami Mudaliar edition. 1927. P. 115. St. 135.)
58. Oruvarāl ākkappaḍumporul āmō.
(Manonmaniyam by P. Sundaram Pillai, M.A., 1922. P. 24.)
59. Nēyamum ākkappaḍumporul āmō.
(Ibid., P. 23.)
60. Valampuri cūḷnta salaṅcalam ennak kāṇappaḍupavar talaimakkaḷ enpa.
(Nāṭakaviyal—V. G. Suryanarayana Sastriar, Madras, 1901. Pandita
mittira press. P. 15. St. 83.)
61. Kāttal iṇitu, kākkappaḍutalum iṇitu
Alittal iṇitu, alikkappaḍutalum naṇṇu
Uṇpatu naṇṇu, uṇṇappaḍutalum naṇṇu.
(Bharati's Songs—Kāṭchi—P. 366. St. 6.)
62. Kālāl utaikkappaḍiṇ aḍaiyum iṇṇam.
(Agalikai Venpa by Raosaheb V. P. Subramaniya Mudaliar, G. P. V. C.
Second edition. P. 21, St. 118.)
63. Aruḷappaṭṭēṭtan aṇar ellām uḷḷan teruḷappaṭṭāy allai tēṇtu.
(Pārikātai—Mahavidvan R. Raghava Aiyangar, 1937. St. 131.)

St. John Hankin

By

K. P. KARUNAKARA MENON.

(Annamalai University)

The decadence of the English drama began with the passing of the Elizabethan age. Drinkwater computes that between the end of the Shakespearean epoch and the beginning of the present generation not more than a dozen plays have been written in England, which are of indisputable excellence as literature and as stage pieces. After the Restoration the theatre became the haunt of the most idle and frivolous section of society. This tradition continued down to the Victorian era. The theatre was neither respected nor respectable. Sir Walter Scott, in answer to a suggestion that he might do something for the London stage, wrote in 1819 : " I do not think the character of the audience in London is such that one could have the least pleasure in pleasing them. One half come to prosecute their debaucheries, so openly that it would degrade a bagnio ; another set to snooze off their beef-steaks and port wine ; a third are critics of the fourth column of the newspaper ; fashion, wit or literature there is not, and, on the whole, I would far rather write verses for mine honest friend Punch (the street 'Punch and Judy') and his audience. The only thing that could tempt me to be so silly would be to assist a friend in such a degrading task, who was to have the whole profit and shame of it." That conditions were practically the same fifty years later is seen from Professor Henry Morley's *Journal of a London Play-goer from 1851-1856*. In the Victorian age, however, poets were called upon by the theatre managers to provide them with a suitable repertoire. Browning, for example, was requested by Macready to "write me a play and save me from going to America". But the attempts of the poets failed because they held fast to the traditions of the Elizabethan age. Their plays on subjects which permitted treatment in long rhetorical speeches in graceful verse made no appeal to the modern audience. "In England", said Matthew Arnold in 1879, "we have no drama at all. Our vast society is not homogeneous enough, nor sufficiently united, even any large portion of it, in a common view of life, a common ideal capable of serving as basis for a modern English Drama." The sober critic, A. B. Walkley, expresses the same idea in his *Drama and Life* : "It is impossible to think of the early Victorian theatre without a yawn, so 'unidea'd' was it, so ephemeral, so paltry and jejune. One shrinks from dwelling on this tedious theme." And H. G. Wells, in

his *World of William Clissold*, describes the late eighties and early nineties as "the absurd days of the British theatre".

But towards the very end of the century there were indications of a change for the better. Ibsen was introduced to the British public by Edmund Gosse, by William Archer and by Bernard Shaw. He inspired the new dramatists to write serious plays dealing seriously with serious subjects. Among the pioneers of the new school of the realistic play of ideas were Robertson, Pinero, Shaw, Granville Barker, Stanley Houghton, Galsworthy and Hankin. They made an attempt to liberate the drama from the fetters of commercialism and to grapple with the realities of life. They leaped over all the old dramatic fences and introduced the spirit of social enquiry and of technical experimentation in their plays. The elaboration of plot was subordinated to the setting forth of an idea and its development through the medium of character.

St. John Emile Clavering Hankin, who belongs to the new school of English drama, was born in 1860 at Southampton. He received his education in his native city and later at Malvern and Merton Colleges, Oxford. He graduated in 1890 and then became a journalist in London. In 1894 he went to Calcutta where he continued his journalistic career for a year. He then returned to England and became a contributor to *Punch* and to the *Times*. His plays were written in the years that followed. In 1909, in a fit of depression as a result of his neurasthenic condition, he drowned himself.

Hankin, like the representatives of the school of drama to which he belongs, is a dramatist of ideas. He directs the searchlight of his criticism on the society of his time, and his incidents and characters spring from his ideas. He himself outlines his method of work in these words: "I select an episode in one of my characters, when something of importance to their future has to be decided, and I ring up my curtain. Having shown how it was decided and why it was so decided I ring it down again." A short analysis of his plays will make it clear that they are built on a central idea rather than on a situation or character.

The Two Mr. Weatherbys (1902), the first important play of Hankin, illustrates the idea that a marriage may be ruined as easily by excess of ideals as by their absence, and that a good reputation may become as embarrassing as a bad one, because it necessitates hypocrisy. The "good" James Weatherby passes off as a veritable saint in the eyes of his wife, her aunt and her cousin who are all intolerable moral martinets. James is eager to order these meddlesome relations of his wife out of his house. But he has not the courage to dethrone himself from the high moral pedestal of piety and idealism that he occupies in their eyes. He is thus forced to be dishonest and continually hypocritical. His brother,

the 'bad' Dick, on the other hand, leads a life of good-humoured enjoyment which his 'dignified' wife could not understand, and is, therefore, happy to be separated from the woman who makes a fetish of rectitude. Hankin fully brings out the contrast between the happiness of the 'bad' man who remains honestly himself and the unhappiness of the 'good' man who is constantly under the necessity of being dishonest and deceitful. The separated wife is thoroughly disgusted with her lonely life and is eager for a reconciliation while James' spouse who is shocked at the discovery of her husband's mendacity and dissimulation threatens to leave him. The unerring logic of the play, however, seems to break down in the conventionally happy ending with the reconciliation of the two couples.

Hankin's next play, *The Return of the Prodigal* (1911) is a satire on English middle class ideals of social success. Eustace Jackson, the prodigal son, the ne'er-do-well, who has squandered a thousand pounds in Australia, makes a dramatic return to the paternal home. He pretends to have fainted at the gate and is carried into the house and nursed by his simple affectionate mother. He finds that his father, Mr. Jackson, is a candidate for the local seat in Parliament, and that his brother, Henry, aspires for an alliance with the nobility. Eustace threatens to go to the workhouse and thus ruin the ambitions of his father and his brother, and he exploits the situation to extract from the former an annual allowance of a £250.

In his next play, *The Charity that Began at Home* (1905), Hankin makes fun of the quixotic though well-intentioned experiments in philanthropy, which often lead to disastrous consequences. Basil Hylton, the apostle of the Church of Humanity preaches the noble doctrine of kindness to disagreeable people boycotted by society. His disciples, Lady Denison and her daughter, Margery, acting on his precepts, invite to their house a motley crowd of impossible men and women—General Bonsor, the insufferable bore, whose never-ending stories had emptied every club of which he had been a member, Mrs. Horrocks, an embodiment of vulgarity and snobbery, Mrs. Triggs, a stranded short-tempered and uncivil boor of a German governess, Hugh Verreker, a penniless irresponsible youngster with a disreputable past, and Mr. Firket, a commission agent all the twenty four hours of the day. Lady Denison manages her household on the same philanthropic plan, engaging servants dismissed for misconduct. The results of the experiments soon manifest themselves. The butler seduces the innocent maid, and all the other servants give notice. The guests constantly wrangle and make life impossible for themselves and their hostess, and to crown all, the wastrel, Verreker, proposes to Margery who accepts him so that she might "open the eyes

of his soul". A week's engagement, however, disillusioned Verreker. He cannot contemplate without horror a long married life with Margery, writing letters to charitable institutions on behalf of orphans, and visiting the poor and the sick of the village. His tastes are altogether different, and he saves the situation by asking to be left off.

The Cassilis Engagement was also written in the same year. The problem which the author tackles here is what a mother is to do when she finds her only son engaged to a girl entirely unsuited in birth, education and character. Mrs. Cassilis, the brainy but affectionate mother, knows that opposition will only strengthen the young people's desire for marriage. Under the circumstances she follows the only course which promises success. She invites Ethel, her son's fiancé, and her mother Mrs. Borridge (who is as vulgar as her name) to her house for a long stay. While the neighbours are all disgusted with the impossible manners of the cockneys, Mrs. Cassilis is all kindness and affability to her guests. A few days' stay results in young Geof realising the mistake he has committed in his choice of a sweetheart, while Ethel herself, accustomed to the cheap excitements of London life, is bored to death, and in the end, she is so exasperated that she breaks off the engagement herself.

The only other play of any importance by Hankin is *The Last of the De Mullins*. This, like its predecessor, is a play of caste and of convention. With the exception of Janet, the heroine, the De Mullins are obsessed by family pride. Nine years before the time at which the play opens Janet had a child by a young officer whom she loved but could not marry. She ran away from home to London where after great travail she succeeds as the proprietress of a fashionable hat-shop. She is called home by her father's illness, and there she meets again her son's father who is now engaged to another girl. Janet's father whose family pride is conquered to a certain extent by his affection for his little grandson presses his daughter to stay with him. But she is heartily sick of the De Mullin complex and of the miserably narrow and conventional life of the village. The hide-bound society with its despicable Grundyism, she knew, would look with unmitigated horror on her state of unmarried motherhood. She, however, is not only not ashamed of what she has done, but is really proud of having indulged her natural and legitimate desire to have a child of her very own. And from this atmosphere of false respectability and morality she makes her escape to the spacious London with her son.

Besides these dramas Hankin has also written two one-act plays, *The Burglar who Failed* and *The Constant Lover*. The former is the

story of a miserable young man who is driven by poverty to try his hand at robbery. But he finds his new occupation utterly miserable and unprofitable, and he is therefore grateful to a young lady (whose rooms he intended to burgle) for securing him the place of a foot man. *The Constant Lover* is a delightful little masterpiece full of sunshine and laughter, and conceived with a fancy of quite uncommon delicacy. It is a short delicious dialogue between the Constant Lover (one constantly in love—with different persons, and never engaged to any) and a 'principled' young girl who is fascinated by his charming manner. But his philosophy of love shocks her and she decides on accepting her love-lorn cousin whom she has long kept away. Hankin has also left a fragment of a play which has been completed and named *Thompson* by his friend and fellow-author, George Calderon.

From this analysis of the plays it will be seen, that like all the representatives of the new drama, Hankin also deals mostly with the life of the middle and lower classes. The ordinary man in his social and moral relationships holds the centre of the stage. Hankin's heroes and heroines are usually people who disturb the sanctified peace of society, the social misfit, the wastrel, the unmarried mother, all those who protest against the conventionality of the comfortably adjusted and the unrespectability of the respectable. The ethical and social problems which the Victorians fondly thought they had solved are regarded by Hankin and his fellow dramatists as open questions. Janet who would unhesitatingly have been condemned by our fathers for having cast off her virtue and run away from home is represented as a type of fine independence. A Victorian would have shown the prodigal Eustace as coming home in a chastened mood. But in Hankin's play he comes back to make terms with his father and to secure for himself a further period of indolent wastefulness at the paternal expense. In *The Charity that Begins at Home* he shows that the philanthropy that consists in being kind to people who are social outcasts leads to all kinds of complications. Thus all the so-called ethical laws and social conventions are put into the melting pot.

But though Hankin's plays are as much plays of moral ideas as those of Shaw, there is a difference between the two dramatists in their criticism of narrow moral ordinances and social conventions. While Shaw loses his temper, shakes his fist and makes his characters merely the mouthpiece of his vehement outbursts against the soul-destroying forces of tradition, Hankin never forgets that he is writing plays and not sociological and ethical tracts. The problems are investigated in terms of art and not propaganda. The artist's sense of decorum and restraint always keeps him within reasonable limits, he

does not exploit his characters by subjecting them to his dictation. He allows social truths to evolve from what they do and say, he does not make them so many Hankins hacking and hewing the objects of his intellectual hatred. "It is the dramatist's business", he said, "to represent life, not to argue about it".

That Hankin was pre-eminently an artist and not a propagandist is seen again from the care with which he has constructed his plays. This may be illustrated by an examination of *The Cassilis Engagement*. The 'Curtain' in this play deserves particular attention. The dramatist ends each Act with a crisp and pregnant phrase, an incident or a mysterious word. This makes the audience await with impatience the opening of the next Act. Thus Act I terminates with apparently artless care.

LADY MARCHMONT. And *that's* the girl your son is to marry.

MRS. CASSILIS. Marry her! Nonsense, my dear Margaret.

We are anxious to know the device of the mother to cure Geoffrey of his absurd love for Ethel and how she fares in her attempt.

If the end of the earlier Acts should stimulate the interest of the audience, it is equally important to close the play without arousing further curiosity. There should be no wish left to probe into the future. It is as difficult and as necessary to set all expectation at rest at the end of the play as to excite it at the end of the first Act. In a tragedy the dramatist usually finds it convenient to ring down the curtain with the failure of his principal character, most often with his death. When the comedies ended with the union of the lovers the problem of concluding a play was easy of solution. Such conventional happy endings, however, are not common in modern comedies in which we find a closer approximation to the facts of life. The playwrights of to-day have come to realize that marriage is not the end, but the beginning of the trouble. Hankin disliked the conventional Happy Endings where every Jack gets his Jill and all live happily ever after. He condemns those dramatists who for practical considerations "send the audience away from the theatre smiling". Only one of his plays, *The Two Mr. Weatherbys* ends 'happily,' and it is the only one which ends unsatisfactorily. In all his other plays the conclusion is not happy in an ideal or conventional sense, but it is happy in the sense that the curtain comes down on the best possible solution for the persons most concerned. He is thus justified in calling his first published volume of 1907 *Three Plays with Happy Endings*. There is a Shavian twang in this title, for all the three plays end in the frustration of marriages. But the marriages if they had materialised would have been ill-advised and followed by disas-

trous consequences. The endings are, therefore, happy in the negative sense that positive misery has been avoided. "For Geof and Ethel it would have been wedding knells, not bells", so also for Eustace and Stella, for Margery and Verreker. Hankin's popularly called unhappy endings are, therefore, not only the most rational and logical, but also the happiest. Thus in the subordination of the propagandist tendency to artistic propriety, in the skilful construction of his plays, and in the logical conclusions on which he insisted, he shows himself to be an honest and conscientious artist. He was a very fastidious craftsman, and he bestowed elaborate care and attention in revision and in the search for rightness and balance in form. No wonder he was proud of his work and frankly avowed the fact. When one of his colleagues said to him, "You always think so well of your plays, Hankin," he replied, "Of course, I do, otherwise I shouldn't continue to write them."

The careful art of the writer is seen again in his brilliant dialogue. This is one department in which the modern dramatists have far excelled their predecessors. His admirable sense of appropriate dialogue is almost as good of as that of Ibsen. Many of his scenes are excellently written, terse, incisive, economical, pungent and to the point. In sheer brilliant and epigrammatic conversation he often resembles Oscar Wilde who has influenced many of the men who came after him. We find in Hankin the same dexterity and wit of which Wilde was a master, but Hankin tempers his dialogue to the requirements of the middle class country people who mainly constitute his *dramatis personae*. Everywhere he give us "good talk which is real talk plus imagination". As an instance of his finest dialogue may be quoted the scene between Eustace and his brother.

HENRY [*disgusted*]. And so you *walked* all the way from London to Chedleigh in order to play off a heartless practical joke.

EUSTACE. Walked? Nonsense. I came by train.

HENRY. But you told Vi you walked.

EUSTACE. I said I *started* to walk. I only got as far as the station.

HENRY [*angrily*]. It was unpardonable. The mater was awfully upset. So was the governor.

EUSTACE. That was the idea. There is nothing like a sudden shock to bring out any one's real feelings. The governor had no idea how fond he was of me until he saw me apparently dead, and unlikely to give him further trouble. And by the time I came round he'd forgotten the cause of his sudden affection—or perhaps he's never realized it—

and was genuinely glad to see me. Psychologically, it was most interesting.

HENRY. It was extremely undignified and quite unnecessary. If you had simply come up to the front door and rung the bell you would have been received just as readily.

EUSTACE. I doubt it. In fact, I doubt if I should have been received at all. I might possibly have been given a bed for the night, but only on the distinct understanding that I left early the next morning. Whereas now nobody talks of my going. A poor invalid! In the doctors' hands! Perfect quiet essential. No. My plan was best.

HENRY. Why didn't that fool Glaisher see through you?

EUSTACE. Doctors never see through their patients. It is not what they are paid for, and it is contrary to professional etiquette.

[HENRY snorts wrathfully.]

Besides, Glaisher's an ass, I'm glad to say.

HENRY [*fuming*]. It would serve you right if I told the Governor the whole story.

EUSTACE. I dare say. But you won't. It wouldn't be cricket. Besides, I only told you on condition you kept it to yourself.

HENRY [*indignant*]. And so I'm to be made a partner in *your* fraud. The thing's a swindle, and I've got to take a share in it.

EUSTACE. Swindle? Not a bit. You've lent a hand—without intending it—to reuniting a happy family circle. Smoothed the way for the Prodigal's return. A very beautiful trait in your character.

HENRY [*grumpy*]. What I don't understand is *why* you told me all this. Why in Heaven's name didn't you keep the whole discreditable story to yourself?

EUSTACE [*with flattering candour*]. The fact is, I was pretty sure you'd find me out. The governor's a perfect owl, but you've got brains—of a kind. You can see a thing when it's straight before your nose. So I thought I'd let you into the secret from the start, just to keep your mouth shut.

HENRY. Tck! [*Thinks for a moment*]. And what are you going to do now you *are* at home?

EUSTACE [*airily*]. Do, my dear chap? Why nothing.

[*And on the spectacle of EUSTACE's smiling self-assurance and HENRY's outraged moral sense, the curtain falls.*]

[The Return of the Prodigal, Act II.]

No less effective is the scene in which Verreker breaks off his engagement with Margery.

MARGERY [*Merrily*]. Well ? what is the important thing you have got to say to me ?

VERREKER. I'll tell you [*Pause. Looks at her fixedly for a moment or two*]. By Jove, you are pretty, Margery.

MARGERY. I don't think *that's* very important.

VERREKER. Then you are very much mistaken ! However that's not what I had to say. [*Pause. He pulls himself together with an effort, and speaks gravely but kindly*]. Margery, I want you to break off our engagement.

MARGERY [*unable to believe her ears*]. Hugh !

VERREKER [*gently*]. My dear, I don't like saying it, and I hope you don't like hearing it—though I don't want to hurt you too much either. But I've been thinking things over, and I'm quite sure we two oughtn't to marry.

MARGERY. Why not ?

VERREKER. For lots of reasons. I'm not good enough for you, Margery, and that's the long and short of it.

MARGERY. What nonsense !

VERREKER. It's not nonsense at all, unfortunately. It's a painful truth. Mrs. Eversleigh was right. I ought never to have proposed to you.

MARGERY [*sadly*]. Do you mean you don't love me, Hugh, as you thought you did ?

VERREKER. No. I don't mean that. I love you as much as ever, more perhaps now that I am going to lose you. But on every ground except love I'm quite unfit to marry you.

MARGERY [*pleading*]. Surely love is enough ?

VERREKER [*almost impatient at what he considers the colossal ineptitude of that remark*]. No. It isn't. Margery, let's face facts, and not shirk them as every one else seems to do. Marriage isn't a thing to be romantic about. It *lasts* too long.

MARGERY. Hugh!

VERREKER. My dear, it may last forty years. Surely that's long enough in all conscience. [*Recovering from his momentary irritability*]. Very well, then. As one marries for a long time one should choose carefully, reasonably. One mustn't be carried away by passion. Passion's a great thing in marriage, but common sense is a greater. Now what sort of a life should we make of it together if we married, you and I? Why, my dear, we've not an idea or a taste in common. Everything you say makes me laugh, and almost everything I think would make you blush. It's simply absurd for a girl like you to marry a fellow like me. Let's say so frankly and end it.

MARGERY [*puzzled*]. But, Hugh, you *liked* being engaged to me at first, didn't you? Why have you changed your mind? Have I done anything?

VERREKER. No, dear. You've been absolutely sweet and good, as you always would be. Only you are *too* good, and that's all about it.

MARGERY [*rather hurt. She is convinced that this must be one of Hugh's jokes, and she naturally thinks it rather heartless of him to joke at such a moment*]. Now you're laughing at me.

VERREKER [*absolutely serious*]. I never was further from laughter in my life. I say you are too good and I mean it. You look on life as a moral discipline. I look on it as a means of enjoyment. You think only of doing what you imagine to be right. I think only of getting what I know to be pleasant. [*With an ironical smile*]. They call it incompatibility of temper in the Law Courts, I believe.

[*The Charity that Began at Home, Act IV.*]

We have already seen that Hankin is a dramatist of ideas rather than of character or situation. His characters and ideas spring from his situations. His stage figures, therefore, often seem to us rather manufactured, and their author maintains a humorous or cynical aloofness. Hankin has thus nothing of the "stern-eyed kindliness" of Galsworthy. But his men and women, unlike the characters of Shaw, are not mere automata which merely repeat their inventor's opinions. They are human and are recognisable. But the failure of the author to invest his characters with the element of emotion (except in a few notable cases which we shall refer to later) makes them less real than they would otherwise have been.

An even more serious charge that may be brought against the characters of Hankin is that they are very often types, and that these types repeat themselves in his plays. One such type is the easy-going ne'er-

do-well young fellow who sets at defiance the accepted notions of respectability. Eustace Jackson and Hugh Verreker are twins, and Dick Weatherby is a near cousin. Another type is the out-spoken class-proud lady of rank. There is a close family resemblance between Lady Farringford of *The Return of the Prodigal*. Mrs. Eversleigh of *The Charity that Begins at Home* and Lady Remenham of *The Cassilis Engagement*. But some of these types he has hit off with unexcelled mastery. There is no greater bore in literature than General Bosnor, no ruder boor than Mrs. Triggs, no better vulgarian than Mrs. Borridge.

LADY MARCHMONT. Good morning, Mrs. Borridge. I hope you slept well.

MRS. BORRIDGE. Sound as a bell. But, then, I was always a oner to sleep. My old man, when 'e was alive, used to say 'e never knew any one sleep like me. And snore! Why, 'e declared it kep' 'im awake 'alf the night. But *I* never noticed it.

LADY MARCHMONT [*sweetly*]. That must have been a great consolation for Mr. Borridge.

MRS. BORRIDGE. Your 'usband snore?

LADY MARCHMONT [*Laughing*]. No.

MRS. BORRIDGE. Thinks it's low, per'aps . . . They used to say snorin' comes from sleepin' with your mouth open, but *I* don't know. What do *you* think?

LADY MARCHMONT. I really don't know, dear Mrs. Borridge. I must think it over.

[*The Cassilis Engagement, Act IV.*]

On the whole Hankin knows human nature only in the gross. He does not, and cannot, divine the true inner workings of the human heart.

In his outlook on life as in his portrayal of character Hankin is cynical and pessimistic. Cynicism and pessimism are the two notes which are never far away from the modern drama. It is in this view that Hankin conceives and develops his theme. In *The Two Mr. Weatherbys* the man who strives hard to please his wife is faced with the problem of persuading her to stay with him, while his gay and pleasure-loving brother who has broken away from his matrimonial bondage is embarrassed by his wife's desire to be reconciled to him. In *The Return of the Prodigal* the thorough-going idler returns home, threatens to disrupt the family peace and triumphantly marches away with his blackmail. The same satirical bent and lack of sympathy are seen in *The Charity that Begins at Home* and *The Cassilis Engagement*. It is a

hard and repellent world that is presented to us. In some of his remarks we can trace the influence of Wilde, whose paradoxes are cynicism *in excelsis*, e.g.

LADY REMENHAM. Engagements are such troublesome things. They sometimes even lead to marriage. But we'll hope it won't be as bad as that in this case.

[*The Casilis Engagement*, Act V.]

Or again, there can be no representation of human meanness more telling than that in this passage :

MRS. PRATT. And thank you, Lady Farringford, for the embroidered tea-cloth you sent (for the Mission Room Fund Bazaar). It is *sure* to sell !

LADY FARRINGFORD. Let us hope so. It's extremely ugly. I bought it at the Kettlewell sale of work last year intending to give it to my poor sister Adelaide. But afterwards I hadn't the heart. So I sent it to your bazaar instead.

[*The Return of the Prodigal*, Act I.]

As illustrations of Hankin's mastery of pungent and yet amusing satire and irony the following passages will serve :—

MR. JACKSON. By the way, Sir John, as chairman of my election committee, there is a point on which I want your advice. The local branch of the Independent Order of Good Templars wrote to me ten days ago asking for a subscription. So I sent five guineas.

SIR JOHN. Quite right. The Temperance Vote must be reckoned with in this Division.

MR. JACKSON. Just so. But the Good Templars published the fact in the local newspaper.

SIR JOHN. Well, that's what you wanted, wasn't it ?

MR. JACKSON. Ye-es. No doubt. But I forgot that the secretary of the local branch of the Licensed Victuallers' Association would be sure to see the paragraph, and write to me for an explanation.

SIR JOHN. I see. Did he ?

MR. JACKSON. Yes.

SIR JOHN. Ah ! What did he do ?

MR. JACKSON. I was in some doubt. But Sims, my agent, told me

that the Licensed Victuallers had a Benevolent Fund or something. So I sent ten guineas to that. That seemed the best way out of the difficulty.

SIR JOHN. Much the best, much the best.

[*Trying to escape.*]

MR. JACKSON [*detaining him*]. But that's not the end of the matter. For now the Good Templars have written to ask if I am prepared to support any legislation designed to combat the evil of the Drink Traffic. And the Licensed Victuallers want to know if I will pledge myself to oppose any Bill which aims at the reduction of the sale of intoxicating liquors.

SIR JOHN. Hum! They rather had you there?

MR. JACKSON. Yes . . . However, I think I have got out of it all right. I've written a letter to the Licensed Victuallers to say I am not in favour of unduly restricting the sale of liquor in the interests of Temperance Propaganda. And I've written another to the Good Templars saying that I'm in favour of Temperance Propaganda providing it doesn't unduly restrict the sale of intoxicating liquor. I think that meets the case?

SIR JOHN. I see. Running with the hare and hunting with the hounds, eh? Quite right. I think you got out of it very well.

[*The Return of the Prodigal.*]

But cynicism is, after all, "the fume of petty hearts", and fortunately there are many passages in Hankin, which show that his unfeeling detachment is only one side of his nature, and that he was capable of real feeling. There are, again, some characters in his plays, portrayed with emotion. It was, perhaps, not given to Hankin to be passionate, but a rare tenderness was not outside his compass. Mrs. Jackson in *The Return of the Prodigal* is conceived with a sympathy that has in it no trace of cynicism. She is an innocent, loving and tender woman. While all the other characters of the play have been introduced to answer some definite purpose, she alone has been created to satisfy his artistic impulse. She is "a complete creation, arguing nothing, doing nothing, merely being, and in her Hankin approaches poetic imagination in conception if not in utterance." Thus while Eustace's reaction to all the other characters is primarily rational, his relations to his mother alone are emotional and loving. "Dear old mater," he says, "she is not clever, but for real goodness of heart I don't know her equal." Again, "I am not absolutely inhuman. Because I'm fond of her, of course, and don't like giving her pain." The conversation between Eustace and his sister in

Act IV is again "a little gem of unforced emotion, a light but all-sufficing exposition in a few words of the tragedy of the unwanted woman."

But the play in which his cynicism is least present is *The Last of the DeMullins*, and perhaps "the one figure among his men and women of whom one can think as loving passionately and as being passionately loved" is Janet Mullin. In that vehement outburst in which she defends her own conduct and describes the glory of motherhood Hankin reaches a power of emotional expression that is missing from his earlier work.

MRS. CLOUSTON. Well, I've never heard of anything so disgraceful. I thought Janet at least had the grace to be ashamed of what she did.

JANET [*genuinely astonished*]. Ashamed? Ashamed of wanting to have a child? What on earth were women created for, Aunt Harriet, if not to have children?

MRS. CLOUSTON. To marry and have children.

JANET [*with relentless logic*]. My dear aunt Harriet, women had children thousands of years before marriage was invented. I dare say that they will go on doing so thousands of years after it has ceased to exist.

MRS. DE MULLIN. Janet!

JANET. Well, mother, that's how I feel. And I believe it's how all wholesome women feel if they would only acknowledge it. I *wanted* to have a child. I always did from the time when I got too old to play with dolls. Not an adopted child or a child of some one else's, but a baby of my very own. Of course I wanted to marry. That's the ordinary way a woman wants to be a mother nowadays, I suppose. But time went on and nobody came forward, and I saw myself getting old and my chance slipping away. Then I met—never mind. And I fell in love with him. Or, perhaps, I only fell in love with love. I don't know. It was so splendid to find some one at last who really cared for me as women should be cared for! Not to talk to because I was clever or to play tennis with because I was strong, but to kiss me and to make love to me!

DE MULLIN [*solemnly*]. Listen to me, my girl. You say that now, and I dare say you believe it. But when you are older, when Johnny is grown up, you will bitterly repent having brought into the world a child who can call no man father.

JANET [*passionately*]. Never! Never! That I am sure of. Whatever happens, even if Johnny should come to hate me for what I did, I shall always be glad to have been his mother. At least I shall have lived. These poor women who go through life listlessly and dull, who

have never felt the joys and the pains a mother feels, how they would envy me if they knew! If they knew! To know that a child is your own, is a part of you. That you have faced sickness and pain and death itself for it. That it is yours and nothing can take it from you because no one can understand its wants as you do. To feel its soft breath on your cheek, to soothe it when it is fretful and still it when it cries, that is motherhood and that is glorious!

[*The Last of the De Mullins, Act III.*]

A further instance of tenderness on the part of Hankin is seen in his presentation of De Mullin. He is choleric and stiff-necked, but his foibles do not make him ridiculous. As Drinkwater remarks, "It was a real gift of Hankin's, one that has been memorable in great men, this faculty of making human weakness at least not contemptible. There is scarcely a noble figure in his plays—even Violet Jackson lacks something of courage—and yet there is scarcely one for whom we cannot spare some affection. Lady Remenham herself might discover heat at any moment."

Hankin was, as we have seen, a pioneer of the new drama. His plays made a noteworthy contribution at a critical period in the history of the modern English drama. He has been described as a symptom rather than a finished product, one who is to be judged more by the right lead he gave than by his actual achievement. He brought back drama once again to the realm of pure and respectable literature. Judged even by the intrinsic value of his plays he is assured of a prominent place among his contemporaries and immediate successors. The skill with which he has constructed his plays, the intelligence and wit with which they abound, his brilliant, and natural dialogue, his amusing cynicism, his successful, though rare, excursions into the realms of feeling and sentiment, and above all, the sincerity of his craftsmanship will keep his work alive long after he is dead.

PART III.

**Certain Philosophical Bases of Madhva's
Theistic Realism**

By

B. N. KRISHNAMURTI ŚARMA,
(Annamalai University)

CHAPTER I

**MADHVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF THE ONE TRANSCENDENT
REFERENCE**

Labels are convenient as a rule though they mislead at times. In so far as Madhva admits a plurality of selves for ever distinct from the Brahman, though always subject to and guided by it, his system may be regarded as a Pluralistic Theism. There has been a persistent tendency however, to depict Madhva's philosophy as an "absolute Dualism".¹ This has prevented the system from being studied with an open mind for most men are scared away by the very name of 'Dualism'. There can be little doubt that if properly presented, the system of Madhva will have more readers in the world than any other. For it gives us a philosophy which omits no part or aspect of life in its interpretation of reality.

It is not very often realised that there is a fundamental difference between the 'Dualism' of Madhva and those of the Sāmkhya-Yoga and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools. Neither the Puruṣas nor Prakṛti has, in Madhva's philosophy, an *independent* existence² as in the Sāmkhya. Nor does he ascribe to God the position merely of an Onlooker द्रष्टा a *dues ex machina* or even of a Co-operator अनुग्राहक in the Cosmic

1. S. Radhakrishnan, *Ind. Phil.*, ii, p. 745.

2. Cf. द्रव्यं कर्म च कालश्च स्वभावो जीव एव च ।

यदनुग्रहतः सन्ति न सन्ति यदुपेक्षया ॥ (*Bhāg.* II, 10, 12.)

सर्वपदार्थानां सत्तादिप्रदानाय सर्वगतत्वोक्तेः, ईश्वरप्रसादमन्तरेण कस्यापि वस्तुनः सत्त्वरैवेवा-
भावात् । (*Jayatirtha*, TP. ii, 2, 5.)

process,³ as do the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and the Yogas. Mere Deism has no attraction for Madhva. God is not merely immanent in the Universe but transcends it.

One distinguishing mark of the Vedānta in all its forms is the fundamental belief that everything in the world *has* to be traced to an absolute spiritual principle which is the ultimate ground and explanation, both logical and ontological, of all else. Such a transcendent reference is denied by the Sāṃkhyas, while its acceptance is by no means a strict metaphysical necessity in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Yoga schools. The Vedānta however, teaches that the world of matter and souls, *is, because of God*. Brahman is not merely the cause of the world but the very ground of its being and becoming.

This dependence of the world on Brahman is variously conceived of in the different schools of the Vedānta. Śaṅkara equates it to an Adhyāsa (appearance). The world of appearance would not be there but for the Brahman. It has no existence *apart from* the Brahman : अनन्यत्वं व्यतिरेकेणभावः Śaṅkara, B.S. ii, 1, 14. Śrīdhara indicates the true Advaitic interpretation of the phrase : ब्रह्मसत्तयेव जगत्सत्त्वम् ॥ when he writes under *Bhāgavata*, i, 1, 1 : यत्सत्यतया मिथ्यासर्गोऽपि सत्यवत् प्रतीयते [“in virtue of whose reality even the unreal creation *appears* to be real”]. Rāmānuja on the other hand, views the dependence of the world of matter and souls on the Brahman, on the analogy of the dependence of the human body for its subsistence, upon the soul. God is the soul आत्मा of the world. When the soul departs, the body perishes : जीवापेते वाव किलेदं म्रियते (*Chāṇ. Up. VI, 11, 3*). While it remains perfectly true that our bodies cannot exist and function in the absence of the life-giving capacity of the soul, Madhva finds the analogy a little misleading, in so far as the soul is not bound to the body as the Viśiṣṭādvaitin would appear to assume in his theory of God. The relation of body and soul does not also suggest the more or less derivative being of the soul that is admitted in the system. It is all very well to say that identity means merely inseparable existence : अपृथक् सिद्धिः। But it is capable of cutting both ways. Is the Lord also incapable of existing without His ‘body’? That seems hardly fair. Again, is the “अपृथक् सिद्धि” (relation of mutual dependence) between God and his ‘body’ (or attributes : Souls and matter), of the same kind

3. नहि यदधीनं यस्य सत्तादि, तत्तस्यानुप्राहकमात्रम् ! (T.P. ii, 2, 5.)

प्रकृत्यादि सत्ताप्रदत्वं चाङ्गीतकृमीश्वरस्य । (Madhva, B.S.B. ii, 2, 5.)

The texts : ‘सत्यस्य सत्यम्’; ‘नित्यो नित्यानां चेतनश्चेतनानाम्’ are similarly interpreted by Madhva.

or order as that which exists or may be said to exist between Him and his essential attributes of reality (सत्यं) intelligence (ज्ञानम्) and freedom from limitations (न न्यम्)? That again, is impossible. That is why Madhva abandons the metaphor of body and soul and prefers to state his position in plain words.

In his view, the world of matter and souls exists only as a result of an act of will of God.⁴ It cannot exist without His sufferance. This is the meaning of such statements as : इच्छामात्रं प्रभोः सृष्टिः (Māṇḍ Up. 8) द्रव्यं कर्म च कालश्च न सन्ति यदुपेक्षया (Bhāg. II, 10, 12). But at the same time, the existence of matter and souls, is, in the last analysis, immaterial to God : न हि जीवप्रकृतिभ्यामीश्वरस्यार्थः (Madhva. Bhāg. T. ii, 9, 31). It is the world that is bound to God, not He to the world. The relation is in *this sense*, merely unilateral. The Universe is ब्रह्मसापेक्ष neither in the Advaitic nor in the Viśiṣṭādvaitic sense of the term, but as existing and functioning at God's will. The relation in which it stands to the Brahman is thus neither an imaginary one as in the Advaita, nor a physical one as in the Viśiṣṭādvaita, but an essentially spiritual one. The statement that the world cannot exist without God (अपृथक् सिद्धि) means much more than either Śaṅkara or Rāmānuja would concede, viz., that it owes its very power of existence, functioning, etc., to God and derives them from Him : तदधीनसत्ताप्रतीतिप्रवृत्तिम् । The entire Universe is thus an expression of the will of God and is being sustained every moment of its existence by the same will. It is in His absolute power. He can make and unmake it at will.⁵ His power over it is absolutely unrestricted.⁶ Alone among Indian philosophers, Madhva would concede that theoretically there is nothing impossible or absurd in agreeing that God *can* create a world out of nothing, that He *could* bring into existence a Universe not unlike the one with which we are familiar, without the aid of a pre-existent Matter or souls. But the *fact*

4. There is here a parallel to the Berkleyan view with this difference that the material world has a *real, objective* existence, *outside the mind of God* and is *perceived by Him as such* :

‘न च मायाविना माया दृश्यते विश्वमीश्वरः ।

सदा पश्यति तेनेदं न मायेत्यवधार्यताम् ॥ (Madhva, *Tattvodyota*.)

[An illusion is not witnessed by the Magician. But God witnesseth the world always. Therefore take it that it is no illusion.]

5. भस्म कुर्याज्जगदिदं मनसैव जनार्दनः । (Mbh. IV, 67, 18.)

निष्कालमीदृशं किमु त्रयः करन्ति । (R.V. X, 48, 7.)

6. अघटितघटनापटीयसी शक्तिः ।

remains that He *has not*, in His infinite wisdom, *chosen to do so*. And all our philosophy has necessarily to take note of this and respect it :

शक्तोऽपि भगवान्विष्णुः अकर्तुं कर्तुमन्यथा ।
स्वमिन्नं कारणाभिन्नं मिन्नं विश्वं करोत्यजः ॥

(Av. ii, 1, p. 17.)

[Though Viṣṇu is quite capable of doing without accessories or making such changes in them as He likes, yet out of His own free will He has made the world different from Him but “different and at the same time identical with its (material) cause”.]

And Jayatirtha, commenting on this writes :—

‘अन्यथा’ कारणैर्विना कर्तुं शक्तोऽपि हरिः, कारणान्तराण्युपादायैव करिष्यामीति स्वेच्छानियमतः कारणैरेव जगत्सृजति । एवं, ‘अन्यथा’ प्रकृत्या अहङ्कारं, अहङ्कारेण महान्तमित्येवं, तथा प्रकृतिं निमित्तीकृत्य कालादिकं चोपादानीकृत्य कर्तुं शक्तोऽपि, एतेनैवेदमुपादानीकृत्यैवेदं स्रक्ष्यामीति स्वेच्छानियमतः नियतैः क्लृप्तैरेव तथा नियतैः स्वनियतसत्ताशक्यादिमद्भिरेव कारणान्तरैरिदं जगत्करोतीति योजना ।

इदमुक्तं भवति—यदुक्तमीश्वरस्य कारणोपादाननियमोऽस्ति न वेति, तत्रास्तीति ब्रूमः । तथा च प्रकृत्यादीनां कारणत्वं युक्तम् । स च नियमो, न कुलालादिरिव तान्यपह्नाय, व्यत्यस्य वा करणे शक्त्यभावनिबन्धनः, येन तस्य स्वातन्त्र्यं तेषां पारतन्त्र्यं च न स्यात् ; किं नाम, स्वेच्छानियमत एव ॥

(Nyāyasūdhā, ii, 1, adh. 6, p. 299.)

[It amounts to this :—As regards the query if there is need for God to rely upon causal complements, we say that there is. Hence the causality of Prakṛti and other things is understandable. But this necessity does not like that of the potter, consist in any inability to do either without the accessories or altering their sequence, in which case alone His independence and their dependence would be at stake. On the contrary, it is determined by His own sweet will.]

This is what is meant by saying that God is कर्तुमकर्तुमन्यथा चापि कर्तुं शक्तः । There can be no better reconciliation of Reason and Revelation, religion and philosophy.

7. Cf. a verse of Vyāsarāya in a similar strain :

“उत्पिपादयिषेदेव यदि शृङ्गं शशादिषु ।
गवादाविव जायेरस्तदमावादभूदसत्”॥

[If He wishes to create them horns will grow over the heads of hares as they do on those of cows and bulls. It is because He has not so willed it that the hare's horn is said to be Asat i.e., non-existent.]

One would naturally expect to find so thorough-going a philosophy to be given its proper place not merely as an important limb of the Vedānta but as the highest expression of the truth of the Brahmanvāda of the Upaniṣads: making the Universe "Brahman-centric". Yet, there are persons who would fain dismiss it as belonging "more to the religious history than to the philosophical development of India"! ⁸

Madhva concedes freely that there are points of contact between the Jīva and Brahman. The distinction between the two, however great and ineradicable, is yet one of degrees not of kind. The soul of man at its best, possesses the same characteristics of reality, knowledge and bliss, though to a lesser extent than the Brahman.⁹ It is in virtue of this that any approach to the Brahman is at all possible and the two are sometimes identified in the Upaniṣads: तद्गुणसारत्वात् तद्व्यपदेशः प्राज्ञवत् (B.S. ii, 3, 29). In B.S. ii, 3, 43, Madhva makes the soul "an Amśa" (closely related to) of God. Brahman is the prototype of which the ectype is the Jīva; रूपं रूपं प्रति रूपो बभूव तदस्य रूपं प्रति चक्ष्णाय । In iii, 2, 18, he calls the Jīva a reflection (प्रतिबिम्ब) of Brahman, in so far as the former is different from, dependent upon but nevertheless similar to the latter.¹⁰ The freed soul has a nature akin very much to God, which enables it to be in perfect harmony with the Divine :

मुक्तानां सत्यकामत्वं सामर्थ्यं च परस्य तु ।
कामानुकूलकामत्वं नान्यत्तेषां विधीयते ॥

(B.S.B. iv, 2, 16.)

[The "Satyakāmatva" of Muktas consists in their desires being attuned to those of God. They have no further independence.]

It should therefore be obvious that Madhva has *not* set up any opposition between the Jīva and Brahman. He would allow even the most exaggerated description of the affinity between the two in mystic

8. S. Radhakrishnan, *Ind. Phil.*, ii, (Preface).

9. जीवस्य परमेश्वरांशत्वं तु, तत्सादृश्यं, तदधीनसत्तादिमत्त्वं, चेत्यर्थः । (NS. ii, p. 453 b.)
तत्सम्बन्धित्वमेव तदंशत्वमिति वक्ष्यामः । (TP. ii, 3, 43.)

[The soul is an "amśa" of God in this sense that it is similar to Him and owes its existence, etc., to Him. To be a part of God is to be related to Him.]

10. भिन्नत्वतदधीनत्वतत्सदृशैरेव सूर्यकाद्युपमा, न त्पाध्यधीनत्वादिना ।

(Madhva, B.S. iii, 2, 18.)

[The analogy of the Sun's reflection is adduced in view of its difference (from) dependence (on) and similarity to the Sun.]

or philosophical language, provided the modicum of difference between the two that is borne out by the authorities, is *not* attempted to be suppressed or whittled away.

Absolute difference between Jīva and Brahman is *not* thus a characteristic of Madhva's position. Some community of nature is always admitted and even with that it is possible to keep the doctrine distinct from Advaita. There are vital differences between the Jīva and the Brahman. The one (God) is *ever free* from Samsāra and is नित्यशुद्ध-बुद्धमुक्तस्वभाव ' to use Śamkara's mouth-filling phrase. He is *ex hypothesi* all-knowing, all-powerful creator of the Universe. The most potent facts about the soul are on the other hand, its comparative ignorance (अल्पज्ञत्व) dependence and bondage. These limitations really pertain to the soul and are not merely due to "Buddhi". Some of these features, especially अल्पज्ञत्व and dependence, persist in Mokṣa too. The Mukta does *not* bloom into a sovereign lord overnight. Even the Sūtrakāra admits that the released cannot lay claim to the cosmic functions of the Supreme (iv, 4, 17). There is thus an undeniable difference in some respects at least between the two,—differences which are real and natural (स्वाभाविक) other than those brought about by association with the bodies. It is upon these that Madhva takes his stand in *refusing to absorb* the soul in God. At the same time God and Man are not so utterly or violently *opposed* to each other as light and darkness. In the works of Jayatīrtha :

जीवात्मनः परमात्मना आत्यन्तिकमेदः समर्थ्यते (NS. II. 3. p. 435) परं तु, न जीवो ब्रह्मणः षट् इव पटादत्यन्तमिन्नः ॥ तथात्वेऽमेदश्रुतय उपरुध्येरन् ॥ (II. 3. p. 453b),

Madhva is aware as much as his critics that there are two currents of thought in the Upaniṣads, one supporting the oneness of Jīva and Brahman and the other their difference. Now, these differences, on the showing of the Scriptures themselves, *do not perish* on this side of release but continue on the other shore as well. And as an orthodox Vedāntin pledged to the belief in the Apauruṣeyatva of the Vedas and the unity of their teaching, he sets about reconciling the two sets of passages so as to evolve a consistent system.

The difficulty is not of course peculiar to Madhva. But there is a remarkable difference between him and Śamkara, in the treatment of the Śrutis which are themselves our only source of knowledge regarding these matters. Śamkara is able to arrive at a Siddhānta (conclusion) only by assigning a *lower* place to the Bheda-śrutis suggesting that they are incapable of revealing the highest philosophical truth and raising the "Advaita-śrutis", to a position of superior validity and eminence as being "truth-declaring": (तत्त्वावेदक). He thus rests his solution upon

the distinction between lower and higher wisdom. But the hypothesis is discredited by several passages in the Upaniṣads themselves, which are said to be the Para-Vidyā *par excellence*, and which show that the distinctions and differences said to be begotten of "lower knowledge", persist even in the state of highest release. And Śamkara is frequently put to the necessity of explaining away such texts (जज्ञन् क्रीडन्....) etc., as instances of 'philosophical looking-back' upon *the world that was*.¹¹

Madhva, on the other hand, accepts the validity of human experience in general. As absolute difference and identity cannot both be the truth of the matter, as no particular part of the Śruti can be admitted to be error-ridden, the Bheda-śrutis whose evidence is in conformity with the uncontradicted experience of humanity (अबाधितानुभव) are accepted at their full face-value. The Abheda-śrutis are then interpreted in a (figurative or) secondary sense (गौणार्थ) so as not to nullify the reality of the experience already established :—

खातन्त्र्ये च विशिष्टत्वे स्थानमत्यैक्ययोरपि ।
सादृश्ये चैक्यवाक् सम्यक् सावकाशा यथेष्टतः ॥

[The identity-texts can freely be accommodated in the sense of (1) independence, (2) majesty, (or an organic whole), (3) identity of place or (4) inclinations and (5) resemblance.]

Why the Upaniṣads should at all embarrass the seeker after truth with a set of passages bearing a monistic hue when Monism itself cannot really be their actual and ultimate purport, is ingeniously answered by Jayatirtha, in his commentary on the *Td* :—

‘तत्त्वमसीति वाक्येन परमात्मसादृश्यविशेषः प्रतिपाद्यते ; अमेदस्य प्रमाणवार्ति धतत्त्वात् ।

ननु वक्तव्यार्थं शब्दप्रयोगे कस्माद्गौणप्रयोगः ? अस्त्यत्र प्रयोजनम्—इह हि, महत्त्वादियुगवन्तं खातन्त्र्येणात्मानं मत्वा स्तब्धं श्वेतकेतुं निमित्तीकृत्य, स्वातन्त्र्याद्यभिमानिनो जीवजातस्याहंकारशान्तये तत्त्वमसीत्युच्यते ।

तत्र यदि, विज्ञानानन्दधनः त्वमसीति ब्रूयात्तदा नाहंकारशान्तिः स्यात् । अमेदोक्तौ तु, मीमांसा जायते—न तावदत्र मुख्यार्थः सम्भवति, प्रमाणविरोधात् । अतः स इव त्वमसीत्वर्थः । न चायमपि सम्भवति—अप्रसिद्धप्रतिपत्तये खलु प्रसिद्धमुपमानमुपादीयते । ‘यथा गौस्तथा गवयः’ इत्यादौ दृष्टत्वात् । न चैवं प्रकृते ; उभयोरप्रसिद्धत्वात् । अतो नास्योपमानमात्रे तात्पर्यमिति पश्यन्, सूर्यसूर्यकयोरिव, ईश्वरस्य मम चास्ति सादृश्यविशेष इति पश्यन्, अहंकारं त्यजति । प्रतिबिम्बे चात्मनि, बिम्बसमान-

11. विज्ञानधातुरेव केवलः सन्, भूतपूर्वगत्या कर्तव्यवचनेन तृचा निर्दिष्ट इति गम्यते ।

(Śamkara, B.S. i, 4, 22.)

धर्मानविरुद्धान् सम्भावयतीत्यतो लाघवेन बहोरर्थस्य प्रतिपत्तये 'तत्त्वमसि' इत्युच्यते ॥ पारतन्त्र्य-
मात्रोक्तौ तु, राजपुरुषवदेव प्रतीतिः स्यात्, इति ॥”

(*Tattvodyota-ṭikā*, p. 29.)

[As factual identity is opposed to received testimony, the text “*Tattvam asi*”, can only be taken to preach a special kind of resemblance between God and Man.]

Do you ask why a figurative expression should be resorted to when plain words are always at one's command? We answer that there is a purpose in view. For in this text the Upaniṣad seeks to curb the pride of one and all of us human beings who imagine ourselves to be independent of God. This is done by taking Śvetaketu, who became conceited by looking upon himself as a highly distinguished and independent being, as the basis of the illustration.

If therefore, in these circumstances, his father had told Śvetaketu that he was of the essence of knowledge and bliss, his conceit would not have abated. But if a flat identity were preached he will be set athinking as follows: “in this case, the primary meaning could not have been intended, as it is opposed to the *Pramāṇas*. Therefore the sense (of the words) must be “you are like Him” Even this is difficult to follow. For, one always proceeds from the known to the unknown as in the instance of the *gayal*. But in this case, even this is not possible as both are unknown. Therefore, the statement cannot simply be meant to be an analogical proposition. Reflecting like this, he will come to the conclusion that there is a peculiar kind of resemblance between himself and God, as between the Sun and its reflection. He will further realise that it is determined by the relation of “the controller and the controlled” and then abandon his conceit. He will also learn to attribute to the reflection (*viz.*, himself) such properties of the original (God) as are not opposed to facts. A good deal of sense is thus compressed in the statement “*Tattvam asi*” (Thou art He). Hence it is purposely resorted to. If dependence alone had been conveyed (to Śvetaketu by some such statement as Thou art not He or Thou art Dependent on Him) he would have taken it merely that he had no more affinity with God than the retainer has with the King.]

In so far then, as he opposes the thesis of “*Svarūpaikya*” or essential and factual identity between Jīva and Brahman and the unreality of the world, Madhva is a Dualist. But he is *not* one in the sense in which a *Sāṃkhya* or a *Naiyāyika* is. Dualism is often blindly supposed to be an obscuration or attempt at obscuration of the truth. It is sought to be

thrown into disrepute and bad odour by those hostile to the realistic way of thinking. Popular misconception apart, a Dualism is generally defined as the recognition of *two independent principles* or *Substances*. As has already been pointed out, (Part I, p. 1), Madhva is *not a Dualist* in this sense. He recognises without reserve that the highest kind of substantiality, of being *res completa*, "complete in itself, determined by itself and capable of being explained entirely by itself", is possessed *only* by the Supreme Brahman: Viṣṇu. In fact this is exactly the definition of "Sva-tantra" accepted in the system and applied to the Highest Being : God :—

स्वरूप—प्रमिति-प्रवृत्तिलक्षण सत्तात्रैविध्ये परानपेक्ष स्वतन्त्रम् (तदपेक्षमस्वतन्त्रम् ।)
(*Tattvasaṁkhyāna-ṭīkā.*)

[Independence lies in not being indebted to another in the matter of one's threefold reality of existence, cognition, or activity. The opposite of this is Dependence.]

God is the *only Independent Reality* or the *Highest Reality*, if you please, that exists. Everything else, including Prakṛti and Puruṣas, is subject to Him, though not actually created by Him *de novo*. Madhva's philosophy is thus perfectly capable of rising to the highest level of Transcendentalism, *if and when there is need for it*. At the same time, it has got its feet on the *terra firma* of facts. If philosophy is an interpretation of reality as a whole, it must have relation to the facts of life and experience. However high and for however long the philosopher may soar on the naked peaks of the Absolute, he must at last set his feet upon hard earth. We cannot deny *this* world to have the other. Madhva himself has indicated the right way of looking at the world of matter and souls, *from the side of the Brahman* in its highest state of "self-containedness" :—

“द्रव्यं कर्म च कालश्च स्वभावो जीव एव च ।
यदनुग्रहतः सन्ति न सन्ति यदुपेक्षया ”|| (Bhāg. II, 10, 12.)

[Matter, Karma, Time, nature and souls exist by the sufferance of God and not in spite of Him.]

“इदं हि विश्वं भगवानिवेतरो यतो जगत्स्थाननिरोधसम्भवः।” (Bhāg. I, 5, 20.)

[This world though other than God, is yet like Him in so far as it has its rise, sustenance and dissolution from Him.]

“नहि जीवप्रकृतिभ्यामीश्वरस्यार्थः” (B.T. ii, 9, 31.)

[God does not benefit in the least by the existence of Matter and Souls.]

“यदधीना यस्य सत्ता तत्तददित्येव मण्यते ।

विद्यमाने विभेदेऽपि मिथो नित्यं स्वरूपतः” ॥ (B.T. ii, 5, 2.)

[That which depends for its existence upon another is spoken of as being identical with it, even though there is a natural difference between the two.]

“काल आसीत्पुरुष आसीत् परम आसीत् । तद्यदासीत् तदावृतमासीत् तदधीनमासीत् ; अथ ह्येक एव परम आसीत् यस्यैतदासीत् , न ह्येतदासीत् । (B.S.B. ii, 1, 17.)

[Time was, souls were and God was. Whatever there was, was then enveloped by God in whose power it was ; hence it was (as good as) non-existent.]

“नहि तदधीनं पृथगित्येवोच्यते ! (Br. Up. Com. iv, 4, 14.)

[What is dependent is never regarded as having a separate existence.]

“अद्वैतं परमार्थतः” — (Māṇḍūkya, i, 17d.) यद् अद्वैतं नामोच्यते, तत् परमार्थतः भगवदपेक्षया इत्यर्थः ।¹²

(Madhva, *Chān. Up.* ii, 22, p. 15b.)

[The so-called “Advaita” is from the highest point of view, i.e., to say from the vantage of the One Independent Being.]

In his *Bhāgavata-Tātparyā*, wherein he rises to the highest pitch of Transcendentalism, Madhva distinguishes the highest kind of reality from mere existence. What is truly real is what has being in itself and for itself. Such reality is possessed *only* by the Brahman :—

पारमार्थिकसत्यत्वं स्वातन्त्र्यमभिधीयते ।

तद्विष्णोरेव नान्यस्य ; तदन्येषां सदास्तिता ॥ (B.T. xi, 24, 17.)

[The highest form of reality is independence. That is possessed by Viṣṇu (God) alone. All else can merely lay claim to continued existence.]

The others : especially Prakṛti and Puruṣas, in so far as they *depend* for their very being, existence and activity upon the Lord, merely *exist* from eternity. They cannot lay claim to be *as real* as the Absolute. In a hypothetical sense then, it is *even permissible* to speak of them as

12. Cf. “Quo comparata nec pulchra sunt, nec bona sunt, nec sunt”. Augustine, *Con.* xi, 4.

“not-existing”¹³ and “other than real”.¹⁴ Such accounts or descriptions should not however blind us to the fact that these *nevertheless have an actual existence* apart and distinct from the Supreme, though not independent of it. We are quite welcome to hold that dependence signifies want of substantiality in the philosophical sense. And Madhva won't be perturbed by it. But it does not deprive a thing of its reality. Reality in other words, is not the same as substantiality. It is just uncontradicted existence: अनारोपितं तत्त्वम् । We have no right to deny the reality of the world simply because it is not independent, or does not exist in the same form for ever and for ever. It is there, has been there and will be there, changing and depending on God. Why there should *at all* be such a world or why God should tolerate its existence, is more than any philosophy can answer. Nor is it its business to do so. The only Theistic answer to such a query is that given by Jayatirtha :

ननु शक्तस्यापि परमेश्वरस्य तन्नियमानुसरणेच्छा कुत इति चेत् । किं कारणं पृच्छसि, उत, ज्ञापकम् ? आद्ये, स्वभावोऽयमिति ब्रूमः । द्वितीये श्रुतिप्रसिद्धेरिति !

(NS. ii, 299.)

[When He has got the capacity and independence to do as He likes, why should God desire to follow a definite course of making use of certain accessories in his creation ? Do you ask us the reason for God's behavior or for an indication that such is His policy ? If the former, we say it is His nature. If the latter, we plead that the Śrutis have it so.]

Though He can do very well without the Prakṛti and the Puruṣas, God prefers in his infinite glory and inexorable will, to do *with* them. Such ‘dependence’ (अपेक्षा) of God upon things which are themselves dependent on Him, is no mark of inferiority or limitation. It is at the worst a self-limitation imposed by Him on His own self and even that attests and enhances His glory :—

साधनानां साधनत्वं यदात्माधीनमिष्यते ।

तदा साधनसम्पत्तिरैश्वर्यद्योतिका भवेत् ॥ (Madhva, B.S.B. II, 1, 39.)

[When the fitness of the accessories themselves to become accessories depends on one's own self (God), the presence of accessories but serves to enhance the powers of that self.]

13. नष्टेतदासीत् । नासदासीन्नो सदासीत्तदानीम् ।

14. “नामानि विश्वा अमि न सान्ति लोके

यदाविरासीदनुत्तस्य सर्वम्” ॥ Śruti (q. by Madhva).

The dependent is often treated as of no consequence and having no separate status :

न हि तदधीनं पृथगित्येवोच्यते ! (Brh Up. Com. iv, 4, 14).

यदधीना यस्य सत्ता तत्तदित्येव भण्यते । (B.T. ii, 5, 2.)

नवै वाचो न मनासीत्याचक्षते, प्राणा इत्येवाचक्षते । (Chān. Up. v, 1, 15.)

[They don't call them "the mind", "speech", and so on. They merely designate them as "Breath".]

All this would show that Madhva has examined the relative position of the reals in his system with the insight and perception of a true philosopher. He has shown that if we are to avoid playing tricks with evidence, the only satisfactory solution of the conflict between the "Dvaita" and "Advaita"-Śrutis would lie in the adoption of the idea of The One Transcendent Reference. He has little sympathy with the reckless monism of Śamkara which is indifferent alike to the hopes and beliefs of men and reduces the panorama of creation to a random illusion. At the same time, he is not for attributing false perfection of any kind to the world. The latter is given just what is its due and no more. It is real in that it is Anāropita, not the effect of any superimposition (adhyāsa) or personal delusion. Independent it is not. And God is greater than His creation.^{14a} This in a nutshell is the position of Madhva. When we emphasise the existence of the subordinate reals side by side with the Brahman, we have a Dualism or more accurately a Theistic Realism. When we think exclusively of the transcendent majesty of God and isolate or abstract Him from everything that is not-God, we may and do sometimes indulge in the language of Monism. Such according to Madhva would be the ideology of the Upaniṣads :—

सर्वाण्यपि हि वेदान्तवाक्यान्त्यसङ्ख्येयकल्याणगुणाकरं सकलदोषगन्धविधुरं एकरूपमेव परं ब्रह्म नारायणारूपं प्रतिपादयन्ति । किन्तु, (1) कानिचित् सर्वज्ञत्वसर्वेश्वरत्वसर्वान्तर्यामिन्त्वसौन्दर्यौदार्यादिगुणविशिष्टतया ; (2) कानिचित् अपहृतपाप्मत्वनिर्दुःस्वत्वप्राकृतभौतिकदेहरहितत्वादि—दोषाभाविशेषितया ; (3) कानिचित् अतिगहनताज्ञापनायावाङ्मनसागोचरत्वाकरेण ; (4) कानिचित् सर्वपरित्यागेन तस्यैवोपादानाय अद्वितीयत्वेन ; (5) कानिचित् सर्वसत्ताप्रतीतिप्रवृत्ति-निमित्ताप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं सर्वात्मकत्वेन, इत्येवमाद्यनेकप्रकारैः परम्पुरुषं बोधयन्ति ॥ ततो व्याकुलबुद्धयो गुरुसम्प्रदायविकलाः अश्रुतवेदव्याख्यातारः सर्वत्राप्येकरूपतामनुसन्दधाना वेदं छिन्दन्ति ॥

(NS. p. 124.)

[All the Upaniṣadic texts without exception, sing the glory of the Supreme Being Nārāyaṇa who is a storehouse of numberless attributes of an auspicious character and who is entirely free from all blemishes. But of these (1) some represent Him as endowed with such attributes as omniscience, lordship of creatures, control

The bonds and impurities are not however the essential nature (स्वरूप) of the souls, at any rate, of those of the highest order.⁴ They are foreign to the soul like the rust on copper and are taken to be associated with the selves, from the beginning, at the pleasure of the Lord. This event is without a beginning in time, but is all the same subject to the Lord's pleasure. He is thus ultimately responsible for the bondage of the souls—not in the sense that He threw them into it at a certain point of time, but that its continuous association with the soul is in every way subject to Him and its riddance will depend upon His grace and co-operation.⁵ Its onset is rendered possible by the power of concealment (of the true nature of the soul) which is vested in the Lord⁶ and which corresponds to the "tirodhāna"-activity recognised by Śrīkaṇṭha as one of the five characteristics of Parameśvara.⁷

It may, no doubt, appear to be a very despotic thing for God to envelop the souls in beginningless Māyā; but, as already pointed out, it is a necessary evil in the scheme of things. The association with Prākṛtic bonds is a necessary step in the spiritual evolution of souls and is therefore permitted by God. It is an ordeal through which every one of them has to pass before attaining to his or her full stature—whatever that may be. It is the desire of the Almighty that souls *shall* fulfil themselves *only in this way* and in no other. And there is no questioning His will as He is a "Satyasamkalpa".

4. बलमानन्द ओजश्च सहो ज्ञानमनाकुलम् ।

स्वरूपाण्येव जीवस्य व्यज्यन्ते परमाद्विभोः ॥ (B.S.B. II, 3, 31.)

एतच्च सज्जीवविषयं । केषांचित् दुःखादिरूपत्वं मिश्रत्वं च ज्ञातव्यम् ॥ (TP. ii, 3, 31.)

[Vim, vigor, bliss, strength and wisdom are innate in the soul. But they are manifested only by the grace of the Supreme.]

5. Cf. ततो ह्यस्य बन्धविपर्ययो (B.S. III, 2, 5.)

मत्तः स्मृतिर्ज्ञानमपोहच न (Gītā, XV, 15.)

“ बन्धको भवपाशेन भवपशाच्च मोचकः ।

कैवल्यदः परंब्रह्म विष्णुरेव सनातनः ” ॥ (Skānda Purāṇa, q. by Śrīdhara.)

6. See Madhva's definition of Brahman in (i, 1, 2)

बन्धमोक्षौ च पुरुषाद्यस्मात्स हरिरैकराट् । and

संसारमोक्षस्थितिबन्धहेतुः । (Svet. Up. VI, 16.)

7. It may also be compared to the Āvaraṇa and Vikṣepaśakti (powers of hiding and misrepresenting the truth) associated with the Brahman in Advaita : Cf.

आच्छाद्य विक्षिपति संस्फुरदात्मतत्त्वं जीवेश्वरत्वजगदाकृतिभिर्मूषैव ।

अज्ञानमावरणविभ्रमशक्तियोगात् ॥ (Samkṣepasāriraka, i, 20.)

Strictly speaking, the problem of the so-called origin of bondage, is more easily solved on the theistic hypothesis than for example on the Advaitic view. Surely, if the All-knowing Advaitic Brahman could *somehow* delude *itself* by drawing on the veil of "Āvaraṇākṣepaśakti" round itself and appear as the many (See *Samkṣepaśārīraka*, i, 49 ; ii, 208 and iii, 7 : (ब्रह्मैव संसरति.....स्वाज्ञानतः), there can be no ethical horror or logical absurdity in the position of the Theist that God *permits*, the self-obscurance of the jīva who is by nature *limited and finite*. The Sūtras also support this position of Madhva :

परामिध्यानात् तिरोहितं ततो ह्यस्य बन्धविपर्ययो (iii, 2, 5.)

by ascribing bondage and release to the will (abhidhyāna) of the Lord.⁸

The bonds of the soul are thus *real* in that they are not imaginary. They have no beginning in time, though depending constantly upon the will of God. The essence of this bondage is ignorance and misunderstanding of the true nature of God and of one's own self :

तस्य स्वप्रकाशस्यापि (जीवस्य) परमेश्वरेच्छया, परमेश्वरे स्वधर्मेण चाज्ञानं सम्भवत्येव ।
अज्ञानमपि सत्यमेव । नाज्ञानकल्पितम् । (NS. p. 64.)

Madhva calls this, his view of the origin of Bondage as the "Svabhāvā-jñāna-vāda", the theory of the original nescience of the soul.⁹ It has certainly got one advantage—that of intelligibility—over the Advaitic view. The greatest difficulty on the Advaitic view is that Ignorance can never invade the Brahman which is both *independent* and of the nature of *absolute knowledge* (jñāna-svarūpa):

अज्ञताखिलसंवेत्तुर्घटते न कुतश्चन ।

उपाधिभेदाद्धटत इति चेत्, स स्वभावतः ?

अज्ञानतो वा ? द्वैतस्य सत्यता स्वत एव चेत् ॥ (Upādhi-khaṇḍana.)

Cf. also Śamkara's remark under B.S. ii, 1, 21 :—

नहि कश्चिदपरतन्त्रः बन्धनागारं आत्मनः कृत्वानुप्रविशति !

8. This seems to be the only natural explanation of the sūtra. Śamkara is rather far-fetched and clumsy in taking Abhidhyāna to mean meditation :

(अविद्यया) तिरोहितं (आत्मस्वरूपं) । ततो हि अस्य बन्धः । परामिध्यानात्
(अविद्यापगमे) तु (बन्ध-) विपर्ययः ॥

That this is not quite to the point is clear from yet another sūtra II, 3, 13, of similar import wherein also the term, "Abhidhyāna" occurs and where it is rendered by Śamkara himself as "at His will" (tadabhidhyāna) or samkalpa.

9. स्वभावाज्ञानवादस्य निर्दोषत्वाच्च तत् भवेत् ॥ (Av. i, 1, 1, verse 33.)

The term itself is variously interpreted by Jayatīrtha.

The worst that could be said of Madhva's view of the origin of bondage is that it involves his God in a benevolent despotism. But Śamkara's reduces the Brahman to the position of a powerless creature befooled by his own Ignorance. Certainly, there is much to choose between the two.

Though bondage is thus real, it does not follow that it is *as real* as the soul, i.e., eternal and indestructible. The possibility of its destruction does not make bondage itself or its association with the soul, any the less real *as a fact*.

Nor is there much difficulty in conceiving of the final disruption of ignorance and the cessation of bondage as a result of the soul's prolonged endeavour and the grace of God.¹⁰ The objection of the Advaitin that if bondage were real, it could not be destroyed suffers from a confusion of ideas ; for reality is not always the same as eternal existence. If the Lord wills it, even beginningless ignorance can be terminated.¹¹

Divine grace has thus a very important function to fulfil in Dvaita philosophy. It alone cuts the Gordian knot of release from bondage. Hence the need for Bhakti and Jñāna in the system. For according to Madhva, Mokṣa is merely the attainment of one's fullest stature.¹² Whatever is in the nature (svarūpa) of the soul, becomes fully manifest in release. It does not confer universal pervasiveness, omniscience or unlimited sovereignty on the released, as these do not legitimately belong to the soul. They are attributes distinctive of the Lord. The soul realises just what is legitimately and essentially within its power and province. In seeking to fulfil ourselves, we do not annihilate our being. We merely attain to our complete selfhood, so long obscured from our vision. For this we need the help of God and His grace. For, not all our knowledge can enable us to burst the last veil of Māyā (positive ignorance) which is two-faced, one that prevents the soul from comprehending itself in all its completeness (जीवाच्छादिका) and the other which

10. Cf. तथाविधस्यापि i.e., (सत्यस्यापि) बन्धस्य निवृत्तिं वक्ष्यामः ॥ (NS. p. 64.)

11. अघटितघटकानन्तैश्वर्यगुणवान् (ईश्वरः, तस्य प्रसादात् अनादिरपि सत्योऽयं बन्धो निवर्तते)
(NS.)

The Advaitin cannot similarly appeal to the mysterious powers of God as self-delusion through māyā and Avidyā would be inconsistent with the sovereignty of Brahman ; whereas to delude the souls which are *dependent*, for a beneficial purpose, cannot detract from its glory.

12. मुक्तिर्हित्वा न्यथारूपं स्वरूपेण व्यवस्थितिः ॥ (Bhāg. II, 10, 6, quoted by Madhva.)

precludes a vision of the Supreme : परमाच्छादिका .¹³ It is only the grace of God that can lift the last veil of Bondage. Not all our Karma or Jñāna or even Bhakti¹⁴ can achieve this unaided by God. No man, says Madhva, can ever *deserve to be saved* by his own efforts :

“.....इत्यादेर्न हरिं विना ।
ज्ञानस्वभावतोऽपि स्यान्मुक्तिः कस्यापि हि क्वचित् ॥ (AV. i, 1, 1.)

The element of grace is thus *indispensable*. This truth is expressed by the following text of the *Kaṭha* :

‘नायमात्मा प्रवचनेन लभ्यो न मेधया न बहुना श्रुतेन ।
यमेवैष वृणुते तेन लभ्यः तस्यैष आत्मा विवृणुते तत्त्वं स्वाम् ॥’

Nowhere do we find such perfect *raison d'être* for Divine grace, as in the system of Madhva. Since bondage itself is in a sense, due to God, release from it must also in the last resort depend on Him. But we cannot expect God to drop manna into our lips without the least effort on our part to *earn* His grace. Everyone must work with all his heart, for his own spiritual uplift¹⁵ and God would naturally confer his grace in accordance with the fitness of the seeker as determined by his moral strength and clearness of vision.

13. Cf. “अथान्ये प्रकृती दुष्टे नृषु प्रातिस्विकं स्थिते ।
स्वगुणाच्छादिका त्वेका परमाच्छादिकापरा ॥
स्वगुणाच्छादिकां हत्वा परमाच्छादिकां परः ।
व्यावृट्च मोक्षपदवीं ददाति पुरुषोत्तमः” (Bhāgavata-Tāt., x, 81, 13-15.)

14. ‘भक्तिरेवैनं.....’ इति भक्तेरेव पृथङ्मोक्षकत्वान्नेश्वरस्य कृत्यं इति मन्तव्यम्—
“अनादितो गुणाः सन्तो मत्तयाथा न ह्यमूचन् ।
जीवं तद्गुणसुव्यक्तिं कृत्वेन मोचयेद्भरिः ।
काश्चिन्न मोक्षयेद्भासौ स्वातन्त्र्यं तेन तस्य हि” ॥
इत्यनादिगुणविस्तरे सत्यपि, अव्यतयादिना, तदिच्छां विना मोक्षाप्राप्तेः ॥
(Nyāyavivaraṇa, iii, 3, 33.)

[Because there is the text : “Bhakti alone leads to Him . . .”, it should not be supposed that there is nothing more to do for God, as Bhakti by itself would automatically save one. For we read : Bhakti and other qualifications though existing in the soul from eternity, have not been able to save it. God alone could do so after manifesting his latent nature. He may not save a few others at all. He is free to do as He chooses.” From this it is clear that though qualifications may exist from eternity, they are all latent and release cannot be had unless He desires it.]

15. Cf. अनुवदप्रह्णान्तु..... B.S. iii, 2, 19 and bhāṣya thereon.

Like other Vedāntins, Madhva regards the soul as essentially uncreated and co-eternal with God, though not independent of Him. Under B.S. ii, 3, 19, he remarks that the souls are uncreated in time ; but they have births with reference to the bodies they put on from time to time.¹⁶

Following the Sūtrakāra (ii, 3, 22-7), Madhva takes the soul to be "atomic" in size. As it is *ex hypothesi* other than physical, atomicity cannot be taken in the physical sense. What is meant to be emphasised would thus appear to be the monadic rather than the strictly atomic character of the soul. Such monadism would not give rise to any *problem* in the state of release as in Madhva's system, the monads are never admitted to become all-pervasive.¹⁷ Nor, to Madhva, is mokṣa a state of unlimited lordliness for the souls. When the impurities attaching to them are completely shed, they become happy and free, but not omniscient or all-pervasive. They are capable of taking any number of forms and enjoy whatever pleasure they choose at will ; but they cannot have a share in the eightfold cosmic activities of the Supreme.¹⁸ Release does not confer upon them an unlimited sovereignty of any kind. There are certain limitations even to the freedom of the released—limitations which are necessary in the interests of the preservation of the dignity and majesty of the Supreme Being. Neither logic nor metaphysics can tolerate the existence of more than one Infinite, all-powerful Being. Madhva is firmly opposed to the view of some commentators on the Sūtra iv, 4, 9, that the released become forthwith independent not only of other souls *but even of the Lord* ! His is a better interpretation of the sūtra :

‘ अत एव चानन्याधिपतिः ’—न मुक्तः क्लृप्तपतिभ्योऽन्यपतियुक्तः । (TP.) अधमपति-
शून्यत्वान्मुक्तेः संसारवैलक्षण्यमिति सिद्धम् । (TP.)) नतु सर्वाधिपतिनिवारणाय । कुतः? अन्यपद-
प्रयोगात् ; अन्यथा, अपतिरित्यवश्यम् । (NS. p. 653.)

He points out that the released are subject not only to God :

उतामृतत्वस्येशानः (R.V. x, 90, 2.)

मुक्तानां परमा गतिः (Mbh. xiii, 254, 17b.)

मुक्तोपसृप्यव्यपदेशात् (B.S. i, 3, 2.)

जगद्व्यापारवर्जम् (B.S. iv, 4, 17.)

16. नित्यस्यापि हि जीवस्योपाध्यपेक्षया उत्पत्तिर्युज्यते ॥ (B.S.B. ii, 3, 19.)

17. Under B.S. ii, 3, 26, Madhva points out that though atomic, the soul can pervade the body :

चिद्रूपेण व्याप्तिः । जीववैलक्षण्येण व्याप्तिः ॥

18. जगद्व्यापारवर्जम् (B.S. iv, 4, 17). Since the author of the sūtras has already (i, 1, 2) asserted that the eight-fold determinations of the Universe, belong exclusively to the Brahman, this limitation is naturally to be expected.

but also to such other souls as occupy a higher place than themselves, in the hierarchy of Jivās.

Mukti according to Madhva is nothing more than "complete self-expression, self-manifestation, and self-realisation", in short, a complete unfolding of the self in all its promise and potency.¹⁹ It is नैजसुखानुभूति experience of the bliss of one's own nature. The realisation of the truth does not mean the abolition of the plurality of the world but only a removal of the false sense of separateness and independence.²⁰ It is an insight that changes the face of the world and makes all things new. The Mukta sees everything through the eyes of God,²¹ in their proper perspective, as *utterly dependent upon Him*, which he fails to do here and now.

The pleasures of the highest Heaven described in some of the Upaniṣads, are not the last word on the subject. They are only broad indications of what the supreme state of felicity may be like. Consequently then, we need neither take them too literally nor laugh them out as garish fancies. Madhva has not left us in doubt as to the manner of life led by the souls in release. Like the Lord, they are for ever contented. They don't have to *seek* satisfaction for theirs is the kingdom of Heaven. Wisdom and enjoyment are of their own nature. With all that there is no need to fear that their condition would be one of stagnation all round. A theistic account of Mokṣa cannot any day make conditions there *more stagnant* than an Advaitic view of it! Madhva is satisfied that there is room for activity and full play of capacities for every one of us according to his abilities, in Mokṣa. The released may rest in the contemplation of their own blessedness,—like the Advaitic Brahman. They may contrast their present with their past and feel thankful for their escape. They may adore the majesty of God and sing His praise or worship Him in a thousand ways. They may offer sacrifices if they wish to, the only difference being that nothing is *obligatory* on them.

There is *no prescribed* round of activities or code of conduct in Mokṣa, which means that there is unlimited scope for spontaneous acti-

19. 'एष सम्प्रसादोऽस्माच्छरीरादुत्क्रम्य परंज्यातिरुपसम्पद्य स्वेन रूपेणामिनिष्पद्यते'

(Chān. 8, 12, 3.)

20. Cf. 'यो हि ब्रह्मसूत्रादिकं जंगत् आत्मनोऽन्यत्र स्वातन्त्र्येण लब्धसद्भावं पश्यति तं मिथ्यादर्शिनं जगत् पराकरोति । (Śamkara, B.S. i, 4, 19.)

21. 'स ब्रह्मणा पश्यति ब्रह्मणः शृणोति, ब्रह्मणैवेदं सर्वमनुभवति ।' (śruti)

(Madhva on B.S. iv, 4, 5.)

vity of every kind,—for Karma,²² Jñāna and even Bhakti.²³ There is no call for activity in that there is no one to *call upon you* to do this or that. The urge is entirely from within :—

‘ कदाचित्कर्म कुर्वन्ति कदाचिन्नैव कुर्वते ।

नित्यज्ञानस्वरूपत्वान्नित्यं ध्यायन्ति केशवम् ” ॥ (Madhva, B.S.B. iii, 3, 30).

[Sometimes they perform Karma, and sometimes not. Being of the essential nature of wisdom, they always are lost in the contemplation of God.]

The worship and activity in Mokṣa are *ends* in themselves. They are not, as here, *means to an end* :—

हरेरुपासना चात्र सदैव सुखरूपिणी ।

न तु साधनमूता सा सिद्धिरेवात्र सा यतः ॥ (Ibid., iv, 4, 21).

[Worship of God is there always of blissful nature. It is not a means to an end. It is an end in itself.]

The assumption of activity cannot reduce the released state to the level of this world as these are no longer determined by injunctions and prohibitions or attended by unpleasant consequences in the event of non-performance. It is precisely this freedom from all conditions that distinguishes the life in mokṣa from ordinary life :

बन्धप्रत्यवायामात्रे हि मोक्षसार्थवत्त्वम् ; अन्यथा मोक्षत्वमेव न स्यात् ।

(Madhva, B.S. iii, 3, 30.)

[Release can have meaning only when it is unconditioned and does not involve bondage, or punishment for non-performance of a desirable act.]

Unless some kind of activity were recognised, it would be difficult to differentiate the liberated souls from stones and sticks despite the

22. कृष्णो मुक्तैरिज्यते वीतमोहैः (Mbh. XIII, 18, 16.)

[Kṛṣṇa is worshipped by the released with sacrifices.]

23. Cf. “ आत्मारामाश्च मुनयो निर्माद्या अप्युरुक्मे ।

कुर्वन्त्यहैतुकीं भक्तिमित्थंभूतगुणो हरिः ” ॥ (Bhāg. I, 7, 10.)

[Even the sages who are content in themselves, and free from bonds, cultivate motiveless Bhakti towards God. Such is the attraction of the Lord.]

reputed possession, by them, of intelligence. Such service as the freed render to God is entirely voluntary and an end in itself :

“ साधनानि तु सर्वाणि भक्तिज्ञानप्रवृद्धये ।

नैवान्यसाधनं भक्तिः फलरूपा हि सा यतः ॥²⁴ (Madhva, Brh. Up. com.)

Madhva has brought together certain texts²⁵ bearing upon the nature of life in the released state and these have been elucidated by the author of *Madhvasiddhāntasāra*²⁶ :—

- (1) केचित्स्त्रीमोगं कुर्वन्ति²⁷ ।
- (2) केचित् गजतुरगादीन् धावयन्ति²⁸ ।
- (3) केचन क्रगादि वेदोच्चारणेन²⁹ भगवन्तं स्तुवन्ति ।
- (4) केचन सुखोद्वेगेण ‘ हावु ’ हावु ’ इत्यादिशब्दानुच्चारयन्ति³⁰ ।
- (5) केचन पूर्वाभ्यासवशेन यज्ञादिकं³¹ कुर्वन्ति ।
- (6) केचन ‘ आजन्ममरणं स्मृत्वा मुक्ता हर्षमवाप्नुयुः ’ ।
- (7) केचनेच्छामात्रेण पित्रादिदर्शनवन्तो³² भवन्ति ।

24. Cf. “ आत्मारामाश्च मुनयो निर्ग्रन्था अप्युरुक्मे ।

कुर्वन्त्यहेतुर्की भक्तिमित्थंभूतगुणो हरिः ” ॥ (Bhāg. I, 7, 10.)

25. कृष्णो मुक्तैरिज्यते वीतमोहैः (Mbh. XIII, 18, 6.)

‘ सर्वे नन्दन्ति यशसा गतेन ’ (R.V. X, 71, 10.)

‘ अक्षण्वन्तः कर्णवन्तः सखायो (R.V. X, 71, 7.) ‘ एतत्सामगायन्नास्ते हावु

हावु (Taitt. Up. III, 10, 5.) ‘ स तत्र पर्येति जक्षन् क्रीडन्... (Chān. VIII, 12, 3.)

“ शाखां शाखां महानद्यः संयान्ति परितः स्रवाः ।

धानापूपा मांसका माः सदा पायसकर्दमाः ॥

यस्मिन्नग्निमुखा देवाः सेन्द्राः सह मरुद्गणाः ।

ईजिरे क्रतुभिः श्रेष्ठैस्तदक्षरमुपासते ॥

प्रविशन्ति परं देवं मुक्तास्तत्रैव भोगिनः ।

निर्गच्छन्ति यथाकामं परेशेनैव चोदिताः ” ॥

(Mahābhārata, quoted in Av. ii, p. 29 b.)

‘ यत्रानन्दाश्च मोदाश्च मुदः प्रमुद आसते ।

देवैः सुकृतकर्मभिः तत्र माममृतं कृधि ’ ॥ (R.V. IX, 113, 1.)

26. Bombay, p. 161-2.

27. Chān. Up. VIII, 12, 3.

28. Ibid.

29. R.V. X, 72, 11.

30. Taitt. Up. III, 10, 5.

31. Mbh. XIII, 18, 6.

32. Chān. Up. VIII, 2, 1, and VIII, 2, 1-10. and Śaṅkara, B.S.B. IV, 4, 8.

- (8) केचन सर्वलोकचारिणः³³ ।
 (9) केचन शुद्धसत्त्वनिर्मितलीलाशरीराण्यादाय³⁴ क्रीडन्ते ।
 (10) केचन भगवद्गुणकर्माणि गायन्ति
 (11) केचन नृत्यन्ति ।
 (12) केचन वाद्यानि वादयन्ति ॥

As individuality persists in Mokṣa : अविनाशी वा अरेऽयमात्मा अनुच्छित्तिधर्मा (Brh. Up. iv, 5, 14.), there must be some outlet for the energies of the freed. Nor does scripture deny desires to the released. It is the desires of a worldly nature that are denied :

“ कामो येऽस्य हृदि स्थिताः ।
 इत्यन्तःकरणस्थानां कामानां मोक्षमेव हि ।
 प्राह श्रुतिर्हृदीत्येव, न चेत् व्यर्थविशेषणम् ”॥ (Av. ii, p. 45.)

[By the term “Kāma ye asya hṛdi sthitāḥ”, the śruti speaks of the destruction of only those desires that are rooted in the Antahkaraṇa, but not those which pertain to the inmost essence of the soul. Otherwise the qualification “in the heart” (hṛdi) would be needless.]

All Theists recognise the persistence of personality in release. Since souls are many, the plurality of selves *must* survive there too. Since multiplicity without distinction would be inconceivable, Madhva finds it easy to maintain that there is distinction based upon difference in capacity, and endowment (yogyatā), among the souls. One result of this difference is the gradation in the bliss enjoyed by the various souls. It is these distinctions which lie at the very root of the nature of each soul, in short, the uniqueness of each, that help to distinguish one from the other. All souls could not have put forth the same kind of effort, of the same intensity or duration. It thus stands to reason that there must be a proportionate difference in the nature of the rewards reaped by them. There are highly evolved souls like those of Brahmā, and the other gods, whose spiritual perfection must certainly be greater than that of us mortals. And it cannot go in vain :

“ दशकल्पं तपश्चरिणं रुद्रेण लवणार्णवे ।
 त्यक्त्वा सुखानि सर्वाणि क्लिष्टेन लवणाम्भसा ॥
 शक्रेण वर्षकोटीश्च धूमः पीतोऽतिदुःखतः ।
 वर्षायुतं तु सूर्येण तपोऽर्वाक्षिरसा कृतम् ॥
 सुदुःखेन सुखं त्यक्त्वा धर्मेणाकाशशायिना ।

33. Ibid. VIII, 25, 2.

34. B.S. IV, 4, 12 and Śaṅkara thereon.

पीता मरीचयो वर्षसहस्रमतिसादरम् ॥
 अतिकृच्छ्रेण कुर्वन्ति यत्नं ब्रह्मविदोऽपि च ।”
 इत्येतदखिलं मोक्षे विशेषाभावतः कथम् ?
 युक्तं च साधनाधिक्यात्साध्याधिक्यं सुरादिषु ।
 नाधिक्यं यदि साध्ये स्यात्प्रयत्नः साधने कुतः ? ॥

(*Anuvyākhyāna*, iii, p. 45-6.)

[Rudra performed severe penance in the salty sea for ten eons, (kalpa), abandoning all pleasures and putting himself to great hardship. Indra took in smoke for a crore of years with supreme difficulty. The Sun-god performed penance with his head downwards, for ten thousand years. Yama, lying in the sky, exposed himself to the heat of the Sun's rays, for a thousand years. Even the knowers of Brahman put forth further effort. How could these things be reconciled were there no gradation in mokṣa ? It is proper that there should be results in accordance with efforts. If there be no proportionate increase in results why should men be so eager to work more and more ?]

Again, the Śāstras tell us that there are persons who work deliberately for their salvation as well as great Seers like Sanaka (Ekānta-bhaktas) who love God for His own sake (and not for their salvation) and even refuse the prospect of unity with Him.³⁵ Surely, any theory of Mokṣa, if it is to be balanced and thorough-going, must take note of these differences :

यदि तारम्यं न स्यात् —

‘नात्यन्तिकं विगणयन्त्यपि ते प्रसादम्’ (*Bhāg.* iii, 15, 48.)

‘नैकात्म्यतां मे स्पृहयन्ति केचित्’, (*Ibid.*, iii, 25, 34.)

... .. एकत्वमप्युत ।

दीयमानं न गृह्णन्ति ॥ (iii, 29, 13.)

इति मुक्तिमप्यनिच्छतामपि मोक्ष एव फलं । तमिच्छतामपि भवति सुप्रतीकादीनामिति कथमनिच्छतां स्तुतिरूपना स्यात् ? (Madhva, G.B. ii, 52.)

The nature and degree of bliss enjoyed by each soul is thus in proportion to its natural fitness (yogyatā) and amount of preparation (sādhana).³⁶ As between them and God there is already this difference that they cannot take part in the cosmic functions of the Supreme (B.S. iv, 4, 17).

35. *Bhāgavata*, iii, 29, 13.

36. The preparation itself depending ultimately on “Yogyatā”.

This limitation is not impracticable as there is a God to control the released : उतामृतत्वरयेशानः । It is of course needless for Him to issue a command to the effect for His wish is law to the released,³⁷ not that He cannot get such a commandment obeyed :

परमेश्वरकामाद्यविभागेनैव तेषां सत्यकामत्वम्—‘कामेन मे काम आगात्’
(T.Ā. III, 15, 2a.) इति श्रुतेः ॥ (Madhva, B.S. iv, 2, 26.)

As in an ideally Communistic State, the released can be expected to know what is good and best for them to do and they can also be trusted to carry on their way, without encroaching upon one another's province or upon the liberties of God. They neither *do* nor *can* will what is impossible of achievement or beyond their deserts. While it remains true that all their desires come true, Madhva would explain that on no occasion would they entertain a low or unholy desire or one beyond their powers of achievement :—

साधिकानन्दसम्प्राप्तीं सृष्ट्यादिव्यापृतिष्वपि ।
मुक्तानां नैव कामः स्यात् अन्यान्कामास्तु भुञ्जते ॥
तद्योग्यता नैव तेषां कदाचित् क्वापि विद्यते ।
न चायोग्यं विमुक्तोऽपि प्राप्नुयान्नैव कामयेत् ॥ (B.S.B. iv, 4, 18.)
न च, सङ्कल्पादेव समस्तसम्भवात् सृष्ट्यादिसमस्तकार्यसम्भवः—
नहि सुवर्णं शुद्धमपि वह्निकार्यकरं भवेत्—
‘अयोग्यशक्तितस्त्वेव नाधिकानन्दसम्भवः।
न हि कश्चित् सुशक्तोऽपि चकाराचेतनं चितिम् ।
न च कामस्तथा भूयात्, ततः स्यात् सत्यकामिता”॥ (Nyāyavivaraṇa, iv, 4, 9.)

This is not certainly to exalt the souls above God ; for, an undictated harmony (satyakāmātā) is the regular feature of Mokṣa. There is no room for discord or jealousy over there. Each one has his reward and each one feels happy and full to the brim. Each is so much absorbed in his own contentment that he has no thoughts to give to the disparity between him and others. He sees nothing more than that every other person also, is likewise happy and full to the brim : भोगमात्रसाम्यलिङ्गाच्च। (B.S. iv. 4, 22.). Madhva's mokṣa is thus a philosophic Communism come true.

One of the familiar objections to the admission of multiplicity with difference [तारतम्य] in Mokṣa is that if there are differences and inequalities there, they would inevitably lead to jealousy and strife among the souls and reduce the state of Mokṣa to the level of our own world.

37. Cf. “Thy will be done on earth as it is in Heaven”. (Bible).

An obvious reply to this objection is that difference is consistent and compatible with co-operation and goodwill also,—not merely with conflict. Madhva goes a step further and argues that inequality by itself cannot lead to strife. It is the feelings of jealousy and other bad passions that are ultimately responsible for it, and as these are ruled out of Mokṣa, difference or inequality cannot by themselves do any harm. There is no guarantee either that *equality* would in all cases be an unmixed good. We have any number of instances in the world of persons who are most *heartily jealous of their equals*—who cannot tolerate the idea of another man being their equal in wealth or fame :—

भवेयुर्यदि चेष्याद्याः समेष्वपि कुतो न ते ?
तप्यमानाः समान् दृष्ट्वा द्वेष्युर्यदि युता अपि ॥
दृश्यन्ते बहवो लोके ! दोषा एवात्र कारणम् ।
यदि निर्दोषता तत्र किमाधिक्येन दुष्यते ? ॥ (A.V. iii, p. 47.)

Madhva is *alone* in admitting multiplicity *with* difference in Mokṣa. Rāmānuja admits multiplicity while denying the difference in enjoyment, endowment or natural fitness (yogyatā). Of these two, Madhva's seems undoubtedly the more logical position. The Viśiṣṭādvaitin is pledged to the equality of all souls and God in the matter of lordliness and bliss. Equality is more often the synonym of similarity. Yet no two things are ever exactly similar. What then distinguishes one soul from another ?—especially when all of them are "Saccidānandasvarūpas". The idea of "svarūpa-bheda" without "Svarūpa-vaicitrya or Viśeṣa", is impossible. There is thus no escape from "Svarūpa-tāratamya" or at least "Svarūpa-vaicitrya", if one is keen on preserving the plurality of souls. "Ānandatāratamya" would thus appear to be a sensible deduction from "Svarūpa-vaicitrya".

Every released soul is perfect in its own way ; but all souls are not equally perfect, nor are they equal to God. Release does not confer upon them pervasive universality, in place of their former finitude and individuality. Since the soul is always and by nature, finite and dependent on God, and of limited powers of understanding, it remains so even in release.³⁸ Release is only from the cycles of births and deaths and not also from the essence of self-hood.

38. Cf. मुक्तोपसृप्यव्यपदेशात् (B.S. I, 3, 2.)

जगद्व्यापारवर्जम् (B.S. IV, 4, 17.)

TATTVAŚĀRAH

BY

VĀTSYA VARADAGURU

EDITED WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

BY

R. RAMANUJACHARI, M.A.

श्रीः

श्रीमते रामानुजाय नमः ।

श्रीमते वात्स्याय वरदगुरवे नमः ।

तत्त्वसारः ।

श्रीविष्णुचित्तपदपङ्कजसङ्गमाय

चेतो मम स्पृहयते किमतः परेण ।

नो चेन्ममापि यतिशेखरभारतीनां

भावः कथं भवितुमर्हति वाग्विधेयः ॥ १ ॥

क पथि विदुषामेषा प्रौढी श्रियः प्रभुणा शपे

मशकशकनं मन्ये मादृक्प्रभावनिदर्शनम् ।

यतिवरवचस्तेजः प्रत्यर्थिवर्गनिरर्गल-

क्षपणनिपुणं नित्यं जागर्ति कीर्तिकरं मयि ॥ २ ॥

Śrīviṣṇucitta-padapaṅkaja-saṅgamāya

ceto mama sprhayate kim atah pareṇa |

no cen mamā'pi yatiśekhara-bhāratinām

bhāvaḥ katham bhavitum arhati vāgvidheyaḥ || 1.

Kva pathi viduṣām eṣā prauḍhī śriyaḥ prabhuṇā śape

maśakaśakanam manye mādṛkprabhāvanidarśanam |

yativara-vacastejaḥ pratyarthivarga-nirargala-

kṣapaṇanipuṇam nityam jāgarti kīrtikaram mayi || 2.

न खलु कवितामानः का नः क्षतिः पथि गौतमे
 न च परिचयः काणादे वा कुमारिलदर्शने ।
 अपि गुरुमते शास्त्रेष्वन्येष्वपीह तथापि नः
 फलति विजयं सर्वत्र श्रीयतीश्वरगीश्रमः ॥ ३ ॥

यश्चकार यतिराजभारतीचित्तवृत्तिषु परं परिश्रमम् ।
 तस्य वैदिकसदृशिखामणेरग्रतः क परवादिसम्भवः ॥ ४ ॥

अन्यत्र व्यवहारतो न भवति व्युत्पत्तिरन्यत्र वा
 कश्चित्कार्यधियः कथं व्यवहरेदित्यञ्च निश्चीयते ।
 शब्दाः कार्यपरा इति श्रुतिरतस्तत्रैव मानं पुनः
 प्रामाण्यं कथमश्रुवीत परिनिष्पन्ने परे ब्रह्मणि ॥ ५ ॥

यः प्राबोधि परेहयापवरके दण्डस्थितो बोध्यतां
 चैत्रायेति स तस्य बोधनसमुद्युक्तो यदूचे वचः ।
 एतच्चेष्टितमेदवित्तदितरो मूको यथाकर्णयन्
 बालः खल्विदमस्य बोधकमिति व्युत्पत्तिमभ्यस्यति ॥ ६ ॥

अङ्गुल्या निर्दिशद्विर्धटमुखमखिलं वस्तु तत्तद्बुवद्भिः
 तच्छब्दांस्तद्विभक्तीरपि च तदुचिते गोचरे पूर्ववृद्धैः ।
 पित्राद्यैश्शिक्ष्यमाणाश्शिशव इह मुहुस्स्वात्मनां तत्तदर्थ-
 ज्ञानं तच्छब्दमात्रश्रवणत उदितं प्रेक्ष्य जानन्ति शक्तिम् ॥ ७ ॥

भूतानीति पदेन वस्त्ववगतौ सत्यामिमानीति य-
 द्वायन्त्यामखिलेश्वरोऽगणि जगज्जन्मादिभिर्लक्षणैः ।
 तेनादर्शि विचित्रतैव जगतस्सृज्यस्य तेनापि त-
 त्सृष्टुर्ब्रह्मण उज्वला गुणगणा जिज्ञास्यताहेतवः ॥ ८ ॥

Na khalu kavitāmānaḥ kā naḥ kṣatiḥ pathi Gautame
 na ca paricayaḥ Kāṇāde vā Kumārīladarśane |
 api Gurumate śāstreṣv anyeṣv apī'ha tathāpi naḥ
 phalati vijayam sarvatra Śrī yatiśvaragīśśramah | 3

Yaś cakāra Yatirājabhāratīcittavṛttiṣu param pariśramam |
 tasya vaidikasadaśśikhāmaṇer agrataḥ kva paravādi-
 sambhavaḥ || 4

Anyatra vyavahārato na bhavati vyutpattir anyatra vā
 kaścit kāryadhiyaḥ katham vyavahared itthañ ca niścīyate |
 sabdāḥ kāryaparā iti śrutir atas tatrai'va mānam punaḥ
 prāmāṇyam katham aśnuvīta pariniṣpanne pare Brahmaṇi || 5

Yaḥ prābodhi parehayā'pavarake daṇḍas sthito bodhyatām
 caitrāye'ti sa tasya bodhanasamudyukto yad ūce vacaḥ |
 etacceṣṭitabhedavit taditaro mūko yathā'karṇayan
 bālaḥ khalv idam asya bodhakam iti vyutpattim abhyasyati || 6

Aṅgulyā nirdiśadbhir ghaṭamukham akhilam vastu
 tattad bruvadbhiḥ
 tacchabdāṁs tadvibhaktīr api ca taducite gocare pūrvavṛddhaiḥ |
 pitrādyaiś śikṣamānāś śiśava iha muhus svātmanām tattadārtha-
 jñānam tacchabdamātraśravaṇata uditam prekṣya jānanti
 śaktim || 7

Bhūtāni'ti padena vastvavagatau satyām imāni'ti yad
 gāyantyām akhileśvaro'gaṇi jagajjanmādiḥ lakṣaṇaiḥ |
 tenā'darśi vicitratai'va jagatas srjyasya tenā'pi tat-
 sraṣṭur brahmaṇa ujvalā guṇagaṇā jigñāsyatāhetavaḥ || 8

अस्येत्युद्दिश्य सौत्रं पदमथ तदचिन्त्यादिभाष्यं विवन्ने
 तत्तन्मानप्रसिद्धं जगदभिदधती तद्विचित्रत्वमाह ।
 श्रौती सौत्रीदमुक्तिस्त्विति हृदि निदधत्तत्र चाचेतनांशे
 वैचित्रीमाह पूर्वं पदमथ नियतेत्यादिकं चेतनांशे ॥ ९ ॥

कार्यत्वाद्घटवत्सकर्तृ विमतं क्षित्यादि कार्यञ्च त-
 त्सर्वं सावयवत्वतस्स भगवानाधारसिद्धान्ततः ।
 इत्येतन्न घटेत विश्वजनने यत्कर्तृकालैक्ययोः
 कार्यत्वव्यभिचारिभेदगणनाद्धेतार्विरोधोऽथवा ॥ १० ॥

यत्कल्पनालघिमलालसमानसानां
 कर्त्रैक्यसिद्धिरिति नादरणीयमेतत् ।
 तद्व्याप्तिमेव हि रुणद्धि सकर्तृकत्वं
 किं कल्प्यते लघिमसम्पदमीप्समानैः ॥ ११ ॥

क्षमादावंशिनि कारणान्तरगणे यत्नेऽप्यदृष्टे तनौ
 पक्षे दृष्टविरूपतास्त्वपरधा कल्प्या न कर्तर्यपि ।
 सेयं न्यायपथप्रहीणयुगपत्सर्गक्षयौ नेक्षितौ
 सर्वस्येह न कल्पनापरिकरस्तन्नानुमेयः परः ॥ १२ ॥

नित्यं क्षित्यादि सांशं भवदपि घटतां कारणानां परेषां
 व्यापारः कर्त्रपेक्षाविधुर इह भवत्वस्य कर्तुः प्रयत्ने ।
 नापेक्ष्ये धीचिकीर्षे तनुभृत इह चादृष्टमीष्टे विधातुं
 कार्यं देही दवीयानपि सृजतु जगद्वर्ष्म दृश्येतरद्वा ॥ १३ ॥

Asye'ty uddiśya sautram padam atha tad acintyādibhāṣyam
vivavre

tattanmānaprasiddham jagad abhidadhatī tadvicitratvam āha |
śrautī' sautrī'damuktis tv iti hr̥di nidadhat tatra cā'cetanāmśe
vaicitrīm āha pūrvam padam atha niyate ty ādikam
cetanāmśe || 9

Kāryatvāt ghaṭavat sakarṭṛ vimatam kṣityādi kāryaṅ ca tat
sarvam sāvayavatvats sa bhagavān ādhāra siddhāntataḥ |
ity etan na ghaṭeta viśvajanane yat karṭṛkālaikyayoḥ
kāryatvavyabhicāribhedagaṇanād dhetoḥ virodho'thavā || 10

Yat kalpanā-laghima-lālasa-mānasānām
kartraikyasiddhir iti nā'daraṇīyam etat |
tadvyāptim eva hi ruṇaddhi sakarṭṛkatvam
kim kalpyate laghimasampadam īpsamānaiḥ || 11

Kṣmādāv amśini kāranāntaragaṇe yatne'py adṛṣṭe tanau
pakṣe dṛṣṭavirūpatā'stv aparadhā kalpyā na kartary api |
se'yam nyāyapathaprahīṇa-yugapat-sargakṣayau ne'kṣitau
sarvasye'ha na kalpanāparikaras tan nā'numeyaḥ paraḥ || 12

Nityam kṣityādi sāmśam bhavad api ghaṭatām kāraṇānām
pareṣām
vyāpāraḥ kartrapekṣāvidhura iha bhavatv asya kartuḥ
prayatne |
nā'pekṣye dhīcikirṣe tanubhṛta iha cā'dṛṣṭam iṣṭe vidhātum
kāryam dehī daviyān api sṛjatu jagadvarṣma dṛśyetaṛad vā || 13

दृष्टानुगुण्यविरहादिह कल्पनाना-

मासामसिद्धिरिति चेदपि कर्तरि स्यात् ।

जन्मक्रमेण ददृशे जगतः क्षयो वा

क्लृप्तिश्च दर्शनवशादनयोस्तथा स्यात् ॥ १४ ॥

धिकौमारिलदर्शनव्यसनिनः प्राभाकरप्रक्रिया-

विक्रान्तानपि हन्त नाथविधुरं विश्वं जगज्जरूपतः ।

दूरे कारणदोषबाधकधियोन्निधे पुमर्थे स्वतः-

प्रामाण्यं न कथं भजन्ति विधिवन्मन्त्रार्थवादोक्तयः ॥ १५ ॥

छान्दोग्ये केचिदाहुर्दिशतिरुत तमादेशमप्राक्ष्य इत्य-

त्राऽऽङ्पूर्वस्तूपदेशं प्रकटयति सतो न प्रशास्तिं घञन्तः ।

नो कर्तर्यस्ति कर्मण्यगणि घञिह सत्कर्तृशास्तौ न कर्म

स्यात्स्यात्कर्मोपदेशे तदिदमुदितमादेशवाचोपदेश्यम् ॥ १६ ॥

अत्र ब्रूमः प्रशास्तिं वदति दिशिरसावाङ्मुखो नोपदेशं

शास्तौ सोऽतिप्रसिद्धो न हि पर इह चापेक्षितार्थप्रसङ्गः ।

युक्तोऽसाधारणोक्त्या घञगणि करणेऽप्यत्र वैवक्षिकत्वं

शाब्दोक्तं कारकाणान्ननु करणतया कर्तरि स्याद्विवक्षा ॥ १७ ॥

षष्ठ्यान्यत्वमवेदि नैनमवदच्छूलोको न चाज्ञातता

ज्ञातस्यास्य तथापि नावयविता तस्यान्य आत्मा श्रुतः ।

शोध्यत्वञ्च विकारवाचकवचस्तद्ब्रह्म पुच्छं भवे-

न्न त्वानन्दमयस्स चान्नमयवत्कोशो बहिः कथ्यते ॥ १८ ॥

Dṛṣṭānugūṇyavirahād iha kalpanānām
 āsām asiddhir iti ced api kartari syāt |
 janmakrameṇa dadṛṣe jagataḥ kṣayo vā
 klptiś ca darśanavaśād anayos tathā syāt || 14

Dhik Kaumārilaḍarśanavyasaninaḥ Prābhākaraparakriyā-
 vikrāntān api hanta nāthavidhuram viśvaṁ jagaj jalpataḥ |
 dūre kāraṇadoṣabādhakadhiyor nāthe pumarthe svataḥ-
 prāmāṇyaṁ na katharṁ bhajanti vidhivan mantrārtha-
 vādoktayaḥ || 15

Chāndogye kecid āhur diśatir uta tam ādeśam aprākṣya ity a-
 trā'ṇpūrvas tū'padeśaṁ prakāṣayati sato na praśāstim gha-
 ṇantaḥ |
 no kartary asti karmaṇy agaṇi ghaṇ iha satkartṛśāstau
 na karma
 syāt syāt karmopadeśe tad idam uditam ādeśa-
 vāco'padeśyam || 16

Atra brūmaḥ praśāstim vadati diśir asāv ānmukho no'padeśam
 śāstau so'tiprasiddho na hi para iha cā'peksitārthaprasaṅgaḥ |
 yukto'sādhāraṇoktyā ghaṇ agaṇi karaṇe'py atra vaivakṣikatvam
 śābdoktam kārakāṇān nanu karaṇatayā kartari syād
 vivakṣā || 17

Ṣaṣṭhyā'nyatvam avedi nai'nam avadat śloko ṇa cā'nātātā
 jñātasyā'sya tathāpi nā'vayavitā tasyā'nya ātmā śrutaḥ |
 śodhyatvaṇ ca vikāravācakavacas tad brahma puccham bhaven-
 na tv ānandamayas sa cā'nnamayavat kośo bahiḥ kathyate || 18

पुलिङ्गान्तप्रधानप्रकृतपरवचोरूपं चाप्यनन्यैः

श्लोकाः पुच्छं न चाहुस्स्वरसमपि हि नस्सूत्रमन्योऽन्तरो न ।

षष्ठ्यादिश्चांशभावान्निरवधिकतया रूपणादानुरूप्या-

त्पर्यायत्वादनन्यात्मकवचनतया पुच्छहेतुः परास्तः ॥ १९ ॥

कपिस्त्वादित्यः कं पिबति किरणैरित्यपि कपि-

र्बभस्तीत्याम्नातस्स कपिरमुनास्तं यदिह तत् ।

प्रतीमः कप्यासं दिवसकरतेजोविकसितः

स पद्मश्रीमत्त्वादगणि भगवच्चक्षुरूपमा ॥ २० ॥

नाळं कपिर्भवति कं पिबतीति तस्मिन्

यस्यास आसनमुशन्ति मनीषिणस्तत् ।

कप्यासमुज्ज्वलमुदारमिदं सरोजं

चक्षुर्निदर्शनमुदीरितमीश्वरस्य ॥ २१ ॥

कमुदकमिह प्यासो यस्यासनं यदि बोद्धवः

कविभिरुदितं कप्यासं तद्गभीरजलोदयात् ।

शिशिरमधुरं श्रीमद्वामोदराक्षिनिदर्शनं

भवति नळिनं लुप्ताकारस्त्वपिः पिहितादिवत् ॥ २२ ॥

कप्यासं भानुबिम्बं हरिभजनपदं हृत्सरोजं च यद्वा

तद्वाचोपासकाक्षिद्वयमिति तु न सत्तत्र यत्पुण्डरीकम् ।

गौणं तस्याक्षिणी इत्युभयपदनिराकाङ्क्षतानादरेणा-

प्यध्याहारस्समानाधिकृतपदगतित्यक्तिरूर्ध्वं तदुक्तिः ॥ २३ ॥

Pullīngānta-pradhāna-prakṛta-paravaco-rūpaṇaṁ cā'py anyaiḥ
 ślokāḥ puccham na cā'hus svarasam api hi naś sūtram
 anyo'ntaro na |
 ṣaṣṭyādiś cā'mśabhāvān niravadhikatayā rūpaṇād ānurūpyāt
 paryāyatvād ananyātmakavacanatayā pucchahetuḥ
 parāstaḥ || 19

Kapis tv ādityaḥ kaṁ pibati kiraṇair ity api kapir
 babhastī'ty āmnātas sa kapir amunā'stam yad iha tat |
 pratīmaḥ kapyāsam divasakara-tejovikasitaḥ
 sa padmaś śrīmatvād agaṇi bhagavaccakṣurupamā || 20

Nālam kapir bhavati kaṁ pibatī'ti tasmin
 yasyā'sa āsanam uśanti maṇiṣiṇas tat |
 kapyāsam ujvalam udāram idam sarojam
 cakṣur nidarśanam udīritam īśvarasya || 21

Kaṁ udakam iha pyāso yasyā'sanam yadi vo'dbhavaḥ
 kavibhir uditam kapyāsam tad gabhīrajalodayāt |
 śīśīramadhuram Śrīmaddāmodarākṣinidarśanam
 bhavati nalinam luptākāras tv apiḥ pihitādivat || 22

Kapyāsam bhānubimbam haribhajanapadam hr̥tsarojaṁ ca
 yadvat
 tadvac co'pāsakākṣidvayam iti tu na sat tatra yat puṇḍarīkam !
 gaṇam tasyākṣiṇī ity ubhayapadanirākāṅkṣatā'nādareṇā'
 py adhyāhāras samānādhikṛtapadagatityaktir ūrdhvam
 taduktiḥ || 23

कश्चिज्जल्पति मर्कटस्य जघनं कप्यासमक्षणोरयं
 दृष्टान्तः कथमिष्यते भगवत्ससत्येव गत्यन्तरे ।
 सामानाधिकरण्यमत्र पदयोः प्राप्तं कुतस्त्यज्यते
 पद्मं चेद्विशिनष्टि तत्सदृशि तच्छब्दस्तु गौणस्तव ॥ २४ ॥

दरविकसितं पद्मं कप्यासमाह गतिस्त्विदं
 भवति भगवच्चक्षुर्दृष्टान्तपङ्कजसङ्गता ।
 तदपि च न सत्तस्मिन्नर्थे यतो न तु कुत्रचि-
 त्तदवयवशस्संहत्या वा पदं व्युदपद्यत ॥ २५ ॥

षट्स्वर्थेषु समीरितेषु चतुराः कप्यासवाचस्त्रयो
 गम्भीराम्भ इति प्रकृत्य भगवद्रामानुजाङ्गीकृताः ।
 तत्स्वीकारबहिष्कृतास्तदितरे हेयास्त्रयस्तद्विदा
 श्लोकैष्पड्भिरमीभिरित्थमुदितस्सोऽयं विभागो मया ॥ २६ ॥

गायत्री नाम सामश्रुतिशिरसि परं ज्योतिरध्यायि सिद्धय-
 चातुष्पद्यन्तु भूतक्षितितनुहृदयैष्पड्विधं तद्विधाभिः ।
 गानत्राणादिकाभिश्श्रुतिगतवचनव्यक्तिभेदात् सिद्धा
 वाक्प्राणोक्तिः परार्था स्वरसनिगमनश्रुत्यधीनं तदेतत् ॥ २७ ॥

तमो नाम द्रव्यं बहुलविरलं मेचकचलं
 प्रतीमः केनापि कचिदपि न बाधश्च ददृशे ।
 अतः कल्प्यो हेतुः प्रमितिरपि शाब्दी विजयते
 निरालोकं चक्षुः प्रथयति हि तद्दर्शनवशात् ॥ २८ ॥

Kaścij jalpati markatasya jaghanam kapyāsam akṣṇor ayam
 dṛṣṭāntaḥ katham iṣyate bhagavatas saty eva gatyantare |
 sāmānādhikaraṇyam atra padayoḥ prāptam kutas tyajyate
 padmañ ced viśinaṣṭi tatsadrśi tacchabdas tu gaṇas tava || 24

Daravikasitaṁ padmañ kapyāsam āha gatis tv iyam
 bhavati bhagavaccakṣur dṛṣṭāntapaṅkajasaṅgatā |
 tad api ca na sat tasminn arthe yato no tu kutracit
 tadavayavaśas saṁhatyā vā padaṁ vyudapadyata || 25

Ṣaṭsv artheṣu samīriteṣu caturāḥ kapyāsavācas trayo
 gambhīrāmbha iti prakṛtya bhagavad-Rāmānujāṅgīkṛtāḥ |
 tatsvikārabahiṣkṛtās taditare heyās trayas tadvidā
 ślokaṣ ṣaḍbhir amībhir ittham uditas so'yaṁ vibhāgo
 mayā || 26

Gāyatrī nāma sāmāsrutiśirasi param jyotir adhyāsi siddhyac-
 cātuṣpadyan tu bhūtakṣītitanuhrdayaiṣ ṣaḍvidhaṁ
 tadvidhābhiḥ |
 gānatrāṇādikābhiś śrutigatavacanavyaktibhedāt tu siddhā
 vākprāṇoktiḥ parārthā svarasanigamanaśrutyadhīnaṁ
 tad etat || 27

Tamo nāma dravyaṁ bahulaviralam mecakacalam
 pratīmaḥ kenāpi kvacid api na bādhaś ca dadṛśe |
 ataḥ kalpyo hetuḥ pramītir api śābdī vijayate
 nirālokaṁ cakṣuḥ prathayati hi taddarśanavaśāt || 28

भूमाख्यः पुरुषोत्तमो यदधिकं ब्रह्मेह सत्याह्वयं
 प्राणाख्यादवरात्मनस्तु बलतस्तदज्ञाधिकस्सत्यवित् ।
 यस्सत्यं वदतीति वाग्गमयितुं न ह्यग्निहोत्र्यन्तरं
 शक्नोति प्रकृताग्निहोत्र्यवगमाद्ब्रह्मस्तु शब्दश्रियः ॥ २९ ॥

अस्वारस्यचतुष्टयं परमते यच्छब्दलिङ्गव्यथा
 तस्मिन्नित्यनपेक्षया व्यवहिते हृत्पुण्डरीकेऽन्वयः ।
 अप्याकाङ्क्षितकामवेदनविधिक्षेपस्वपक्षे द्वयं
 यच्छब्दस्य यदैकशेष्यमपि या तत्रैकवद्भाविता ॥ ३० ॥

पटुतरविग्रहादि वहतां भवतापवतां
 भगवदुपासनं दिविषदामपि सम्भवति ।
 न तु शतमर्थवादवचसामपि मन्त्रगिरां
 विधिवदिह प्रमाणमपदोषमपुम्प्रभवम् ॥ ३१ ॥

स्तुतिपरमाद्यमत्र निजसाध्यविधेयरुचि-
 प्रजननसिद्धये स्ववचनीयगुणादरवत् ।
 तदितरथा न सिद्धयति विधिष्विव तत्त्वविदां
 कथमसता गुणेन कथितेन नुतिर्भवति ॥ ३२ ॥

अथ मनवो विधेयपरिबोधनकार्यमुखा-
 द्विधिमुपकुर्वते हि दिविषद्वपुरादिधियम् ।
 उपजनयन्त एनमुपकर्तुमलं खलु ते
 कथमिव देवताधियमुपैति वपुर्विधुरा ॥ ३३ ॥

Bhūmākhyāḥ Puruṣottamo yad adhikam Brahme'ha
satyāhvayam

prāṇākhyād avarātmanas tu balatas tadjñādhikas satyavit |
yas satyam vadatī'ti vāg gamayitum na hy agnihotryantaram
śaknoti prakṛtāgnihotryavagamād bhaṅgas tu śabdaśriyaḥ || 29

Asvārasyacatuṣṭayam paramate yac chabdalingavyathā
tasminn ity anapekṣayā vyavahite hr̥tpuṇḍarīke'nvayaḥ |
apy ākāṅkṣitakāmavedanavidhikṣepas svapakṣe dvayam
yac chabdasya yad aikaṣeṣyam api yā tatrai'kavadbhāvitā || 30

Paṭutaravigrahādi vahatām bhavatāpavatām
bhagavadupāsanaṁ diviṣadām api sambhavati |
na tu śatam arthavādavacasām api mantragirām
vidhivad iha pramāṇam apadoṣam apumprabhavam || 31

Stutiparam ādyam atra nijasādhyā-vidheyaruci-
prajananasiddhaye svavacanīyaguṇādaravat |
tad itarathā na siddhyati vidhiṣv iva tattvavidām
katham asatā guṇena kathitena nutir bhavati || 32

Atha manavo vidheyaparibodhana-kāryamukhād-
vidhim upakurvate hi diviṣadvapurādidihiyam |
upajanayanta enam upakartum alam khalu te
katham iva devatādhiyam upaiti vapurvidhurā || 33

अथ सुरनरतिर्यक्स्थावरात्मप्रपञ्च-

प्रजननगणनासु छन्दसामन्तभागे ।

प्रकटतरमधीता विग्रहा देवताना-

मवकलय गतिञ्चोपासनप्रक्रियासु ॥ ३४ ॥

निगमशतनिदानैर्देवताविग्रहादि

स्फुटतरमितिहासैर्धर्मशास्त्रैः पुराणैः ।

अपि गदितमनन्तोपासनेऽस्याधिकारः

तदयममरवर्गस्तत्फलार्थी समर्थः ॥ ३५ ॥

संस्थानं कलयाकृतिं त्वनुगतं तावत्प्रतीमो हि तत्

ब्रूमश्चापरमप्यदर्शि न तथा पक्षान्तरे जातिषु ।

यद्ब्रह्मेत्वपुरस्सरीषु धिषणा बह्वीषु साधारणी

जातिर्जातिरितीदृशी फणितिरप्येवं मदीये पथि ॥ ३६ ॥

एका व्यक्तिषु भूयसीष्वनुगता पूर्णा प्रतिव्यक्ति या

संस्थानादपरा निरादिनिधना सा जातिरास्थीयताम् ।

गौर्गौरित्यनुवृत्तबुद्धिवचसी नो चेद्धटेते कथं

व्युत्पत्तिश्च कथं गवादिवचसां व्यक्तिष्वसङ्ख्यासु नः ॥ ३७ ॥

अत्र ब्रूमः प्रतीमः किमपि किमपरं वस्तु सास्नादिमत्त्वा-

द्भोत्वन्नामानुवृत्तव्यवहृतिविषयं तद्धि तादृक्षमैक्षि ।

गोत्वाजत्वाश्वतादिष्वनुगतमपरं वस्तु जातिष्वनेका-

स्वेकं जात्यादिशब्दव्यवहृतिघटकं जातिवादे किमूचे ॥ ३८ ॥

Atha suranara-tiryak-sthāvarātma-prapañca-
 prajanana-gaṇanāsu chandasām antabhāge |
 Prakṛtātaram adhītā vighrahā devatānām
 avakalaya gatiṁ co'pāsanaprakriyāsu || 34

Nigamaśatanidānair devatāvighrahādi
 sphuṭātaram itihāsair dharmasāstraiḥ purāṇaiḥ |
 api gaditam anantopāsane'syā'dhikārah
 tad ayam amaravargaḥ tatphalārthī samarthaḥ || 35

Samsthānam kalayā'kṛtiṁ tv anugatam tāvat pratīmo hi tat
 brūmaś cā'param apy adarśi na tathā pakṣāntare jātiṣu |
 yadvad gotvapurassariṣu dhiṣaṇā bahviṣu sādharmaṇī
 Jātir jātir iti'drśi phanītir apy evam madye pathi || 36

Ekā vyaktiṣu bhūyasiṣv anugatā pūrṇā prativyakti yā
 samsthānād aparā nirādinidhanā sā jātir āsthīyatām |
 gaur gaur ity anuvṛttabuddhivacasī no ced ghaṭete katham
 vyutpattiś ca katham gavādivacasām vyaktiṣv asaṅkhyāsu
 naḥ || 37

Atra brūmaḥ pratīmaḥ kimapi kim aparaṁ vastu sāsānādimatvād-
 gotvan nāmā'nuvṛttavyavahṛtiviṣayaṁ tad dhi tādrkṣam aikṣi |
 gotvā'jatvā'svatādiṣv anugatam aparaṁ vastu jātiṣv anekā-
 sv ekaṁ jātyādiśabda-vyavahṛtighaṭakaṁ jātivāde kim
 ūce || 38

अन्यस्यादर्शनेन व्यवहृतिघटनस्यान्यथैवोपपत्त्या
 कल्प्यत्वासम्भवेनाप्युभयसमयसङ्गीतसंस्थावलम्बी ।
 युक्तो जात्यादिशब्दस्सुसदृगिह मिथस्सा ह्यनुस्यूतधीवा-
 ग्युत्पत्त्यर्थेव यादृक्परसमयमतामाकृतिं सा व्यनक्ति ॥ ३९ ॥

अभावस्याभावो भवति खलु भावः परमते
 घटादेरप्येवं कथय किमभावो न भवति ।
 घटस्य प्रध्वंसो भवति हि कपालत्वमपर-
 स्त्वभावः पिण्डत्वं किमिह ददृशे किञ्चिदपरम् ॥ ४० ॥

संसर्गाभावमेवं विदुरिह सुधियो भावमेव त्वभावं
 मन्वानाः कुम्भवद् भूतलत इतरभूभागभेदस्त्वभावः ।
 यस्तत्तत्कालभेदव्यतिकरितगृहप्राङ्गणादिप्रदेशः
 कुम्भाभावाश्रयोऽन्यैरगणि स इह नः काधिकस्योपलम्भः ॥ ४१ ॥

सच्च त्यच्चेति सृष्ट्वा विशसि चिदचितौ तेन चोक्तोऽसि विश्वं
 त्वज्जत्वात्त्वल्लयनत्वात्त्वमिति च निखिलं त्वच्छरीरं किलेति ।
 तैस्तैश्शस्त्रैरभेदव्यवहृतिहृदयं विस्तृणानैर्निरस्ता
 भेदाभेदावभेदं भ्रममपि भगवन् कारणं कल्पयन्तः ॥ ४२ ॥

उन्नीतं गुरुणारुणाधिकरणे न ह्येकहायन्यगा-
 दारुण्यान्वयमाभिधानिकमपि त्वाक्षेपतः प्राप तम् ।
 यद्भूतेऽरुणयेति केवलगुणं वाग्द्रव्यनिर्देश-
 द्वाक्यस्थानगिरस्तु कारकविभक्त्यन्ता मिथस्सङ्गताः ॥ ४३ ॥

Anyasyā'darśanena vyavahṛtighaṭanasyā'nyathai'vo'papattyā
kalpyatvā'sambhavenā'py ubhayasamaya-saṅgītasamsthāva-
lambī |
yukto jātyādiśabdāḥ susadṛg iha mithas sā hy anusyūtadhīvāg-
vyutpattyarhai'va yādṛk parasamayamatām ākṛtim sā
vyanakti || 39

Abhāvasyā'bhāvo bhavati khalu bhāvaḥ paramate
ghaṭāder apy evam kathaya kim abhāvo na bhavati |
ghaṭasya pradhvaṁso bhavati hi kapālatvam aparas
tv abhāvaḥ piṇḍatvam kim iha dadṛśe kiñcid aparam || 40

Samsargābhāvam evam vidur iha sudhiyo bhāvam eva tv a-
bhāvam
manvānāḥ kumbhavad bhūtalata itarabhūbhāgabhedas
tv abhāvaḥ |
yas tattatkālabheda-vyatikarita-grha-prāṅgaṇādi-pradeśaḥ
kumbhābhāvāśrayo'nyair agaṇi sa iha naḥ kvā'dhikasyo'
palambhaḥ || 41

Sac ca tyac ce'ti sṛṣṭvā viśasi cidacitau tena co'kto'si viśvam
tvajjatvāt tvallyanatvāt tvam iti ca nikhilam tvaccharīraṁ
kile'ti |
tais taiś śāstrair abhedavyavahṛtiḥṛdayaṁ vistrṇānair
nirastā
bhedābhedāḥ abhedāṁ bhramam api Bhagavan ! kāraṇam
kalpayantaḥ || 42

Unnītaṁ Guruṇā'ruṇādhikaraṇe na hye'kahāyany agād
āruṇyānvayam ābhidhānikam api tv ākṣepataḥ prāpa tam |
yad brūte'ruṇaye'ti kevalaguṇaṁ vāgdravyanirdeśavad
vākyasthānagiras tu kārakavibhaktyantā mithas
saṅgatāḥ || 43

अरुणाधिकरणसरणिस्समगणि रामानुजार्यमुनिभिर्या ।
उचितेयमनुचितान्या परिषदि विदुषां स्फुटीभवति ॥ ४४ ॥

उपात्तेऽपि द्रव्ये विसदृशविभक्तिव्यपगमा-
त्प्रकृत्या वैशिष्ट्यं परिणमति खल्वाकृतिनयात् ।
विभक्तिस्त्वर्थैक्यं प्रथयति समानैव पदयोः
त्रिरूपा सा सङ्ख्यानवयमिव दिशेत्कारकधियम् ॥ ४५ ॥

आदावीश्वरदत्तयैव पुरुषस्वातन्त्र्यशक्त्या स्वयं
तत्तज्ज्ञानचिकीर्षणप्रयतनान्युत्पादयन्वर्तते ।
तत्रोपेक्ष्य ततोऽनुमत्य विदधत्तन्निग्रहानुग्रहौ
तत्तत्कर्मफलं प्रयच्छति पुनस्सर्वस्य पुंसो हरिः ॥ ४६ ॥

दुष्कर्मस्वनिवर्तनानुमनने पुंसः करोत्यच्युतः
स्वातन्त्र्येण निरङ्कुशेन सगुणश्श्रुत्या न दोषो हरेः ।
दृष्टश्चारिषु निग्रहो गुणतया लोके न दोषात्मना
न स्यादाश्रयसिद्धिरौपनिषदं नो चेत्प्रमाणं वचः ॥ ४७ ॥

दुष्कर्मव्यवसायतस्तु विरतो यस्तस्य पुंसः पुरा
भूयोजन्मसमार्जितान्यगणितान्यागांस्यनाहत्य यत् ।
तस्यानन्तसुखाप्तये च यतते लक्ष्मीसहायस्स्वयं
तत्कारुण्यपुरस्सरो गुणगणस्तस्यायमुज्जृम्भते ॥ ४८ ॥

आदौ भेदश्रुतीनामनृतविषयता लक्षणा चैक्यवाचां
दूरेणैव प्रहाणं तदुभयघटनात्पराणाञ्च वाचाम् ।
प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणस्वरसगतिहतिस्तर्कबाधश्च भूया-
न्मायावादे तदेतत्सकलमितरथा लक्ष्मणाचार्यपक्षे ॥ ४९ ॥

Aruṇādhikaraṇasaraṇis samagaṇi Rāmānujāryamunibhir yā |
ucite'yam anucitā'nyā pariṣadi viduṣāṁ sphuṭibhavati || 44

Upātte'pi dravye visadrśavibhaktivyapagamāt
prakṛtyā vaiśiṣṭyaṁ pariṇamati khalv ākṛtinayāt |
vibhaktis tv arthaikyam prathayati samānai'va padayoḥ
trirūpā sā saṅkhyānvayam iva diśet kārakadhiyam || 45

Ādāv Īśvaradattayai'va puruṣas svātantryaśaktyā svayam
tattajñānacikīrṣaṇaprayatanāny utpādayan vartate |
tatro'pekṣya tato'numatya vidadhat tannigrahānugraha
tattatkarmaphalam prayacchati punas sarvasya puṁso
hariḥ || 46

Duṣkarmasv anivartanānumanane puṁsaḥ karoty acyutaḥ
svātantryeṇa niraṅkuṣeṇa saḡuṇaś śrutyā na doṣo hareḥ |
dṛṣṭaś cāriṣu nigraho ḡuṇatayā loke na doṣātmanā
na syād āśrayasiddhir aupaniṣadam no cet pramāṇam
vacaḥ || 47

Duṣkarmavyavasāyatas tu virato yas tasya puṁsaḥ purā
bhūyojanmasamārjitāny agaṇitāny āgāṁsy anādr̥tya yat |
tasyā'nantasukhāptaye ca yatate lakṣmīsaḡāyas svayam
tatkāruṇyapurassaro ḡuṇagaṇas tasyā'yam uj̄j̄r̄mbhate || 48

Ādau bhedaśrutinām anṛtaviṣayatā lakṣaṇā cai'kyavācām
dūreṇai'va prahāṇam tadubhayaghaṭanātatparāṇāṁ ca vācām |
pratyakṣādipramāṇa-svarasagatihatis tarkabādhaś ca bhūyāt
māyāvāde tad etat sakalam itarathā Lakṣmaṇācāryapakṣe || 49

न द्वैतं प्रतिपादयन्त्युपनिषद्वाचः प्रसिद्धं हि तत्
 किन्त्वद्वैतमनन्यगोचरतया तद्वेद्यमास्थीयताम् ।
 अप्राप्ते खलु शास्त्रमर्थवदिति व्यर्थः प्रयासो यतः
 प्रख्यातादितरस्तु शास्त्रविषयो भेदस्त्वदद्वैतवत् ॥ ५० ॥

यच्छ्वेताश्वतरश्रुतिर्नृबहुतामेको बहूनामिति
 ब्रूते तत्र विधिर्विशिष्टविषयस्त्वष्टाकपालादिवत् ।
 नित्यत्वात्मबहुत्वमत्र निगमादन्यत्र विद्मः कथं
 प्रत्यक्तवेन पराक्तया स्वपरयोर्मुक्तौ च भेदस्फुटः ॥ ५१ ॥

सामानाधिकरण्यभागिषु पदस्तोमेषु सर्वेषु किं
 प्रत्याय्यं व्यतिरिच्यते प्रतिपदं वक्तव्यमद्वैतिना ।
 यद्वा नेति न चेदनर्थकतया नैकातिरिक्तं पदं
 पठ्येत प्रतिवादिनस्त्वितरथा युक्तिस्त्वमासीदिति ॥ ५२ ॥

दृश्यत्वादनृतं विगीतमिति यद् दृष्टान्तयन्तो जगु-
 रशुक्त्यारोपितरूप्यमत्र कतिचित्तत्रेदमाचक्ष्महे ।
 धर्मिग्राहकमानधिककृतमिदं सोपाधिकत्वं पुनः
 सौत्रं व्यक्तमभङ्गुरं व्यभिचरल्लिङ्गञ्च भङ्गाय वः ॥ ५३ ॥

मिथ्यात्वं भ्रान्तिसिद्धं यदि खलु जगतस्साध्यते सिद्धसाध्यो
 हेतुस्सत्यः प्रपञ्चो भवति हि यदि वा सत्यमद्वैतहानिः ।
 साध्यं ब्रह्मस्वरूपं यदि भवति तदा सिद्धसाध्यत्वमेव
 स्यादेवं च प्रपञ्चव्युदसनसरणिर्दूरतस्ते निरस्ता ॥ ५४ ॥

VEDĀRTHA-SAMGRAHA

BY

BHAGAVĀN RĀMĀNUJA

EDITED WITH ENGLISH TRANSLATION AND NOTES

BY

R. RAMANUJACHARI, M.A.,

AND

PANDIT K. SRINIVASACHARYA.

श्रीः
श्रीमते रामानुजाय नमः

। वेदार्थासङ्ग्रहः ।

अशेषचिदचिद्वस्तुशेषिणे शेषशायिने ।
निर्मलानन्तकल्याणनिधये विष्णवे नमः ॥

परं ब्रह्मैवाज्ञं भ्रमपरिगतं संसरति त
त्परोपाध्यालीढं विवशमशुभस्यास्पदमिति ।
श्रुतिन्यायापेतं जगति विततं मोहनमिदं
तमो येनापास्तं स हि विजयते यामुनमुनिः ॥

I bow to Viṣṇu, the Lord for whose glory all the sentient and non-sentient objects exist, who has his repose on the serpent Śeṣa and in whom abide an infinity of spotless and auspicious qualities.

Views such as the following which are opposed at once to scripture and to logic have acted as a deluding mass of darkness and kept the world under its spell.—That the Supreme Brahman itself is affected by ignorance and by illusion (i.e. that of diversity) and is subject to the ever recurring cycle of births and deaths (*samsāra*);¹ that the Supreme Brahman itself, connected as it is with a limiting condition (*upādhi*), which is distinct from it, becomes subject to *karma*,² and that this Brahman itself becomes the seat of imperfections (by changing over into sentient and non-sentient entities).³ May the glory of the sage Yāmuna, by whom was dispelled this darkness of ignorance, live for ever.

1. The Advaitins.

2. Bhāskara and his followers.

3. Yādavaprakāśa and those of his way of thinking.

अशेषजगद्धितानुशासनश्रुतिनिकरशिरसि समधिगतोऽयमर्थः—जीवपरमात्मयाथा-
 त्म्यज्ञानपूर्वकवर्णाश्रमेतिकर्तव्यताकपरमपुरुषचरणयुगलध्यानार्चनप्रणामादिरत्यर्थप्रियस्तत्प्राप्ति-
 फलः । अस्य जीवात्मनोऽनाद्यविद्यासञ्चितपुण्यपापरूपकर्मप्रवाहहेतुकब्रह्मादिसुरनरतिर्यक्-
 स्थावरात्मकचतुर्विधदेहप्रवेशकृततत्तदात्माभिमानजनितावर्जनीयभवभयविध्वंसनाय देहातिरि-
 क्तात्मस्वरूपतत्त्वभावतदन्तर्यामिपरमात्मस्वरूपतत्त्वभावतदुपासनतत्फलभूतात्मस्वरूपाविर्भा-
 वपूर्वकानवधिकातिशयानन्दब्रह्मानुभवज्ञापने प्रवृत्तं हि वेदान्तवाक्यजातम्—‘तत्त्वमसि’
 ‘अयमात्मा ब्रह्म’ ‘य आत्मनि तिष्ठान्नात्मनोऽन्तरो यमात्मा न वेद यस्यात्मा
 शरीरं य आत्मानमन्तरो यमयति स त आत्मानन्तर्याम्यमृतः’ ‘एष सर्वभूतान्तरा-
 त्मापहतपाप्मा दिव्यो देव एको नारायणः’ ‘तमेतं वेदानुवचनेन ब्राह्मणा विविदिषन्ति

The following truth is clearly learnt from the upaniṣads which constitute, as it were, the summit of the collection of scriptures that authoritatively formulate what is good for the whole world :—The attainment of the Supreme Self results from the meditation, adoration and worship of the feet of the Supreme Lord in a spirit of utmost love and devotion and helped by the performance of duties relating to *varṇa* (caste) and *āśrama* (stage in life) and based on an understanding of the real nature of the individual self and the Supreme Self. On account of the stream of karma in the shape of merit (*punya*) and demerit (*pāpa*) accumulated through beginningless ignorance (*avidyā*), the individual self enters into four kinds of bodies—the gods like Brahṁā, men, animals and those that cannot move—and comes to identify itself falsely with the respective bodies, and, as a consequence, is afflicted by the dread of samsāra. For the purpose of dispelling this irresistible fear of samsāra, the collection of upaniṣadic texts of which a few are given below has been formulated, and their teaching is as follows.—The essence of the self which is in reality different from the body ; its characteristics ; the essence of the Supreme Self, who dwells within it and His characteristics ; the loving meditation of the Lord ; and the resulting experience of Brahman which is of unsurpassed excellence and which presupposes the blossoming of the soul's own essential nature. “That thou art,” “This self is Brahman ;” “He who dwelling within the self, is within the self, whom the self does not know, whose body the self is, who from within rules the self—He is thine Inner Ruler, the Immortal Self ;” “He is the Inner Self of all beings ;” “He is devoid of evils ; He is the Divine Lord ; He is the one Nārāyaṇa,” “Brahmins desire to know Him by reciting the

यज्ञेन दानेन तपसानाशकेन ' ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परम् ' 'तमेवं विद्वानमृत इह भवति नान्यः पन्था अयनाय विद्यते ' इत्यादिकम् ।

जीवात्मनः स्वरूपं देवमनुष्यादिप्रकृतिपरिणामविशेषरूपनानाविधभेदरहितं ज्ञानानन्दैकगुणम् । तस्यैतस्य कर्मकृतदेवादिभेदे विध्वस्ते स्वरूपभेदो वाचामगोचरः स्वसंवेद्यः ज्ञानस्वरूपमित्येतावदेव निर्देश्यम् । तच्च सर्वेषामात्मनां समानम् ।

एवंविधचिदचिदात्मकप्रपञ्चस्योद्भवस्थितिप्रलयसंसारनिवर्तनैकहेतुभूतः समस्त-
हेयप्रत्यनीकतयानन्तकल्याणैकतानतया च स्वेतरसमस्तवस्तुविलक्षणस्वरूपोऽनवधिका-
तिशयासङ्ख्येयकल्याणगुणगणः सर्वात्मपरब्रह्मपरज्योतिः परतत्त्वपरमात्मसदादिशब्दभेदै-
र्निखिलवेदान्तवेद्यो भगवान्नारायणः पुरुषोत्तमः इत्यन्तर्यामिस्वरूपम् । अस्यैव च वैभव-

Vedas, by giving gifts, and by austerities, such as fasting ;" " He who knows Brahman attains the Highest ;" " He who knows Him becomes immortal here ; there is no other way of attaining final release."

The finite soul is, in its essence, free from manifold distinctions, such as devas and men, which are in reality only diverse modifications of matter (*prakṛti*) ; it has knowledge (*jñāna*) and bliss (*ānanda*) for its chief characteristics ; and when, in regard to this self, such distinctions as gods and the like born of *karma* are totally destroyed, it is no longer possible to distinguish with the aid of words one self from another. It is impossible, when this stage is reached, to say " This is the soul of a deva," " That is the soul of a man " and so forth. Individuality is a thing to be grasped by each self. In the state of purity, when the distinctions born of *karma* are lost, all that could be said is that the self is in its essential nature *jñāna* ; but this is a feature shared in common by all souls.

The essential nature of the Inner Controller consists in His being the Supreme Puruṣa, Bhagavān Nārāyaṇa, who is the main cause of the creation, the sustenance and the dissolution of the entire universe consisting of sentient and non-sentient entities referred to above, and of the removal of the bondage of *samsāra*. Being opposed to all that is evil, and being the abiding place of limitless perfections, He is in His essential nature distinct from every thing other than Himself. He possesses an infinite collection of auspicious qualities which are unsurpassed in excellence ; He is referred to in all the upaniṣads by expressions, such as ' the Self of all ', ' the Supreme Brahman ', ' the Supreme Light ', ' the Supreme Truth ', ' the Supreme Self ', and ' Existence.' By describing the world with the aid of expressions, such as,

प्रतिपादनपराः श्रुतयः स्वेतरसमस्तचिदचिद्वस्तुजातान्तरात्मतया निखिलनियमनं तच्छ-
क्तितदंशतद्विभूतितद्रूपतच्छरीरतत्तनुप्रभृतिभिः शब्दैस्तत्सामानाधिकरण्येन च प्रतिपाद-
यन्ति ।

तस्य वैभवप्रतिपादनपराणामेषां सामानाधिकरण्यादीनां विवरणे प्रवृत्ताः केचन
निर्विशेषज्ञानमात्रमेव ब्रह्म ; तच्च नित्यमुक्तस्वप्रकाशस्वभावमपि तत्त्वमस्यादिसामानाधि-
करण्यावगतजोवैक्यं ब्रह्मैवाज्ञं बध्यते मुच्यते च ; निर्विशेषचिन्मात्रातिरेकी ईशेशितव्याद्य-
नन्तविकल्पस्वरूपं कृत्स्नं जगन्मिथ्या ; कश्चिद्वद्वः कश्चिन्मुक्त इतीयं व्यवस्था न विद्यते ;
इतः पूर्वं केचन मुक्ता इत्ययमर्थो मिथ्या ; एकमेव शरीरं जीववत् ; निर्जीवानीतराणि
शरीराणि ; तच्छरीरं किमिति न व्यवस्थितम् ; आचार्यो ज्ञानोपदेष्टा मिथ्या ; शास्त्रञ्च
मिथ्या ; शास्त्रप्रमाता च मिथ्या ; शास्त्रजन्यं ज्ञानञ्च मिथ्या ; एतत्सर्वं मिथ्याभूतेनैव
शास्त्रेणावगम्यत इति वर्णयन्ति ।

‘His potency’ (*śakti*), ‘His parts’ (*aṁśa*), ‘His manifestations’ (*vibhūti*), ‘His form’ (*rūpa*), ‘His body’ (*śarīra*), ‘His person’ (*tanu*), and by equating the world with Him, the scriptures, whose sole aim is to speak of the glories that belong exclusively to Him, proclaim that He controls all the world by virtue of His being the Inner Soul of all things other than Himself.

Of the many people who have attempted to explain the significance of this equation (i.e. of the world with Brahman), whose aim is to bring out His glories, some⁴ are of the following opinion.—“Although Brahman is, in its essential nature, eternal, free and self-luminous, yet it itself is influenced by ignorance and thereby becomes bound and (later) is released, since it is learnt from co-ordinations, such as ‘That thou art’ to be identical with the finite self. Everything other than this pure consciousness, in fact, this entire universe consisting of endless distinctions, such as, the Lord and those who are under His control, is unreal (*mithyā*). There is no basis for the demarcation that one soul is bound and another liberated. The belief that some souls obtained the blessed state before is false. There is but a single body which is possessed of the individual self ; all other bodies are devoid of souls ; but it is difficult to determine and point out to that one body (which is associated with the finite self). The preceptor who imparts knowledge is unreal ; the *śāstras* too are unreal ; even the person who understands the *śāstras* is unreal ; the very knowledge that arises from them is unreal ; and all this is understood from the scriptures which are themselves unreal.”

अपरेऽपहतपाप्मत्वादिसमस्तकल्याणोपेतमपि ब्रह्म एतेनैक्यावबोधेन केनचिदुपाधि-विशेषेण सम्बद्धं बध्यते मुच्यते च, नानाविधमलरूपपरिणामास्पदं चेति व्यवस्थिताः ।

अन्ये पुनरैक्यावबोधयाथात्म्यं वर्णयन्तः स्वाभाविकनिरतिशयापरिमितोदार-गुणसागरं ब्रह्मैव सुरनरतिर्यक्स्थावरनारकिस्वर्ग्यपवर्गिचेतनैकस्वभावं स्वभावतो विलक्षण-मविलक्षणञ्च वियदादिनानाविधमलरूपपरिणामास्पदं चेति प्रत्यवतिष्ठन्ते ।

तत्र प्रथमपक्षस्य श्रुत्यर्थपर्यालोचनपरा दुष्परिहरान् दोषानुदाहरन्ति । तथा-हि—प्रकृतपरामर्शितच्छब्दावगतस्य ब्रह्मणः स्वसङ्कल्पकृतजगदुदयविभवविलयादयः ‘तदैक्षत बहु स्यां प्रजायेय’ इत्यारभ्य ‘सन्मूलाः सोम्येमाः सर्वाः प्रजाः सदायतनाः सत्प्रतिष्ठाः’ इत्यादिभिः पदैः प्रतिपादिताः । तत्सम्बन्धितया प्रकरणान्तरनिर्दिष्टाः सर्वज्ञतासर्वश-

For an identical reason, namely, the knowledge of oneness (conveyed by the texts equating Brahman with the world), others⁵ have come to the conclusion that although Brahman is endowed with auspicious qualities, such as that of being opposed to all evil, He comes to be bound to worldly life and is liberated therefrom by virtue of His association with a certain limiting condition (*upādhi*); He also becomes subject to manifold modifications which partake of the nature of imperfections.

Yet others,⁶ professing to teach the true significance of the knowledge of identity come forward to proclaim that Brahman Himself who possesses a sea of natural, excellent, inexhaustible and noble qualities, has the predominant nature of existing as manifold souls, such as divinities, men, animals, and immovable entities, souls in Hell, the denizens of Heaven (*svarga*), and those who have obtained release; that He is, in His essential nature, both different and non-different (from men and things); and that He is the source of manifold modifications, such as, ether (*ākāśa*), which share the character of diverse imperfections.

Against the first of these views those who have inquired deeply into the true significance of the scriptures have raised several objections that cannot be met. And they are as follows :—With the aid of expressions such as those found in the passage commencing with “It thought ‘Let me become manifold; let me be born’” and ending with “All these beings, my dear, have their origin in *Sat*, their support in *Sat*, and are absorbed in *Sat*,” the creation, sustenance and dissolution of the world are said to result from the mere will (*saṁkalpa*) of Brahman referred to by the word ‘that’ (i.e. *tat* occurring in the passage *tat tvam asi*)—a word indicative of the topic under discussion; countless, infinite, wonder-

5. The Bhāskariyas.

6. Yādvaprakāśa and his followers.

क्तित्वसर्वेश्वरत्वसर्वप्रकारत्वसमाभ्यधिकनिवृत्तिसत्यकामत्वसत्यसङ्कल्पत्वसर्वावभासकत्वाद्यनव-
धिकातिशयासङ्ख्येयकल्याणगुणगणा अपहृतपाप्मेत्याद्यनेकवाक्यावगतनिरस्तनिखिलदोषता
च सर्वे तस्मिन् पक्षे विहन्यन्ते ।

अथ स्यात्—उपक्रमेऽप्येकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानमुखेन कारणस्यैव सत्यतां प्रति-
ज्ञाय, तस्य कारणभूतस्यैव सत्यतां विकारजातस्य चासत्यतां मृददृष्टान्तेन दर्शयित्वा,
सत्यभूतस्यैव ब्रह्मणः ‘सदेव सौम्येदमग्र आसीत् एकमेवाद्वितीयम्’ इति सजाती-
यविजातीयनिखिलभेदनिरसनेन निर्विशेषतैव प्रतिपादिता । एतच्छोधकानि प्रकर-
णान्तरगतवाक्यान्यपि ‘सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म’ ‘निष्कलं निष्क्रियं निर्गुणं निरञ्जनम्’
‘विज्ञानमानन्दम्’ इत्यादीनि सर्वविशेषप्रत्यनीकाकारतां बोधयन्ति । न

ful and auspicious qualities, such as omniscience, omnipotence, lordship over all things, possession of all things as His attributes (*prakāra*), the character of being unequalled and unsurpassed, the possession of the transcendental realm, and of a will (*samkalpa*) that is ever fulfilled, and the power to illumine all things are spoken of in other contexts as belonging to that Brahman; that Brahman is free from all evil is learnt from many passages, such as “He is not subject to the taint of karma.” All these would, on this theory, be self-contradictory.

The Advaitins may contend as follows:—“Having asserted at the very outset, through the formulation that by knowing one thing all things become understood, that the cause alone is real, and having shown with the aid of the example of clay that the causal substance alone is real and that all modifications are unreal, and having negated with the aid of the text “In the beginning, my dear, this was just Being, one only, without a second” all distinctions from objects similar to itself and from those dissimilar to itself, the character of being distinctionless is attributed to that Brahman which alone (as described at the outset) is real. Texts found in other contexts also which attempt to determine the nature of Brahman (*śodhaka-vākya*) teach that Brahman has the character of being opposed to all distinctions. E-g. “Brahman is existence (*satya*), knowledge (*jñāna*) and infinity (*ananta*);”⁷ “without parts, without action (*niṣkṛya*), without qualities (*nirguṇa*), without attachment (*nirañjana*);”⁸ “knowledge (*viñāna*), bliss (*ānanda*).”⁹ It cannot be said, (the Advaitin continues), that if all words denote the single feature (of being opposed to all distinctions), they would become

7. *Tait. up.* I.i.

8. *Śvet. up.* VI.19.

9. *Bṛh. up.* V.ix.28.

चैकाकारताबोधे पदानां पर्यायता ; एकत्वेऽपि वस्तुनः सर्वविशेषप्रत्यनीकाकारत्वोप-
स्थापनेन सर्वपदानामर्थवत्त्वादिति ।

नैतदेवम् । एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानं सर्वस्य मिथ्यात्वे सर्वस्य ज्ञातव्यस्या-
भावान्न सेत्स्यति ; सत्यमिथ्यात्वयोरैकताप्रसक्तिर्वा ; अपि त्वेकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानप्रतिज्ञा
सर्वस्य तदात्मकत्वेनैव सत्यत्वे सिद्धयति ।

अयमर्थः—श्वेतकेतुं प्रत्याह ‘स्तब्धोऽस्युत तमादेशमप्राक्ष्यः’ इति । परिपूर्ण इव
लक्ष्यसे ; तानाचार्यान्प्रति तमप्यादेशं पृष्ठवानसीति । आदिश्यतेऽनेनेत्यादेशः । आदेशः
प्रशासनम् । ‘एतस्य वा अक्षरस्य प्रशासने गार्गि सूर्याचन्द्रमसौ विधृतौ तिष्ठतः’ इत्यादि-
भिरैकार्थ्यात् । तथा च मानवं वचः ‘प्रशासितारं सर्वेषाम्’ इत्यादि ।

synonyms (i.e. idle repetitions) ; for, though reality is unitary, all the
words become serviceable in so far as they signify that, in its essential
nature, it is opposed to all distinctions (i.e., each word denotes that
Brahman is opposed to the contradictory of the feature suggested by
that word. Eg. *satyam* conveys the idea that Brahman is opposed to
asatya).

This contention is untenable. The proposition “By knowing one
thing all things become known” is undemonstrable ; for if all things
are unreal, there would be no ‘all things’ (*sarva*) to be known.
Again, either the reality (of the world) or the unreality (of Brahman)
would result, (since the proposition “By knowing one thing all things
become known” implies identity of nature between that one thing and
all things). But it is only when (as on our theory) all things are con-
sidered real, for the reason of their having Brahman for their Self, the
assertion that ‘the knowledge of all things results from a knowledge of
one thing’ becomes intelligible.

This is the true meaning (of the text in question) :—He (Uddālaka)
asked (his son) Śvetaketu : “stabdosi, uta tamādeśam aprākṣyaḥ,”
meaning thereby “you appear like one fully learned ; did you ask those
teachers about that *ādeśa* also ?” ‘*Ādeśa*’ means ‘one by whom *ādeśa*
is exercised ; and *ādeśa* denotes control or command (*praśāsana*) ; for it
has an identical meaning with (the word *praśāsana* occurring in) pas-
sages such as “In fact the Sun and the Moon, O Gārgi, stand well sup-
ported through the control of this Imperishable Brahman (*Akṣara*).”¹⁰
There are also the statements of Manu, such as, “(He is) the ruler of
all (*praśāsītāram sarveṣām*).”¹¹

10. *Brh. up.* V.viii.8.

11. *Manu-smṛti* XII.122.

अत्रापि 'एकमेव' इति जगदुपादानतां प्रतिपाद्य 'अद्वितीय' पदेन अधिष्ठात्रन्तरनिवारणादस्यैवाधिष्ठातृत्वमपि प्रतिपाद्यते । अतस्तं प्रशासितारं जगदुपादानभूतमपि पृष्ठवानसि येन श्रुतेन मतेन विज्ञातेन अश्रुतममतमविज्ञातं श्रुतं मतं विज्ञातं भवति इत्युक्तं स्यात् । निखिलजगदुदयविभवविलयादिकारणभूतं सर्वज्ञत्वसत्यकामत्वसत्यसङ्कल्पत्वाद्यपरिमितोदारगुणसागरं किं ब्रह्म त्वया श्रुतमिति हार्दा भावः ।

तस्य निखिलकारणतया कारणमेव नानासंस्थानविशेषसंस्थितं कार्यमित्युच्यत इति कारणभूतसूक्ष्मचिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरकब्रह्मविज्ञानेन कार्यभूतमखिलं जगद्विज्ञातं भवतीति हृदि निधाय 'येनाश्रुतं श्रुतं भवत्यमतं मतमविज्ञातं विज्ञातम्' इति पुत्रं प्रति पृष्ठवान् पिता ।

(As in these parallel passages) here also (i.e. in the text under discussion) after stating with the aid of the expression 'one only' (*ekam eva*) that He is the material cause (*upādāna-kāraṇa*) of the universe, and by denying with the help of the expression 'without a second' (*advitiya*) that it has any other controller (*adhiṣṭhātā*), it is asserted that He is also the efficient cause. Therefore, the question addressed by Uddālaka would amount to asking: 'Did you ask also for Him, who is at once the controller and the material cause of the world, for Him by hearing, thinking and knowing whom what was not heard, what was not thought, and what was not known become heard, thought and known?' The following was the idea at the back of Uddālaka's mind (when he asked the question): "Was that Brahman who is the cause of the origin, sustenance and destruction of the entire world, and who possesses a sea of limitless and noble qualities, such as omniscience, possession of the supernatural realm, possession of a will that is ever fulfilled, inquired into by you?" Bearing in mind the fact that, since the cause itself assuming different specific shapes comes to be spoken of as the effect, and also the fact that since Brahman is the cause of all things, the entire universe which is of the nature of an effect becomes known by knowing Him who is the universal cause and who has for His body all the sentient and non-sentient entities existing in a subtle (*sūkṣma*) state, the Father questioned his son thus: "(Did you ask for Him by hearing, thinking and knowing of whom) what was not heard of becomes heard, what was not thought of becomes thought, and what what was not known becomes known?"

NĪTIMĀLĀ

By

NĀRĀYANĀRYA

Edited with Introduction and Notes

By

R. RAMANUJACHARI

AND

K. SRINIVASACHARI

**श्रीः
श्रीमते रामानुजाय नमः
भूमिका**

श्रीमन्नारायणार्थप्रतिभाद्रविणनिक्षेपायमाणं नीतिमालाभिधानं प्रबन्धरत्नमिदं जीवितमिव जागर्ति श्रीमद्विशिष्टाद्वैतसिद्धान्तस्य । आदर्शविमलोऽयं प्रबन्धः नातिसंक्षेपविस्तररमणीयैः प्रस्फुटार्थैः वाक्यजालैः न केवलं कुशाग्रधिषणानामपितु मृदुप्रज्ञानामपि हृदयमावर्जयतीति नेदमनुभवापेतं वचनम् । तदेतत्प्रबन्धरत्नमियता कालेन केवलं श्रवणपथगोचरं दिष्ट्येदानीं दृष्टिपथमवतीर्णं विद्वज्जनानुभाव्यं भवतीति महदिदं पण्डितमण्डलीभागधेयम् । एतत्प्रबन्धप्रणेता नारायणार्याः कदा कतमं देशमलमकुर्वन्निति अदसीयैः अन्यदीयैर्वा वचनैर्नेदंतया निर्णेतुं शक्यते ; अथापि श्रीभाष्यकारसिद्धान्तस्यैव तत्रतत्र श्रीभाष्यवाक्यानुदाहृत्य व्यवस्थापनात्, श्रीमद्वेदान्तदेशिकगुरुवर्यैः स्वप्रबन्धेष्वेतन्नीतिमालावाक्यानां भूयिष्ठमुदाहरणाच्चेमे आचार्याः श्रीभाष्यकाराणां अर्वाचीनाः श्रीमन्निगमान्तमहागुरुणां प्राचीनाश्चेति सामान्यतो निर्णये मन्यामहे न विमर्शका विप्रतिपद्येरन्निति । तथाहि—श्रीमन्न्यायसिद्धान्तज्ञेने जडद्रव्यपरिच्छेदे^१ ‘यत्तु नीतिमालायां नारायणार्थैरुक्तं “ज्ञानस्य तु परात्तत्वाभावमात्रमेव न तु प्रत्यक्त्वम्” इति’ । तथा तत्रैव जीवपरिच्छेदे^२ ‘नारायणार्थैस्तु संभूतिविनाशशब्दौ फलद्वारा लक्षणया विद्याकर्मविषयावुक्तौ “विदुषो विद्यासाध्यस्यापवर्गस्य सम्यगभिवृद्धिरूपत्वात्” इत्यादिना’ इति । एवमीश्वरपरिच्छेदे^३ ‘अयमेवार्थः नारायणार्थैरप्युक्तः “गुणैरित्यताराहित्याद्बस्तुना अपरिच्छिन्नत्वं चावगम्यते” इति’ इति । तत्रैव अद्रव्यपरिच्छेदे^४ ‘यत्तु नारायणार्थैरुक्तं “संस्थानमेव जातिः तत्प्रतिपिण्डं भिन्नत्वेऽपि द्वितीयादिपिण्डेषु सौसादृश्यात् प्रतिसंधीयमानं स्वाश्रयेषु वस्तुष्वेकबुद्धिशब्दनिबन्धनं भवति...इति’ एवं ‘देवप्रीत्यादिकं वा’ इति^५ तत्त्वमुक्ताकलापश्लोकस्य व्याख्यानावसरे ‘आप्तस्य हित-

१. न्याय सिद्धा

Sri Vaisṇava Siddhānta Grantha Ratnamālā edition.

Madras पुट. १६

२. न्याय सिद्धा (Madras edition) पुट १६२, १६३

३. न्याय सिद्धा (Madras edition) पु. २१२

४. न्याय सिद्धा (Madras edition) पु. ३७५

५. देवप्रीत्यादिकं वा विदितमिह विधिप्रत्ययस्यास्तु वाच्यं

नात्रान्योन्याश्रयो न श्रुतपरिहरणं नापि क्लृप्तिर्गर्हिष्ठा ।

प्राधान्यं स्याच्च किञ्चिन्नृपभजननयास्तिद्धमेतच्चशास्त्रै

रिथं स्वार्थविरोधेऽप्यतिगरिभयान्नेष्यते शब्दशक्तिः ॥

Tattva-Muktā-Kalāpa

पु. ६८०

Prof. Rāmamiśra Śāstri edition, Benares.

कामस्य नियोगं केचिदूचिरे' इति नारायणार्याणामुक्तिः सर्वार्थसिद्धौ प्रस्तूयते । तथा तत्रैव 'आप्तस्याहुर्नियोगं हितमभिलषितं केऽपि भाष्याशयस्थं' इत्यत्र सर्वार्थसिद्धौ^६ 'स्वपक्षनिष्ठानामेव केषांचित् ईश्वरनियोगरूपविधिपक्षं विविच्य दर्शयति' इत्यवतरणदर्शनात् श्लोके केचित्पदेन नारायणार्या अभिप्रेता इति स्पष्टमवगम्यते । एवं न्यायपरिशुद्धावपि^७ 'नारायणार्यैस्त्वेवमुक्तं' इत्यारम्य 'आप्तस्य हितकामस्य नियोगं केचिदूचिरे । भाष्यकारोऽपि भगवानेतदेवान्वमन्यत' इति नीतिमालावचनमनूद्यते । तथा 'विध्युत्तयाधीत्य वेदान्' इति सारावलोक्तस्य^८ व्याख्याने चिन्तामणौ कुमारवरददेशिकः वचनमिदमुदाहरति ।

एवं मीमांसापादुकायां^९ 'सूत्रोक्तं नूनमन्यत्' इति श्लोके नारायणार्यास्सबहुमानं निर्दिश्यन्ते वेदान्तगुरुभिः । अतो निश्चप्रचमिदं वक्तुं शक्यते श्रीभाष्यकारसिद्धान्तनिष्ठा नारायणार्याः श्रीमन्निगमान्तगुरूणां प्राचीनाश्चेति । कचिदेतेषां नारायणार्याणां सिद्धान्तमननुमन्यमाना अपि निगमान्तगुरवः तत्र तत्र सबहुमानमेतानाचार्यान्निर्दिशन्तः स्वीयमादरातिशयं सम्यगाविष्कुर्वन्ति ।

एते च नारायणार्याः जैमिनीयानि मीमांसासूत्राणि पौनरुक्त्यादिदोषदूषितानि मन्वानाः संगृह्य सूत्राण्यन्यानि प्राचीकशन्निति पादुकापरित्राणे कुमारवरददेशिकाः प्रतिपादयन्ति । तथाहि—'सूत्रोक्तं नूनमन्यत्' इति पादुकाश्लोके इमानि परित्राणवाक्यानि^{१०} 'अत एव प्राज्ञा नारायणार्याः परिमितगभीराणि परस्परविरोधादिरहितानि सूत्राणि प्रणीय अधिकरणानां पञ्चशतीमेव मीमांसाशास्त्रमाचक्षते । अन्यानि पुनरधिकरणानि पौनरुक्त्यादिदोषदूषितान्यकथयन्.....यत्तु प्राज्ञैर्नारायणार्यैस्संगृह्य कथनं न तज्जैमिनीयवचनदूषणायते । जैमिनिर्हि मन्दामन्दसकलशिष्यजनसंवित्तिसौकर्यार्थं मन्दप्रयोजनान्यधिकरणानि पृथगनुकथयांचकार । नारायणार्यास्तु प्रौढविद्वज्जनपरिग्रहाभिसंधिना प्रधाना-

६. Tattva-Muktā-Kalāpa पु. ६८४

७. न्याय परि (Memorial edition, Madras) पुट. २८३

८. अधिकरण सारावली श्लो. २०

९. सूत्रोक्तं नून मन्यद्विदुरथ च मिथो व्याहृतं वृत्तिकाराः

प्राज्ञैर्नारायणार्यैस्तदिह विदधिरे सम्मतास्सूत्रभेदाः ।

सामाचार्योक्तिरेषा समरमुखगता तन्न सत्सङ्गृहीतेः

नत्वा नुत्वेनमाह ब्रह्मिङ्गुरूपि ब्रह्मविद्वाक्यभाष्यम् ॥ मी. पा. श्लो. ११

१०. मी. पा. (edited by Navanitam Krishnamachariar) grantha script पु १६

र्थप्रकाशनेन तुल्यन्यायतया सर्वमप्यर्थजातं परिमितेन ग्रन्थसन्दर्भेण प्राचीकशन्निति ११ द्वयोरप्यै-
करस्यसिद्धिरिति न विरोधगन्धः' इति । अतश्चेदमवगम्यते यदेते नारायणार्थी न केवल-
मुत्तरमीमांसायां पूर्वमीमांसायामप्यनितरसाधारणेन पाण्डित्यविमर्शयोः प्रकर्षेण व्यराजन्त
इति । परंतु एतेषां मीमांसासङ्ग्रहः प्रौढविद्वज्जनहृदयङ्गमः नाद्य यावदस्माकं चक्षुर्विषय-
मवतरति । हन्त ! श्रीभगवद्रामानुजसिद्धान्तस्य अथवा सर्वस्य सिद्धान्तस्य इदमेकं शोच-
नीयं वैशसं यद्वहूनां प्राचामाचार्यवर्याणां प्रबन्धाः भाग्यवैषम्यादस्माकं श्रोतुमपि दुर्लभतां
गमिता इति ।

मन्यामहे नैतदावेदनीयं विदुषां यद्गीताभाष्यमप्येते नारायणार्थी विरचितवन्त
इति ; यतस्तद्गीताभाष्यं काञ्च्यां सुदर्शनमुद्रालये मुद्रितं विलसति ।

तथा गीताभाष्यतात्पर्यचन्द्रिकायां 'सर्वधर्मान्परित्यज्य' इति श्लोकस्य व्याख्याना-
वसरे १२ 'अनियतधर्मपरित्यागोऽत्र विवक्षित इति नारायणार्थव्याख्यायामपि नानुष्ठानवि-
रोधः' इत्यारभ्य महता प्रबन्धेन नारायणार्थगीताव्याख्यानानुवादतद्दूषणानि प्रपञ्चि-
तानि । तत्रैव चोपरि १३ "पिशाचरन्तिदेवगुप्तशङ्करयादवप्रकाशभास्करनारायणार्थयज्ञस्वा-
मिप्रभृतिभिः स्वं स्वं मतमास्थितैः परशतैर्भाष्यकृद्भिः अस्मत्सिद्धान्ततीर्थकरैश्च भगवद्या-
मुनाचार्यभाष्यकारादिभिरविगीतपरिगृहीतोऽयमत्र सारार्थः—'भगवानेव परं तत्त्वं अनन्य-
शरणैर्यथाधिकारं तदेकाश्रयणं परमधर्मः' इति निगमितम् । न्यायपरिशुद्धावनुमानाध्याये
नारायणीयः गीताभाष्यश्लोकः अनुद्यते वेदान्तगुरुभिः १३ । यथा 'उक्तं च नारायणार्थैः
भगवद्गीताभाष्ये "प्रसिद्धमपि विज्ञानं वादे यो नाम निन्दते । स सदस्यैर्नियन्तव्यो
व्यवस्था नान्यथा यतः" इति ।

साम्प्रदायिकास्तु ऐतिह्यं किमप्यत्र समुदाहरन्ति । तथा हि एते नारायणार्थीः प्रथमं
कंचित्कालं यादवप्रकाशान्तेवासिन आसन् । तदात्वे च स्वाचार्यकृतस्य उपनिषत्सारनाम्नः
ग्रन्थस्य व्याख्यां तदनुमत्या रचयांबभूवुः । कदाचिदेते आचार्याः श्रीरङ्गमेत्य तत्र
श्रीभाष्यकारं छात्रेभ्यः स्वपदकमलमाश्रितेभ्यः विशिष्टाद्वैतसिद्धान्तं सोपपत्तिक-

११. गी. भा. (Ananda Press, Madras) पु. ९४७

१२. गी. भा. (Ananda Press, Madras) पु. ९५२

१३. न्याय. परि (Memorial edition, Madras) पु. १०१

मुपदिशन्तं साक्षात्कृतवन्तः । असकृत् श्रीभाष्यकारस्य कालक्षेपगोष्ठीं एत्य तदीयमुपदेशं शृण्वन्त एते कियताचित् कालेन यादवसिद्धान्ते शिथिलतादराः श्रीभाष्यकारसिद्धान्ते बद्धादराश्च बभूवुः । क्रमेण विशिष्टाद्वैतसिद्धान्त एव औपनिषदस्सर्वप्रमाणाविरुद्धश्चेति निश्चिन्वानाः श्रीभाष्यकारमेव गुरुमवृणत । अनन्तरमेव नीतिमालाभिधं प्रबन्धरत्नमिदं विरचितवन्त इति ।

अयमत्रास्मदीयो निष्कर्षः । भगवद्रामानुजसिद्धान्तनिष्ठा अप्येते नारायणार्याः कचित्कचित् स्वातन्त्र्यमवलम्बमाना अन्यथैव विशिष्टाद्वैतसिद्धान्तं शिक्षयन्तः भगवति रामानुजेऽतिशयितभक्तिमन्त इति ।


श्रीपाञ्चरात्ररक्षायां नित्यानुष्ठानस्थापनाधिकारे ‘भाष्यकाराव्यवहितशिष्यैः वज्रि-वंशेश्वरैः श्रीरङ्गनारायणाचार्यैः’ इत्यारभ्य काश्चन कारिका उदाहृताः^{१४} । एते च श्रीरङ्ग-नारायणाचार्याः नीतिमालाकर्तुः नारायणार्यात् अन्य एव भवितुमर्हन्ति ; यत एते ‘वज्रिवंशेश्वराः श्रीरङ्गनारायणाचार्या’ इति सोपपदं निर्दिश्यन्ते । नीतिमालाकर्तारस्तु निरुपपदं नारायणार्या इत्येव तत्र तत्र व्यपदिश्यन्ते । अत एव नीतिमालाकर्तुः नारायणार्याद्व्यावर्तयितुं ‘श्रीभाष्यकाराव्यवहितशिष्यैः वज्रिवंशेश्वरैः श्रीरङ्गनारायणाचार्यैः’ इति निर्दिशन्ति निगमान्तगुरवः । ஶ்ரீபாஞ்ராக்ஷா ஶ்ரீரங்கநாராயணாசார்யை: इति भाषायां प्रसिद्धाः श्रीरङ्गनारायणाचार्याः पाञ्चरात्ररक्षायां असकृदुदाहृतानां नारायणमुनीनां गुरव इति सुस्पष्टमवगम्यते ; यतस्तत्रैव नित्यव्याख्यानाधिकारे नारायणमुनीन्प्रकृत्य ‘तद्गुरुभिः वज्रिवंशेश्वरैः’ इति प्रतिपादितमस्ति^{१५} ।

इदमत्रावधेयम् — तात्पर्यचन्द्रिकायां नारायणार्यस्य यादवभास्करादिमध्ये परिगणनाद्यामुनादिभ्यस्सिद्धान्ततीर्थकरेभ्यः पृथक्करणाच्च, अयमन्य एव तत्र तत्र किञ्चित्स्वातन्त्र्यमवलम्बमानो नारायणार्यः । गुरुपङ्क्तिप्रविष्टाः श्रीभाष्यकाराव्यवहितशिष्या वज्रि-वंशेश्वरा नारायणमुनिगुरवश्श्रीरङ्गनारायणाचार्या नूनमेतस्मादतिरिच्यन्त इति ।

१४. श्रीपाञ्च रक्षा (edited by Raghavachariar, Madras-Grantha script) पुट. ३०

१५. श्रीपाञ्च. रक्षा. पुट.

॥ वादार्थसंग्रहः ॥



अथेदानीं एतद्ग्रन्थस्थानां दशानां वादानामर्थास्तङ्कयन्ते । ते चैवमुद्देशतो निरूपिता ग्रन्थकर्तृभिरेव निबन्धोपक्रमे—

१. “ पौर्वापर्यस्य नियमः कर्मब्रह्मविचारयोः ।

तथा वेदान्तवाक्यानामप्रामाण्यनिराक्रिया ॥

२. विवर्त्तपक्षक्षपणं परिणामनिराकृतिः ।

शक्तिविक्षेपभङ्गश्च ब्रह्मणो निर्णयस्तथा ॥

३. निर्णयः पुरुषस्यापि विधिरूपविनिर्णयः ।

दशार्थानधिकृत्येयं नीतिमाला प्रवर्तते ” ॥ इति ।

(१) तत्र प्रथमे ब्रह्मविचारस्य कर्मविचारानन्तर्यनिर्णयाधिकारे ‘ अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा ’ इति सूत्रसिद्धः कर्मब्रह्मविचारयोः पौर्वापर्यनियमस्समर्थ्यते । अद्वैतिनोऽत्र पूर्वपक्षिणः । ते ह्येवमाहुः—अनधीतवेदस्य विचारानुपपत्तेः यथा कर्मविचारः कर्मभागाध्ययनपूर्वकः, एवं ब्रह्मविचारोऽपि ब्रह्मभागाध्ययनपूर्वक एव ; न तत्र कर्मविचारापेक्षा ; बुभुक्षुर्मुमुक्षुश्चेति कर्म-ब्रह्मभागायोरधिकारिभेदात् । अध्ययनविधिर्यद्यर्थज्ञानपर्यन्तस्स्यात्, तदा विधिबलादध्ययनक्रमेण प्रथमं कर्मविचारः पश्चाद्ब्रह्मविचार इत्यापद्येत । स ह्यक्षरग्रहणमात्रपर्यवसायी । अर्थविचारस्तु रागप्राप्तः, न स वैधः । व्यापकत्वादव्यवहितत्वाच्चाक्षरग्रहणमेव फलमध्ययनस्य । अत एव गृहीतत्वाध्यायमश्रुतमीमांसमपि श्रोत्रिय इति व्यगदिशन्ति । अपि च ‘ तरति शोकमात्मवित् ’ इत्यादिभिः अद्वितीयात्मविज्ञानमपवर्गसाधनं श्रुतम् । तदेतद्विज्ञानं प्रति च ‘ शान्तो दान्त ’ इति श्रुत्या शमादीनां साधनत्वं प्रतिपाद्यते । अतश्च शमदमाधानन्तर्यमेव युक्तं ब्रह्मविचारस्य ; न तु कर्मविचारानन्तर्यमिति

अत्र सिद्धान्तः—‘यज्ञेन दानेन तपसानाशकेन’ इति श्रुत्या यज्ञादीनां विद्योत्पत्ति-
साधनत्वं प्रतिपाद्यते । ‘तत्र विविदिषन्ति’ इति व्यपदेशः ‘अश्वेन जिगमिषति’ इतिवत् धात्व-
र्थप्रधानः प्रतिपत्तव्यः; विविदिषायाः साध्यत्वासम्भवात् । पुरुषार्थः तत्साधनं वा साध्यं भवितु-
मर्हति । न तावद्विविदिषा पुरुषार्थः, नापि तत्साधनम्; विद्याया एव तत्साधनत्वस्य ‘ब्रह्म वेद
ब्रह्मैव भवति’ इति श्रुतिप्रतिपन्नत्वात् । तच्च वेदनमुपासनात्मकं वाक्यजन्यज्ञानादतिरिक्तं
विषेयभूतम् । इत्थञ्च विद्यायाः यज्ञादिसाध्यत्वात् अनिर्णीते साधने साध्यनिर्णयायोगात्
यज्ञादिस्वरूपनिर्णयाय कर्मविचारः प्रथममपेक्षितः । एवं नित्यनैमित्तिककर्मणां अकरणे
प्रत्यवायश्रवणात् अनर्थं परिहृत्यैवाभ्युदये यतितव्यमिति न्यायादपि स एवादौ कर्तव्यः ।
अत एव सद्विद्यादहरविद्यादीनां भेदाभेदनिर्णयः कर्मभेदाभेदनिर्णयहेतुभिः न्यायैः शारी-
रके क्रियमाण उपपद्यते; अनधिगतकर्मणस्तदसम्भवात् । अद्वितीयात्मविज्ञानमपवर्ग-
साधनं इत्यत्राप्यद्वितीयत्वं नाम अनेकगुणविभूतिविशिष्टस्य एकत्वमेव; न तु निर्विशेषत्वम्;
तस्य सर्वप्रमाणविरुद्धत्वात् । गुणविभूत्यादिविशिष्टब्रह्मवेदनस्यैवापवर्गसाधनत्वं ‘पृथगात्मानं
प्रेरितारं च मत्वा जुष्टस्तस्तेनामृतत्वमेति’ इत्यादिभिः प्रतिपाद्यते । एवंभूतवेदनं प्रति
‘यज्ञेन दानेन’ इत्यादि श्रुत्या यज्ञादेरेव साधनत्वमुच्यते । ‘शान्तो दान्त’ इत्यादि शमा-
दीनामनुग्राहकत्वाभिप्रायम् । न च विरोधः; व्यापारोपरमरूपाश्शमादयोऽविहिता प्रतिषिद्ध
निषिद्धकाम्यकर्मविषयाः; व्यापाराश्च विद्यासाधनभूतकर्मविषया इति व्यवस्थाङ्गीकारात् ।
तदेवं ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य कर्मसापेक्षत्वात् कर्मविचारानन्तरमेव ब्रह्मविचारः कर्तव्य इति ।

इति ब्रह्मविचारस्य कर्मविचारानन्तर्यनिर्णयाधिकारः प्रथमः ॥



(२) अथ द्वितीये वेदान्तप्रामाण्यनिर्णयाधिकारे वेदान्तवाक्यानां ब्रह्मणि प्रामाण्यं
समर्थ्यते ।

अत्र पूर्वपक्षिणः प्राभाकराः तार्किकाश्च । तत्र पूर्वेषामयमाशयः—सिद्धार्थे ब्रह्मणि
न वेदान्तवाक्यानां प्रामाण्यम् । तथाहि—शब्दार्थयोस्सम्बन्धमजानतः पुंसश्शब्दो नार्थ-
प्रत्यायकः । सम्बन्धश्च वृद्धव्यवहारत एव प्राह्यः । स व्यवहारः प्रयोजकवृद्धस्य गामान-
येत्यादिः, प्रयोज्यवृद्धस्य च गवानयनादिः । प्रयोजकवृद्धवाक्यश्रवणानन्तरं प्रयोज्यवृद्धस्य

कार्यं दृष्ट्वा व्युत्पत्सुः पार्श्वस्थः एवमनुमिनोति—इदं वाक्यं अस्य कार्यबुद्धयुत्पादकम् , स्वश्रवणसमनन्तरकालिकैतत्प्रवृत्तिप्रयोजकत्वात् । यद्वाक्यं स्वश्रवणसमनन्तरकालिकयत्प्रवृत्तिप्रयोजकम् , तत्तस्य कार्यबुद्धयुत्पादकम्, यथा मदीयकार्यावगतिसमनन्तरप्रवृत्तिप्रयोजकं वाक्यम् इति । एवं सामान्यतोऽनुमाय पुनर्गवानयनादिदर्शनात् कार्यविशेषं निश्चिनोति । एवं वाक्यार्थे निश्चिते, पुनः ‘ गां बधान ’ इत्यादिप्रयोगे पदानामावापोद्वापाभ्यां तत्तत्पदार्थमवगच्छति । ‘ पुत्रस्ते जातः ’ इत्यादिसिद्धवस्तुपरवाक्यस्थले च मुखविकासालिङ्गेनापि पुत्रजन्माद्यर्थविशेषनिर्णयो न सम्भवति ; सुखप्रसवादीनां हर्षहेतूनां बहूनां सम्भवात् इति ।

अत्र समाधिः—‘ पुत्रस्ते जातः ’ इत्यादिसिद्धार्थपरवाक्येष्वपि सम्बन्धग्रहणं दृश्यते । तत्र तद्वाक्यश्रवणानन्तरं पुत्रजन्मसाक्षात्कारेण वा, पुत्रजन्मासाधारणोत्सवलिङ्गेन वा पुत्रजन्मविशेषनिश्चयस्सम्भवति । अतो न विशेषाप्रतिपत्तिः ।

गामानयेत्यादिकार्यपरवाक्यस्थलेऽपि प्रयोज्यवृद्धस्यानुषङ्गिकानेकव्यापारसम्भवात् तत्रापि कार्यविशेषावधारणं दुश्शकमेव । हेत्वन्तरेण तदवधारणञ्च तुल्यमुभयत्र ।

वस्तुतस्तु व्युत्पत्सुः स्वस्य कार्यावगतेः पदार्थज्ञानपूर्वकत्वदर्शनात् प्रयोज्यवृद्धकार्यावगतिरपि पदार्थज्ञानपूर्विकेत्येवानुमिन्यात् । तच्च ज्ञानं प्रयोजकवाक्यादिति वृद्धव्यवहारेऽपि सिद्धार्थे शब्दस्याभिधानमस्ति । एवं पित्रदिभिश्शशिपक्ष्यादीनङ्गुल्या निर्दिश्य तत्तच्छब्दैस्तेषु तेष्वर्थेषु प्रयुज्यमानैर्बाला व्युत्पाद्यन्ते । क्रमेण च व्युत्पन्नास्ते तत्तच्छब्दश्रवणसमनन्तरम् तत्तदर्थेषु स्वात्मनां बुद्धयुत्पत्तिं पश्यन्तश्शब्दार्थयोस्सम्बन्धान्तरादर्शनाद्बोध्यबोधकभाव एव सम्बन्ध इति निश्चिन्वन्ति । अतस्सिद्धार्थेऽपि शब्दस्य प्रामाण्यं सम्भवतीति प्रतिपद्यन्त एव प्रामाण्यं ब्रह्मणि वेदान्तवाक्यानीति ।

तार्किकास्तु—सिद्धार्थे शब्दस्य प्रामाण्येऽपि जगत्कर्तुरनुमानसिद्धत्वान्न वेदान्तप्रमाणकं ब्रह्म ; शास्त्रस्य प्रमाणान्तराप्राप्तार्थविषयत्वात् । प्रकृते तु भूमधरादिकं कार्यम् , सावयवत्वात् , घटादिवत् ; भूमधरादिकं स्वोपादानोपकरणसम्प्रदानप्रयोजनाभिज्ञकर्तृकम् , कार्यत्वात् , घटादिवत् , इत्येवमनुमानं सम्भवति । अनेन कर्तृकल्पनायां अनेककर्तृ-

कल्पनापेक्षया एककर्तृकल्पनं न्याय्यमिति जीवासंभावितज्ञानादिः जगन्निर्माता ईश्वर-
स्सिद्धयतीति ।

सिद्धान्तस्तु—उक्तानुमानात् जगतः कर्तृमात्रसिद्धावपि, अकर्मवश्यत्वसर्वज्ञत्वादि-
विशिष्टैककर्तृकत्वं शास्त्रादेवावगन्तव्यम् । विचित्रसन्निवेशस्य रथगोपुरप्रासादादेः बहुकर्तृ-
कत्वस्यैव दर्शनादत्रापि विचित्ररचनस्य जगतो बहुकर्तृकत्वमेवानुमानतः प्रसज्येत । अपि च
लोके कर्तुः कर्मवश्यत्वादिदर्शनात् आनुमानिकेश्वरस्यापि व्यासिबलेन तदवर्जनीयम् । अकर्म-
वश्यत्वे शरीरेन्द्रियाद्युपकरणायोगः । तेषां नित्यत्वे ‘सावयवत्वात् कार्यम्’ इत्यनुमानस्य तेषु
व्यभिचारः । अतश्शास्त्रैकप्रमाणकं ब्रह्मेति ।

॥ इति वेदान्तप्रामाण्यनिर्णयाधिकारो द्वितीयः ॥



(३) अथ तृतीये विवर्तपक्षप्रतिक्षेपाधिकारे निर्विशेषब्रह्मवादिनः अद्वैतिनः प्रतिक्षिप्य-
न्ते । ते ह्येवं मन्यन्ते—‘यतो वा इमानि’ इत्यादिश्रुत्या जगत्कारणं ब्रह्मेति प्रतिपादितम् । तच्च
‘सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म’ इत्यादिश्रुतिभिः सच्चिदद्वितीयानन्दस्वरूपं प्रतिपन्नम् । तस्य
चानाद्यज्ञानतिरोहितस्वरूपतया अहं सुखी, अहं दुःखो, देवोऽयं, मनुष्योऽयं, घटोऽयं,
पटोऽयं, इत्याद्यान्तरबाह्यविविधाध्यासोपादानतया जगत्कारणत्वमुपपद्यत इति ।

अत्र सिद्धान्तः—सच्चित्सुखाद्वितीयस्वरूपं ब्रह्मेति वदद्भिः सदादिशब्दप्रवृत्ति-
निमित्तानि सत्तादीनि दुर्निरूपणि । तथाहि—सत्ता न जातिः ; आश्रयस्य सतः एकत्वात् ।
न च प्रमासम्बन्धयोग्यत्वम् ; ब्रह्मणः प्रमेयत्वानङ्गीकारात् । नाप्यसद्व्यावृत्तिः ; सदसद्विलक्षणस्य
प्रपञ्चस्याप्यसद्व्यावृत्तिमत्त्वेन सत्त्वप्रसङ्गात् । यदि सच्छब्दार्थ एव सत्ता, तर्हि सत्तायाः
धर्मत्वेन ब्रह्मणोऽपि सच्छब्दार्थस्य सत्तारूपत्वेन कञ्चन धर्मिणं प्रति धर्मत्वप्रसङ्गात् ।

एवं चित्त्वमपि दुर्निरूपम् । तच्च यदि चैतन्यम्, तदा ब्रह्मणः चैतन्यगुणकत्वप्र-
सङ्गः । यदि चिच्छब्दस्यैव चैतन्यमर्थः, तदा प्रमाणज्ञानानामपि चैतन्यरूपाणां ब्रह्मत्वं
प्रसज्यते । स्वाधीनस्वप्रकाशत्वं चित्त्वमित्यपि दुर्बचम्, स्वव्यतिरिक्तप्रकाशस्यैवानभ्युपग-
मात् ।

एवं सुखरूपत्वमपि दुर्वचम् ; 'सुखं मे स्यात्' इत्यादिभिः सुखादीनां आत्मगुणत्वं ह्यनुभूयते । पदार्थविदोऽपि सुखादीनामात्मगुणत्वमाचक्षते । न च ब्रह्मणो गुणत्वमिति न तस्य सुखरूपत्वम् । अनुकूलत्वं सुखत्वमिति चेत्, ब्रह्म कस्यानुकूलम् ?—जीवानाम् ? उत स्वस्यैव ? नार्थः ; ब्रह्मभिन्नजीवानभ्युपगमात् । नान्त्यः, तत्रानुकूलत्वं भोग्यत्वं चेत्, स्वस्य भोक्तृत्वाभावेन स्वभोग्यत्वस्याप्यसम्भवः । दुःखनिवृत्तिश्चेत्, ब्रह्मणः निवृत्तिरूपत्वेनाभावात्मकत्वप्रसङ्गः । तस्मान्न सुखरूपत्वं ब्रह्मणः ॥

अद्वितीयत्वञ्च न सदृशद्वितीयरहितत्वम् ; ब्रह्मद्वित्वाभावेन सदृशद्वितीयस्यैवाप्रसिद्धेः । 'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्' इत्यादिश्रुतिभिः अद्वितीयं प्रतिपादितं इत्यपि न युज्यते तत्र 'अग्रे' इति कालविशेषस्य, 'आसीत्' इति क्रियाविशेषस्य 'इदं सत्' इति जगतस्सदात्मकत्वस्य, 'एकमेव' इति नामरूपविभागाभाववचनेन ब्रह्मणः उपादानतायाः, 'अद्वितीयम्' इत्यधिष्ठानान्तरनिवारणेन निमित्तत्वस्य, अत एव अनन्तशक्तियोगस्य च प्रतिपादनात् । 'नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन' इत्यत्रापि अब्रह्मात्मकनानावस्तुनिषेधे एव । अतो न निर्विशेषब्रह्मसिद्धिः ।

एवं अनाद्यविद्यातिरोहितं ब्रह्मेत्यपि तिरोधानासम्भवादानुपपन्नम् । तत्र अज्ञानं ज्ञानाभावः, अन्यथाज्ञानं वा ? उभयथापि वस्तुस्वरूपतिरोधायकत्वासम्भवः । अपि चाज्ञानेन ब्रह्मस्वरूपतिरोधानं दुर्निरूपम् ; आच्छाद्यविषयकज्ञानोत्पत्तिनिरोधो ह्याच्छादनशब्दार्थः । अत्र त्वाच्छाद्यस्य ब्रह्मणः ज्ञानविषयत्वानङ्गीकारात्तदुत्पत्तिनिरोधरूपमाच्छादनं सम्भवति ।

एवं ज्ञानरूपं ब्रह्म अनाद्यविद्याशबलितं सत् जगदुपादानकारणमित्यप्यनुपपन्नम् । तत्र किं ब्रह्म जगदुपादानम् ? उताविद्या ? यद्वा तदुभयम् ? । नाद्यः, कारणानुरूपत्वात् कार्यस्य ब्रह्मवज्जगतस्सत्यत्वप्रसङ्गात् । न द्वितीयः ; ब्रह्मणः उपादानत्वपरश्रुतिविरोधात् । नापि तृतीयः ; जगतः जडाजडात्मकत्वसत्यासत्यात्मकत्वादिविरुद्धस्वभावत्वप्रसङ्गात् ।

अविद्यारूपदोषवशात् ज्ञानरूपे ब्रह्मणि जगदध्यस्तम्, अध्यासाधिष्ठानत्वमेवोपादानत्वमित्यप्युक्तम् ; ब्रह्मणो भ्रमाधिष्ठानत्वानुपपत्तेः । शुक्तिकादौ अधिष्ठाने

केनचिद् भास्वरत्वाकारेण प्रतिपन्ने शुक्तित्वाद्याकारेण तिरोहिते हि रजतादिभ्रमो दृष्टः ।
ब्रह्मणश्च निर्विशेषतया प्रतिपन्नाप्रतिपन्नाकारभेदाभावात् न तस्मिन् जगदध्यासस्सम्भवति ।
तस्मात् जगद्रूपेण विवर्त्तमानं जगदुपादानमिति च नोपपत्तिमत् ॥

॥ इति विवर्त्तपक्षप्रतिक्षेपाधिकारस्तृतीयः ॥

(४) चतुर्थे परिणामपक्षप्रतिक्षेपाधिकारे ब्रह्मपरिणामरूपं जगदिति यादवभास्करपक्षः
प्रतिक्षिप्यते ।

अत्र पूर्वपक्षः—‘ सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत् ’ इत्यादिश्रुतिभिः प्रलयावस्थायां प्रलीन-
निखिलभेदं ब्रह्मावगतम् । तदेव सर्वशक्ततया सर्गसमये विचित्रचिदचिन्मिश्रप्रपञ्चरूपेण
परिणतमिति ‘ तदैक्षत बहु स्याम् ’ इत्यादिभिः प्रतिपाद्यते । तस्मान्निरस्तसमस्तविषयस्य ब्रह्मणः
परिणामभूतं जगदिति ।

अत्र सिद्धान्तः—ब्रह्मण एव जगदाकारेण परिणामे जगद्रूपस्थूलत्वह्रस्वत्वादिकं
ब्रह्मणि प्रसज्येत । तथा च ‘ अस्थूलमनण्वह्रस्वम् ’ इत्यादि श्रुतयो विरुद्धयन्ते ।
नहि चिद्रूप एवेश्वरोऽचिद्रूपेण परिणत इति संभवति । न च ब्रह्मोपादनत्वशतरेव जगत
श्चैतन्यशक्तियोगोऽस्तीति वाच्यम् ; चैतन्यस्य जगति नित्यानुपलब्धत्वात् तच्छक्त्यभावस्यैव
तत्र निर्णयात् । प्रलयावस्थायां प्रलीननिखिलभेदं ब्रह्मेत्यप्यनुपपन्नम् ; ‘ नित्यो
नित्यानां चेतनश्चेतनानाम् ’ ‘ अजामेकाम् ’ इत्यादिश्रुत्या जीवानां प्रकृतेश्च नित्यत्व-
श्रवणात् । अतः प्रकृतिपुरुषयोरुपसंहारदशायां विनाश इति न सुवचम् ।

किञ्च जीवानामनित्यत्वे कृतहानमकृताभ्यागमश्चेति दोषद्वयं प्रसज्यते । पूर्वकल्पाव-
साने नष्टैर्जीवैः प्रागनुष्ठितानामभुक्तफलानां कर्मणां निष्फलत्वात्कृतनाशः । उत्तरकल्पादावु-
त्पद्यमानानां तेषां जीवानामसत्त्वपि पूर्वकर्मसु तत्तत्कर्मफलभूतदेहेन्द्रियादिपरिग्रहाद-
कृताभ्यागम इति । किञ्च तेषामनित्यत्वे आत्मनाश एव निश्श्रेयसमिति वक्तव्यम् । तथा च
प्रलयदशायां तादृशनिश्श्रेयससिद्धेरवर्जनीयत्वेन निश्श्रेयससाधनभूतोपासनविधीनामानर्थ-
क्यं प्रसज्यते ।

अपि च यद्युपासकाः स्वनाश एव मोक्ष इत्यध्यवस्येयुः, तदा स्वनाशस्यापुरुषार्थत्वेन मोक्षकथाप्रस्तावगन्धादपसर्पेयुः । 'रसं ह्येवायं लब्धवानन्दी भवति' इति मुक्तस्यानन्दप्राप्तिश्च श्रूयते । तस्मात्परिणामवादोऽपि न समञ्जस इति ।

इति परिणामप्रतिक्षेपाधिकारश्चतुर्थः ।



(५) अथ पञ्चमेऽधिकारे यादवप्रकाशाभिमतः शक्तिविक्षेपपक्षः प्रतिक्षिप्यते ।

तत्रायं पूर्वपक्षः—सन् घटः, सन् पट इति सर्वेषु पदार्थेषु सदिति बुद्धेरनुवर्तमानत्वात् सत् द्रव्यम् ; घटादयस्तु तदवस्थाविशेषाः । तच्च सद्द्रव्यं ब्रह्म । स्वव्यवहारे स्वसत्तातिरेकेणान्यान्-पेक्षत्वात्स्वयम्प्रकाशं तत् । भोक्तृभोग्यनियन्तारश्च ब्रह्मणोऽंशाः । ते च नित्याः । तत्र भोक्तृ-समष्टिपुरुष एकः । तस्य व्यूहाः प्रतिशरीरं भिन्ना जीवाः । अणवोऽनन्ता नित्याश्च ते । बद्धमुक्तनित्यभेदेन ते त्रिविधाः । सततपरिणामि प्रकृतिद्रव्यं भोग्यमित्युच्यते । तस्मिन्ब्रह्म-गुणास्तिरोहिताः । अत एवाचेतनमेतत् । सैषा प्रकृतिः कालपरमाकाशाव्यक्तभेदात् त्रिधा । तत्र कालो मुहूर्तादिविभागयुक्तः अजस्रक्षणपरिणामी च । परमाकाशो नाम प्रकृतेराद्यावस्था । प्रलयकाले तमश्शब्दवाच्या तत्सलोहसमावर्जितजलवत्परेणात्मना संसृज्यमाना पृथग्व्यवहारा-योग्या तिष्ठति । तादृश्यवस्था शक्त्यवस्थेत्युच्यते । एतामवस्थामधिकृत्य 'सदेव' इत्यादि-श्रुतयः । सेयं तमोवस्थापन्ना प्रकृतिः परमात्मनो विभागरूपं विकारं प्रतिपद्यते । स विभागः शक्तिविक्षेप इत्युच्यते । स परमाकाशो मुक्तानामीश्वरस्य च स्थानम् ।

अव्यक्तं नाम मिलितानि सत्त्वरजस्तमांसि । तत्सर्गकाले महदादित्रयोविंशति-विभागभागभवति । नियन्ता नाम ईश्वरः ब्रह्मांशः निरतिशयज्ञानानन्दादिगुणकस्सर्वशक्तश्च । स ईश्वरो मुक्ताश्च प्रलयकाले संसारिजीववत् सुप्तकल्पा अवतिष्ठन्ते । इत्थं सर्वं जगद्ब्रह्म-द्रव्यत्वात्तदभिन्नम् ; अवस्थारूपेण भिन्नञ्च । अत एव भेदपराणि अभेदपराणि च समञ्जसानि वेदान्तवाक्यानीति ।

अत्र सिद्धान्तः—घटस्सन्, पटस्सन्निति सत्ताया द्रव्यधर्मत्वेनैवोपलभ्यमानत्वात्सतो द्रव्यत्वमित्यनुपपन्नम् । सद्द्रव्यं स्वयम्प्रकाशमित्यपि न युक्तम् ; घटादीनामपि सद्द्रव्यत्वेन

स्वयम्प्रकाशत्वप्रसङ्गात् । भोक्तृभोग्यनियन्तारश्च न ब्रह्मणोऽंशाः; नियन्तुरेव ब्रह्मत्वेन तत्रां-
शांशिभावस्य प्रमाणविरुद्धत्वात् । ‘ यतो वा इमानि ’ इति श्रुत्या ब्रह्मणो जगत्कारणत्व-
मुच्यते । किं तत्कारणमित्यपेक्षायां ‘ सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत् ’ ‘ आत्मा वा इदमेक
एवाग्र आसीत् ’ ‘ एको ह वै नारायण आसीत् ’ इत्यादिभिस्सामान्यविशेषन्यायेन निय-
न्तुः नारायणस्यैव हि ब्रह्मत्वं प्रतिपाद्यते । एवं नियन्तृवत् भोक्ता भोग्यश्च न ब्रह्मांशौ ;
‘ पतिं विश्वस्य ’ ‘ प्रधानक्षेत्रज्ञपतिः ’ इत्यादिभिः भोक्तृभोग्ययोः ब्रह्मणश्च विरुद्धस्वभाव-
त्वप्रतिपादनात् । ‘ परमाकाशः प्रकृतेराद्यावस्था ’ इत्यपि ‘ ऋचो अक्षरे परमे व्योमन् ’
‘ दिव्यं स्थानमजरश्चाप्रमेयम् ’ इत्यादिप्रमाणविरुद्धम् । ईश्वरो मुक्ताश्च प्रलयकाले सुप्त-
कल्पा इत्यपि ‘ तद्विष्णोः परमं पदं सदा पश्यन्ति सूरयः ’ ‘ सर्गेऽपि नोपजायन्ते प्रलये न
व्यथन्ति च ’ इत्यादिप्रमाणप्रतिहतम् । तदेवमनेकदोषदुष्टमिदं मतमसङ्गतमिति ।

इति शक्तिविक्षेपाधिकारः पञ्चमः ।



(६) अथ ब्रह्मस्वरूपनिर्णयाधिकारे षष्ठे ब्रह्मस्वरूपमुपवर्ण्य सर्वशरीरकं तन्निमित्त-
मुपादानं चेति प्रसाध्यते । तथा तार्किकाभिमतपरमाणुकारणवादः साङ्ख्याभिमतप्रकृतिकारण-
वादश्चात्र प्रतिक्षिप्यते ।

तत्र ब्रह्मस्वरूपं ‘ एतदमृतमभयमेतद्ब्रह्म ’ । ‘ नित्यं विशुं सर्वगतम् ’ इत्यादिभिः
प्रमाणैस्सर्वानुकूलं देशकालवस्तुपरिच्छेदरहितञ्च प्रतीयते । गुणैरियत्ताराहित्याद्वस्त्वपरिच्छेदः ।
‘ अपहृतपाप्मा ’ इत्यादिभिः निर्मलत्वञ्चावगम्यते ब्रह्मणः । निर्मलत्वञ्च त्रिविधम्—स्वतश्शुद्ध-
त्वम्, हेयवस्तुसंसर्गेऽपि तद्दोषासंस्पृष्टत्वम्, श्रवणस्मरणादिभिरपवित्राणां पवित्रताहेतु-
त्वञ्चेति । ‘ विज्ञानं ब्रह्म ’ ‘ परं ज्योतिरुपसम्पद्य ’ इत्यादिभिः स्वयम्प्रकाशं तेजोरूपञ्च
तदवगम्यते । ज्ञानबलैश्वर्याद्यसङ्ख्येयमङ्गलगुणकञ्च तत् ; ‘ परास्य शक्तिः ’ इति प्रमाणात् । ‘ यस्य
पृथिवी शरीरं ’ ‘ यस्यात्मा शरीरम् ’ इत्यादिश्रुत्या सर्वशरीरकञ्च ॥ यस्य यत् आवेयम्, यत्
विधेयम्, यत् शेषभूतम्, तत्तस्य शरीरमिति शरीरलक्षणम् । ईश्वरस्याशरीरित्वश्रुतयः कर्म-
निमित्तशरीरविरहपराः । एवं सर्वशरीरकत्वाद्ब्रह्मणः तत्तद्वस्तुवाचिनश्शब्दाः तदात्म-

भूतपरमात्मपर्यन्ताः, यथा मनुष्यादिशब्दास्तच्छरीरकजीवपर्यन्ताः । अत एव 'वचसां वाच्यमुत्तमम्' इत्यादि सङ्गच्छते । एवं शरीरभूतचिदचिद्वस्तूनि कदाचिन्नामरूपविभागानर्हसूक्ष्मदशापन्नानि भवन्ति । तदा तद्विशिष्टं ब्रह्म कारणम् । 'तदैक्षत बहु स्याम्' 'तदात्मानं स्वयमकुरुत' इत्यादिभिरीक्षणपूर्वकबहुत्वश्रवणान्निमित्तमुपादानञ्च ब्रह्म भवति ।

अत्र तार्किकाः—चिदचिद्विशिष्टं ब्रह्म नोपादानम् ; परिणामाश्रयस्यैवोपादानत्वात् । चेतनानां परमात्मनश्चापरिणामित्वेनोपादानत्वायोगात् । नाप्यचिद्वस्तु उपादानम् ; ब्रह्मोपादानत्वश्रुतिविरोधात्, निमित्तोपादानयोर्भेदप्रसङ्गाच्च । अतः परमाणव उपादानम्, ब्रह्म निमित्तमिति ।

तन्न, परमाणुसद्भावे प्रमाणाभावात् । निरवयवानां परमाणूनां संयोगे संयुक्तप्रदेशातिरिक्तप्रदेशाभावात्प्रथमानुपपत्तिश्चापरिहार्या । सावयवत्वे तु तदवयवानामपि सावयवत्वादनन्तावयवत्वप्रसङ्गेन मेरुसर्पपयोस्साम्यं प्रसज्येत; अवयवतारतम्याभावात् । लोके निमित्तोपादानभेदेऽपि ब्रह्मणस्सर्वशक्तत्वादुभयविधकारणत्वमुपपद्यते । तस्मान्न परमाणव उपादानमिति ।

साङ्ख्यस्तु सततपरिणामिनी स्वतन्त्रा प्रकृतिः पुरुषसंयोगात् महदादिविसदृशपरिणामं भजते । प्रलये तु सूक्ष्मसदृशपरिणामवती । अतः प्रकृतिरेवोपादानमित्याहुः ।

तन्न ; पुरुषस्य निष्क्रियत्वेन तेन संयोगाभावात् । तत्सन्निधानमात्रस्य तत्संयोगरूपत्वे तत्सन्निधानस्य नित्यत्वेन सर्वदा सृष्टिप्रसङ्गः । अतस्स्वतन्त्रायाः प्रकृतेरुपादानत्वमयुक्तम् । चिदचिद्विशिष्टब्रह्मण उपादानत्वेऽपि चेतनानां ब्रह्मणश्च न परिणामित्वप्रसक्तिः, अचिद्वस्तुवत् स्वरूपान्यथाभावस्याभावात् । अवस्थान्तरापत्तिरूपकार्यता तु तयोरपि स्वीक्रियते । सर्गावस्थायां ज्ञानविकास एव चेतनानामवस्थान्तरापत्तिः । ब्रह्मणस्तु स्थूलचिदचिद्वस्तुनोरन्तरात्मतया अवस्थानम् । चिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरकस्य ब्रह्मण एकत्वादद्वैतश्रुतयः शरीरभूतचिदचितोऽशरीरभूतब्रह्मणश्च भेदाद् द्वैतश्रुतयश्च सुसङ्गता भवन्ति ॥

इति ब्रह्मस्वरूपनिर्णयाधिकारः ।

(७) सप्तमे पुरुषस्वरूपनिर्णयाधिकारे चार्वाकाद्यभिमतदेहात्मवादादिकं निरस्य पुरुषस्वरूपं व्यवस्थाप्यते ।

तत्र पूर्वपक्षः—देह एवात्मा ; स्थूलोऽहं, कृशोऽहमिति स्थौल्यादिविशिष्टदेहस्याहमर्थसामानाधिकरण्यात् । अहमर्थो ह्यात्मा । अतस्तत्समानाधिकरणतया देहः प्रतीयमान आत्मा भवितुमर्हति । अहं जानामीति प्रतीतेर्देहस्य ज्ञानवत्त्वमपि स्वीकार्यमिति ।

अथवा इन्द्रियाण्येवात्मा, अहं जानामीति प्रतीतेः । ज्ञानं हि इन्द्रियव्यापारभूतसन्निकर्षफलमिन्द्रियगामीत्येव युक्तम् । यथा तत्तत्पुरुषव्यापारभूतस्नानाध्ययनादिफलं तत्तत्पुरुषगामि ।

यद्वा इन्द्रियाणां प्रतिशरीरमनेकत्वान्मनस एकत्वात्तदेवात्मा ।

अथवा संविदेवात्मा ; अजडत्वात् । विद्यमानदशायां सर्वदा प्रकाशमानत्वादजडत्वं तस्या इति ।

सिद्धान्तस्तु—चार्वाकभिमतदेहात्मवादो नोपपद्यते ; अहमिदं जानामीति प्रतीतौ-इदमिति शरीरस्य पराकत्वेन, अहमित्यात्मनः प्रत्यक्त्वेन च भानात् । स्थूलोऽहमिति देहेऽहं-प्रत्ययो लाक्षणिको भ्रान्तिमूलको वा स्यात् ; ममेदमिति व्यतिरेकप्रत्ययात् । तथा च प्रयोगः—शरीरं अहम्प्रत्ययागोचरः इदमितिगृह्यमाणत्वात्, घटादिवत् । एवं जानामीति प्रत्ययः शरीराविषयकः, अप्रकाशमानतदवयवप्रतिभासत्वात् । उभयसम्प्रतिपन्नशरीर-प्रत्ययः व्यतिरेकदृष्टान्तः । अवयविनः प्रतिभासे हि तदवयवप्रतिभासोऽप्यवश्यम्भावी । अतः अहं जानामीत्यत्र शरीररूपावयविनः प्रतिभासेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने करचरणाद्यवयवप्रतिभासोऽपि स्यात् । न हि ते प्रतीयन्ते । अतश्शरीराविषयकः ‘अहं जानामि’ इति प्रत्यय इति ॥

इन्द्रियात्मवादेऽपि प्रत्येकमिन्द्रियाणां आत्मत्वे इन्द्रियान्तरानुभूतस्येन्द्रियान्तरेण प्रतिसन्धानाभावप्रसङ्गः । ‘यमहमद्राक्षं तं स्पृशामि’ इति इन्द्रियान्तरेण प्रतिसन्धानं तु दृश्यते । सम्भूतानां तेषामात्मत्वे एकैकेन्द्रियापाये तत्तदनुभूतार्थस्मरणं न स्यात् । एकेन्द्रियापगमे आत्मनः प्रायण प्रसङ्गश्च ।

एवं मनआत्मवादोऽपि न युक्तः । आत्मा हि कर्ता ; मनस्तु चक्षुरादिवत्करणम् ।
एवं प्राणोऽपि न चेतनः, वायुत्वात् बाह्यवायुवत् ।

अद्वैतिनां संविदात्मवादोऽपि न युक्तः ; घटमहं वेद्मीति संविदः आत्मधर्मतया
प्रतीयमानत्वात् । संविदोऽहमर्थत्वे 'संविदहम्' इति प्रतीतिश्च स्यात् । अहमर्थो हि प्रत्यक् ।
न हि संविदः प्रत्यक्तत्त्वम् ।

तस्मात् 'जानात्येवायं पुरुषः' 'न विज्ञातुर्विज्ञातेर्विपरिलोपो विद्यते', इत्यादिभिः
स्वयम्प्रकाशो नित्यज्ञानश्चायमात्मा । 'नित्यो नित्यानां चेतनश्चेतनानाम्' इति श्रुत्या
असङ्गश्च सुखदुःखव्यवस्थायाः प्रतिशरीरमनुभूयमानत्वात् प्रतिशरीरं स भिन्नः । 'एषोऽणुरात्मा'
इति श्रुत्या अणुश्च । परमात्मशरीरत्वेन विशिष्टवस्त्वेकदेशभूतोऽयं परमात्मांशः ।
कर्ता चायम् ; 'ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्गकामो यजेत' इत्यादि स्वर्गापवर्गसाधनानुष्ठानविधायक-
शास्त्रप्रामाण्यात् ।

इति पुरुषस्वरूपनिर्णयाधिकारः सप्तमः ।



(८) अष्टमे विधिस्वरूपनिर्णयाधिकारे शब्दभावनादेर्विध्यर्थवन्निरस्य पुरुषनियोगस्य
तथात्वं व्यवस्थाप्यते । अत्र पूर्वपक्षो कुमारिलः, प्राभाकरश्च ।

कुमारिलस्यायमाशयः—प्रवर्तको हि विधिर्भवति । स च शब्दभावना । सैव पुरुषप्रवृ-
त्तिहेतुः शब्दव्यापारश्च । यमागन्तुकं धर्मं प्राप्य यः कार्याय प्रभवति स तस्य
व्यापार इति मर्यादा । ईदृशव्यापारत्वमभिधापरपर्यायशब्दभावनाया उपपन्नम् । स च
व्यापारश्च शब्दज्ञानमेवेष्ट्यते ; यतश्च शब्दः स्वज्ञानरूपमागन्तुकं धर्मं प्राप्यार्थप्रतीतिं प्रवृत्तिं च
जनयतीति ।

तदयुक्तम् ; अभिधासद्भावे प्रमाणाभावात् । न तावद्विज्ञादिशब्दः प्रमाणम् ; तत्र
तस्य व्युत्पत्त्यभावात् । नापि शब्दस्य व्यापारस्सम्भवति । द्विधा हि व्यापारः प्रयत्नः परि-
स्पन्दश्चेति । अचेतनत्वाच्छब्दस्य न प्रयत्नो व्यापारो भवति । गुणत्वान्न परिस्पन्दोऽपि ।

नापि शब्दविषयकज्ञानमेव शब्दस्य व्यापारः; ज्ञानस्यात्मगुणत्वेन शब्दव्यापारत्वायोगात् । तस्मान्न शब्दभावना नाम काचित्सिद्धयति ।

प्राभाकरस्तु—कार्यबुद्धिरेव प्रवृत्तिहेतुः । तथाहि—यः पुरुषः पुरुषान्तरेण प्रवर्तितः स्वयं कामादिना वा प्रवर्तते, स सर्वोऽपि ममेदं कृतिसाध्यमिति मत्वैव प्रवर्तते । अतः कार्यमेव विध्यर्थः । तच्च लोके क्रियैव । वेदे तु यागादिक्रियायाः क्षणध्वंसिन्याः कालान्तरभाविस्वर्गसाधनत्वासम्भवात्क्रियाव्यतिरिक्तः कश्चिदपूर्वनामा विध्यर्थः । तज्ज्ञानं प्रवृत्तिकारणम् । तदेवं नियोगापरपर्यायस्यापूर्वस्य लिङ्वाच्यत्वालौकिकलिङादयः क्रियायां लाक्षणाः इति युक्तम् ; अनेकार्थकल्पनायोगादिति ।

तदपि न ; कार्यस्य दुर्निरूपत्वात् । तथाहि—कृतिसाध्यञ्चेत्कार्यम्, यागादेः कार्यत्वप्रसङ्गः । कृत्युद्देश्यञ्चेत्, स्वर्गादिस्तथात्वं स्यात् । किञ्च कृत्युद्देश्यं सुखं दुःखनिवृत्तिर्वा ? अपूर्वस्य एतदन्यतररूपत्वाभावाच्च कृत्युद्देश्यत्वमिति ।

अतः आप्ताभिप्रायो विध्यर्थः ; तज्ज्ञानादेव प्रवृत्तेः । तथाहि—परवचनात् परस्य प्रवृत्तिं पश्यन् बालस्त्वयमन्यान्प्रवर्तयितुं यदा वाक्यं प्रयुङ्क्ते, तदा स्वस्मिन् परप्रवृत्तिहेतुभूतामिच्छां दृष्ट्वा एवमवगच्छति—नूनं सर्वेऽपि पुरुषाः, परोऽस्मिन् प्रवर्ततामिति आज्ञानुज्ञारूपां प्रवर्तनां कृत्यैव लिङादि प्रयुक्तवन्त इति । अतः प्रवर्तनाया विध्यर्थत्वमनुपपन्नम् ।

वैदिकानि वाक्यानि पुरुषस्थेश्वरस्याज्ञां तदुक्तिं विना परिबोधयितुमर्हन्ति । यथा लोके राजभृत्याः केनापि कारणेन राजाज्ञां जानन्तः तेनाबोधिता अपि परेभ्यः कथयन्ति ‘एवं युष्मानाज्ञापयति राजा’ इति । एवं वैदिकानि वाक्यानि पुरुषाज्ञां नूनं प्रतिपादयन्त्येवेति वेदस्यापौरुषेयत्वं सुस्थमिति ।

इति विधिस्वरूपनिर्णयाधिकारोऽष्टमः ।



(९) अथ निश्श्रेयससाधननिर्णयाधिकारे नवमे निश्श्रेयससाधनभूतं वेदनं निर्णीयते ।

अत्र पूर्वपक्षिणः शाङ्कराः भास्करादयश्च । तत्र पूर्वेषामयमाशयः—‘तरति शोकमात्मवित्’ इत्यादिभिर्वेदान्तवाक्यजन्यज्ञानमेव मोक्षसाधनमाम्नातम् । तज्ज्ञानं प्रथमं प्रतिबद्ध-

फलम् । श्रवणादिभिः प्रतिबन्धे निरस्ते तदेवापरोक्षरूपमविद्यानिवर्तकम् । संसारस्य मिथ्यात्वेन प्रमाणज्ञानैकनिवर्त्यत्वाद्द्वयानस्य प्रमाणज्ञानरूपत्वाभावेन नाविद्यानिवर्तकत्वमिति ।

तन्न । ‘ आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः ’ इत्यादिभिर्विधेयभूतस्य ध्यानस्यैवाविद्यानिवर्तकत्वं प्रतिपाद्यते । वाक्यार्थज्ञानं त्वविधेयं न तन्निवर्तकम् ; उक्तज्ञानवतामप्यविद्यानिवृत्त्यदर्शनात् । भेदवासनादिरूपप्रतिबन्धकहेतूनामपि मिथ्यात्वेन वाक्यार्थज्ञानेन बाधावश्यम्भावात् वाक्यार्थज्ञानस्य प्रतिबद्धफलत्वमप्यनुपपन्नम् ।

शब्दादपरोक्षज्ञानञ्च न कचिद्दृष्टम् ; तस्य परोक्षधीमात्रहेतुत्वात् । संसारस्य सत्यतायास्समर्थितत्वेन तस्य ध्याननिवर्त्यत्वमप्युपपद्यते । तस्मान्न वाक्यार्थज्ञानं निश्श्रेयसहेतुरिति ॥

अन्ये तु साङ्ख्ययोगावपवर्गसाधनम् । तत्त्वानामवधारणं साङ्ख्यं श्रवणादिरूपम् । योगस्य तु विविधमनुष्ठानम् । ईश्वरार्थानां कर्मणां करणम् , इतरेषां त्यागः सर्वकर्मफलत्यागश्चेति । ‘ तत्कारणं सांख्ययोगाधिगम्यम् ’ इति श्रुतेरुक्तार्थोऽवसीयते । परित्राजकानां तु ज्ञानयोगमात्रम् , न कर्मेति ।

तन्न—‘ नान्यः पन्थाः ’ इति श्रुत्या वेदनेतरस्यापवर्गोपायत्वप्रतिषेधात् । ‘ तत्कारणम् ’ इत्युदाहृतश्रुत्या ज्ञानकर्मयोगाभ्यां परमात्मसाक्षात्कारो भवतीत्येतावन्मात्रमुच्यते, न पुनरपवर्गफले समुच्चयो विधीयते । ‘ अविद्यया मृत्युं तीर्त्वा विद्ययामृतमश्नुते ’ इति कर्मज्ञानयोः फलभेदाभिधानान्नापवर्गफले तयोस्समुच्चयः । अत्र विद्याविद्याशब्दाभ्यां ज्ञानकर्मणी अभिधीयते ।

त्रय्यन्तनिष्णातास्त्वेवमभिदधति—‘ ब्रह्मविदाम्प्रोति परम् ’ इत्यादिभिर्वाक्यार्थज्ञानविलक्षणं ध्यानोपासनादिशब्दवाच्यं साक्षात्कारसदृशं प्रीतिरूपापन्नं वेदनमपवर्गोपायतया विधीयते । तस्य च वेदनस्य विवेकविमोकाभ्यासक्रियाकल्याणानवसादानुद्धर्ष-

रूपसाधनसत्तात् प्राप्तिरिति ब्रह्मनन्दिना प्रतिपादितम् ‘तल्लब्धिर्विवेकविमोकाभ्यास-
क्रियाकल्याणानवसादानुद्धर्षेभ्यः’ इति । अत उक्तलक्षणं वेदनमेव निश्श्रेयससाधनम् ।

एवं प्रपत्तिरप्युक्तध्यानासमर्थानामुपायः ; ‘मुमुक्षुर्वै शरणमहं प्रपद्ये ; ‘शरणं त्वां
प्रपन्ना ये ध्यानयोगविवर्जिताः । तेऽपि मृत्युमतिक्रम्य यान्ति तद्वैष्णवं पदम्’ इत्यादि-
प्रमाणात् । सा च भगवदेकोपायत्वप्रार्थनात्मिका । तस्माद्यथाधिकारं भक्तिः प्रपत्तिर्वा
उपाय इति ।

॥ इति निश्श्रेयससाधननिर्णयाधिकारो नवमः ॥



अथ दशमे निश्श्रेयसनिर्णयाधिकारे निश्श्रेयसस्वरूपं निर्णीयते । अत्र पूर्वपक्षिणो
बौद्धार्हतवैशेषिकप्राभाकारभाट्टशाङ्करभास्करादयः । तत्र बौद्धैकदेशिनो माध्यमिकाः
प्रकृष्टशून्यभावनया शून्यभावापत्तिं मोक्षमाचक्षते । योगाचारादयस्तु क्षणिकत्वभावनया
विषयोपरागरहितज्ञानसन्तानम् ।

एतेषां पक्षे बन्धमोक्षभागिनस्त्विह भोक्तुरभावान्मोक्षो दुर्घटः ।

आर्हतास्तु—सम्यग्दर्शनचारित्र्यैः प्रक्षीणाशेषमलस्याविर्भूतसकलगुणस्य लोकान्तरे
ऽवस्थितिर्मोक्ष इत्याहुः । तत्र, स्वयं परिणामरहितस्य भोक्तुर्गमनानुपपत्तेर्गमनपूर्वकलोकान्त-
रावस्थानलक्षणमोक्षस्य दुर्वचत्वात् ।

वैशेषिकाः प्राभाकराश्च निःशेषात्मगुणोच्छेदं मोक्षमातिष्ठन्ते । इदमपि न ;
सुखानुभवाभावात् । दुःखाभावस्याप्यननुभाव्यत्वेनापुरुषार्थत्वात् । न हि पाषाणादेर्दुःखाभावः
पुरुषार्थतया प्रसिद्धः ।

भाट्टास्तु मनस्करणकेन ज्ञानेन आनन्दानुभवं कैवल्यं मन्यन्ते । एतदपि न ;
मोक्षदशायां करणाधीनज्ञानाभावेन शब्दादिविषयाभावेन च ज्ञानसुखयोरसम्भवात्
आनन्दानुभवस्य दुर्घटत्वात् ।

अद्वैतिनस्तु—अविद्यानिवृत्तिं मोक्षं सङ्गिरन्ते । तत्र यद्यविद्याप्रध्वंसोऽविद्यानिवृत्तिः, तदा ध्वंसस्य द्रव्यावस्थाविशेषरूपत्वेन, तेनावस्थाविशेषापन्नद्रव्येण सद्वितीयत्वापत्तिः । अविद्याया द्रव्यत्वाभावे तत्कार्यप्रपञ्चस्यापि द्रव्यत्वं न स्यात् । अविद्यानिवृत्तेर्ब्रह्मस्वरूपत्वे नित्यत्वेन तस्य तत्त्वज्ञानसाध्यत्वन्न स्यात् । बन्धाभावश्च प्रसज्यत इति ।

भास्करादयस्तु उपाधिनिवृत्तौ जीवस्य ब्रह्मभावो मोक्ष इति ब्रुवन्ते । तत्र ; विलक्षणस्य द्रव्यस्य कदापि द्रव्यान्तराभेदासम्भवात् । जीवपरमात्मनोश्च मुक्तिदशायामपि भेदश्चर्यते ' ब्रह्मविदामोति परम् ' ' परात्परं पुरुषमुपैति दिव्यम् ' इत्यादिभिः । अतोऽयमपि पक्षो नोपपद्यते ।

किन्तु निःशेषप्रक्षीणकर्मणः विदुषः मूर्धन्यनाड्या उत्क्रान्तस्य ब्रह्मोपसम्पन्नस्य ' परं ज्योतिरुपसम्पद्य स्वेन रूपेणाभिनिष्पद्यते ' इति श्रुत्या स्वाभाविकापहतपाप्मत्वादिगुणा-विर्भावोऽवगम्यते । एवं रूपस्य तस्य ' सोऽश्नुते सर्वान्कामान्सह ब्रह्मणा ' इति श्रुत्या अनन्तकल्याणगुणविशिष्टब्रह्मानुभव एव मोक्ष इति प्रतिपाद्यते । एवं मुक्तस्य जगद्व्यापार-वर्जं भगवद्देश्वर्यं समानम् । ' एतेन प्रतिपद्यमाना इमम्मानवमावर्तं नावर्तेन्ते ' इति श्रुत्या निश्च्रेयसस्य नित्यत्वमवगम्यते । तदेवमसङ्कुचितो ब्रह्मानुभवा मोक्षः इति सर्वं समञ्जसम् ॥

॥ इति निश्च्रेयसनिर्णयाधिकरो दशमः ॥

वादार्थसंग्रहस्सम्पूर्णः ॥

प्रीयतां वासुदेवः



ERRATA

पुटः	पङ्क्तिः	अशुद्धम्	शुद्धम्
३	६	तस्यावान्तर	तस्यावान्तर
५	३	षन्ताति	षन्तीति
”	१४	तत्रोपसान	तत्रोपासन
१२	२०	यदुक्त	यदुक्तम्
१३	१	वाप्तिः	वाप्तेः
१४	८	देहोऽयम्	देवोऽयम्
”	११	त्वस्य वा	त्वस्य चा
”	१७	तस्मात् सुदुर्निरूपम्	तस्मात्सद्दुर्निरूपम्
१८	३	निकास्सत्य	निकास्सत्य (इशक्य)
२०	२१	मस्मद्भिन्न	मस्माद्भिन्न
२३	१७	विषयम्	विषयो
२५	१	केनचिद्	केनचित्
२५	२	प्रतिपपन्ने	प्रतिपन्ने
”	१६	वं	त्वं
”	१९	णाया	णीया
२५	२१	मनिर्वचनीया	मनिर्वचनीया सत्या वा ?
२६	६	सौम्ये	सोम्ये
२९	१२	व्यावृत्योभिन्ना	व्यावृत्योभिन्ना
”	”	वृ (व्य) त्ति	वृत्ति (व्यक्ति ?)
”	१९	रागान्तुक	रागान्तुक
”	२३	श्रवणात्तयो	श्रवणात् । तयो
”	२१	अविनाशा वा	अविनाशी वा
३०	११	इत्यवसेयुः	इत्यनस्येयुः
३१	६	सद्दत्	सद्

पुटः	पङ्क्ति	अशुद्धं	शुद्धम्
३२	६	त्मना विभागं	त्मना अविभागं
३३	७	नुवृत्तेः । स	नुवृत्तेस्स
३४	६	साम्येद	सोम्येद
"	१३	परब्रह्मशब्द	परब्रह्मशब्द
"	१४	नां नूद्य	नानूद्य
"	१५	प्रक्रियया	प्रक्रियया
३५	६	मद्रूपेणा	मद्रूपेणा
"	९	गमात्मानं	गात्मानं
"	१८	प्रयागश्च	प्रयोगश्च
३६	३	राद्यवस्था	राद्यावस्था
"	८	रवगमन्न	रवगमान्न
३७	८	वाचा	वाचो
३८	२३	महाविभूतिस्सुवीर्य	महावबोधसुवीर्य
३९	२	कुर्वन्ती	कुर्वती
"	८	परमकाश	परमाकाश
"	१४	सूरीणां	सूरीणां
"	१७	शरीरत्व	शरीरित्व
४०	१७	तेषां न स्व	तेषां न (तु ?) स्व
"	२४	तद्वद्वत्तुषु	तद्वद्वत्तुषु
४१	८	द्वितीयादि	द्वितीयादि
"	२१	शरीराणा	शरीराणा
४२	४	तद्वता	तद्वतो
"	२०	समाना	सामाना
"	२२	मकुरत	मकुरुत
४३	३	पादानयोर्भेद	पादानयोर्भेद
"	१२	श्रयणीयम्	श्रयणीयम्
"	१६	माश्वरो	मीश्वरो

पुटः	पङ्क्तिः	अशुद्धम्	शुद्धम्
४६	९	शरिर	शरीर
५१	७	प्रद्योतेनैव	प्रद्योतेनैष
”	”	मयति येवे	मति ' येवै '
”	२३	णोशित्वं	णोशित्वं
५२	१	आपाधिक	औपाधिक
५४	८	व्यापारत्वं	व्यापारवत्वं
५५	१	निपातनयाः	निपातनयोः
”	८	धायते	धोयते
”	१०	तथा	तदा
”	१२	यथा	तदा
”	१९	प्रवर्तकत्वम्	प्रवर्तकम्
५६	६	गुणान्यव्या	(गुणस्यापि सव्या ?)
५७	३	णाप्रवर्ति	ण प्रवर्ति
”	१७	द्देश्यं वा	द्देश्यं च
५८	६	कार्यमिति	कार्यमिति
५९	११	यथा	यदा
६०	५	देवान्दर्वि	देवा दर्वि
”	१३	देवतादि त	देवतादि व
”	१६	सन्तोषफल	सन्तोष (:?) फल
”	२४	भूति	भूतिं
६२	९	जनयति	जनयन्ति
”	१३	घटाद्यानात्म	घटाद्यनात्मा
”	१६	वधरित	वधारित
”	”	शक्तितात्पर्यनिश्चयशब्द	शक्तितात्पर्यशब्द ।
६३	८	साध्यत्वा	बाध्यत्वा
”	२१	चेति । तत्र	चेति (योगः प्रकृते ज्ञानयोगः ध्यानम् ?) तत्र
६४	२३	पुरुषार्थप्रियत्वेन	पुरुषात्यर्थप्रियत्वेन

पुटः	पङ्क्तिः	अशुद्धम्	शुद्धम्
”	”	चेत्य	चात्य
६६	१	तथा प्राप्तो	तदामोति
७२	५	भवत्यभेदेभेदश्च तस्याज्ञान	भवत्यभेदो भेदश्च तस्याज्ञान
७२	६	मपपद्यते	मुपपाद्यते
”	६	कथमुपपद्यते	तत्कथमुपपद्यते
”	१४	च	पक्षे च
”	”	जक्षन्	जक्षत्
”	२३	सम्पद्यते	सम्पद्य....निष्पद्यते
७३	१४	क्लिश्यन्ति	क्लेशयन्ति
”	२३	पञ्चभूत	भूतसङ्घ

BODHAVIMARSA

BY

V. SUBRAMANYA SASTRI.


॥ श्री गुरुभ्योनमः ॥

। बोधविमर्शः ।

(पूर्वतोऽनुवृत्तः)

॥ वे. मुद्ररूप्यशास्त्री ॥

॥ अण्णामलै विश्वविद्यालयः ॥



नैयायिकास्तुः पण्डितश्चैत्रः इति वाक्यात्पण्डिताभिन्नश्चैत्रः इति बोधमनुभवामः । नचात्र धात्वर्थ आख्यातार्थो वा मुख्यविशेष्यतया भासते इति वक्तुं शक्यम् तिङन्तस्यैवाभावात् । दृश्यन्ते च बहुलमाख्यातशून्याः प्रयोगाः ‘शशी दिवसधूसरः विगतयौवना कामिनी सरो विगतवारिजं मुखमनक्षरं स्वाकृतेः । प्रभुर्धनपरायणः सततदुर्गतस्सज्जनः नृपाङ्गणगतः खलो मनसि सप्त शल्यानि मे ॥ इत्यादयः । नच तत्र ‘अस्तिर्भवन्तोपरः प्रथमपुरुषोऽप्रयुज्यमानाऽप्यस्ति’ इति कात्यायनस्मरणात् अस्तीति क्रियापदमध्याहर्तव्यम् तदर्थ एव तद्वाक्यजन्यबोधे मुख्यविशेष्यतया भासते इति न प्रथमान्तचैत्रपदार्थमुख्यविशेष्यको बोधः क्लृप्त इति वाच्यम् । त्वं पण्डितः, अहं पण्डितः इत्यादौ प्रथमपुरुषास्तिपदाध्याहारस्यायोग्यतया निरुक्तस्मरणाप्रवृत्तेः क्रियापदाध्याहारे मानाभावात् प्रथमान्तार्थमुख्यविशेष्यकस्यैव बोधस्य जायमानत्वात् । नच तत्रापि प्रातिपदिकार्थप्रकारकशाब्दबोधं प्रति विशेष्यतया सुबजन्योपस्थितिः कारणं, सुबर्थप्रकारकशाब्दबोधं प्रति क्रियापदजन्योपस्थितिः कारणमिति च कार्यकारणभावात्प्रमाणात् योग्यस्य क्रियापदस्याध्याहार इति वाच्यम् । सुप्त्वप्रातिपदिकत्वादीनामनुगतानतिप्रसक्तानां दुर्निर्वचतया अननुगतत्वेन प्रातिपदिकार्थेत्यादेरनुगतस्य कार्यकारणभावस्यासंभवात् । तथाहि सुप्त्वं न जातिः अत्वमत्वादिना सांकर्यात् । नापि सुप्पदवाच्यत्वं तत् तत्पदस्य ईश्वरसङ्केते प्रमाणाभावात् । नापि पाणिनिसंकेतसंबन्धेन सुप्पदवत्त्वं, व्याकरणान्तरप्रणेतृपुरुषीयसंकेतसंबन्धेन तत्पदवत्त्वं, पुरुषविशेषीयसंकेतसंबन्धेन

पदान्तरवत्त्वं चादाय विनिगमनाविरहात् । एवं प्रातिपदिकत्वमपि अनुगतं दुर्वचं बोध्यम् । तथा च निरुक्तस्य अनुगतकार्यकारणभावस्याभावात् तत्तत्प्रातिपदिकार्थान्विशिष्योपादाय तत्तदर्थप्रकारकशाब्दबोधं प्रति तत्तद्विभक्तिजन्योपस्थितिः कारणं, तत्तद्विभक्त्यर्थप्रकारकशाब्दबोधे क्रियापदजन्योपस्थितिः कारणमिति विशिष्यैव कार्यकारणभावो वाच्यः । प्रकृते च प्रकृत्यर्थविशेष्यतया सुबर्थस्य सुबर्थविशेष्यतया च कस्याप्यभानेन तथा कार्यकारणभावो न कल्प्यते इति न तत्रापि क्रियापदाध्याहारः ।

किञ्च अस्तिर्भवन्तोपरः इति न विधायकम् कल्की स्लेच्छान्तकः, रामो रावणस्य हन्ता, इत्यादौ लङन्तासधातोरयोग्यत्वात् । त्रयः कालाः इति विभागपरवाक्ये सन्तीत्यध्याहारस्य सुतरामयोग्यत्वाच्च । त्विष्वपि कालेषु वर्तमानत्वादीनां बोधनासंभवात् । न चास्तिपदं धातुमात्रस्य भवन्तीपदं च लकारमात्रस्योपलक्षकम् । अतश्च यथायोगं क्रियाध्याहारस्संभवत्येवेति वाच्यम् । न विधौ परश्शब्दार्थ इति न्यायेन विधायकवाक्ये लक्षणाया अयुक्तत्वात् । एवञ्च यत्र प्रयोक्तुरस्तित्वविवक्षा तत्र तद्बोधाय अस्तिपदमध्याहार्यमिति कात्यायनवचनमनुवादकमेव । वैयाकरणा अपि नीलमिदं न तु रक्तमिति वाक्यं इतरनिवृत्तितात्पर्यकं अस्त्यादिरहितमभ्युपगच्छन्ति । ‘प्रायशो वाक्यस्य सुप्तिङन्तसमुदायत्वात्, सुबन्तानां च प्रायः क्रियाविशेषणत्वात् धातोश्च क्रियावाचकत्वेन पुरःस्फूर्तिकत्वादिच्छावशाद्वा प्रथमतो धात्वर्थनिरूपणं बोध्यम् ।’ इति धात्वर्थनिरूपणप्राथम्ये हेतुं वर्णयन्तो भूषणकारास्तिङन्तशून्यमपि वाक्यमभ्युपगच्छन्ति । धात्वर्थनिर्णये ‘तस्मिन्प्रयोगे य आख्यातार्थ इत्यस्यावश्यकत्वेन आख्यातशून्ये देवदत्तः पक्तेत्यादौ देवदत्तस्याकर्तृत्वापत्तेः’ इति ग्रन्थेन आख्यातार्थव्यापाराश्रयत्वस्य कर्तृत्वस्वरूपत्वं प्रतिक्षिपन्तो भूषणसारकाराः स्पष्टमेवाङ्गीकुर्वन्ति तिङन्तशून्यमपि वाक्यम् । न च प्राचीनवैयाकरणाभिमतमसङ्गतम् । तिङ्समानाधिकरणे प्रथमा इति वार्तिकात् तिङ्समानाधिकरण्ये एव प्रथमा साधुर्भवति । अतः इतरनिवृत्तिपरेऽपि वाक्ये अस्तिपदाध्याहार आवश्यक इति वाच्यम् । चैत्रेण शयितव्यमिति सुबन्तचयात्मकं वाक्यमिष्यते नव्यवैयाकरणैः । सुप्तिङन्तचयो वाक्यमित्यस्य सुबन्तचयः तिङन्तचयः सुप्तिङन्तचयः इति तैर्विवरणात् । शयितव्यमिति प्रथमान्तपदम् । न च तस्य तिङ्समानाधिकरण्यमस्ति । यदि तत्राप्यस्तिपदमध्याह्रियते तदा सुबन्तचयपर्याप्तत्वं

वाक्यस्य न स्यात् । यदि च तिङ्सामानाधिकरण्ययोग्यत्वमेव वार्तिकेन विवक्षितमिति तत्र प्रथमा उपपाद्यते । तदा तथैव प्रकृतेऽपि प्रथमोपपादनीया । एवं क्रियापदरहितस्थले नियमेन अस्तिपदाध्याहारवादिभिरपि अस्तिर्भवन्तीपर इत्यनुशासनज्ञानाभावे निरुक्तस्थले पण्डिताभिन्नश्चै-
तः इति बोध इष्यते । तस्मात् चैतः पण्डित इत्यादौ प्रथमान्तार्थविशेष्यको बोधः क्लृप्त इति सति संभवे प्रथमान्तार्थमुख्यविशेष्यक एव बोधः स्वीकर्तुमुचितः ॥

चैतः तण्डुलं पचति इत्यत्र तण्डुलप्रातिपदिकार्थः द्वितीयार्थे कर्मत्वेऽन्वेति । प्रातिपदिकार्थविशेष्यतया कर्मत्वादौ विवक्षित एव द्वितीयादीनामनुशासनसिद्धत्वात् । कर्मत्वस्य ससंबन्धिकत्वेन नियमेन निरूपकसाकांक्षत्वात् द्वितीयार्थकर्मत्वं धात्वर्थे पाके ऽन्वेति । पाकश्चाख्यातार्थे कृतो । प्रकृतिप्रत्ययो सहाय्यं ब्रूतस्तयोस्तु प्रत्ययः प्राधान्येन इति व्युत्पत्तेः । आख्यातार्थकृतिश्च व्यापाररूपा शुद्धं प्रातिपदिकार्थमात्रमाकांक्षति । न तु व्यापारिणम् । व्यापारिणमाकांक्षमाणश्च व्यापारः तेनैव व्यापारेण व्यापारिणमाश्रयते उतान्येन । यदि तेनैव तदात्माश्रयः । यद्यन्येन तदानवस्था । शुद्धश्च प्रातिपदिकार्थः प्रथमान्तार्थ एव । न च प्रथमाप्रकृत्यर्थस्यापि प्रथमार्थेऽन्वयो वाच्यः तयोस्तु प्रत्ययः प्राधान्येन इति व्युत्पत्तेरिति वाच्यम् । प्रथमायाः संख्यातिरिक्तार्थाभावात् । न च प्रातिपदि-
कार्थसूत्रात्प्रातिपदिकार्थ एव तदर्थ इति वाच्यम् । तस्य प्रातिपदिकेनैव लाभात् प्रत्ययस्य तत्र शक्तिकल्पनाया अयुक्तत्वात् । अनन्यलभ्यः शब्दार्थ इति न्यायात् । एवं सत्यपि तस्य प्रथमार्थत्वे तत्र प्रातिपदिकार्थः अभेदेनान्वेतीति वाच्यम् । तच्च न संभवति अभेदान्वयप्रयोजिकाया विरूपोपस्थितेरभावात् । अतश्चैतदोत्तरप्रथमाया एव चैत्रोऽर्थः प्रातिपदिकं तात्पर्यग्राहकमिति वक्तव्यम् । तथाचानन्तानां प्रातिपदिकानां व्यर्थत्वापरपर्या-
यतात्पर्यग्राहकत्वकल्पनामपेक्ष्य अल्पीयस्याः प्रथमायाः प्रयोगसाधुत्वसंपादकत्वकल्पनं युज्यते । एवं तटः तटी इत्यादौ लिङ्गस्य पुंस्त्वादेर्बोध एव नास्ति बाधितत्वात् । बोधेऽपि तटान् तटीः इत्यादौ प्रथमाया अभावे इव तटः इत्यत्राप्युपपत्तेर्न प्रथमायास्तदर्थकता । एवं द्रोणं व्रीहि-
मानयेत्यादौ प्रथमाशून्यस्थल इव द्रं णपदस्य द्रोणपरिमिते लक्षणया द्रोणो व्रीहिरिति प्रयोग उपपादयितुं शक्यते । अतः परिमाणमपि न प्रथमार्थः । परन्तु अनन्यलभ्यत्वासंख्यैव । प्रातिपदिकार्थातिरिक्तेषु कर्मत्वादिष्वविवक्षितेषु प्रथमा भवतीति प्रातिपदिकार्थसूत्रार्थः ।

एवञ्च प्रयोगसाधुत्वाय प्रथमा प्रयुज्यते । अर्थाभावेऽपि प्रथमामनुशासता सूत्रकारेण न केवला प्रकृतिः प्रयोक्तव्येति सूचितम् । संख्या च न प्रकृत्यर्थविशेष्यतया भासते इति वक्तुं युक्तम् । तथासति तस्या धात्वर्थे परम्परासंबन्धेनान्वयस्य वाच्यतया गौरवात् । अतस्सा प्रकृत्यर्थ एव समवायेन साक्षात्संबन्धेनान्वेति । एवञ्च प्रथमान्तचैत्रपदस्य एकत्व-विशिष्टश्चैत्रोऽर्थः । न च अभिहिते प्रथमा इति कात्यायनस्मरणात् आख्याताद्यभिहितं कर्तृत्वादिकं प्रथमार्थः तत्रैव प्रकृत्यर्थः प्रकारतया भासते इति वाच्यम् । उक्तार्थानामप्रयोगः इति न्यायेन आख्याताभिहितकर्तृत्ववाचकत्वस्य प्रथमायां कल्पयितुमशक्यत्वात् । न चाख्याते-न सामान्यतः कर्तृत्वबोधनेऽपि चैत्रवृत्तित्वेन कर्तृत्वबोधार्थं प्रथमया कर्तृत्वाभिधानमावश्यक-मिति वाच्यम् । आख्यातार्थस्य कर्तृत्वस्य प्रथमान्तार्थेऽन्वयेनैव चैत्रवृत्तिकर्तृत्वस्य लाभात् । न चाख्यातोपात्तकर्तृत्वं आख्यातार्थभावनायां (कृतौ) अन्वेति न प्रथमान्तार्थे इति वाच्यम् । कृत्यतिरिक्तस्य कर्तृत्वस्याप्रामाणिकत्वात् । कृतेश्च प्रथमान्तार्थेऽन्वयेन निरुक्तार्थलाभसंभवात् । न च कर्तृत्वस्याख्यातेनानभिधाने प्रथमा न साधुः स्यादिति शङ्क्यम् । कृतिरूपकर्तृत्वाभि-धानस्य प्रथमाप्रयोजकत्वसंभवात् । न च कृत्यभिधानस्य तत्प्रयोजकत्वे चैत्रेण सुप्यते इत्यत्र चैत्रपदोत्तरं प्रथमा स्यात् । चैत्रेण स्वापः क्रियते इति विवरणानुसारेण आख्यातेन कृत्यभिधानादिति वाच्यम् । चैत्रेण सुप्यते इत्यत्र स्वापनिरूपितं कर्तृत्वं तृतीयया बोध्यते । तच्च कृतिमत्त्वमिति कृतिः तृतीयार्थ इति पर्यवसितम् । कृतिश्च धात्वर्थे स्वापेऽन्वेति । चैत्रेण स्वापः क्रियते इत्यत्र तु कृजर्थनिरूपितमेव कर्तृत्वं तृतीयया बोध्यते न तु स्वाप-निरूपितम् । कृजर्थनिरूपितञ्च कर्तृत्वमाश्रयत्वरूपमिति नव्यमते आधेयत्वं तृतीयार्थः । तच्च धात्वर्थे कृतावन्वेति । चैत्रवृत्तिकृतिसाध्यः स्वापः इति विवरणवाक्याधीनो बोधः । एव-ञ्चात्र कृज्यातुः नाख्यातविवरणम् । तथाच भावाख्यातस्य कृतिबोधकत्वे मानाभावेन कृतिरूपस्य कर्तृत्वस्यानभिधानात् चैत्रपदोत्तरं तृतीयैव न प्रथमा । न च अभिहिते प्रथमा इत्यनुशासनबलात् कर्तृत्वादिकं प्रथमार्थ इति वाच्यम् । प्रातिपदिकार्थनिष्ठे कर्तृत्वादिके समभिव्याहृताख्यातादिना अभिहिते सति तत्प्रातिपदिकोत्तरं प्रथमा इत्यस्यानुशासनार्थत्वात् । एवञ्च प्रथमान्तार्थः कुत्र विशेषणतया अन्वितात् ।

आख्यातार्थभावना व्यापाररूपा व्यापारिणमार्काक्षति । प्रथमान्तार्थश्च निर्व्यापारः

व्यापारमाकांक्षति । अतः उभयाकांक्षया उभयोरन्वयः । तत्रापि भावना प्रकारः न प्रथमान्तार्थः । पूर्वोक्तन्यायेन तस्य विशेष्यभासकसामग्र्यभावात् । न च प्रथमाप्रकृत्यर्थान्वयिनः प्रत्ययार्थस्याभावेऽपि आख्यातार्थ एव प्रथमान्तार्थः अन्वेतु । प्रातिपदिकार्थस्य भेदसंबन्धेन धात्वर्थेऽनन्वयान्न कोऽपि व्यत्यतिविरोध इति वाच्यम् । तच्छब्दः पूर्ववाक्यार्थबोधे यः प्रधानं तद्वाची । प्रयाति पुरुषस्तस्य पादयोरभिवादय इत्यत्र तच्छब्दः पुरुषं परामृशति । प्रयाति पुरुषः इति वाक्यार्थं तस्य प्राधान्य एव तच्छब्देन पुरुषपरामर्शो युज्यते । एवं यो यश्शूद्रस्य पचति द्विजोऽन्नं सोऽतिनिन्दितः इत्यत्र तच्छब्दः पूर्ववाक्यार्थं प्रधानं द्विजं परामृशति इति संगच्छते । एवं आख्यातार्थस्य प्रथमान्तार्थविशेषणत्वे पचन्पचति इति वाक्यं निराकांक्षं संपद्यते । तस्माद्वाक्यात् पाककृतिविशिष्टः पाककृतिमानिति बोधो भवेत् । स चोद्देश्यतावच्छेदकविधेयतावच्छेदकयोरभेदेनाव्युत्पन्नः इति तादृशं वाक्यं न प्रामाणिकमिति आज्ञस्येनोपपादयितुं शक्यते । एवं प्रथमान्तार्थविशेष्यकबोधधाङ्गीकारे वैयाकरण-मधीते य इति स्थः स्थं वहति यः इति च विवरणविनियमाणयोः वृत्तिविग्रहवाक्ययोः समानविशेष्यकसमानप्रकारकबोधजनकत्वमाज्ञस्येनोपपद्यते । तथा चाख्यातार्थभावनैव प्रथमान्तार्थेऽन्वेति । पाकानुकूलकृतिमांश्चैत्र इति प्रथमान्तार्थमुख्यविशेष्यको बोधः । तदुक्तं न्यायकुमुदाज्जलावाचार्यैः । ‘नह्यन्यतराकांक्षा अन्वयहेतुः अपितूभयाकांक्षा । प्रातिपदिकार्थो हि *फलेनान्वयमलभमानः क्रियासंबन्धमपेक्षते । भावनापि व्यापारभूता सती व्यापारिणमित्युभयाकांक्षा अन्वयहेतुः’ । इति ‘अत एवानुभवोऽपि यावदुक्तं भवति पाकानुकूलवर्तमानयत्नवान् तावदुक्तं भवति पचतीति’ । इति च ॥

एवमुपपत्तिसिद्धः प्रथमान्तार्थमुख्यविशेष्यको बोधः सर्वानुभवसाक्षिकः । प्रथमान्तार्थमुख्यविशेष्यकबोधविद्वेषिणोऽपि शङ्खः पाण्डर एव इत्यत्र अवधारणविषयपाण्डराभिन्नः शङ्खः इति बोधमभिलपन्ति । किमत्र प्रथमान्तार्थ एव विशेष्यः इति पृष्टास्ते ब्रूयुः धात्वर्थमुख्यविशेष्यकं बोधं जनयति वाक्यमिति स्वमतमनुसन्धानाः, अध्याहृतक्रियापदार्थमुख्यविशेष्यक एव तादृशशङ्खकर्तृका सत्तेति बोधः तत्र जायते इति । एवमालङ्कारिकाः

प्रायः प्रथमान्तार्थमुख्यविशेष्यकमेव बोधं निरूपयन्ति । किं बहुना बोधादिष्वभिनिवेशरहिता वेदान्तिनोऽपि शाब्दबोधप्रसक्तौ प्रथमान्तार्थमुख्यविशेष्यकमेव बोधं निरूपयन्ति । एवञ्च चैत्रः पचति इत्यत्र पाकानुकूलकृतिमात्रेण इति बोधः अनुभवसिद्धो युज्यते-तराम् । अत एव अवगतनिरुक्तवाक्यार्थः पुरुषः चैत्रः पाकानुकूलकृतिमात्रवेति न सन्दिग्धे ।

ननु भावप्रधानमाख्यातमिति निरुक्तं न भावशब्दितभावनायाः प्रत्ययार्थस्य धात्वर्थनिरूपितविशेष्यत्वं बोधयति । तथा सति तयोस्तु प्रत्ययः प्राधान्येनेत्येव सिद्धत्वाद्व्यर्थ-मिदमापद्येत । भावाख्यातेऽव्याप्तिश्च तत्र धात्वर्थस्यैव विशेष्यतया भावेन तदपेक्षया प्रधानी-भूतप्रत्ययार्थबोधकत्वस्याभावात् । तस्माद्भावपदार्थधात्वर्थस्यैव प्राधान्यबोधकं निरुक्तमिति तद्वि-रुद्धः प्रथमान्तार्थविशेष्यको बोधः स्वीकर्तुं न शक्यते इति चेत् ।

न, प्रत्ययार्थः प्रधानमिति न्यायेन आख्यातार्थस्य धात्वर्थविशेष्यत्वे सिद्धेऽपि आख्यातार्थेषु कालसंख्याभावनारूपेषु कीदृशः आख्यातार्थो विशेष्यः इति जिज्ञासायां आख्यातार्थभावनायाः धात्वर्थापेक्षया प्राधान्यं बोधयितुं निरुक्तमिदं प्रवृत्तमस्ति । भावपदार्थो भावना । कर्त्राख्याते कर्तृत्वं, कर्माख्याते कर्मत्वं, आश्रयत्वं प्रतियोगित्वमित्यादयः भावना-पदव्यपदेश्याः । एवञ्च धात्वर्थनिष्ठप्रकारतानिरूपितभावनानिष्ठविशेष्यताशालिबोधजनक-माख्यातमिति फलितम् । प्रत्ययार्थः प्रधानमिति सुवर्थविषयतयापि न संकोचितं भवति । आख्यातार्थेषु कस्य गुणत्वं कस्य प्राधान्यमिति विचिकित्सायां आख्यातार्थसंख्याद्यपेक्षया भावनायाः प्राधान्यं बोधयति निरुक्तमिति न स्वीकर्तुं युक्तम् । आख्यातार्थसंख्यायां भावनाविशेषणत्वे कर्त्राख्याते स्वाश्रयसमवेतत्वसंबन्धेन, कर्माख्याते ओदनः पच्यते इत्यादौ स्वाश्रयोदननिष्ठविकल्पितजनकपाकानुकूलत्वसंबन्धेनान्वयस्य वाच्यतया शाब्दबोधस्य अधिकविषयकतया गौरवापत्तेः । एवञ्च प्रत्ययार्थः प्रधानमित्येव सिद्धत्वाद्व्यर्थमिदं व्यर्थमिति शङ्का नोदेति । तदुक्तमभियुक्तैः ‘भावप्रधानमाख्यातमिति निर्वचनस्मृतेः । आख्यातार्थेषु भावस्य प्राधान्यमनुशिष्यते ॥’ इति । न च तथापि भावाख्यातेऽव्याप्तिरस्त्येवेति वाच्यम् । तत्रापि चैत्रकर्तृकस्वापाश्रयत्वं इत्याकारकस्य धात्वर्थप्रकारकस्य आश्रयत्वरूपभावनाविशेष्य-कस्य बोधस्य जननेन आख्यातलक्षणसंगमनात् । अयञ्च बोधः शिरोमणिसंमतः ।

“चैत्रेण सुप्यते, गगनेन स्तीयते इत्यादौ प्रथमान्तपदाभावात् धात्वर्थस्य भावनाया विशेषणतयैवान्वयस्य व्युत्पन्नत्वात् भावनाया बाधितत्वाच्च, भावनाविशेष्यविरहादनन्वितैव संख्या । एकवचनं तु साधुत्वार्थम् ।” इति शिरोमणिभट्टाचार्या आख्यातवादे निरूपयन्ति । भावनाविशेष्यविरहादित्यनेन भावनाविशेष्यको बोधः न तु भावनाविशेषणकेतरविशेष्यको बोधः इति लभ्यते । अन्यथा भावनाया अबोधादिति ब्रूयात् । युज्यते चायं बोधः निरुक्तस्मृत्यनुरोधात् । एवञ्च न भावाख्यातेऽव्याप्तिः ।

अथवा भावप्रधानमित्यनेन न भावप्रधानकबोधोपधायकत्वं विवक्षितमिति शक्यते वक्तुम् । येनाख्यातेन बोधो न जनितः तत्राव्याप्त्यापत्तेः । अतस्तादृशबोधस्वरूप-योग्यत्वं तादृशबोधजनकतावच्छेदकीभूतानुपूर्वीमत्त्वरूपमेव विवक्षणीयम् । स्वप्यादेः अकर्मकधातोः पाकगमनादौ शक्तिभ्रमः लक्षणाग्रहो वा यदा तदा ततः धात्वर्थप्रकारकाख्यातार्थभावनाविशेष्यकबोधोदयेन तादृशबोधजनकतावच्छेदकानुपूर्वीमत्त्वस्य सत्त्वेन भावाख्यातेऽव्याप्तिविरहः ।

अथवा भावप्रधानमाख्यातमिति वचनं प्रमाणीकुर्वद्भिरपि नव्यवैयाकरणैः वैयाकरणः इत्यादिवृत्तिविवरणवाक्यघटकस्याख्यातस्य भावप्राधान्यं न स्वीक्रियते । वृत्तिविग्रहयोः समानविशेष्यकसमानप्रकारकबोधजनकत्वानुभवेन, तथा बोधकभाष्यप्रानागन्तात्, ‘कचिद्गुणप्रधानत्वमर्थानामविवक्षितम्’ इत्युपक्रम्य ‘आख्यातं तद्विदितार्थस्य यत्किञ्चिदुपदर्शकम् । गुणप्रधानभावस्य तत्र दृष्टो विपर्ययः’ ॥ इति हयुक्तेः, तत्र विपर्ययशब्दस्वारस्याच्च, व्याकरणमधीते यः इति विवरणवाक्यस्य व्याकरणाध्ययनकर्तृबोधकत्वं व्यवस्थापयन्ति ते । एवञ्च निरुक्तस्मृतेः तद्विदादिवृत्तिविवरणस्थले संकोचः स्वीकरणीयः । एवं भावाख्याते तस्य संकोचः इत्यपि शक्यते वक्तुम् ।

ननु भावप्रधानमाख्यातमिति वचनस्यैवमर्थवर्णनेऽपि ‘यत्रोभे भावप्रधाने भवतः’ इत्युत्तरग्रन्थपर्यालोचनया भावस्यैव वाक्यजन्यबोधविशेष्यत्वं प्रतीयते । न प्रथमान्तार्थस्येति चेन्न ।

स्थितिः कारणमिति आख्यातार्थसंख्याभावनासाधारण्येन एककार्यकारणभावकल्पनालाघ-
वञ्च न प्रथमान्तार्थमुख्यविशेष्यकबोधे मूलयुक्तिः । निरुक्तन्यायेन आख्यातत्वस्यानुगतानति-
प्रसक्तस्य दुर्वचतया तादृशानुगतकार्यकारणभावस्यासंभवात् । अपिच प्रथमान्तपदजन्योपस्थि-
तिकार्यतावच्छेदकं किं भावनान्वयबुद्धित्वं उत संख्यान्वयबुद्धित्वमिति विचार्य आख्यातार्थ-
भावनानवगाहिनः आख्यातार्थसंख्याबोधस्यानुदयेन भावनान्वयबुद्धित्वमेव कार्यतावच्छेदकम् ।
प्रथमान्तपदानुपस्थाप्ये च न संख्यान्वयबोधो भवति । व्याप्यधर्मावच्छिन्नसामग्र्या
व्याप्यधर्मावच्छिन्ने कार्ये जननीये व्यापकधर्मावच्छिन्नजनकसामग्री अपेक्ष्यते । संख्यान्वय-
बोधत्वव्यापकभावनान्वयबुद्धित्वावच्छिन्नजनिकायाः प्रथमान्तपदजन्योपस्थितेरभावादिति
निर्धारयन्ति नैयायिकप्रबन्धारः । चैत्रः पचतीत्यादौ आख्यातैकवचनजन्यैकत्वोपस्थितिः न
शाब्दबोधहेतुः मानाभावात् । आख्यातं विनापि सुबेकवचनादेकत्वबोधसंभवादिति निष्कर्षा-
नुसारिणामाशयः भट्टाचार्यैरेव प्रपञ्चितो व्युत्पत्तिवादे । चैत्रो मैत्रश्च गच्छतः इत्यत्र
चैत्रं मैत्रे च प्रत्येकमेकत्वं सुबेकवचनाद्बोध्यते इत्युभयविधानुभवोऽपि शाब्द एव ।
नत्वन्यतरस्याप्यशाब्दत्वं कल्पनीयम् ।

चैत्रो न पचतीत्यत्र भावनाया नञर्थे संख्यायाश्च प्रथमान्तार्थेऽन्वयेन कार्यकारणभावान्तरं
स्वीक्रियत एव । नचैवं तत्तत्स्थलानुसारेण तत्र तत्रान्वयस्वीकारेऽनेककार्यकारणभावकल्पना-
गौरवमिति वाच्यम् । निरुक्तवाक्यात्पाकानुकूलकृत्यभाववांश्चैतः इत्यस्मत्संमतबोधजनने न
कोऽपि प्रयोगस्यातिप्रसङ्गः अप्रसङ्गो वा । परन्तु कार्यकारणभावान्तरं कल्पनीयम् । परैस्तु
प्रयोगातिप्रसङ्गवारणाय नञः चैत्रनिष्ठाभावे आख्यातस्य वा कृत्यभावे लक्षणा स्वीक्रियते ।
एवञ्च तत्तत्पदजन्यलक्ष्यार्थोपस्थितेः शाब्दबोधहेतुत्वं कल्पनीयम् । लक्षणाकल्पनस्य
तादृशकारणताकल्पन एव पर्यवसानात् । द्वितीयपक्षे नञः व्यर्थत्वापरपर्यायतात्पर्यग्राहकता
च कल्पनीया । एवं केवलशक्यार्थबोधस्य नञा कुत्राप्यजननात् नञो लक्षणाकथनमप्य-
समञ्जसम् । नञ्समभिव्याहारस्थलेषु नञः लक्षकत्वपदान्तरगतलक्षणातात्पर्यग्राहकत्वयोर-
न्यतरस्यैव तैः प्रतिपादनात् ।

किञ्च सुबर्थलिङ्गसंख्याव्यतिरिक्तप्रातिपदिकार्थव्यतिरिक्तप्रकारकशाब्दबोधं प्रति भावनानिष्ठविशेष्यतासंबन्धेन लिङ्गानन्वयिपदजन्योपस्थितिः कारणमित्यनुगतः कार्यकारणभावो न संभवति । जानातीत्यादावाश्रयत्वं, नश्यतोत्यत्र प्रतियोगित्वं, पचति पच्यते इत्यादौ कृतिः, न पचतीत्यादौ कृत्यभावश्च मुख्यविशेष्यतया भासते । नह्याश्रयत्वादि-साधारणमनुगतानतिप्रसक्तं भावनात्वं निर्वर्क्तुं शक्यम् । न च संख्याकालकारकातिरिक्ताख्यातार्थत्वं भावनात्वं । आख्यातार्थत्वञ्च शक्तिरक्षणान्यतरसंबन्धेन आख्यातप्रतिपाद्यत्वमिति वाच्यम् । पूर्वोक्तन्यायेन आख्यातत्वस्यैवानुगतत्वात् । न च भावनात्वमखण्डो धर्म इति वाच्यम् । तत्साधिकायाः अभावादिषु भावनेत्यनुगतप्रतीतेः शपथैकनिर्णयत्वात् । न च तान्त्रिकैः भावनापदव्यपदेश्यत्वमेव तत्त्वमिति वाच्यम् । तान्त्रिकसंकेतसंबन्धेन भावनापदवत्त्वं पुरुषान्तरीयसंकेतसंबन्धेन पदान्तरवत्त्वञ्चादाय विनिगमनाविरहात् । भावनात्वमिव निरुक्तकार्यतावच्छेदककोटिप्रविष्टं सुप्तं प्रातिपदिकत्वमपीति कानुगतकार्यकारणभावोऽवकाशं लभते ।

[To be continued.]

MUKURA

EDITED BY

K. A. SIVARAMAKRISHNA SASTRI

पदस्यार्ध इति । पदस्य खण्ड इत्यर्थः । स च पूर्व उत्तरो वा, उभयोरपि पदत्वस्य इष्टत्वात् । ननु इङ्गघशब्दस्य 'अहारहस्सुवरनिङ्गघान्तः' 'त्वे इत्यनिङ्गघान्तः' इत्यादौ विभागयोग्यपदद्वयात्मकपदे एव प्रयोगो दृश्यते, नतु तदेकदेशात्मकपूर्वोत्तर-खण्डयोः । अत एव 'तस्य पूर्वपदमवग्रहः' इत्युत्तरसूत्रे 'तस्य—विभज्यमानपदद्वया-त्मकसमुदायरूपपदस्य पूर्वपदं अवग्रहः' इत्यर्थः सिद्धो भवति । अन्यथा तु तस्य इत्यनेन पूर्वोत्तरखण्डयोः ग्रहणे पूर्वखण्डात्पूर्वस्य पदस्यापि अवग्रहत्वं स्यात् । एवञ्च 'अदब्धायो-ऽशीततनो' इत्यादौ 'आयो' इत्यस्यापि 'नावग्रहः' इत्यनेन प्रगृह्यसंज्ञाप्रतिषेधः स्यात् । अतः इङ्गघपदस्य तादृशसमुदायबोधकत्वमेव । अतएव ग्रन्थकृदपि 'नहि इङ्गघस्य द्वयोच्चारणात्' इत्यादिवाक्ये समुदायतात्पर्येणैव अनुपदमेव स्वयमपि इङ्गघपदं प्रयोक्ष्यते । तत् कथमत्र इङ्गघपदस्य खण्डपरता? इति चेत्—तत्राह—इङ्गघ्यते—विभागेन विचाल्यते इति । इत्थञ्च इङ्गघशब्दस्य विभज्यमानार्थकत्वमाश्रित्य प्रकृते खण्डयोः ग्रहणमिति भावः ॥

अत एवेति । एतत्सूत्रारम्भात् प्राक् तत्र इङ्गघखण्डयोः पृथक् पदत्वाभावादेवे-त्यर्थः । ननु एतत्सूत्रारम्भे सति नानापदत्वातिदेशात् कथं त्रिचत्वारिंशत्पदत्वम्? भ्रान्तोऽसि, 'असंख्याने' इति पर्युदासादिति गृहाण ।

तस्मादिति । अत्रायमभिसन्धिः — 'नानापदवत्' इत्यादिसूत्राकरणेऽपि 'तस्य पूर्वपदमवग्रहः' इत्युत्तरसूत्रे 'तस्य' इति स्थाने 'इङ्गघस्य' इति निवेश्य इङ्गघस्य पूर्वपदं अवग्रहसंज्ञं स्यात् इत्यर्थे सति पूर्वपदमित्यनुवादसामर्थ्यात् पूर्वखण्डस्य पदत्वं सिद्धम् । किञ्च पूर्वखण्डस्य पदत्वाभावे पदग्रहणपरिभाषया अवग्रहेषु प्रग्रहत्वाप्राप्त्या 'नावग्रहः' इति प्रतिषेधसूत्रमेव व्यर्थं स्यात् । तस्मात् सिद्धमवग्रहस्य पदत्वम् । 'त्वे इत्यनिङ्गघान्तः' इत्यादौ 'अनिङ्गघान्तः' इति प्रतिषेधाभावेऽपि 'अदितित्वे' इत्यादौ 'त्वे' इति उत्तरखण्डस्य पदत्वाभावेन 'पदग्रहणेषु पदं गम्येत' इति परिभाषयैव प्रग्रहत्वाभावे सिद्धे 'अनिङ्गघान्तः' इति प्रतिषेधसामर्थ्येन उत्तरखण्डस्यापि पदत्वं सिद्धम् । एवञ्च ज्ञापकेनैव पूर्वोत्तरखण्डयोः पदत्वे सिद्धे सूत्रमिदं किमर्थं इत्यपि नाशङ्क्यम्, 'असंख्याने' इति प्रतिषेधार्थमवश्यविधेयत्वात् । 'नह्यप्रदर्शितविषयः प्रतिषेधः शक्यो विज्ञातुम्' इति स्थानि-

वत्सूत्रस्थकैयटाद्युक्तरीत्या अभावज्ञाने प्रतियोगिज्ञानस्य कारणत्वाच्च प्रतियोगिप्रदर्शनं विना निषेधस्य कर्तुमशक्यत्वेन 'असंख्याने' इति प्रतिषेधकरणार्थं नानापदवत्त्वस्य अवश्य-विधेयत्वात् सूत्रमिदमावश्यकमेवेति ॥ एतदेवाभिप्रेत्याह—विधेय एवेति ॥

पदग्रहणेषु पदं गम्येत ॥ पदापदसाधारणधर्मवद्ग्रहणे पदमात्रग्रहणमभिमत-मितिपरमार्थः । अनया च परिभाषया पदैकदेशस्य व्यावृत्तिरिव पदसमुदायस्यापि व्यावृत्तिः, उभयोस्तुल्यत्वात् ॥

अपि विकृतम् । ननु 'छिन्नेऽपि पुच्छेश्चा श्वैव नचाश्वो न च गर्दभः' इति लोक-न्यायेन यथा देवदत्तस्य निमित्तवशादुपचयापचयौ जायमानौ व्यपदेशहानिं न कुरुतः, तथा णत्वादिविकारविशिष्टानामपि तत्र तत्र ग्रहणे सिद्धे सूत्रारम्भस्य फलं किमिति चेत्—शास्त्रान्तरोक्तविकारविशिष्टग्रहणाभाव इति गृहाण । तदेतन्मनसि निधायाह—वक्ष्य-माणकार्ययोगादिति ॥ वक्ष्यमाणकार्यप्रवृत्तिप्रयोज्यविकारविशिष्टस्यैव विकृतशब्देन ग्रहणम्, ननु शास्त्रान्तरीयविकारविशिष्टस्येति भावः । अत एव 'इन्द्रा वद्वन्वान्परः' इति वतेः पृथक् वन्वानोर्ग्रहणं सार्थकं भवति । अन्यथा मूलशास्त्ररीत्या वतिप्रत्ययस्यैव नुमा-गमदीर्घादिना विकृतत्वेन वन्वानोरपि ग्रहणे सिद्धे तद्वैयर्थ्यापत्तिः । एवं 'पारी परिपरी' इति 'षुष्कृधि' इति 'प्रापूर्वः' इत्यादिकमपि बोध्यम् । अस्य च फलं 'वृत्रहणम्' इत्यादौ हन् शब्दे विहितस्य णत्वस्य 'वृत्रघ्नः' इत्यत्र अप्रवृत्तिः ॥

अप्यकारादि । इदं सूत्रं 'श्वर्ता वयुना' इत्यादौ श्वादिपदानां अश्वादिपदे-ष्वपि शक्तिं ग्राहयति । एवञ्च अनेन सूत्रेण सर्वेषां पदानां स्वरूपे अकारादौ तत्र च गृहीतशक्तिकस्य पुंसः तत्र तत्र उभयोरपि बोधात् उभयत्र कार्यसिद्धिरिति बोध्यम् । स्पष्टीकरिष्यते चायमर्थः षष्ठेऽध्याये ॥

एकवर्णः पदमपृक्तः ॥ इदं स्पष्टार्थम् ; 'उकारोऽपृक्तः' इति सूत्रे अपृक्त-ग्रहणं परित्यज्य तत्स्थाने पदशब्दनिवेशेनैव इष्टार्थसिद्धेः । तथाहि—'पदं प्रकृत्या वकारोऽन्तरे' इति सूत्रं प्रणयम् । तस्यचायमर्थः—पदात्मक उवर्णः प्रकृत्या स्यात् अचि-परे, तयोश्चान्तरा वकार आगमो भवतीति । न च 'अन्कारादि च' इति परिभाषया

अन्कारादेरपि ग्रहणापत्त्या 'अन्वह मासाः' इत्यादावपि प्रकृतिभावादिकं स्यादिति वाच्यम् ; 'उः प्रकृत्या' इत्येवं सूत्रे कृतेऽपि पदग्रहणपरिभाषया पदात्मकः उकारः इत्यर्थे लब्धे पुनःपदग्रहणं क्रियमाणं 'उ' इत्यस्यैव यत्र पदत्वम्, नतु वर्णान्तरविशिष्टस्य, तत्रैव प्रकृतिभावः इत्यर्थस्य बोधकम् इत्यदोषात् । किञ्च 'अन्कारादि' इति परिभाषायाः पदग्रहणपरिभाषासन्नियोगशिष्टत्वेन, तस्याश्च परिभाषाणां अनियमे नियमकारिणीत्वस्वाभाव्येन पदापदसाधारणधर्मवच्छब्दोपादानमात्रविषयकत्वेन, प्रकृते च पदग्रहणस्य साक्षादुपात्तत्वात् सन्देहाभावेन [पदग्रहणपरिभाषाया] अप्रवृत्त्या तत्सन्नियोगशिष्टाया अन्कारादिपरिभाषाया अपि अप्रवृत्तेः । तस्मात् सूत्रमिदं स्पष्टार्थमेव । स्पष्टा चेयं रीतिः 'अपृक्त एकाल् प्रत्ययः' इति सूत्रे मूलशास्त्रे ॥

आद्यन्तवच्च । तयोरिवेति 'तत्र तस्यैव' इति सूत्रेण सप्तम्यन्ताद्वतिप्रत्ययः । यस्मात्परं किञ्चिदस्तीति । तथा च तद्धटकवर्णध्वंसाधिकरणक्षणवृत्तित्वे सति तद्धटकवर्णप्रागभावाधिकरणक्षणवृत्तित्वमेव तदादित्वमिति पर्यवसितम् । एवं तद्धटकवर्णप्रागभावानधिकरणक्षणवृत्तित्वे सति तद्धटकवर्णध्वंसाधिकरणक्षणवृत्तित्वमन्त्यत्वमिति च बोध्यम् । एतादृशमादित्वमन्त्यत्वञ्च एकवर्णात्मकपदे नास्तीत्ययमारम्भः । वस्तुतस्तु यथा एकस्मिन्नपि पुत्रे अयमेवज्येष्ठोऽयमेव मध्यम इति व्यवहारः, एवमेकस्मिन्नपि अयमेवादिः अयमेवान्त इति व्यवहारस्याप्युपपत्तेः स्पष्टार्थमिदम् । स्पष्टश्चेदम् 'आद्यन्तवदेकस्मिन्' इति सूत्रे महाभाष्ये ॥

विनाशो लोपः । यो भूत्वा न भवति तत्रैव विनाशपदव्यवहारस्य लौकिकप्रयोगसिद्धत्वेन केवलादर्शनमात्रेण शशशृङ्गादौ विनाशव्यवहारादर्शनाच्च अत्रापि तादृशस्यैव ग्रहणमित्याह—पदावस्थानां श्रुतस्येति ॥

उपबन्धस्तु देशाय नित्यम् । अभक्तकार्यादिति । आगमकार्यादित्यर्थः । आगमः खलु त्रिविधः—पूर्वान्तः, परादिः, अभक्तश्चेति । तत्र आद्यन्तयोरिह शास्त्रे अभावात् अभक्तात्मक एवागम इति बोध्यम् । पूर्वं परं वेति स्वरूपकथनम् । पूर्वत्वेन परत्वेन वेति । अस्मिन् पूर्वं अस्मिन् परे इत्येवं रूपेणेत्यर्थः । पूर्वत्वेन परत्वेन वा निर्दि-

श्यमानस्येति । इदं कार्यभाज इत्यस्य विशेषणम् । तथा च पूर्वत्वेन परत्वेन वा निर्दिश्यमानस्य कार्यभाजोऽवधितया निर्दिश्यते इत्यन्वयः । निमित्तानां हि द्विविधो निर्देशः पूर्वत्वपरत्वरूपेण वा कार्यभाजिनष्टपूर्वत्वपरत्वावधितया वा । उभयविधानामपि निमित्तत्वसिद्धयर्थं उभयथा कथनमिति भावः । इत्थञ्चायमिह निष्कर्षः—स्वनिमित्तत्वञ्च (निमित्तत्वं) स्वाव्यवहितोत्तरवृत्तित्वा (स्वाव्यवहितपूर्ववृत्तित्वा) न्यतरसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नस्य (स्व)वृत्तिकार्यतानिरूपितकारणताश्रयत्वसम्बन्धेन कार्यभाग्विशिष्टत्वमिति (ष्टत्वम्) । एतादृशनमित्तभिन्नत्वे सति कार्यप्रयोजकत्वं उपलब्ध(बन्ध)स्य लक्षणमिति ॥

नानापदीयञ्च निमित्तं प्रग्रहस्त्रादिषु ॥

इति वैदिकाभरणव्याख्याने मुकुराख्याने प्रथमोऽध्यायः ।

अथ द्वितीयोऽध्यायः ।

द्विविधः शब्द इति । प्रसिद्धञ्च द्वैविध्यं मूलशास्त्रे भाष्यादौ । ब्रह्मेत्यभिधीयते इति । तत्रेत्यं शब्दतत्त्वविदः—परापश्यन्तीमध्यमावैखरीभेदेन चतुर्विधा वाचः । तत्र जगदुपादानभूता सकलाकाशव्यापिका योगिनां समाधिमात्रवेद्या सूक्ष्मतमप्रणवात्मिका रवशब्दापरपर्याया परा वागेव शब्दब्रह्मेत्यभिधीयते ;

‘अनादिनिधनं ब्रह्म शब्दतत्त्वं यदक्षरम् ।

विवर्ततेऽर्थभावेन प्रक्रिया जगतो यतः ॥’

इति ह्युक्तेः । सा च सर्वगतापि ज्ञातार्थबुधोपयिषाजन्यप्रयत्नविशेषसहकृतपवनचलनेन प्राणिनां मूलाधारस्थाने अभिव्यज्यते । ततः नाभिपर्यन्तमागच्छता तेन वायुना अभिव्यज्यमाना सूक्ष्मतरप्रणवात्मिका मनोविषयभूता च पश्यन्ती इत्युच्यते । ततो हृदयपर्यन्तमागच्छता तेन वायुना तद्देशेऽभिव्यज्यमाना तत्तच्छब्दोल्लेखिबुद्धिविषयभूता परश्रोत्रग्रहणायोग्या जपादौ श्रवणपिधाने स्वमात्रवेद्या अत एव सूक्ष्मप्रणवात्मिका च मध्यमेत्युच्यते । तत आस्यपर्यन्तमागच्छता तेन तत्तत्स्थानेष्वभिव्यज्यमाना परश्रोत्रग्रहणयोग्या विभिन्नवर्णात्मिका वैखरीत्युच्यते । अत एव

‘परा वाङ्मूलचक्रस्था पश्यन्ती नाभिसंस्थिता ।

हृदिस्था मध्यमा ज्ञेया वैखरी कण्ठदेशगा ॥

इति व्यवहारः । आद्यास्तिस्रः सामान्यतो ज्ञातुमशक्याः । तुरीया परं सर्वैर्व्यवहियते । अत्र प्रमाणम्—‘चत्वारि वाक्परिमिता पदानि । तानि विदुर्ब्राह्मणा ये मनीषिणः । गुहा त्रीणि निहिता नेङ्गयन्ति । तुरीयं वाचो मनुष्या वदन्ति’ इति श्रुतिरेव । एवञ्च वैखर्या एव तत्स्थानादिकथनम्, न पुनः परादेः इति वदन्ति । यद्यपि शब्दब्रह्मात्मकपराया एव सर्वशब्दात्मकत्वं इत्यत्र ‘ओङ्कार एव सर्वा वाक् । सैषा स्पर्शोष्मभिव्यज्यमाना बह्वी नानारूपा भवति’ इति ऐतरेयश्रुतिः, ‘तद्यथा शङ्कुना सर्वाणि पर्णानि सन्तृण्णानि एवमोङ्कारेण सर्वा वाक् सन्तृण्णा’ इति छन्दोगश्रुतिः, इत्यादीनि बहूनि प्रमाणानि सन्ति, तथापि

सूतसंहितायां शिवमाहात्म्यखण्डे पञ्चमाध्याये यज्ञवैभवखण्डचतुर्थाध्याये श्रीमाधवा-
चार्यकृततट्टीकायां, भागवतादौ विशेषेण च मञ्जूषायां अन्यत्र च विस्तर इति नात्र
नापेक्षितमर्थं विस्तृणुम इत्यलम् ।

वर्णात्मकस्योत्पत्तिरिति । वर्णा अपि नित्या इति पक्षे तु ‘शब्दोत्पत्तिः’ इत्यत्र
शब्दशब्दो ध्वनिपरः । वर्णाभिव्यञ्जकध्वनेरुत्पत्तिरित्यर्थः । ध्वनितश्चेदं ‘शब्दो ध्वनिः’
इति व्याचक्षाणेन त्रिभाष्यरत्नकृता ॥ कोष्ठयस्येति । कोष्ठे उदरमध्ये भवः कोष्ठयः ।
‘शरीरावयवाच्च’ इति यत्प्रत्ययः । प्रयोज्यव्यापार इति । वक्ता प्रयोजको वायुं
समुत्थापयति । तेन समुत्थापितस्य वायोः यो व्यापारः स इत्यर्थः । अथवा अग्रेव प्रयो-
जकत्वम्—

‘मनः कायाग्निमाहन्ति स प्रेरयति मारुतम्’

इति शिक्षावचनात् । मनः कायाग्निमाहन्ति इत्यादि । अस्य—

‘आत्मा बुद्ध्या समेत्यर्थान् मनो युङ्क्ते विवक्षया’

इत्यादिः । अस्य च शिक्षावचनस्यायमर्थः, आत्मा—अन्तःकरणम् । बुद्ध्या—स्ववृत्त्या ।
अर्थान्—संस्कारात्मना स्वगतानर्थान् । समेत्य—एकबुद्धिविषयीकृत्य । विवक्षया—
तद्बोधनेच्छया । मनो युङ्क्ते—योजयति । तादृशेच्छाविशिष्टं मनः कायाग्निम्—उदराग्नि
माहन्ति । अभिहतोऽग्निर्मारुतं—वायुं प्रेरयति । प्रेरितो मारुतः उरसि मन्द्रं जनयतीति ।
वायुः करणमिति । तस्य समीरणरूपप्रयत्नवत्त्वात् करणत्वं बोध्यम् । बाह्यप्रयत्नप्रतिपादक-
सूत्राण्यवतारयति ‘अथ वर्णानाम्’ इत्यादिना । विशेषरूपोत्पत्तौ प्रथमकारणभूता
इति । यद्यपि मूलशास्त्रे वर्णोत्पत्तेः पश्चादेव बाह्यप्रयत्ना जायन्ते इति स्थितम्, तथापि इह
‘ता वर्णप्रकृतयः’ इति सूत्रकृतैव तेषां वर्णप्रकृतित्वमुक्तमिति तथोक्तम् । परस्परविरो-
धस्तु यथा कथञ्चित्परिहरणीयः पण्डितैः । इत उपरि आ द्वितीयसमाप्तेरधिकतया विचारणी-
यविषयाभावात् इत्यतैव अलमिति शिवम् ॥

इति वैदिकाभरणव्याख्याने मुकुराख्याने

द्वितीयोऽध्यायः ।

अथ तृतीयोऽध्यायः ।

विभाग इत्यस्येति । आवृत्त्या 'ह्रस्वम्' इत्यत्र 'व्यञ्जनपरः' इत्यत्र च संबन्ध इति बोध्यम् ।

स चेति । प्रकृतिभूतो वर्ण इत्यर्थः । तस्यैवेति । दीर्घस्यैवेत्यर्थः ।

नन्वेवम् 'आदौ' 'उत्तरे' इत्युभयोरपि सामान्येन अधिकारात् उत्तरत्र ग्रही-
ष्यमाणपदेषु सर्वेषु आद्यन्तयोरुभयोरपि ह्रस्वः प्राप्नोति । तत्र यद्यपि 'देवाशीका'
इत्यादिषु हलादिकतिपयपदेषु आदौ दीर्घाभावादेव न ह्रस्व इति समाधातुं शक्यम्,
तथापि 'ईरयथ' इत्यादिषु अजादिपदेषु आदावपि दीर्घसत्त्वेन ह्रस्वप्राप्तिर्दुर्वारैव ।
तस्मात् यत्र सूत्रे यस्य ग्रहणमिष्टं तत्रैव तस्य ग्रहीतव्यत्वेन सामान्येन एवमधिकारोऽस-
ङ्गत इत्यभिप्रायेण शङ्कते—यद्येवमिति । समाधत्ते—अत्राभिधीयते इति । शाखान्त-
राद्व्यावृत्तिरिति । अत्रेदं तत्त्वम्—'अथ विभागे ह्रस्वं व्यञ्जनपरः' इत्येव सूत्रमलम् ।
'आदौ' 'उत्तरे' इतिपदद्वयं तु व्यर्थमेव । 'विभागे ह्रस्वम्' इत्यादेरयमर्थः—विभागे
सति व्यञ्जनपरः दीर्घः ह्रस्वमापद्यत इति । विभागश्च प्रत्यासत्त्या निमित्तभूतव्यञ्जनस्य
ह्रस्वप्रकृतिभूतदीर्घस्य च बोध्यः, नतु व्यञ्जनादिदीर्घान्तपदयोः । अत एव 'शक्तीरथी'
इत्याद्युत्तरसूत्रेषु 'विभज्यमानव्यञ्जनपरः' इति व्याख्यास्यन् ग्रन्थकारोऽपि व्यञ्जनदीर्घ-
योरेव विभाग इत्यर्थमभिप्रेति, न पदयोः । एवञ्च ईरयथादिपदेषु आदौ दीर्घसत्त्वेऽपि
तस्य निमित्तत्वेनाश्रीयमाणव्यञ्जनावधिकविभागाभावात् ह्रस्वस्य तत्र प्रवृत्तिरेव
नास्ति । किञ्च 'उत्तरे' इत्यस्य अधिकाराभावेऽपि 'देवाशीका' इत्यादिपदेषु
अन्त्यभूतदीर्घस्यैव व्यञ्जनावधिकविभागाश्रयत्वेन तस्यैव ह्रस्वः प्रवर्तिष्यते, न
मध्यस्य, नाप्यादेः; तयोस्तादृशविभागाभावात् । नच 'विभागे पदविभागे'
इति मूलवाक्येन दीर्घान्तपदस्य व्यञ्जनादिपदस्य च विभागे सति दीर्घः ह्रस्वमा-
पद्यत इत्यर्थस्यैव प्रतीत्या देवादिषु ईरयथादिषु च व्यञ्जनादिभूतोत्तरपदस्य स्वस्य च
विभागे सति स्वघटकानामखिलानामपि दीर्घाणां ह्रस्वप्राप्त्या तन्निवारणार्थम् 'आदौ'

‘उत्तरे’ इत्युभयोरावश्यकत्वेन कथं व्यर्थता इति वाच्यम् ; तस्य विवरणस्य ‘तत्र पदादेः पूर्व्वेण विभागः, पदान्तस्य तु उत्तरेण’ इत्याद्यग्रिमग्रन्थानुरोधेन ‘शक्तीरथी’ इत्यादि-सूत्रस्थ ‘विभज्यमानव्यञ्जनपरः’ इति वाक्यसाङ्गत्यार्थश्च पदान्तपदाद्योर्विभाग एव पद-विभागशब्देन विवक्षितः इत्यवश्यवक्तव्यत्वेन समुदायविभागे अवयवविभागस्यापि सत्त्वेन तयोर्विरोधाभावेन च पूर्व्वोक्तार्थोपपत्तेः । किञ्च अधिकाराङ्गीकारेऽपि ‘आदौ’ इत्यस्य प्रयोजनं दुरुपपादम्, सर्वत्राप्यन्त्यस्यैव ह्रस्वस्य विधास्यमानत्वात् । ‘व्युत्पूर्वं आननुदात्तः’ इति चरमसूत्रेऽपि न फलम्, तत्र व्युत्पूर्वकस्य नकारपरस्य आकारस्यैव ह्रस्वविधानेन तत्र ‘आदौ’ ‘अन्ते’ इत्यंशानुपयोगात् । स्पष्टञ्चेदं तत्रैव सूत्रे मूले । न च व्यञ्जनावधिकविभागे सति व्यञ्जनपरः दीर्घः ह्रस्वमापद्यते इत्यर्थे ‘उदीरयथ’ इत्यत्र ‘उत्’ इत्यस्य ‘ईरयथ’ इत्यस्य च विभागे दकाररूपव्यञ्जनावधिकविभागस्य सत्त्वेन रेफरूप-व्यञ्जनपरत्वस्यापि सत्त्वेन च ईकारे ह्रस्वप्राप्तिरिति भ्रमितव्यम् ; विभज्यमानव्यञ्जनपर इति मूलोक्तरीत्या प्रत्यासत्तिन्यायेन यस्य व्यञ्जनस्य परत्वमुच्यते, तदवधिकविभागे सति इत्येवार्थेन ‘उदीरयथ’ इत्यत्र यस्य रेफात्मकव्यञ्जनपरत्वमुच्यते, न तदवधिकोविभागः, यदवधिको विभागः, नासौ दकारः परभूत इति ह्रस्वस्याप्रसक्तेः । प्रत्यासत्तिन्यायाश्रयणे च परग्रहणमेव लिङ्गम् । अन्यथा ‘ह्रस्वं व्यञ्जनविभागे’ इत्येवसिद्धे किं परग्रहणेन ? तस्मात् ‘आदौ’ ‘उत्तरे’ इति द्वयमपि व्यर्थमेवेति दिगिति ॥

वेदशब्दस्य धर्मबोधकत्वार्थकत्वे आपस्तम्बोक्तिं प्रमाणीकरोति—मन्त्रब्राह्मणेति । वाक्यानामेवेति । पदसमान्नाये हि प्रतिपदं विश्रम्य उच्चारणेन न तस्य शाब्दबोधजनकतेति भावः । अत एव स्वभावसिद्धार्धमात्राकालाधिककालव्यवधानेन पदानामुच्चारणे शाब्दबोधो नेष्यत इति वृद्धाः इति ‘संहितायाम्’ इति सूत्रे शेषरकारः समगीष्टः । ननु ‘आदावुत्तरे’ इत्यत्र प्रथमतः ‘आदौ, इति पदस्य पश्चात् ‘उत्तरे’ इतिपदस्य च अधिकारात् तत्क्रमेण प्रथमतः आदिह्रस्वे एव विधातव्ये तमविधाय अन्त्य-ह्रस्वस्य प्रथमतो विधानमसङ्गतमिति शङ्कते—नन्वादावुत्तरे इति । अग्रे विधातव्यमिति । प्रथमतो विधातव्यमित्यर्थः । तत्क्रमानुरोधात् । अधिकारक्रमानुरोधात् । समाधत्ते—उत्तर इति ग्रन्थस्यानुवृत्तिलाभायेति । न काचित् क्षतिरिति । लक्ष्यासि-

द्विरूपा क्षतिर्नास्तीति भावः । एवं मनोऽसि प्राजापत्यमिति । अत्र 'प्रस्थेन्द्रिया' दिसूत्रेण प्राशब्दे ह्रस्वप्राप्तिरिति भावः । अधामेति । विभज्यमानव्यञ्जनपरत्वाभावादेव ह्रस्वाप्राप्तौ 'अग्नियाज्ये किम्' इत्याशङ्क्य प्रत्युदाहरणत्वेन प्रदर्शनमसङ्गतमिति चिन्त्य-
मिदम् । एष वो भरता राजेति । इदमपि प्रत्युदाहरणम् 'अधामा' इतिप्रत्युदाहरणतुल्य-
योगक्षेममिति बोध्यम् । व्यञ्जनपर इत्येतदपीति । एवञ्च 'विभागे' 'ह्रस्वम्' इति
पदद्वयमेवात्रानुवर्तते इति भावः । 'आदौ' इत्यस्य तु अत्र अनुवृत्तौ फलाभावः, अग-
नुवृत्तौ च न दोषः, इत्यादि प्रपञ्चितं प्रथमसूत्रे एवेति नेह रोमन्थायामहे इत्यलम् ॥

इति वैदिकाभरणव्याख्याने मुकुराख्याने

तृतीयोऽध्यायः ।

अथ चतुर्थोऽध्यायः ।

अथ प्रग्रहाः ॥ वर्णा इति ॥ ‘ऊकारः’ इत्यादिना तेषामेव ग्रहीष्यमाणत्वात् ॥

नावग्रहः ॥ विधेरूर्ध्वमिति । ‘नानापदवत्’ इति सूत्रोक्तरीत्या विधेरनन्तरमेव प्रतिषेधस्य न्याय्यत्वात् इति भावः । समाधत्ते—तदुच्यते इति । ननु सर्वत्र प्रतिषेध-सिद्धयर्थं आदौ कर्तव्यत्वेऽपि यथा ‘अथ प्रग्रहाः’ इत्यनन्तरं करणेन अवग्रहाणां प्रग्रह-संज्ञाप्रतिषेधो भवति, एवम् ‘इतिपरोऽपि’ इत्यस्मात् परत्र करणे तेनापि सह अन्वय-संभवेन तस्यापि स्पष्टं प्रतिषेधान्वयः सिद्धो भवति । तस्मात् तत्रैव कर्तव्ये कुतः ततः प्रागेव कृतमिति शङ्कते—नन्वेवमपि इति । स्पष्टो भवतीति । नच ‘इतिपरोऽपि’ इत्यस्मात् पूर्वं सूत्रकरणेऽपि ‘नावग्रहः’ इत्यस्य अधिकारत्वेन ‘ऊकारः’ इत्यादिषु सर्वत्र यथा संबन्धो भवति, एवम् ‘इतिपरोऽपि’ इत्यनेनाप्यभिसम्बन्धोऽस्ति—अव-ग्रहभिन्नः इतिपरो भवति—इत्यर्थेन इदानीमपि अन्वयः स्पष्टः इति वाच्यम् ; ‘इति-परोऽपि’ इत्यस्याप्यधिकारसूत्रत्वेन तस्यापि तत्र तत्र ‘ऊकारः’ इत्यादौ संबन्धे ऊकारः प्रग्रहो भवति, पदाध्याये इतिपरश्च भवति इत्येकवाक्यतया विधिसूत्रेणैवान्वयस्य वक्त-व्यतया ‘नावग्रहः’ इत्यस्यापि अधिकारत्वेन उभयोः परार्थत्वेन परस्परमन्वयस्य ‘गुणा-नाञ्च परार्थत्वादसंबन्धः समत्वात् स्यात्’ इति न्यायविरुद्धत्वेन ‘इतिपरोऽपि’ इत्यनेन ‘नावग्रहः’ इत्यस्य संबन्धायोगात् इत्यभिप्रायात् । परे तु ‘नावग्रहः’ इति निषेधस्य ‘इतिपरोऽपि’ इत्यनेन सह अन्वयाभावेऽपि न काचिदनुपपत्तिः ; इतिपरत्वस्य प्रग्रहसंज्ञाकार्यत्वेन अवग्रहेषु ‘नावग्रहः’ इति प्रग्रहसंज्ञायाः प्रतिषेधेन तत्संज्ञाप्रयुक्त-कार्यस्यापि अप्रवृत्तेः । ‘नप्लुतपूर्व’ इति सूत्रमूलोक्तरीत्या संज्ञाकरणस्य कार्यार्थत्वेन तन्निषेधस्य तत्प्रयुक्तकार्यनिषेध एव पर्यवसानात् । अत एव ग्रन्थकृतापि ‘अन्तः’ इति परोऽपि’ इति सूत्रयोः ‘प्रतिषेधान्वयश्च स्पष्टो भवति’ इति प्रतिषेधान्वयस्य स्पष्टत्वमे-वोक्तम् , नत्वावश्यकत्वम् । किञ्च ‘इतिपरोऽपि’ इति सूत्रस्य विधायकत्वमेव, नाधि-कारत्वम् । तस्य चायमर्थः—अग्रहं वक्ष्यते । ते पदाध्याये इतिपरा भवन्तीति । एवञ्च

‘नावग्रहः’ इति सूत्रस्य पूर्वत्र करणेऽपि अधिकारत्वेन अनेन सूत्रेणापि सह अन्वये अवग्रहा इतिपरा न भवन्ति इत्यर्थेन अत्रापि प्रतिषेधान्वयः सिद्धो भवति । परन्तु इदमसंगतं स्यात्—प्रग्रहा इति परा भवन्ति इत्यनेन प्रग्रहेष्वेव इतिपरत्वविधानेन अप्रग्रहेषु च तदप्राप्त्या ‘नावग्रहः’ इति सूत्रेण अवग्रहाणां प्रग्रहसंज्ञायाः प्रतिषेधेन तेषु इतिपरत्वस्य अप्राप्त्या तत्र इतिपरत्वनिषेधस्य असंगतत्वापत्तेः । एतेन विधेरुर्ध्वं किं न क्रियते इत्याशङ्कापि निरस्ता । ‘नावग्रहः’ इत्यस्य अधिकारत्वेन अधिकार-शास्त्राणां उपदेशदेशे पृथग्वाक्यार्थाभावेन ‘ऊकारः’ इत्यादिविधिवाक्येन सहैवान्वयस्य वक्तव्यतया तत्र अवग्रहभिन्नान्तः ए (ऊ)कारः प्रग्रहो भवति इत्यर्थेन विधेः प्राक् प्रतिषेधस्यैवाभावात् । यत्तु ‘अन्तः’ इति सूत्रात् पूर्वत्र सूत्रकरणस्य प्रयोजनम् ‘एकव्यवेतोऽपि’ इत्यत्र सूत्रे द्वेशब्दादेकपदेन व्यवहितपरः अवग्रहभिन्नो यः शब्दः, तदन्तः प्रग्रहो भवति इत्यर्थेन ‘द्वे ह्येते’ इत्यत्र ‘हि’ इत्येकपदेन व्यवहिते ‘एते’ शब्दे यथा प्रग्रहत्व-सिद्धिः, एवं ‘द्वे द्रधसी सतती’ इत्यत्रापि ततीशब्दान्तेकारस्य प्रग्रहसंज्ञा सिध्यति । अन्यथा ततीशब्दात् पूर्वस्य स शब्दस्यापि पदत्वेन द्रधसीति सेति च पदद्वयेन व्यवहितत्वात् प्रग्रहत्वं न सिध्यत् । अवग्रहभिन्नेत्यधिकारे तु ‘एकव्यवेत’ इत्यनेनापि अवग्रह-व्यतिरिक्तैकपदेन व्यवेत इत्यर्थेन सेत्यवग्रहव्यतिरिक्तेन द्रधसीत्येकपदेनैव व्यवेतत्वात् अत्रापि इष्टसिद्धिरिति, तत्र ; एक व्यवेतोऽपिविहितप्रग्रहसंज्ञायाः पदसंख्यानकार्यत्वेन तस्मिंश्च कार्ये अवग्रहाणां पदत्वस्य ‘असंख्याने’ इति निषिद्धत्वात् स इत्यस्यपदत्वाभावेनैव इष्टसिद्धेः । किञ्च द्वेशब्दादेकव्यवेतपरत्वेन सशब्दस्य ग्रहणे तत्र एकाराद्यभावात् प्रग्रहसंज्ञाया अप्रसक्त्या नासौ सशब्दः कार्यभाक्पदत्वेन ग्रहीतुं शक्यते, किन्तु सतती इत्याकारकसमुदाय एव तादृशः । तस्य च द्रधसी इत्येकेनैव पदेन व्यवधानमिति न काप्यनुपपत्तिः । तस्मात् ‘अन्तः’ इति सूत्रात्पूर्वत्र करणे न किमपि प्रयोजनमिति बोध्यम् । नन्वेवं सति ‘अन्तः’ इति सूत्रात् परत्रैव कुतो न कृतमिति चेत्—बाढम्, भवन्तमेवतावत् पृच्छामः—किं प्रयोजनमुद्दिश्य उत्तरत्र कर्तव्यम् ? यदि तु उत्तरत्र करणे किमपि प्रयोजनं (न) अस्ति, पूर्वत्रापि तद्विवृतुमर्हति । किञ्च आदितस्त्रयाणामपि सूत्राणामधिकारत्वेन तुल्यत्वात् न तत्र पौर्वापर्यक्रमे किमपि कारणमुपलभामहे ऋते सूत्र-

कृदभिमतत्वात् । तस्मात् ' नावग्रहः ' इति सूत्रस्य अधिकारत्वे ' ऊकारः ' इत्यादौ सर्वत्र विधिसूत्रे संबन्ध एव फलम् , नान्यत् किमपि इत्यादि विभावनीयं विद्वद्भिः इत्याहुः ॥

इतिपरोऽपि ॥ अन्यतः प्रग्रहाभिव्यक्तिरिति । अन्यार्थं प्रयुक्तेतिकरणतः प्रग्रहाभिव्यक्तिरित्यर्थः । अर्थाभावात् । प्रग्रहाभिव्यक्तिरूपप्रयोजनाभावात् । इतिकरणस्य हि प्रग्रहाभिव्यक्तिः प्रयोजनम् । तच्च अत्र अन्यार्थं प्रयुक्तेतिकरणेनैव सिद्धमिति न पुनरितिकरणप्रसक्तिरिति भावः । ननु तदसाधारणचिह्नस्यैव तदभिव्यञ्जकत्वेन इतिकरणस्य च प्रग्रहोपसर्गादिसाधारणत्वेन कथं तस्य प्रग्रहाभिव्यञ्जकत्वमिति शङ्कते—नन्वितिकरण इति । समाधत्ते—वर्णलोपासं(प्र)युक्तेति । विवृत्तिः सन्धिकार्याभावः । वर्णलोपाप्रयुक्ता या विवृत्तिः तत्पूर्वकस्य इतिकरणस्येत्यर्थः । अत्र विवृत्तिपूर्वकत्वमात्रोक्तौ ' उपायव इत्युप आयवः ' ' प्रसूत्या इति प्र सूत्यै ' इत्यादीङ्गेष्वपि इतिकरणस्य सन्ध्यभावपूर्वकत्वेन प्रग्रहासाधारणत्वानापत्तिः । अतः सन्ध्यभावे वर्णलोपाप्रयुक्तत्वविशेषणमुपात्तम् । उपात्ते च विशेषणे ' उपायवः ' इत्यादौ ' लुप्येतेत्ववर्णपूर्वौ ' इति यलोपेनैव सन्ध्यभावस्य प्रयुक्तत्वात् वर्णलोपाप्रयुक्तसन्ध्यभावपूर्वकेतिकरणस्य तत्र अभावेन सिद्धं तस्य प्रग्रहासाधारणत्वम् । न च ' बालिति ' इत्यादौ हलन्तात्परस्य इतिकरणस्य लकारे कस्यचिदपि सन्धिकार्यस्य अभावेन तादृशसन्धिकार्याभावपूर्वकेतिकरणसत्त्वेन तस्य प्रग्रहव्यभिचारित्वमिति वाच्यम् ; स्वरसंबन्धिसन्धिकार्याभावस्यैव विवृत्तिपदार्थत्वेन हलन्तेष्वदोषात् । इत्थञ्च वर्णलोपाप्रयुक्तस्वरसंबन्धिसन्धिकार्याभावपूर्वकः इतिकरणः प्रग्रहासाधारण इति फलितम् । ननु अन्यथाभावानाश्रयावसानपूर्वक इतिकरणः प्रग्रहासाधारण इत्यस्तु । अन्यथाभावानाश्रयेत्युक्त्या ' प्रसूत्यै ' इत्यादौ ऐकारात्मकावसानस्य आयूरूपान्यथाभावाश्रयत्वान्न दोषः । ' प्रजापतिः ' इत्यादौ च रेफाद्यन्यथाभावसत्त्वेन च नानुपपत्तिः । न च ' उपायव इति ' इत्यादौ अकारस्य तादृशावसानरूपत्वात् तत्पूर्वकेतिकरणस्य प्रग्रहव्यभिचारित्वमिति शङ्क्यम् ; स्वाश्रयत्व, स्वाश्रयसमीपवृत्तित्वान्यतरसंबन्धेन अन्यथाभावाश्रयभिन्नो यः अवसानः तत्पूर्वकेतिकरणेतिपरिष्कारेण ' उपायवः ' इत्यत्र लोपात्मकान्यथाभावस्य स्वाश्रयभूतो यो यकारः तत्समीपवृत्तित्वसंबन्धेन अकारे विद्यमानत्वेन तस्यान्यथाभावाश्रयत्वेन तत्र इतिकरणस्य अन्यथाभावानाश्रयावसानपूर्वकत्वाभावात् । नापि ' वपा-

श्रपणी इति' इत्यत्रणत्वात्मकान्यथाभावस्य स्वाश्रयसमीपवृत्तित्वसंबन्धेन ईकारे सत्त्वेन तादृशकारपूर्वकेतिकरणस्यापि प्रग्रहाभिव्यञ्जकत्वेन अन्यथाभावानाश्रयघटितपरिष्कारोऽसङ्गतः इति वाच्यम् ; स्वाश्रयत्व स्वाश्रयपूर्ववृत्तित्वान्यतरसंबन्धेन अन्यथाभावाश्रयभिन्न इति परिष्कारेण 'वपाश्रपणी इति' इत्यत्र णत्वस्य स्वाश्रयपूर्ववृत्तित्वसंबन्धेन ईकारे असत्त्वेन अन्यथाभावानाश्रयेत्यादिपरिष्कारस्य नासङ्गतिः । नापि च 'प्रजातानितिप्र' इत्यादि-हलन्तेङ्गघेषु इतिकरणस्य अन्यथाभावानाश्रयनकारात्मकावसानपूर्वकत्वेन प्रग्रहव्यभिचारित्वमेवेति वाच्यम् ; अन्यथाभावानाश्रयस्वरपूर्वकेति परिष्कारेण अदोषात् । अथवा अवर्णभिन्नस्वरपूर्वक इतिकरणः प्रग्रहासाधारणः इति परिष्कारे न कोऽपि दोषः । अवर्ण-भिन्नेत्युक्त्या च 'उपायवः' इत्यादौ न दोषः । किञ्च ईकारोकारैकारौकाराणामेव प्रग्रह-त्वविधानेन तत्पूर्वकेतिकरणस्यैव प्रग्रहासाधारणत्वेन इदमेव निर्वचनं ज्यायः । वर्णलोपा-प्रयुक्तविवृत्तिपूर्वकेतिमूलोक्तपरिष्कारस्तु न युक्तः ; लोपेति असं (प्र) युक्तेति सन्ध्यभावेति अनेकाभावघटितत्वात् । किञ्च अकारभिन्नस्वरपूर्वकेति परिष्कारेणैव सिद्धे स्वरसंबन्धि-सन्ध्यभावपर्यन्तानुधावनं विफलमेवेति चेत्—न ; लक्षणस्य लक्षणान्तरादूषकत्वात् ॥

ऊकारः ॥ ऊर्जे त्वेति ॥ अत्र ऊकारस्य प्रग्रहत्वे दोषमुद्घाटयति—इतिकरण इति । न ह्यनादौ नित्यशुद्धे इति पूर्वसूत्रोक्तरीत्यापि ऊकारस्य विभागाभावात् नात्र इति-करणस्य प्रसक्तिः इति वक्तुं शक्यमित्यस्वारस्यं मनसि निधाय दूषणान्तरमाह—किञ्चेति । 'अप्रग्रहाः समानाक्षराणि' इत्यत्र अप्रग्रहशब्देन प्रग्रहभिन्नानां तत्सदृशानामेव ग्रहणम् । सादृश्यञ्च पदान्तत्वेन इति पदान्तानामेव समानाक्षराणां आनुनासिक्यमिष्टम् । अपदान्तानामपि समानाक्षराणामानुनासिक्यं स्यादिति भावः ॥

ओकारः... ॥ साहितस्य ओकारस्य प्रग्रहत्वे दोषमुद्घाटयति—अकारलोपो न स्यादिति । तदेवोपपादयति—वक्ष्यतीत्यादिना । अन्यतः सिद्धस्येति । 'लुप्य-तेत्वकारः' इति सूत्रेण सिद्धस्येत्यर्थः । अयं भावः—'लुप्यतेत्वकारः' इति सूत्रेण विहितस्य अकारलोपस्य 'आयोऽध्वर्योऽक्रतोऽपूर्वः' इति सूत्रेण पुनर्विधानं नियमार्थम् , 'सिद्धे सत्यारभ्यमाणो विधिर्नियमाय कल्प्य (ल्प) ते' इति न्यायात् । नियमश्च सजाती-यानामेव वाच्यः । साजात्यञ्च 'आयो' इत्यादीनां प्रग्रहत्वात् प्रग्रहत्वेनैव वाच्यम् ।

इत्थञ्च प्रग्रहसंज्ञकौकारपूर्वस्य अकारस्य लोपो भवति चेत् तर्हि आयोऽध्वर्योऽक्रतोपूर्वस्यैवेति नियमात् ‘घर्मोऽसि’ इत्यत्र ओकारस्य प्रग्रहत्वे तस्मात्परस्य अकारस्य लोपो न स्यादिति ॥ ननु अत्र सूत्रे असांहितग्रहणाभावदशायां सांहितासांहितसाधारण्येन सर्वेषामप्योकाराणां प्रग्रहत्वप्राप्त्या ‘आयोऽध्वर्यो’ इति सूत्रे ‘एतत्पूर्वस्य अकारस्यैव लोपो भवति, नान्यप्रग्रहपूर्वस्य’ इति नियमे सर्वत्र ओकारस्य प्रग्रहत्वेन ओकारपूर्वस्य अकारस्य कुत्रापि लोपाप्राप्त्या ‘लुप्यतेत्वकारः’ इति सूत्रे ओकारग्रहणस्यैव नैरर्थक्यमापद्यते । तस्मात् न पूर्वोक्तोनियम आश्रायितुं शक्यः, किन्तु असांहितत्वेन साजात्यमादाय ‘असांहितादोकारात्परस्य अकारस्य यदि लोपो भवति तर्हि एतत्पूर्वस्यैव, नान्यपूर्वस्य’ इत्येव नियम आश्रयणीयः । एवञ्च सति सांहितस्योकारस्य प्रग्रहत्वेऽपि न तत्र नियमस्य प्रवृत्तिरिति न कोऽपि दोषः । असांहितग्रहणस्य च वैयर्थ्यं तदवस्थमिति शङ्कते—नन्वेवं सति इति । उत्सर्गोनावकल्पत इति । उत्सर्गस्य वैयर्थ्यमापद्यत इत्यर्थः । अतोऽन्यस्मात्—‘आयो’ इत्याद्योकारादन्यस्मात् । समाधत्ते—अत्रोच्यत इति । नानिष्टं नास्तीति । इष्टसिद्धयर्थमेव संज्ञाकरणम् । यदि तु अनिष्टाभावस्थलेऽपि संज्ञायाः कर्तव्यत्वम्, तदा घटपटादीनामपि संज्ञायाः कर्तव्यत्वापत्तिः । यदि तु तेषु संज्ञाप्रवृत्तिरेवानिष्टा इत्यभिमतम्, तर्हि तुल्यं प्रकृतेऽपीत्यावश्यकमेवासांहितग्रहणमिति भावः ॥

समहदथपित्पूर्वश्च । पिच्छब्दपूर्वश्चेति । न च ‘मम’ इत्यादिवत् ‘त पूर्वश्च’ इत्येव सिद्धे ‘पित्पूर्वः’ इति किमर्थमिति शङ्क्यम् ; ‘शतक्रतवुद्वंशमिव येमिरे’ इत्यत्र ‘क्रतो’ इत्योकारस्यापि प्रग्रहत्वापत्तेः ॥

त्वे इत्यनिङ्गयान्तः । अनिङ्गयस्य अन्त इति विग्रह इति । तथाहि—अनिङ्गयस्य—इङ्गयभिन्नस्य अन्तः इत्यर्थेन ‘त्वे’ इत्यत्र ‘त्वं’ इति वकारान्तसमुदायः, तदन्यत्वादेकारः यथा प्रग्रहो भवति, एवं ‘क्रत्वे दक्षाय’ इत्यत्रापि इङ्गयभिन्नस्य ‘क्रत्वं’ इति वान्तस्य अन्त इति कृत्वा एकारस्य प्रग्रहत्वं प्राप्नोति । पदग्रहणपरिभाषा तु नात्र प्रवर्तते ; संभवाभावादिति भावः । वस्तुतस्तु चिन्त्योऽयं ग्रन्थः ; अनिङ्गयस्येति विग्रहेऽपि पदग्रहणपरिभाषया ‘त्वे’ इत्यस्य यत्र पदत्वं तत्रैव प्रवृत्तेः ‘क्रत्वे दक्षाय’ इत्यादौ दोषाभावात् । परन्तु ‘अनागास्त्वे’ इत्यादावपि प्राप्नोति । तत्र हि

एकारः 'त्वे' इतीङ्गधान्त्योऽपि भवति, 'अनागास्त्वे' इति इङ्गधभिन्नान्त्योऽपि भवति । अत्र इङ्गधभिन्नान्त्य इत्यर्थस्वीकारे तत्र एकारस्य इङ्गधभिन्नसमुदायान्त्यत्वस्यापि सत्त्वेन प्रग्रहत्वं स्यात्, 'अनिङ्गधान्तः' इत्यस्य वैयर्थ्यञ्च । इङ्गधान्तभिन्न इत्यर्थस्वीकारे तु 'अनागास्त्वे' इत्यत्र इङ्गधभिन्नान्त्यत्वेऽपि इङ्गधान्तत्वस्यापि सत्त्वेन तद्विन्नत्वं नास्तीति न प्रग्रहत्वप्रसक्तिः । अतस्तदर्थमेव न इङ्गधान्तः इति विग्रह आवश्यकः इति तत्त्वम् ॥

ऋगिति किम् 'सा मे सत्याशीः' इति । चिन्त्यमिदम्, ऋक्छन्दग्रहणाभावेऽपि 'पदग्रहणेषु' इति परिभाषया 'सामे' इत्यस्य यत्रपदत्वं तत्रैव प्रग्रहत्वप्रवृत्त्या 'सा मे सत्याशीः' इत्यत्र 'सा' इत्यस्य 'मे' इत्यस्य च पृथक्पदत्वसत्त्वेऽपि 'सामे' इत्यस्य समुदायस्य पदत्वाभावात् न तत्र प्रग्रहत्वं प्रवर्त्यति । तस्मात् त्रिभाष्यरत्नोक्तं 'ब्रह्मसामे' इति शाखान्तरस्थं प्रत्युदाहरणमेव ज्यायः ।

अनुदात्तो न नित्यमिति प्रतिषेधादिति । वस्तुतस्तु इदमसङ्गतमिति 'अनुदात्तो न नित्यम्' इति सूत्रे निरूपयिष्यामः ।

तमतिक्रम्येति । असङ्गतमिदम् ; द्यावापृथिवीशब्दस्यैवावधित्वेन ग्रहणात् तद्वटकैकदेशभूतद्यावाशब्दस्य तदवधिकपूर्वत्वाभावात् नासौ द्यावाशब्दः पूर्वत्वेन ग्रहीतुं शक्यते, किन्तु तस्मात्पूर्वं एव तादृशः । किञ्च 'नावग्रहः' इति निषेधेन द्यावाशब्दस्य ग्रहणं न इति वक्तुस्तव कोऽभिप्रायः ? न तावत् द्यावाशब्दस्यैव पृथिवीशब्दपूर्वत्वेन तस्यैव ह्रस्व (प्रग्रहत्व) प्राप्तिरिति निषेधानुसरणमिति इत्यभिप्रायः ; द्यावाशब्दस्य त्वद्रीत्या पूर्वत्वेऽपि तत्र प्रग्रहोद्देश्यस्य ईकारादेरभावादेव प्रग्रहत्वाप्रसक्तेः । प्राप्तस्यैव खलु प्रतिषेध उचितः । नह्यप्रसक्तः प्रतिषिध्यते शास्त्रज्ञैः । तस्मात् 'नावग्रहः' इत्यनेन प्राप्तस्यैव प्रतिषेधः क्रियते । द्यावाशब्दे च न द्यावाशब्दपूर्वत्वम्, नतरां प्रग्रहोद्देश्येकारादिसत्त्वम्, नतमाञ्च प्रग्रहसंज्ञाप्रसक्तिरिति कथं तत् 'नावग्रहः' इति निषेधविषयत्वमुक्तम् ? नह्यत्र चकारेण केवलपृथिवीशब्द आदिश्यते, येन द्यावाशब्दस्य पूर्वत्वं स्यात् । तस्मात् द्यावापृथिवीशब्दस्यैव अत्रानुवृत्तिः । द्यावाशब्दस्य च न तत्पूर्वत्वमिति न दोष इति दिक् ॥

ननु यत्रत्यस्य पूर्वजेशब्दस्य ग्रहणमिष्टम्, तत्रापि द्वौ पूर्वजेशब्दाविति कतरस्य पूर्वजेशब्दस्य ग्रहणमिति शङ्कते—अथ हौत्रब्राह्मणेऽपीति । पूर्वश्चासौ जेशब्दश्चेति व्युत्पत्त्या प्रथमस्यैव पूर्वजेशब्दस्य ग्रहणमिति ग्रन्थान्तरोक्तं समाधानं खण्डयति—तदिदमित्यादिना । ननु तर्हि भवन्मते वा कथं निर्णय इति चेत् तत्राह—इहेति । इह खलु शास्त्रे देशनिबन्धनः विधिः सर्वोऽपि बहुपदसङ्ग्रहार्थ एव क्रियते, नतु कनिष्यपद-सङ्ग्रहाय । तथा सति पृथक् पृथगेव पदानां ग्रहीतव्यत्वात् । एवञ्च अस्यापि विधेः देशनिबन्धनत्वेन बहुसंग्रहार्थत्वात् यतरस्य पूर्वजेशब्दस्य ग्रहणे बहुपदसङ्ग्रहो भवति ततरस्यैव पूर्वजेशब्दस्य ग्रहणमेषितव्यमिति प्रथमस्य पूर्वजे शब्दस्य ग्रहणे सति पदद्वयस्य अधिकस्य सङ्ग्रहो भवति इति स एव गृह्यत इति भावः । ननु उक्तरीत्या अयंशब्द-विषयेऽपि यतमस्य ग्रहणे बहूनि पदानि सङ्गृह्यन्ते ततमस्यैव अयंशब्दस्य ग्रहीतव्यत्वेन 'विवा अयमार्धि' इत्ययंशब्दस्य ग्रहणापत्त्या अनिष्टमापद्यत इति नासौ युक्तिः सङ्गतेति-शङ्कते—यद्येवमिति । समाधत्ते—नैतदेवमिति । यद्यपि 'विवा अयम्' इत्यादेरयं शब्दस्य उत्तरावधित्वेन ग्रहणे भवत्येव संग्रहो बहूनां पदानाम्, तथापि तेन सङ्गृह्य-माणानां पदानां प्रग्रहत्वस्यानभिमतत्वेन न तत्रत्यस्य अयंशब्दस्य अवधित्वेन ग्रहणमिति भावः ॥

पठेत् पूर्वश्चामौ जेशब्दश्चेति त्रिभाष्यरत्नोक्तव्युत्पत्तिरेव ज्यायसी । अन्यथा पूर्वशब्दस्यैव नैरर्थक्यापत्तेः । पूर्वशब्दस्य शाखान्तरीयं व्यावर्त्यमिति त्वदुक्तं प्रयोजनन्तु तुभ्यमेव रांचेत; संभवत्यस्मच्छाखास्थप्रयोजने शाखान्तरीयं व्यावर्त्यमिति कथनस्य अयुक्ततरत्वात् । यत्र तु अस्मच्छाखायां प्रयोजनासंभवः, यथा 'पूर्वजे कृणुध्वंसदने' इत्यत्र, तत्रैव शाखान्तरीयं व्यावर्त्यं कल्प्यम्, न तु प्रयोजनसंभवस्थलेऽपि । किञ्च 'वरीप्रभृत्यायम्' इति सूत्रकृत(ता)न्यासे कृते उत्तरवरीशब्दस्य ग्रहणे पूर्वयोः वरी एते इत्यनयोर्ग्रहणं न स्यात् । इच्छामस्तु पुनस्तयोरपि ग्रहणम् [स्यादित्यभिप्रायेण?] 'पूर्वजे प्रभृति' इति न्यासं कुर्वाणस्य आचार्यस्यापि पूर्वश्चासौ जेशब्दश्च इति व्युत्पत्तिरेवाभि-मता । देशनिबन्धनविधेः बहुपदसंग्रहार्थत्वेन पूर्वपूर्वजेशब्दस्य ग्रहणमिति त्वदुक्तयुक्तिस्तु अत्यन्तमसंगता; अयंशब्दविषये अनिष्टावहत्वात् । यत्तु 'विवा अयम्' इति अयं-

शब्दग्रहणे बहुपदसङ्गहेऽपि तेषु प्रग्रहत्वस्य अनिष्टत्वात् न तस्य अयंशब्दस्य अवधित्वेन ग्रहणमिति समाधायि, तत्तुच्छम् ; विना प्रामाणान्तरं शुष्काध्ययनपाठप्रामाण्येन दोषवारणस्य अविद्वत्कृत्यत्वात् । अन्यथा ‘ऊकारः’ इत्याद्येकसूत्रे कृतेऽपि अनिष्टस्थले अध्ययनपाठप्रामाण्येन अप्रवृत्तौ प्रग्रहाध्यायनिषेधप्रकरणस्यैव उच्छेदापत्तेः । अस्माकन्तु ‘आसन्नं सन्देहे’ इति परिभाषया पूर्वावधिभूतस्य पूर्वजेशब्दस्य प्रत्यासन्नो यः असौ ‘उपहृतोऽयं’ शब्दः तस्यैव उत्तरावधित्वेन ग्रहणात् ‘विवा अयम्’ इत्यादेः अयंशब्दस्य न ग्रहणप्रसक्तिः । पूर्वजेशब्दविषये तु नासौ परिभाषा प्रवर्तितुमर्हति ; पूर्वग्रहणवैयर्थ्यापत्तेः । एतेन ‘आसन्नं सन्देहे’ इति परिभाषाव्याख्यावसरे ग्रन्थान्तरस्थत्वेन स्वकल्पितमेव कमप्यर्थं ‘यदपि’ इत्यादिना स्वयमनूद्य यत् मूले दूषणमुक्तम्, तन्निरस्तम् ; मदुक्तस्य अभिप्रायस्यैव प्रकृतसूत्रस्थत्रिभाव्यरत्नग्रन्थे प्रतिपादितत्वात् । किञ्च ‘आसन्नं सन्देहे’ इति परिभाषायाः मूलोक्तार्थस्य प्रकारान्तरेणैव तत्र सूत्रे साधितत्वात् इदमेव तत्प्रयोजनमित्यपि बोध्यम् । तस्मात् युक्तिप्रमाणाद्यनुसृतमपि ग्रन्थान्तरोक्तं सिद्धान्तं, न्यायलेशरहिताभिः ‘बालसम्मोहनम्’ इत्यादिदुरुक्तिभिः केवलं दूषयतो ग्रन्थकारस्यास्य सिद्धान्तोऽसौ स्वस्य ग्रन्थान्तरदूषणैक ग्राहिलतामेव सूचयतीत्यादि सुधीभिर्बुद्धमिति न वयमत्र व्याप्रियामहे इत्याहुः ॥

‘ओषतात्तिग्महेते’ इति । ननु अत्र ‘तिग्महेते’ इति समुदायस्य पदत्वात् तस्य पदस्य च बहुस्वरत्वात् एकारस्य च तत्संबन्धित्वात् कुतो न प्रग्रहत्वमिति चेत्— अत्र केचित्—‘तिग्महेते’ इत्यस्य इङ्गद्यत्वेन ‘नानापदवत्’ इति सूत्रेण पृथक्पदत्वातिदेशे सति स्वतः सिद्धैकपदत्वस्य अतिदिश्यमानपृथक्पदत्वरूपधर्मविरुद्धत्वात् तत्राश्रयितुमशक्यत्वेन समुदायस्य बहुस्वरत्वेऽपि एकारस्य न तत्संबन्धित्वेन प्रग्रहत्वप्रसक्तिः ; अतिदिश्यमानधर्मविरुद्धस्वाश्रयधर्मप्रयुक्तकार्यनिवृत्तेरतिदेशस्वभावसिद्धत्वात् । अतिदिश्यमानो यो धर्मः एकपदत्वं, पृथक् पदत्वरूपः तद्विरुद्धो यः स्वाश्रयधर्मः, तत्प्रयुक्तं यत् कार्यं प्रकृतप्रग्रहत्वाख्यं तन्निवृत्तिः अतिदेशस्वभावसिद्धा । पृथक्पदत्वे सति ‘हेते’ इति पदस्य बहुस्वरत्वाभावात् तद्वटकैकारस्य न प्रग्रहत्वमित्याहुः ॥

अपरे तु बहुस्वरसंबन्धि इत्यस्य लक्षणया स्वरद्वयवत्पदासंबन्धि इत्यर्थः, यथा मूलशस्त्रे 'तस्मान्नुड् द्विहलः' इति सूत्रे लक्षणया द्विहल्पदस्य अनेकहलर्थकत्वम्, यथा च वा 'गमेरिट् परस्मैपदेषु' इत्यत्र परस्मैपदशब्दस्य लक्षणया आत्मनेपदाभावार्थकत्वमाश्रीयते, तद्वदिहाप्याश्रयामः । एवञ्च सति 'तिग्महेते' इत्येकारस्य स्वरद्वयविशिष्टहेतेपदसंबन्धित्वेन स्वरद्वयवत्पदासंबन्धित्वाभावात् न प्रग्रहत्वप्रसक्तिरिति सञ्जिरन्ते ॥

[अत्र किञ्चिद्विचारणीयम्?] 'सोमदेवतेमतिविदः' इति । परेतु नित्यग्रहणसामर्थ्येन सूत्रान्तरप्राप्तप्रग्रहसंज्ञाया निषेधस्वीकारेऽपि 'सोम देव ते' इत्यत्र नास्य प्रयोजनमुपपादयितुं शक्यम् । तत्रहि 'देव' इत्यस्य 'ते' इत्यस्य च पृथक्पदत्वेन पदग्रहणपरिभाषया 'देवते' इत्यस्य समुदायस्य यत्र पदत्वं तत्रैव 'देवते' इतिप्रग्रहत्वप्राप्तेः । न च नित्यग्रहणसामर्थ्यात् तत्र सूत्रे पदग्रहणपरिभाषाया अप्रवृत्तिरिति वाच्यम् ; 'नमस्ते अस्त्वायुधाय' इत्यत्र पदात्मकस्य तेशब्दस्य 'आ षष्ठात्' इति सूत्रेण प्राप्तस्य प्रग्रहत्वस्य निषेधेन उपक्षीणस्य नित्यग्रहणस्य तत्र सूत्रे पदग्रहणपरिभाषाप्रवृत्त्यभावकल्पकत्वायोगात् । एतेन 'देवते' इति विहितप्रग्रहत्वस्य पदद्वयैकपदसाधारणत्वेन सामान्यत्वात् 'अनुदात्तो न नित्यम्' इत्यनेन बाधः ; अनुदात्ततेपदविषयत्वेन अस्य विधेः विशेषविधित्वात्' इति 'देवते' इत्यादिसूत्रस्थमूलग्रन्थः परास्तः ; 'अनुदात्तो न नित्यम्' इति निषेधस्य पदात्मकतेशब्दमात्रविषयत्वेन देवतेशब्दे तत्प्रसक्तेरेवाभावात् । अस्तुवा देवतेशब्देऽपि 'अनुदात्तो न नित्यम्' इति निषेधविषयता, तथापि नासौ निषेधविधिर्विशेषः ; तेशब्दसामान्योद्देश्यकत्वेन निषेधविधेः सामान्यत्वात् । प्रत्युत देवतेशब्दघटकीभूततेशब्दविशेषविषयत्वेन 'देवते' इति प्रग्रहविधेरेव विशेषविधित्वात् । न च 'देवते' इति प्रग्रहविधेः उदात्तानुदात्तसाधारण्येन अस्य विधेरनुदात्तमात्रविषयत्वात् कुतो न विशेषत्वमिति वाच्यम् ; देवतेशब्दघटकतेशब्दव्यतिरिक्ततेशब्देषु निषेधस्य चरितार्थत्वेन बाधकत्वायोगात् । उत्सर्गशास्त्रत्वेनाभिमतशास्त्राप्रवृत्तिस्थले अचरितार्थत्वं हि विशेषशास्त्रस्य बाधकताया बीजम्, यथा 'द्वे द्वे सवर्णे' 'न प्लुतपूर्वम्' इत्यनयोः । तत्रहि 'द्वे द्वे सवर्णे' इति सूत्रस्य यत्र

स्थले न प्रवृत्तिः, न तत्र 'न प्लुतपूर्वम्' इति शास्त्रस्य चरितार्थता इति युज्यते बाध्यबाधकभावः । एवं तव उत्सर्गत्वेनाभिमत 'देवते' इति शास्त्रस्य यत्र अप्रवृत्तिः 'नमस्ते अस्त्वायुधाय' इत्यादौ, तत्र 'अनुदात्तो न नित्यम्' इत्यस्य यदि चारितार्थ्यं नाभविष्यत्, तदा तस्य बाधकता समभविष्यत् । तदेव तु न संघटते । किञ्च विशेषशास्त्राणां बाधकत्वं हि न वचनबलसाध्यम्, किन्तु लोकन्यायसिद्धमेव । लोके च 'ब्राह्मणेभ्यो दधि दीयताम्, तक्रं कौण्डिन्याय' इत्यादौ विशेषविधिभूतस्य तक्रदानस्य 'ब्राह्मणेभ्यो दधि दीयताम्' इति सामान्यवाक्यप्राप्तदधिदानं प्रति बाधकत्वं अन्यत्र चरितार्थत्वाभावादेव । यत्र तु एतादृशबाधकताबीजाभावेऽपि प्राबल्यबोधकवचनसत्त्वम्, तत्रापि बाधकत्वमस्त्येव, यथा 'तत्र पूर्वं पूर्वम्' इति वचनबलेन पूर्वशास्त्राणां प्राबल्यम् । यत्र पूर्वोक्तबाधकताबीजस्य बाधकताबोधकवचनस्य वा अभावः, तत्र बाधकत्वं नास्त्येव । स्पष्टञ्चेदं मूलशास्त्रे नवीनग्रन्थेषु । तस्मात् 'अनुदात्तो न नित्यम्' इति सूत्रस्य विशेषविधित्वाभावात्, तत्त्वेऽपि वा बाधकताबीजाभावात्, प्राबल्यबोधकवचनस्याप्यभावाच्च 'देवते' इति प्रग्रहविधिं प्रति बाधकत्वकथनं अयुक्तमेव । प्रत्युत उभयोरपि तुल्यत्वेन 'तत्र पूर्वम्' इति परिभाषया 'देवते' इति प्रग्रहविधेरेव प्राबल्यापत्तिः । तस्मात् अत्र विषये पदग्रहणपरिभाषया देवते-शब्दस्य यत्र पदत्वम्, तत्रैव प्रग्रहत्वमिति नेह प्रग्रहत्वप्रसक्तिरपि इति प्रकारान्तरेण तन्निषेधकथनप्रयत्न एव अनावश्यकः इत्याहुः ।

'परौ च' इत्येकस्मिन् विधौ शक्ये पृथग्विधिकरणमिति । चिन्त्यमिदम् ; 'नावग्रहः' इति सूत्रे 'अन्तः' इति सूत्रात् पूर्वत्र करणस्य प्रयोजनम् 'एकव्यवेतोऽपि' इत्यत्र अवग्रहमिन्न इत्यर्थात् 'द्वे द्रधसी सतती' इत्यत्र अवग्रहेण व्यवधानेऽपि प्रवृत्तिः, इति पूर्वमुक्तत्वात् इह 'परौ च' इत्येकसूत्रकरणेऽपि दोषाप्रसक्तेः पृथक्करणस्य अन्यथा-सिद्धत्वात् । किञ्च पृथग्विधिकरणं प्र(अव)ग्रहस्याव्यवधायकत्वं कथं बोधयितुमीष्टे ? शब्दाधिक्यादर्थाधिक्यमित्यस्य भाष्यकारैः तत्र तत्रापहसितत्वात् । तस्मादिदं पूर्वपरविरुद्धं असङ्गतञ्च । वस्तुतस्तु 'नावग्रहः' इति सूत्रे अस्मदुक्तरीत्या संख्याशब्दघटितपृथग्वि-धिकरणं अवग्रहविधावपि प्रवृत्त्यर्थमेव । अन्यथा 'परौ च' इत्येकस्मिन् सूत्रे 'द्वेदेते'

इत्यादौ एकव्यवधाने चरितार्थमिदं सूत्रं 'द्वे द्रधसी सतती' इत्यादौ अवग्रहात्मकपदान्तरेणापि व्यवहिते न स्यात् । 'एकव्यवेतोऽपि' इति करणे तु अस्य विधेः पदसंख्यानकार्यत्वेन तत्र च अवग्रहाणां पदत्वाभावात् नानुपपत्तिरिति बोध्यम् ॥

‘वायव ओराहणवाहौ’ इति । अत्र ‘सोमाय स्व’ इति प्रग्रह प्राप्तिः ॥

इति वैदिकाभरणव्याख्याने मुकुराख्याने
चतुर्थोऽध्यायः

अथ पञ्चमोऽध्यायः ।

पूर्वस्याभाव इति । समाम्नायसिद्धस्य विरामस्य अभाव इत्यर्थः । इतरस्येति अशक्त्यादिहेतुकविरामस्येत्यर्थः ।

‘यथा युक्ताद्विधिः सा प्रकृतिः’ इति । यादृशशब्दमाश्रित्य यो विधिः क्रियते स शब्दः तत्र विधौ प्रकृतिः इत्यर्थः । इदं सूत्रं स्पष्टार्थम् ; तत्तद्विधिसूत्रैरेव प्रकृतिज्ञानस्य सुलभत्वात् । अत एव मूलशास्त्रे प्रकृतिज्ञानाय लक्षणं न कृतमिति बोध्यम् । मूलोक्तसूत्रार्थप्रपञ्चस्तु वस्तुतस्तु केवलाडम्बरमात्रार्थः । ‘प्रउगम्’ इत्यादौ सन्धि कार्यं स्यादेवेति । ‘उवर्णपर ओकारम्’ इत्यादौ पदान्तपदाद्योः अक्षरयोः संहितायामोकारः इत्याद्यर्थेन नासौ दोषः । किञ्च अक्षरत्वस्य कचिदपि विधौ उद्देश्यतावच्छेदकत्वेन अनुपात्तत्वेऽपि ‘उदात्तादनुदात्तः’ इत्यादौ अज्धर्मनिबन्धनविधित्वमात्रेण यथा अक्षरसंहिता इत्युच्यते तथा अत्रापि अत्वोत्वाद्यज्धर्मनिबन्धनत्वेन विधेः अक्षरसंहितेत्युक्तौ बाधकाभावः । अत एव ‘अक्षरसंहितावर्णसंहिता’ इत्यनुक्रमणमपि स्वरसतः सङ्गच्छते इति बोध्यम् ॥

तत्र पूर्वमिति । पूर्वं पूर्वं इति द्विरुक्तिर्व्यासिद्योतनार्था ।

त्रपुमिथुपूर्वः शकारः इति । त्रपुशब्दस्य चकारस्य च मध्ये उभयोरसंबन्धी शकारः कश्चिदागमो भवति इत्यर्थः ॥

कतरस्मादिति संशयः स्यादिति । ननु ‘प्रत्ययात्’ इत्युक्तेऽपि आद्याकारादिति कथं लभ्यते ? अत्-अकारः, प्रत्ययश्चासौ अत् च प्रत्ययात्, प्रत्ययातः परः प्रत्ययात्परः इति व्युत्पत्त्या इति ब्रूमः । अथवा ‘प्रत्यय’ इति लुप्तपञ्चम्यन्तम्, ‘आत्’ इति च पञ्चम्यन्तमिति न दोषः । परेतु ‘सुट्कात्पूर्व’ इति व्याकरणसूत्रवत् ‘अकुर्व च कात्पूर्वः’ इत्येव सुवचमित्याहुः ॥

नासमाम्नातरूपस्येति । परेतु ‘व्यञ्जनपरः’ इति सामान्येन उक्तावपि ‘अनुस्वारश्च’ इत्यादिसूत्रेषु इहानुक्तानामपि शिक्षोक्तविशेषविधीनां भवता सङ्गृहवत्

JOURNAL

OF THE

ANNAMALAI UNIVERSITY

VOL. VIII.

JUNE, 1939

No. 3.

Lytton Strachey the Biographer

By

T. N. JAGADISAN

(*Annamalai University.*)

Criticism recognizes two types of biography—the *objective* or *impersonal* ‘record’ of a life, the type inaugurated by Mason, perfected by Boswell, and discredited by the writers of the Victorian *Life and letters*; the *personal* or *subjective* biography, the type of which Dr. Johnson had a pre-vision, and of which Lytton Strachey became the conscious originator and supreme master. Boswell, the best of all biographers, perfected the impersonal type of biography; he collected all the available material, and his aim was, as far as possible, to let his hero speak for himself. The method of Johnson, the hero of the best of all biographies, is different. He, too, collected all available evidence, but he practised a ‘becoming brevity.’ In the *Life of Savage*, only one letter and a few of his verses are quoted. Dr. Johnson’s aim was, like that of Lytton Strachey a hundred and fifty years later, to ‘lay bare the facts of some cases as he understood them.’ He gave a definitely personal view of the facts he had gathered.

It is not usually recognized that Dr. Johnson’s theory and practice of biography anticipated those of Lytton Strachey in certain points. In his preface to *Eminent Victorians* (that manifesto of the New Biography) Strachey complains: “With us, the most delicate and humane of all the branches of the art of writing has been relegated to the journeyman of letters”. Dr Johnson in his day made a similar complaint and said: “Biography has been allotted to writers who

seem very little acquainted with the nature of their task. They rarely afford any other account than might be collected from public papers, but imagine themselves writing a life when they exhibit a chronological series of actions or preferments; and so little regard the manners of behaviour of their heroes that more knowledge may be gained of a man's real character by a short conversation with one of his servants, than by a formal and studied narrative, begun with his pedigree and ended with his funeral". Dr. Johnson's words remind us of these oft-quoted words from Strachey's preface: "Those two fat volumes, with which it is our custom to commemorate the dead—who does not know them, with their ill-digested masses of material, their slipshod style, their tone of tedious panegyric, their lamentable lack of selection, of detachment, of design?"

According to Lytton Strachey, the first duty of the biographer is "to preserve a becoming brevity—a brevity which excludes everything that is redundant and nothing that is significant." To Johnson "the business of the biographer is often to pass slightly over those performances and incidents which produce vulgar greatness, to lead the thoughts into domestic privacies, and display the minute details of daily life, where exterior appendages are cast aside and men excel each other only by prudence and virtue."

The second great duty of the biographer, according to Lytton Strachey, is "to maintain his own freedom of spirit. It is not his business to be complimentary; it is his business to lay bare the facts of some cases as he understands them." On this problem of the ethics of biography, Dr. Johnson's views are similar to those of Strachey. "There are many" he writes, "who think it an act of piety to hide the faults or failings of their friends, even when they can no longer suffer by their detection. We therefore see whole ranks of characters adorned with uniform panegyric, and not to be known from one another but by extrinsic and casual circumstances." "If", concludes Dr. Johnson, "we owe regard to the memory of the dead, there is yet more respect to be laid to knowledge, to virtue and to truth." "I esteem biography", remarked Dr. Johnson "as giving us what comes near ourselves, what we can turn to use." Or again, he said: "The value of every story depends on its being true."

From the many passages quoted above, it is clear that Dr. Johnson had a vision of the critical type of biography, which Strachey was to popularise and perfect. Moreover, as one reads Johnson's *Lives of the Poets* one is astonished to note the many Stracheyesque touches scattered among them. Milton receives a severer treatment at the hands of Dr. Johnson than Cardinal Manning at the hands of Strachey. It is generally assumed that it was Lytton Strachey who invented the art of

delicately ironic narrative in biography ; but Johnson had anticipated him, as may be seen from his *Life of Savage*, a piece of writing spiced with ironic comments. The methods of Lytton Strachey and of his followers like Andre Maurois and Harold Nicolson, are far more complex, far more subjective and deliberately artistic, but they represent a development along the same lines as Dr. Johnson's. For, Dr. Johnson brought to the composition of his *Lives*, what Lytton Strachey has called, his "immovable independence of thought, his searching sense of actuality,"—qualities which the modern biographer has preached and sometimes attained.

II

Dr. Johnson, however, can in no sense be regarded as the literary ancestor of Lytton Strachey. As far as we know, Lytton Strachey's main inspiration was from France. Sainte-Beuve was the prime inspiration of his life, and St. Simon, his model of a biographer. But Strachey was no servile imitator, and he brought to his biographies his own characteristic approach.

Strachey's manner was partly determined by his own artistic instincts and partly by the nature of the task of 'reaction' against Victorian biography which he set to himself. We cannot at this distant date realise how revolutionary a statement of the ethics of biography the preface to 'Eminent Victorians' was when it appeared. It is Johnson over again complaining that there are many who think it an act of piety to hide the faults and failings of friends, but this time more emphasis was needed, and Strachey gave it. By the beginning of our century, all honesty in biography threatened to become a thing of the past. The Victorian biography, for the most part, was anything but a real portrait or a work of art. It was a funerary monument, an apology, an idyl ; a branch of hagiology, a branch of history. "The Victorian biographer," says Virginia Woolf, "was dominated by the idea of goodness. Noble, upright, chaste, severe; it is thus that the Victorian worthies are presented to us." The subject's private life, his daily occupations, his follies, his failings, his oddities were concealed under the mask of decency, if not of hypocrisy. "What business" asks Tennyson, the most Victorian of Victorians, "What business has the public to know about Byron's wildness ? He has given them fine work and they ought to be satisfied." But another Victorian, Carlyle, knew better. He complained : "How delicate, decent is English biography, bless its mealy mouth! A Damocles' sword of Respectability hangs for ever over the poor English Life-writer (as it does over poor English Life in general) and reduces him to the verge of paralysis."

Into this stronghold of panegyric biography, Strachey broke forth with his *Eminent Victorians* (1918), which startled all Europe by its

brevity, its scholarship, its style, its irony, its 'malevolence.' Frank Swinnerton, who was publishers' reader, has told us of how in the midst of whirring aeroplanes overhead and the rattle of machine-gun fire, he consorted the evening with Cardinal Manning, Thomas Arnold, Florence Nightingale, and General Gordon, and became as excited about *Eminent Victorians* before its publication, as the world was after it. The four studies immediately established his fame as an artist in biography and his methods changed those of popular biographies all over the world. To Lytton Strachey, "the most delicate and humane of all the branches of the art of writing"—biography—was not merely a record or even a portrait, but the interpretation of a personality. Biography was not only a record of facts, but the biographer's deepest responses to them. "Human beings are too important to be treated as mere symptoms of the past." Strachey's pre-occupation was with human nature and only incidentally with events, their causes and results. That the personality of the subject should shine out, clearly and firmly outlined—this Strachey sought as the central unity of his biographies. He knew the meaning of what Edmund Gosse said: 'Broad views are entirely out of place in biography.' Where, as an integral part of his scheme, Strachey had to deal with portions of history in order to tell a story, he did so admirably (witness his masterly summary of the Oxford movement in *Cardinal Manning*), but he always took care to subordinate history to human and psychological interest. The greatest merit of Strachey as a biographer is that he "gratifies perpetually our curiosity about human beings." No one deals with the inter-play of private and public life more convincingly than Strachey.

With *Eminent Victorians*. Strachey made a reputation for himself by destroying the reputations of others. He assaulted the idols of the Victorian age, adopting his favourite method of 'attacking his subject in unexpected places, of falling upon the flank or the rear, of shooting a sudden revealing searchlight into obscure recesses.' In each one of the four studies, Strachey endeavours to follow the dramatic rhythm of certain lives, and to place them appropriately in the midst of the tone and aspect of their times. He seizes what seems to him to be the central characteristic of his subjects, and in approaching them, he has a certain point of view; and a point of view, as Strachey himself has said, by no means implies sympathy. In Strachey's case, it often implies the reverse. The very opening of the essays gives us unmistakable indication of the point of view. In *Cardinal Manning*, it is Strachey's aim to show that Manning was less spiritual than worldly and ambitious, and in the opening paragraph we read :

'His life was extraordinary in many ways, but its interest for the modern inquirer depends mainly upon two considerations—the light

which his career throws upon the spirit of his age, and the psychological problems suggested by his inner history. He belonged to that class of eminent ecclesiastics—and it is by no means a small class—who have been less distinguished for saintliness and learning than for practical ability.”

In *Florence Nightingale*, Strachey sets out to show that the picture of the saintly, self-sacrificing, delicate Lady of the Lamp has to be replaced by that of a strong, self-willed, power-loving administrative chief. Here again the first paragraph sets out the point of view :

“Everyone knows the popular conception of Florence Nightingale. The saintly, self-sacrificing woman, the delicate maiden of high degree who threw aside the pleasures of a life of ease to succour the afflicted, the Lady with the Lamp, gliding through the horrors of the hospital at Scutari, and consecrating with the radiance of her goodness the dying soldier’s couch—the vision is familiar to all. But the truth was different. The Miss Nightingale of fact was not as facile fancy painted her. She worked in another fashion, and towards another end; she moved under the stress of an impetus which finds no place in the popular imagination. A Demon possessed her. Now demons, whatever else they may be, are full of interest. And so it happens in the real Miss Nightingale there was more that was interesting than in the legendary one ; there was also less that was agreeable.”

In the essay on Dr. Arnold, the famous headmaster of Rugby, Strachey has described vigorously the ‘harsh muddle-headedness’ of this stern disciplinarian. Here is an account of Dr Arnold’s stern chastisement of boys:—

“But next morning the hand of discipline would reassert itself; and the savage ritual of the whipping-block would remind a batch of whimpering children that, though sins against man and God might be forgiven them, a false quantity could only be expiated in tears and blood.”

Here is an account of the ‘really Christian education’ that Dr. Arnold wished to give his students:—

“He would treat the boys at Rugby as Jehova had treated the chosen People: he would found a theocracy; and there should be judges in Isreal.”

How artfully the opening picture of General Gordon prepares us for the perpetual tragi-comedy of Gordon’s relations to those who used him, and all the cross-purposes inevitable between practical administrators and a violent mystic! Our attention is at once drawn to a short,

slight English gentleman of a sunburnt complexion, with a touch of grey in his hair and whiskers, and a pair of unusually candid blue eyes, wandering in the neighbourhood of Jerusalem. He carried a thick book in his arm. The book was the Bible, and he was engaged in elucidating four questions....the site of the Crucifixion, the line of division between the tribes of Benjamin and Judah, the identification of Gibeon, and the position of the Garden of Eden.

The great merit of *Eminent Victorians* is that it gave us portraits of human beings instead of puppets. In this book Strachey did two things for biography: he humanised it by irony; he gave it form, and raised it to the supreme level of one of the highest arts. With *Eminent Victorians* biography may be said to have entered upon its strictly modern phase. Biography is no longer a pious document; it has become art. "Read a page of a Victorian biography", says Andre Maurois, "and then read a page of Strachey. You will see immediately that you have before you two very different types. A book of Trevelyan or by Lockhart, apart from being constructed as perfectly as it can be, is above all things a document; a book by Mr. Strachey is above all things a work of art."

III

Eminent Victorians made Strachey's reputation; *Queen Victoria*, already a contemporary classic, established it. In this book, for the first time, an author dared to portray at some length a sovereign, personally known to many living persons and remembered by thousands with veneration, in a spirit of critical detachment and ironic dispassionateness unknown to blind hero-worshippers. The amazing biography was a bomb-shell. It was scholarly, ironic, amusing. To the elderly it seemed shocking and impious; to the young it seemed delicious, for it was exactly the picture or the reaction they needed. The book combined biography and history with point and swiftness. '*Queen Victoria*' wrote *The Manchester Guardian* 'skims as powerfully and beautifully as an aeroplane from cover to cover.'

The biographer sees the woman behind the queen, and with a love of significant details inherent in all good biographers, depicts just those details which go to create an adequate picture of the subject. The triumphant compression and composition of *Queen Victoria* shows Strachey's supreme skill—the adroitness with which he handles his material; the skill with which he understands and states his facts; the power with which he selects, discriminates, pulls out of the shapeless material the letter, the passage, the incident which of all others reveals the true personality. Lytton Strachey displays what Dr. Johnson call-

ed 'the art of writing trifles with dignity.' The biographer knows the truth of what Plutarch said that "an action of small note, a short saying, or a jest, shall distinguish a person's real character more than the greatest signs or the greatest battles." He produces with faithful exactitude the gestures, the tricks of speech, the mannerisms of Victoria and Albert. His imitation of the Queen's mannerisms, of her underlying all the words of a phrase, of her writing "Lord M." instead of Lord Melbourne, 'Dear Albert' instead of Prince Albert—these and other details help to produce a very natural and human portrait.

The long career of Queen Victoria, the changes she lived through, and her relation to them as head of the state, the five periods of her life, are all made crystal-clear, and we are at every turn surprised and delighted by the neat conclusiveness with which facts are arranged and comments elucidated. The political and social facts are there, but the facts are strictly subordinated to the supreme psychological interest of the 'case.' The book is not merely the life of a queen; it is the examination of a temperament, the study of the growth of a human being. It is this psychological motive, this psychological point of view, which gives the book its unity. The several minor figures—Baroness Lehzen, King Leopold, the Duchess of Kent, Melbourne, Prince Albert, Palmerston, Gladstone, Disraeli—are all vividly drawn, but they are described only in so far as they affect or illustrate Victoria's character. Public events—the Hastings scandal, the Bedchamber question, the prerogative of the Crown, foreign politics, are all strictly subordinated to the central purpose—the unfolding of the rhythm of a life, the elucidation of a personality. The external events are studied only to illustrate the internal development.

One of the earliest reviews of *Queen Victoria* pointed out that Strachey came to scoff and remained to pray. There is truth in this, and the criticism is no reproach against Strachey, if we remember that the book begins with an age which is scoffed at by many another who is not particularly noted for scoffing, and that Strachey's attitude to his period and subject only changed with the times of which he was treating. Strachey, for all his irony and apparent scepticism, can see and admire beauty and goodness where they are, and this is where he differs from his imitators, who lose all their perception of goodness and beauty in their cheaply ironic spirit. It was a Cambridge Don who said that the greatest event of 'Modern Biography' is the conquest of Lytton Strachey by Queen Victoria. The Don has paid a compliment not only to Victoria but also to Strachey, for his statement is in essence an acknowledgment that the alleged irreverence of the biographer is but superficial, and that, whenever it is pronounced, as in his portrayal of the pre-Victorian court, it is justified on solid grounds.

Desmond MacCarthy has summarised admirably Strachey's attitude to the Queen when he says: "He sympathised with and wondered at her." Strachey is astonished at her intense consciousness of her own position, the passionate tenacity of her hold on life, the simple firm outlines of her character, her grand manners unsupported by stature or beauty, her vivid emotions and above all her truthfulness.

"It was her sincerity which gave her at once her impressiveness, her charm, and her absurdity. She moved through life with the imposing certitude of one to whom concealment was impossible—either towards her surroundings or towards herself. There she was, all of her—the Queen of England, complete and obvious; the world might take her or leave her; she had nothing more to show, or to explain, or to modify; and with her peerless carriage she swept along her path. And not only was concealment out of the question; reticence, reserve, even dignity itself, as it sometimes needed, might be very well dispensed with."

Since Strachey's book was published, there have appeared many lives of the queen, and subsequent biographers have pointed out that Strachey was wrong in one or two little details of fact. But Strachey's book still remains the best portrait of the queen, since it is the most artistic. After all, minor errors of fact are common both to the dry-as-dust biographer and to the artistic, and the artistic biographer when he has the discretion and insight of so rare an artist as Strachey, gets at the truth more surely than the patient Recording Angel, with his dull detachment, 'with his 'generalised, colourless, unimaginative view of things.' A scientific tone might be admirable when one is considering the law of *causality*, but one needs something else if one has to describe Queen Elizabeth or Queen Victoria. Strachey possesses in an eminent degree the three attributes which he expected of a historian—"a capacity for absorbing facts, a capacity for stating them, and a point of view." When he handled history and biography, he handled it as an artist and poet, and there is no finer workmanship of artistry and poetry than *Queen Victoria*. Passages, scenes, moments of this book become prized possessions of our memory. The final passage of *Queen Victoria*, the final stanza of a perfect poem, has become already a classic:—

"She herself, as she lay blind and silent, seemed to those who watched her to be divested of all thinking—to have glided already, unawares, into oblivion. Yet, perhaps, in the secret chambers of consciousness, she had her thoughts, too. Perhaps her fading mind called up once more the shadows of the past to float before it, and retraced, for the last time, the vanished visions of that long history—passing back and back, through the cloud of years, to older and ever older memories—to the spring woods at Osborne, so full of primroses for Lord Beaconsfield—to

Lord Palmerston's queer clothes and high demeanour, and Albert's face under the green lamp, and Albert's first stage at Balmoral, and Albert in his blue and silver uniform, and the Baron coming in through a doorway, and Lord M. dreaming at Windsor with the rooks cawing in the elm trees, and the Archbishop of Canterbury on his knees in the the dawn, and the old King's turkey—cock ejaculations, and Uncle Leopold's soft voice at Claremont, and Lehzen with the globes, and her mother's features sweeping down towards her, and a great old repeater-watch of her father's in its tortoise-shell case, and a yellow rug, and some friendly flounces of sprigged muslin, and the trees and the grass at Kensington."

IV

Strachey has a taste for Victorians, not because he was in sympathy with them, but rather because in dealing with them, he found his 'freedom of spirit' and his sense of irony exercised to the full. His most successful portraits are those of Victorians, and he has himself described the strange fascination the Victorian era had for the youthful observer of his day. "It has the odd attractiveness of something which is at once very near and very far off; it is one of those queer fishes that one sees behind glass at an aquarium, before whose grotesque proportions and sombre menacing agilities one hardly knows whether to laugh or to shudder; when once it had caught one's eyes, one cannot tear oneself away." The Victorians caught the eye of Strachey and he could not easily tear himself away. But now and then he did tear himself away. He went for his subjects to the eighteenth century, with which he was in sympathy, and once as far back as to the Elizabethan times.

Seven years after *Queen Victoria* was born *Elizabeth and Essex*. Here again Strachey was successful in bringing out the clash of character and event. The book abounds in the usual Stracheyean pictures and passages, delicate hyperboles and intellectual niceties. The times are remote, the figures distant; the biographer steps from solid fact into the doubtful and uncertain region of speculation and conjecture. "By what art" he asks in the opening page, "are we to worm our way into those strange spirits, those even stranger bodies?" Perhaps the book is not so much a biography as a biographical novel, but it must be said that Strachey has succeeded in worming his way into the strange spirits of the Elizabethan era, especially into that strangest of all spirits, Queen Elizabeth herself. The subtle portrait of Queen Elizabeth "where each sentence seems to pick up a part of what was stated in the one before, and moves forward in this groping way towards a complicated truth" may be cited as an example both of Strachey's subtle psychological powers and the peculiar magic of his brilliant style.

"Nor was it only her intellect that served her; it was her temperament as well. That too—in its mixture of the masculine and the feminine, of vigour and sinuosity, of pertinacity and vacillation—was precisely what her case required. A deep instinct made it almost impossible for her to come to a fixed determination upon any subject whatever. Or, if she did, she immediately proceeded to contradict her resolution with the utmost violence, and, after that, to contradict her contradiction more violently still. Such was her nature—to float, when it was calm, in a sea of indecisions, and, when the wind rose, to tack hectically from side to side. Had it been otherwise—had she possessed, according to the approved pattern of the strong man of action, the capacity for taking a line and sticking to it—she would have been lost. She would have become inextricably entangled in the forces that surrounded her, and almost inevitably, swiftly destroyed. Her femininity saved her. Only a woman could have shuffled so shamelessly, only a woman could have abandoned with such unscrupulous completeness the last shreds not only of consistency, but of dignity, honour, and common decency, in order to escape the appalling necessity of having, really and truly, to make up her mind. Yet it is true that a woman's evasiveness was not enough; male courage, male energy, was needed, if she were to escape the pressure that came upon her from every side. Those qualities she also possessed; but their value to her—it was the final paradox of her career—was merely that they made her strong enough to turn back, with an indomitable persistence, upon the ways of strength."

Elizabeth and Essex differs from Strachey's other books in that a Renaissance subject stimulates not so much his irony as his sense of beauty. The characters are less puzzling, and the scepticism and the irony of the biographer are absent. It is perhaps on this score that we feel this book is less satisfying than *Queen Victoria*, in which the supreme and characteristic powers of Lytton Strachey are revealed at their height. No other subject, it would seem, could rouse Strachey's irony and wonder to the same extent as a Victorian.

V

Strachey has said: "Perhaps the best test of a man's intelligence is his capacity for making a summary." Again he has said: "A biography should be as long as Boswell's or as short as Aubrey's." Strachey abounds in the intelligence to make a summary, and his most characteristic production is the short biography, the 'Portrait in Miniature,' though his *magnum opus* is a full-length portrait of middle size. From a study of his bibliographies, it is clear that Strachey had the industry necessary for the pursuit of living details in the thickets of memoirs. Strachey had also the gift of compressed statement of significant facts. He could

concentrate the amplitude of a long life in a narrow space. In *Books and Characters*, in *Portraits in Miniature*, in *Characters and Commentaries*, it is a pleasure, intellectual and aesthetic, to watch his alert and swift mind moving about in a world perfectly realised. Everything is made uncannily simple in a short space; we wonder at the cocksureness of the author, but we are immensely pleased. In a few pages we have 'the pure essentials'—a vivid image, without explanation, transition, commentary or padding—a sense of the pleasing, anxious being, which was and is not.

In his short sketches, Strachey takes for his particular domain the Odd, and fishing in the ocean of the Past he "draws up strange oddities with the sea-weed still clinging to them." He rescues from eternal oblivion to momentary importance many who have been long forgotten—Sir John Harrington, who wrote epigrams and invented the water-closet, Lady Hester Stanhope, lying back on her death-bed 'inexplicable, grand, preposterous, with her nose in the air'; Mr. Creevy, regarding railways as 'the devil's own'; the President De Brosses, who could not bear to think of parting with 281 francs due by Voltaire in payment for faggots and therefore lost a seat in the Academy; Mary Berry, who lived for half a century under the shadow of an irremediable disappointment, 'pre-potent, scolding, loud voiced'; Madam Du Deffand, for whom conversation was the very substance of life itself, for whom men might come and men might go, but talk went on for ever.

VI

Strachey is an artist for whom art is a means of self-expression. When such an artist puts his pen to paper, he is only writing of himself, whatever his subject. It is the great charm of Strachey's books that among the portraits he has painted is the portrait of his own self. We are constantly in communication with an arresting personality so easily felt, so difficult to define. He has been called a classicist, a romanticist, a man of the Eighteenth century, an Eminent Victorian, a spirit of our own era. Perhaps from some point of view or other every one of these labels fits him. Strachey's is a complex spirit mixing rationality with poetry; love of neat precision and economy with 'the vivid and palpable evocations' of the romantic; scepticism with cocksureness; and an eighteenth century outlook with a sensibility that is modern and romantic.

In the writings of Strachey we discern an implicit vision of life; even a study of his favourite words reveals this underlying vision. Strachey surveys the world with a live curiosity. With a distant and yet near look at this strange spectacle of life, he goes in search of the indescribable complexities of personality. He loves nothing better than

to worm his way into the secrets of some strange 'chimera-like' spirit. "Who," he asks, "shall limit the strangeness of the possibilities that lie in wait for the sons of man?" It is interesting to note that the words which Strachey uses frequently are: *curious, strange, mysterious, singular, amazing, wonderful, extra-ordinary, unparalleled, subtle; perhaps*. But Strachey was no mystic (he disapproved of mysticism as his essay on Blake shows); he is only a subtle-souled psychologist who has a vivid sense of the complexity and mobility of human nature, who understands the truth of Walt Whitman's remark: "Do I contradict myself?" "Very well, I contradict myself, I contain multitudes."

The strange spectacle of the world and of the myriad consciousnesses that dwell in it arouse not only his curiosity and delight but also his sense of irony. Strachey's irony is not merely the superior scoffing of a smart idol-breaker; it is the product of a profound and poetic outlook on life, which reaches at conclusions not unlike those of persons for whom Strachey has no sympathy—the metaphysicians, mystics and saints.

In Strachey we must distinguish between two kinds of irony—the smart and superior irony of the idol-breaker who loves to satirise the pretensions and hypocrisies of men and women; the profound involuntary irony of the rationalist-poetical philosopher who sees the drama of existence as a transitory, illusory process which has happened so often that even the greatest of lives is at once real and unreal, significant and insignificant. On this life of the world, different lines of inquiry may lead to the same conclusions, and Strachey, the sceptic and Blake, the mystic, may both see life as an illusion. Strachey sees that beneath the pomp and circumstance of life, there lie the vanity and pity of it. Strachey portrays life as an illusion, and his work is most profound, where suppressing his conscious and aggressive irony, he releases his poetic irony which creates an unmistakable sense of the dreamlike evanescence of life. The pathos and futility of living, the passage of time with its inevitable sequel in death—these are themes which stir the chords of irony in Strachey's imagination. Newman weeping outside the house at Littlemore, old Disraeli bearing flowers to the aged Queen, the little woman who sat on the throne of England sorrowing for her lord, the tiny figure of Gordon standing on the toy ramparts of Khartoum, gazing over a desert which only to him was unlimitable—these move Strachey to the fine balance of compassion and dispassion, which is irony of the profoundest type.

It is sometimes claimed that impartiality is one of Strachey's chief virtues. Andre Maurois made the claim that Strachey does not criticise, he does not judge—he exposes. He, no doubt, set a high value on the

“divine art of impartiality.” In his essay on David Hume he says: “To have no axe to grind is something very noble and very rare. It may be said to be the antithesis of the bestial.” But Strachey had an axe to grind; he was writing from motives of reaction against Victorianism. The strain of reaction, as Virginia Woolf has pointed out, is upon his works and Strachey does take sides. It is impossible not to feel that the focus is slightly wrong in his portraits of Florence Nightingale and of General Gordon and definitely inadequate in the picture of the Elizabethan scene. But it is possible to exaggerate Strachey’s character as an idol-breaker. He could often abandon irony for admiration, when the occasion kindled him to warm appreciation. Those who regard Strachey as an irreverent mocker must remember that he is capable of highly eulogistic speech, as for instance, when he describes the untiring energy of Florence Nightingale.

VII

Lytton Strachey’s importance as a biographer is both historic and intrinsic. He led the reaction against Victorian biography and rescued the reading public from those two fat volumes of *Life and Letters* which were the offspring of misdirected piety. He raised biography to the level of the highest arts, and influenced the methods of biographers all over Europe. But to emphasise this aspect of Lytton Strachey’s work would be to underrate his intrinsic worth as a biographer. When, at no distant date, the methods of his imitators will be regarded as an amusing fashion of early twentieth century, Strachey will still be read, as a fine critic of literature, as a prose writer of rare excellence, and above all as an artist in biography. He has the gift of “a becoming brevity”—of selecting, omitting, arranging facts, brightening some, shading others so that the truth of personality may shine through the life which he essays. To Strachey biography is art, not science. It is not enough to narrate facts; it is necessary to make a living portrait. The truth which Strachey sought after was not merely the truth of science; it was the poetic truth of the artist who sees facts in their inter-relations and as a whole.

Strachey’s greatness as a biographer is in the supreme intellectual adroitness with which he handles his material. “From his power to set a single scene unforgettably before the reader’s eyes—a scene such as that of Rome, in *Life of Manning*, or of the hospital at Scutari—to the whole composition and compression of *Queen Victoria*, his artistry in the management of mass and of felicitous detail is superb.” In breadth of design, in narrative dexterity, in the creation of dramatic scenes, in the subtle analysis of the complexities of character, in masterly summaries of vast material, Strachey has few equals. He is an adept in the art of story-telling. As a portrait-painter, he has a curious method

by which he pursues an indefinable character and succeeds in giving a lifelike sketch. "He begins by designing a rather crude portrait; then he corrects a line, then another, and he keeps on making it more involved, more confused and at the same time near to life." Witness the wonderful portrait of the Prince Consort:

"Albert, certainly, seemed to be everything that Stockmar could have wished—virtuous, industrious, persevering, intelligent. And yet—why was it?—all was not well with him. He was sick at heart.

For in spite of everything he had never reached to happiness. His work, for which at last he came to crave with an almost morbid appetite, was a solace and not a cure. . . . The causes of his melancholy were hidden, mysterious, unanalyzable perhaps—too deeply rooted in the innermost recesses of his temperament for the eye of reason to apprehend. There were contradictions in his nature, which, to some of those who knew him best, made him seem an inexplicable enigma; he was severe and gentle; he was modest and scornful; he longed for affection and he was cold. He was lonely, not merely with the loneliness of exile but with the loneliness of conscious unrecognised superiority. He had the pride, at once resigned and overweening, of a doctrinaire. And yet to say that he was simply a doctrinaire would be a false description; for the pure doctrinaire rejoices always in an internal contentment and Albert was very far from doing that. There was something that he wanted and that he could never get. What was it? Some absolute, some ineffable sympathy? Some extraordinary, some sublime success? Possibly, it was a mixture of both. To dominate and to be understood! To conquer, by the same triumphant influence, the submission and the appreciation of men—that would be worth while indeed! But, to such imaginations, he saw too clearly how faint were the responses of his actual environment. Who was there who appreciated him, really and truly? Who could appreciate him in England? And, if the gentle virtue of an inward excellence availed so little, could he expect more from the hard ways of skill and force? The terrible land of his exile loomed before him a frigid, an impregnable mass. . . . He believed that he was a failure and he began to despair."

One cannot admire too much the skill of the artist, the way in which "the description of a mind slowly becomes a monologue of the mind itself." Like the modern novelist Strachey pictures the stream of consciousness in his biographical studies.

Strachey has the novelist's habit of shedding the light of romance on every scene he describes. No wonder, Virginia Woolf, in a list of half-a-dozen approved Georgian novelists, included Strachey. Perhaps he resembles most the novelist in his power to convey to us a sense of

the passage of time. This is an all-important element in a picture of life, and Strachey is the biographer who gives us that sense in the greatest perfection, whether he is writing a memoir in four pages, or forty or two-hundred. This visible passage of time enables the reader to feel intensely "the pathos and comedy of human lives, the magnificence and futility of efforts, the significance of triumphs and defeats." Other biographies, compared to Strachey's are static. In Sir Sidney Lee's learned and truthful book, *Queen Victoria* is described as having lived; in Lytton Strachey's equally learned and truthful book, the Queen lives. In Lytton Strachey's books events are not merely passed, they are actually passing, men and women are not merely dead, they are dying; 'everything is flowing away while we read.'

Lytton Strachey's biographies are unique in another point of resemblance to the novel—the presence of atmosphere. The ultimate excellence of *Queen Victoria* is neither wit nor picturesqueness nor wealth of appropriately chosen detail. It is atmosphere, something indefinable, something which it has been the privilege of the greatest novelists to achieve. His characters move about each in their own atmosphere, carrying it about with them like a mysterious aura. We can but make ineffectual attempts to define these atmospheres; we may speak of the solid vitality of *Queen Victoria*, the romantic charlatanism of Disraeli, the sad conscientiousness of Prince Albert, but atmosphere is the secret of the artist which we may but dimly perceive.

The great merit of Strachey as a biographer is that he brought to the writing of biography the gifts of a novelist along with the erudition and the method of a scientific biographer. Roughly we may say that Strachey did to biography what Macaulay did to history. Like Macaulay, Strachey has been unfortunate in his imitators. They copy the externals of his method, without possessing his gifts of style and without understanding his discretion. With his imitators, irony degrades into cheap cynicism.

A detailed consideration of Strachey's style is beyond the scope of this essay—such a consideration might well form a separate theme. Strachey's style is the instrument of a scholar and artist, and it has a pervading effect of grace, polish and glitter. His style is highly epithetical (no noun is free from the warm embrace of the neighbouring adjectives) but the epithets are well-chosen and well-arranged, and they form phrases of striking imaginative beauty. He has the vividness of Macaulay without his false ring.

Strachey's style is akin to that of his contemporaries in its epigrammatic vigour, in its brilliant paradoxes and antitheses. The most notable,

witty, and individual feature of his style is his use of anti-climax, and neat, pithy, ironical statement. In one respect Strachey's style is unlike that of the most modern writers; his sentences, in their serpentine windings and in the general intoxication of vivid phrases, have colour and rhythm—qualities which modern prose, in its bald simplicity and snip-snappy brevity, is fast losing.

VIII

There is little use in trying to fix Lytton Strachey's place in literature so soon after his death. But it seems certain that Strachey will be reckoned among the masters of English prose. It is equally certain that *Queen Victoria* will be ranked as a great biography, and that it will be read long after the fashion which Strachey set in biography has become an amusing relic of the past. Strachey's artistic achievement will live longer than his influence. "It is almost as difficult", said Carlyle, "to write a good life as to live one." In writing *Queen Victoria* Strachey has accomplished this difficult achievement.

பழந்தமிழர் கடவுள் வழிபாடு

By

E. S. VARADARAJAN,
(Annamalai University.)

சமயக்கோட்பாடென்பது எந்தாட்டினர்க்குள்ளும், எஞ்ஞான்றும் இருந்து வருகின்றது. மாறிமாறி நீசமும் பிதப்பிதப்புச்சன், யாக்கை நிலையாமை, ஆன்மாவைப்பற்றிய பல்வேறு கொள்கைகள், உயிர்ந்தோற்றத்தின் உண்மைக் காரணம், இயற்கையிற் காணப்படும் ஒருவித ஒழுங்கு என்ற இவைகளும், இன்னும் சில நிகழ்ச்சிகளும், உலகில் கழிவனவும், எளிதில் காரணமற்றிய முடிபாதினவுமான பல்வேறு அற்புதங்களைப்பற்றிச் சிந்திக்கும் செய்து, அச்சிந்தனையின் பயனாக, இவ்வித மானுதல்களுக்கெல்லாம் யாதோ ஒரு மூலகாரணம் இருத்தல் வேண்டும் என்று சன்மனாற்பவ செய்கின்றன. இந்த மூல காரணம் பல சமயவாதிகளால் அவ்வவர் கொள்கைக்கேற்பப் பலவாறாகக் கூறப்பட்டுள்ளது. கடவுளே இம்மூலகாரணமென்பர் சிலர். அதன் கண்ணும் ஓர் ஒற்றுமைப் பாடின்றி ஒவ்வொருவரும் தனித்தனியே ஒவ்வொரு கடவுளைப் பராவுவர். சத்தியே காரணமென்பர் சிலர். அறவுக்களானுபதே சகலமும் என்பர் வேறு சிலர். சிலர் சன்மந்தான் காரணம்; அச்சன்மாணவ நடத்தபவர்கீழ், நடத்தும் ஓர் சத்தியோ வேண்டும். அந்தான் மூலமென்பர் சித்திரர். அதிலே சமயம் என்பது பரந்து பட்ட ஓர் விஷயம். அசன் பல்வேறு பாக்சளும் அம்சங்களும் பல தத்துவ நாய்விரிகளாலும், மத வாதிகளாலும் பலவாலும் நிரூபிப்பெற்ற வந்தனவன. நம் சேர்த்துப் நாட்டினும், நிதிந்து சகாப்தத் தொடர்ச்சத்திற்குச் சிறிதும் முன்னும் பின்னும் பல்வேறு சமயங்களும், சமயக் கடவுளரும், ஆலயங்களும், பூசா வழிபாடுகளும் திருவிழாக்களும் உண்டென்று பழைய தமிழ் நூல்களால் அறிகின்றோம். மேற்படிய பரிவுகளைப்பற்றி நூல்கள் கூறுவன யாவை என்று நிரூபிக்க இக்கட்டுவரையின் நோக்கமாகும்.

சமயக் கொள்கைகளை நிரூபித்த முன்னர் அச்சொள்கைகளை மேற்கொண்டிருந்த மக்கள் யாவர், அவர் கின்னு நிலைய பகுதி எது. அவர்கள் நாகரீகம் எத்தகையது, அவர்கள் அப்பகுதியின் பரிகள்களா அல்லது வந்தேறிகளா. அவர்கள் தனித்து வாழ்ந்தனரா இன்றேல் வேறு நாகரிக மக்களுடன் சேர்ந்து வாழ்ந்தனரா என்ற இவைகளும் பிறவும் ஆராய்த்துக்கணவாம்.

முதற்கண், தமிழராவார்

“வேங்கடம், குமரி, திம்புனற் பெளவம்”

என்ற இந்நான்கெல்லாக்குட்பட்ட தமிழ்ச் சிறு வசித்த மக்களென்றும், இவர்கள் மக்கட் பிரிவில் திராவிடர் வகுப்பைச் சேர்ந்தவரென்றுங் கூறப. அவர்கள் அக்விடத்திலேயே தொன்றுதொட்டிருந்தவர்களா, இன்றேல் வேற்றுத் திசையினின்று போர் தவர்களா என்பதைப்பற்றிப் பல கொள்கைகள் உள்ளன. தமிழ் மொழிக்குப் பெரிதும் இயைபுடைய பிராழைவி பழச்சிவந்தானத்திற் பேசப்படுவதைக்கொண்டு, தமிழ் மக்கள் இந்தியாவின் வடமேற்குக் கணவாட்களின் வழியே வந்திருக்க வேண்டுமென்பர்

ஒரு சாரார். *சமீபத்தில் அகழ்ந்து கண்ட மஹெஞ்சதரோ கட்டிடங்களையும் அவற்றிற் கண்ட பொருளையும் கொண்டு, திராவிடர் நாகரீகமே அவைகளிற் பெரிதுங் காணப் படுகிறதென்பர் நவீன ஆராய்ச்சியாளர். மார்ஷல் (Marshall) என்பவர் ஹரப்பா (Harappa), மஹெஞ்சதரோ (Mohenjadaro) என்ற இடங்களிற் காணப்பட்டவை களைக் கொண்டு, அவைகளை உண்டுபண்ணினவர் ஆரியர் வருவதற்குமுன் இந்நாட்டி லிருந்த ஒரு வகுப்பினரென்றும், அவ்வகுப்பினர் நாகரிகத்தில் முதிர்ந்தவர்களென்றும், அவர்களே திராவிடராக இருத்தல்கூடும் என்றும் கருதுவர். *இக்கொள்கையை ஒத் துக் கொள்ளாது பலவகையிலும் மறுப்பவரும் உளர். டீ. ரீ. T. R. சேஷய்யங்கார் அவர்கள் தமது “திராவிட இந்தியா” என்ற புத்தகத்தில். தமிழர் தென்னாட்டுப் புராதன வாசிகளே என்று சில காரணங்காட்டி நிறுவுவர். “லெஸ்ரியா” கொள்கையைக் கடைப்பிடிப்பவர், முன்னொரு காலத்தில், குமரி முனையுக்கும், ஆப்ரிக்காவின் தென் பாகத் திற்கும் இடையே இப்பொழுதுள்ள சுடற்பகுதி ஒரு பெரு நிலப்பகுதியாயிருந்த தென்றும், அப்பகுதியிற்றான் முதன் முதல் மக்கள் நாகரிகமே முளைக்கத் தலைப்பட்ட தென்றும், அந்நாகரிகத்தை உண்டாக்கியவர் தமிழ் மக்களே என்றங் கூறுநிற்பர். தமிழர் எப்பொழுதும் வியாபாரத் துறையில் மிக்க ஊக்கமுள்ளவரென்றும், பண்டைக் காலத்தில் உலகின் பல பாகங்களோடும் அவர்க்கு வானிகத் தொடர்புண்டென்றும் அறிகின்றோம். இம்மக்கள் நாங்கள் தங்கி வதிந்த இடங்களிற் தங்கள் நாகரிகத்தைப் பரப்பினரோ, இன்றேல் அவ்விடத்து நாகரிகத்தைக் நாங்கள் மேற்கொண்டனரோ உரைப்பரிது.

தமிழர் நாகரிகத்தைக் கூறும் தென்றமிழ் நாட்டுப் பழைய நூல்கள் தொல்காப் பியம், பத்துப்பாட்டு, பதிற்றுப்பத்து, எட்டுத்தொகை, பதினெண் கீழ்க்கணக்கு, சிலப்பதிகாரம், மணிமேகலை என்ற இவைகளாகும். அந்நாளிலும் அதற்கு முன்னரும், தமிழ்ச் சங்கங்கள் மூன்றிருந்தனவாகவும், மேற்கூறிய நூல்கள் கி. பி. இரண்டாவது நூற்றாண்டினிருந்த கடைச்சங்க நூல்களென்றும், ஆராய்ச்சியாளர் துணிந்திருக்கின் றனர். இக்காலத்து இந்நிலப்பகுதி சேர சோழ பாண்டியர் என்ற முடியுமன்னர் மூவ ராலும், சில சிற்றரசர்களாலும் ஆளப்பட்டு வந்தது. வடமொழி வியாகரண நூலாசிரி யரான பாணினி பகவான் பாண்டிய சோழ இராஜ்யங்களையும், பதஞ்சலி பகவான், காஞ்சிபுரம் கேரளம் என்ற இந்த நாடுகளையும் முறையே குறித்தனர். ஏறக்குறைய ‘மெகாஸ்தினீஸ்’ என்ற கிரேக்க யாத்திரிகரின் சமகாலத்தவரும், சிறந்த அர்த்த சாஸ் திர நூல் ஆசிரியருமான சாணக்யர், தாமிரப் பரணி முத்தினையும், பாண்டிய நாட்டுக் கவாடபுரத்தையுங் குறிப்பிட்டனர். அசோகனது 13-வது கல்வெட்டிலிருந்து சேர சோழ பாண்டிய மன்னர் அக்காலத்திற் தன்னிகரற்ற முடியுடை வேந்தராக இப் பகுதிக்கண் இருந்தனரென அறிகிறோம்.

“வழங்குத லுன்வீழ்ந்தக் கண்ணும் பழங்குடி

பண்பிற் றுலைப்பிரித லின்று”

என்ற குறளுரையில் உரையாசிரியர் பரிமேலழகர் ‘பழங்குடி’ என்பதற்குச் “சேர சோழ பாண்டியர்போன்று படைப்புச் காலந்தொட்டு மேம்பட்டகுடி” என்றெழுதிச் சென்றனர். இவர்கட்கு முன்னரும் நாகர் என்ற ஒரு வகுப்பினர் இந்நிலப்பகுதியில் இருந்தனரென்று காலஞ்சென்ற V. கனகசபைப் பிள்ளை பென்பவர்

“ஆயிரத்தெண்ணூறு ஆண்டுகட்கு முற்பட்ட தமிழர்”

என்ற தமது தூலிற் கூறினர். புறநானூற்றுச் செய்யுள் ஒன்றில், நீலநாகன் என்ற ஒரு வன் தனக்குதவிய சிறந்த நுண்ணிய வேலைப்பாடமைந்த கலிங்க மொன்றை, வேள் ஆய் என்ற ஓர் வள்ளல் ஆலமர் செல்வனான சிவபெருமாற் களித்ததாகச் கூறப்பட்டுள்ளது. தமிழ்ப் பஞ்ச காவியங்களில் ஒன்றான மணிமேகலை தூலில் நாகர்களைப்பற்றிக் கூறிய பகுதி பின்வருமாறு :

“ நக்க சாரணர் நயமில்ந் தோன்றிக்
கள்ளடு குழிசியுங் கழிமுடை நாற்றமும்
வெள்ளெலும் புணங்கலும் விரவிய விருக்கையில்
எண்குதன் பிணவோ டிருந்ததுபோலப்
பெண்டுட னிருந்த பெற்றி நோக்கி
வருத்தின னளியன் வம்மின் மக்களர்
நம்பிக் கிரையவோர் நங்கையைக் கொடுத்த
வெங்களு முனும் வேண்டு வகொடுமென ”.

இவ்வரிகளால் டேடி நாகர்கள் கருகிறத்தவரென்றும், அநாகரிகர்களாகவும் வெறுக்கத் தக்கவர்களாகவும் இருந்தனரென்றும், ஊனும் மனுவும் வந்தனர் என்றும், பெண்டிர் சேர்க்கையைப் பெரிதும் விழைந்தவரென்றும் அறிகின்றோம். ஆகவே, சிறந்த நாகரிக மக்களாகக் கோடங்கிலை. ஆயினும், மணிமேகலை தூலாசிரியர் பெளத்த சமயத்தவராகலின், தமது கொள்கைக்கு முற்றும் முரணான கோட்பாட்டினராகிய இந்நாகர்களை இவ்வாறு வேண்டுகின்றே இழித்துப் பேசினரோ என்று ஊதிக்கவும் கூடும்.

நிதக, கி. மு. 350-இல் எழுந்த தொல்காப்பியம் என்ற இலக்கண நூலை ஆதி தூலாக இப்பொழுது தமிழ் மக்களிடம் உள்ளது. இந்நூலினுங்கூட ஆரியர் நாகரீகமும், தமிழர் நாகரீகமும் சலந்து காணப்படுகின்றன. பண்டை நூல்களிற் பல்லிடத்தும் இந்த ஆரியர் என்ற பதம் வழங்கக் காணலாம்.

“ ஆரியர் தவன்றிப் பேரிசை முன்னூர்ப்
பலருடன் கழித்த வொள்வான் மலையன்
தொருவேற் சோடி யாங்கு ”

என்ற நற்றிணையால் மலையமான் நிருமுடிக்காரிசகுச் சொந்தமான முன்னூர்க் கோட்டையை ஆரியர் முற்றியிருந்ததாக அறிகிறோம். இம்மயவாரம்பன் றொடுஞ்சேரலாதன் என்ற சேர மன்னன், “பேரிசை மரபின் ஆரியரை வணக்கியவன்” எனப் பதிறுப்பத்து கூறும். சிலப்பதிகாரத்துட் சேரமான் செஞ்ருட்டுவன், தான் பத்தினி தேவியாகிய கண்ணகியின் படிமத்திற்குச் கற்சொரைச் செல்லுங்கால் தன்னை யெதிர்த்த கனக விஜயர் என்ற ஆரிய மன்னரைச் சிறைப்படுத்தி அக்கல்லைச் சுமக்கச் செய்தனன் என்றும், பின்னர் அப்படிவத்திற்குக் கடவுண் மங்கலஞ் செய்தபொழுது, அவர்களைச் சிறைவீடு செய்தனன் என்றும் கூறப்பட்டுள்ளது. பட்டினப் பாலத்திலேவனும் வடவரை வென்றதாக அந்நூலானறிகின்றோம்.

“ வடவர் வாடக் குடவர் கூம்ப ”

(பட்டினப். 276).

என்பது பட்டினப்பாலை. இன்னும் வடநாட்டினரான வடுகரும், மழவரும், கோசரும், மௌரியரும் தென்னாட்டு வந்திருந்ததற்குப் பழைய நூல்கள் சான்று பகர்கின்றன.

- “நுழைநுதி நெடுவேற் குறும்படை மழவர்”
 “பயநிரை தழீஇய கருங்கண் மறவர்”. (அகம். 35, 309).
 “வின்பொரு நெடுவரை யியதேர் மோரியர்” (அகம். 69).
 “மாகெழு தானை வம்ப மோரியர்” (அகம் 251).
 “துனை காலன்ன புனைதேர்க்கோர்” (அகம் 251).

என்ற வரிகள் இதனை விளக்கும்.

இவற்றால் அப்பழைய காலத்திலேயே ஆரிய நாசரிடம் தென்னாட்டிற் தமிழரிடம் பரந்து கலந்ததென்று ஒருவாறு அறியத்தல் கூடும். ஆகையிலே ஆரியர்கொண்ட சில பல மதக் கொள்கைகளும் அவர்கள் பொருந்தி விளங்கிய தமிழ் நாட்டிலும் விரவியிருக்க வேண்டுமென்று கூறலாம்.

தமிழர் நாகரீகத்தைக் கூறும் தொல்காப்பியம், கிடைத்த தமிழ் நூல்களுள் மிகப் பழையதெனினும் அதன்கண் கண்ட “என்ப”, “மொழிப”, “என்மனார்” என்ற சொற்களான் அந்நூற்குமுன்னே பல்வேறு நூல்கள் இந்நாட்டில் இருந்திருத்தல் வேண்டுமென்று ஊகிக்கக் கிடக்கின்றது. அவைகள் யாவும் அழிந்தொழிந்தன. ஆகவே நமக்குக் கிடைத்துள்ள இந்நூலினின்று தமிழரின் மதக் கொள்கையைப்பற்றி யறிபக் கிடப்பன யாவை என ஆராய்வாம்.

தொல்காப்பியம் என்னும் பேரிலக்கணம், பழந்தமிழ் மக்கள், நிலத்தினைக் குறிஞ்சி, முல்லை, பாலை, மருதம், நெய்தலென ஐந்து வகையாகப் பாகுபடுத்தினர் என்றும், அவை முறையே மலை, காடு, பாலை நிலம், வயற்புடும், கடற்கரை எனப்படுமென்றும், அவ்வநிலங்கட்கு முறையே முருகவேள், திருமால், அரக்கை, இந்திரன், வருணன் என்பவர் தெய்வமென்றும் கூறும். இத்தெய்வங்களைப் பற்றியும், அவைகள் தமிழ் நாட்டில் வழிபடப்பெற்ற முறைகளைப் பற்றியும் ஆராயுமுன்னர், அக்காலத்திலேயே ஆரியர் தமிழ் மக்களுடன் கலந்துறைந்தனராதலின் ஆரியர் மதக்கொள்கைகளும், கடவுள் வழிபாடும் எவ்வாறிருந்தன வென்றறிவது பொருத்தமேயாம். ஜார்ஸ் கார்பெண்டர் (Jori Carpenter) என்ற ஓர் மேனாட்டறிஞர் ஆரியர் சமயக் கொள்கைகளைப்பற்றிப் பேசுங்காத் பின் வருமாறு கூறியுள்ளார் :

“ரிக் வேதம் என்பது இந்தியாவில் வந்தேறிய ஆரியர் மதத்தைப்பற்றிக் கூறுகிறது. அவர்களின் மதக் கோட்பாடும் ஜன சமூகத்தில் உயர்ந்து விளங்கும் சிலரானன்றிப் பொது மக்களான் கைக்கொள்ளற் பாலனவல்ல. ஏனெனில் அவைகளிற் காணப்படும் கிரியைகளும் அநுஷ்டானங்களும் எளிதில் மேற்கொள்ளக் கூடியனவல்ல. அவர்கள் வழிபட்ட தெய்வங்களில் முக்கியமானவை, அக்கினி, வருணன், மைத்ரா, இந்திரன், அசுவினி தேவர்கள் என்ற இவர்களே. காலகரமத்தில் மக்குநாராயணனாகிய விஷ்ணுவும், ஓர் பழம் பூதமெனக் கருதப்பட்ட உருத்திரனும் வணக்கத்திற்குரியராயினர். இறுதியிற் குறித்த இருவரும் ரிக் வேத காலத்திற்குப் பிறகு ஏனைய தெய்வங்களினும் மிகு விளங்கி, இந்தியர்களுக்கே மிக வுயர்ந்த தெய்வமாக மாறினர்”.

பின்னும் ஓரிடத்தில் “மேற்கூறிய தெய்வங்கள் யாவும் ஆண் தெய்வங்களே. புலரி தேவதையாகிய உஷஸ்தைத் தவிர, இதர பெண் தேவதைகள் தத்தம் கணவர்க்கு மனைவியர் என்ற முறையில் தவிர வேறெவ்வகையிலுஞ் சிறந்து விளங்கியதாகத் தெரியவில்லை, ஆலயமுமில்லை” என்றமொழுகிறார்.

வழிபாடு என்பதென்ன

ரோவரெண்ட் ரூட்லில் (Goodwill) என்பவர் தமது “நாகர் வழிபாடு” என்ற நூலின்கண் எழுதுவதாவது: E. J. M. S. Vol. I.

“தெய்வ வுணர்ச்சி அல்லது மத வுணர்ச்சி என்பது மிகப் பழைய காலத்திலேயே மக்கட்கு அச்சத்தினின்று எழுந்திருக்கவேண்டுமென்றும், மதச் சடங்குகள் மக்களின் இன்ப வாழ்க்கைக்கு ஊறு செய்யும் பூதப் பேத பைசாசாசங்களின்போன்ற அப்ராகிருதமான உருவங்களைத் திருப்பிச் செய்வனவென்றும் எண்ணப்பட்டு வந்தது. இந்தியர் மதக் கொள்கையின் ஆதி அமிசத்தை, மிகப் பெரிய உலக நிகழ்ச்சிகள் முதலாக, மக்களை வருத்தும் பல்வேறு நோய்கள், கிரிபத்துக்கள் இறுதியாக உள்ள எல்லாம், இறந்துபட்ட தலைவர்கள், பிதூர்க்கள் ஆகிய இவர்களின் ஆன்மாக்களை என்று கருதப்பட்ட பல்வேறு தோற்றங்கள் அல்லது அவைகளின் செயலெனவே கூறுகின்ற ஓர் கொள்கை என்னலாம். ஊறு செய்யும் பூத பைசாசாசங்களில் எப்பொழுதும் மக்கட்கு ஓர் நம்பிக்கையுள்ளது. மரங்களிற் குடிவொள்ளும் ஆண் பெண் பூதங்களைக் குறித்து வழங்கும் கதைகள் எண்ணிலாட்டும் பிராண்டந்ததாகக் கருதப்பட்டு அவ்வாறே புறக்கணிக்கும்பட்டொழிந்த வீடுகளும், முழுக் கிராமங்களும் அவ்வாறே அநந்தமாகும்” என்பதே. எனவே மக்கள் நாகரிடத் தொடக்கத்தில், தற்காலத்துக்கொள்ளும் எண்ணமே உலகியற் கடந்த சிலவற்றை வழிபடுமாறு தூண்டியது. சில விஷயங்களில் வழிபாடு செய்பவரும், வழிபடும் தேவதைகளும் ஓர் ஒப்பந்தமாக இவ்வழிபாடு அமைவதும் உண்டு. அத்தாவறு வழிபடுவோன், தன் எண்ணம் நிறைவேற்றினால் தெய்வத்திற்கு இன்னது படைப்பென் என்று வேண்டிக்கொள்ளுதல். எண்ணம் நிறைவேற்றப்படுமாயின் வேண்டிக்கொண்டவாறே படைப்பது. இன்றேல் படைத்தலைத் தலிவது என்பது.

இத்தகைய வழிபாடு, திறிஸ்து சகாப்தத் தொடக்கத்திற்குமுன் இததெனதமிழ் நாட்டில் எவ்வாறிருந்ததென்பதற்கு மிகச் சிறந்த சான்றுகள் இல்லை. கிடைத்த சில சான்றுகளைக்கொண்டு ஆராய்வாம்.

தொல்காப்பியக் கடவுள்

தமிழ்ப் பேரிலக்கணமாகிய தொல்காப்பியம் சொல்லதிகாரத்து:

“காலமுலக முயிரி வுடம்பே

பால்வரை தெய்வம் வினையே பூதம்

ஞாயிறு திங்கள் சொல்லென வருடல்

மாயீ ரைந்தொடு”

(தொல். சொல். 57)

என்ற குத்திரத்து, உரைமாகிரியர் சேனாவரையர், காலம் என்றது காலக் கடவுளை என்றும், பால்வரை தெய்வம் என்பது எல்லோர்க்கும் இன்பதுன்பத்திற்குக் காரணமாகிய இருவினையை வகுப்பது என்றும், வினைபென்பது அறத் தெய்வம் என்றும், சொல் என்பது நாமகளாகிய தெய்வமென்றும் எழுதிச் சென்றனர். எனவே, மேற்கூறியவைகளும் தெய்வ வரிசையில் வைத்து எண்ணப்பட்டன என்றறித்கின்றோம். அந்த மிகப் பழங்காலத்திலேயே சொல்லை நாமகளாகிய தெய்வம் என்று கொண்டதி லிருந்து, விலங்குகட்கில்லாததாய் மக்கட்கே சிறந்து மதிக்கப்படுவதான சொல்லிற்கும், அதனான மொழிக்கும் எத்துணைப் பெருமை அளித்து வந்தனர் என்பது புலனாம். மேலும் தமிழ் மக்கள் நிலங்களை ஐவேறு வகையாகப் பகுத்தனர் என்றும், ஒவ்வொன்

நிற்கும் ஒவ்வொரு தேவதை யுண்டென்றும், அவ்வநிலத்தார் அவ்வத் தெய்வங்களை உரிய முறையில் வழிபட்டு வந்தனர் என்றும் முன்னரே காட்டப்பட்டது. ஒல்காப் பெருமைத் தொல்காப்பியத்தில்,

“மாயோன் மேய காடுறை யுலகமும்
சேயோன் மேய மைவரை யுலகமும்
வேந்தன் மேய தீம்புன லுலகமும்
வருணன் மேய பெருமண லுலகமும்
முல்லை குறிஞ்சி மருதநெய் தலெனச்
சொல்லிய முறையாற் சொல்லவும் படுமே” (தொல். அகத். 5)

என்று சூத்திராஞ் செய்தனர் ஆசிரியர். இதனின்றி அவர் காலத்தும், அதற்கு முன்பும் நான்கு தெய்வங்கள் நன்கு மதிக்கப்பெற்று வந்தன என்பது தேற்றம். அதே தூலில் நீரற்று வறண்ட பாலைத் தெய்வமாகக் கொற்றவை அல்லது தூர்க்கையைக் கூறியிருக்கிறது. உரையாசிரியர் நச்சினூர்க்கினியர் “திருமால் மகனாகிய காமனும் தொழப்பட்டு வந்தனன்” என்றெழுதுகின்றார். (தொல். அகத். 5 உரை). தனித்தனி நிலத்திற் குரிய இத்தெய்வங்களன்றி, பொதுப்படத் தெய்வம், கடவுள் என்ற மொழிகளும் மேற்கூறிய தூலிற் காணலாம். இம்மொழிகள் பொதுவாகப் பலவகைப்பட்ட சிறு தேவதைகளினும் மிகு விளங்கிய தெய்வத்தைக் குறித்து நிர்க்குகடும். இன்றேல் வழிபடுவோர் தத்தமக்குகந்த தேவதையை இப்பொது மொழிகளான வழங்கியிருத்தலுங் கூடும்.

இனித் “தெய்வமுணுவே” என்ற அகத்திணையிற் சூத்திரத்தில் ஒவ்வொரு நிலத்தின் கருப்பொருள்களுக்குள் தெய்வமும் ஒன்றாகக் கூறப்பட்டது. புறத்திணைத் துறையாகிய காஞ்சியில் உலகம், யாக்கை, இளமை, செல்வம், இவற்றின் நிலையாமையைப் பற்றி ஆசிரியர் கூறுவர். என்றைக்கும் கூற்றுவன் வருவது திண்ணம் என்ற எண்ணமும், புண்ணியம், பாவம், மோகக் நரகங்களைப் பற்றிய நீளைவுகளும், மூப்பு முடிவும் எவர்க்கும் உண்டு என்ற கொள்கையும், காற்றுள்ளபோதே தூற்றிக்கொள்ளவேண்டும் என்ற முதுமொழிக்கேற்ப மக்களைப் பாவங்களைப் போக்கும் நற்செய்கைகள் புரியுமாறு தூண்டற்கும், அழியாப் பேரின்ப வீடெய்தி வாழ்தற்பொருட்டு இறைவனின் பல் வேறுருவங்களை வழிபடுமாறு செய்தற்கும் கருவிகளாகி நின்றன. தொல்காப்பியம் புறத்திணையியல் 33-ஆம் சூத்திரத்து தூலாசிரியர் கொடி நிலை, கந்தழி, வள்ளி என்ற மொழிகளைக் குறிக்கின்றனர். உரையாசிரியர் இவற்றைக் கீழ்த்திசையில் உதிக்கும் ஒளிக் கதிரோன் என்றும், சுதந்தரனும் உருவிலியாய்ச் சகல தத்துவங்களையுங் கடந்து நிற்கும் பராபரன் என்றும், தண்ணிய கதிர்களுடன் கூடிய மதியென்றும் முறையேகொண்டு அவைகளைத் தெய்வமாகக் கூறிப் போந்தனர். ஆகவே, கந்தழி என்ற சொல்லாற் பழைய மக்கள் ஒரு நாமம் ஒருருவமற்ற கடவுளை இன்ன வகையிற் பாவித்திருந்தனர் என்பது புலனாகின்றது. புறப்பொருள் வெண்பாமாலை ஆசிரியரான ஐயனாரிதனார் இச் சொல் திருமால்கு குறிப்பதென்று கூறி, அத்துறையின்கீழ்ப் பாணசுரன் தீமதிவெரித்த திறமார் செயலிசச் செப்பினர். உலகின் உறையும் மக்கள் வேறு, ஒளியுலகான தேவருலகத்தவர் வேறு என்று பிரித்தும் கூறப்பட்டுள்ளது. ஆயினும் “புவை நிலை” என்ற துறையில் ஓரசரணை மேற்கூறிய தெய்வங்களுள் எத்தெய்வமாகவேனும் குறிக்கும் வழக்கமும் தொன்றுதொட்டுள்ளது. சிறப்பாகத் திருமால் காப்புக் கடவுளாகலானும், அரசன் மேற்கொள்வதுங் காப்புத் தொழிலே யாகலானும் அரசனைத் திருமாலாகவே கூறுவது பெருவழக்கு. பிற்காலத்தும்,

“நாவில்த்ணுப் பரதிவீபதி:” என்றும்,

“திருவுடை மன்னனைக் காணிற்றிருமாலேக் கண்டேனே” என்றும்,

பெரியார் பணித்தனர். மேற்கூறிய தெய்வங்கள் தவிர, மறைகளைப் பற்றியும் அம்மறை பயின்றுவந்த அந்தணரைப் பற்றியும் ஷே நூலிற் பலவிடங்களிலும் காணலாம்.

“நாலே கரக முக்கோன் மணையே

ஆயுங் காலே யந்தணர்க்குரிய”

(தொல். மரபி. 70)

“படையுங் கொடியு மரசர்ச்சூரிய”

(ஷே. 71)

“வைசிகன் பெறுமே வானிக வான்க்கை”

(ஷே. 77)

“வேளாண் மாந்தர்ச் சூழுநாணல்

தில்லென மொழிப பிழவகை நிகழ்ச்சி”

(ஷே. 80)

என்ற சூத்திரங்களான் நால்வகைச் வருணப்பாடுபாடு தொல்காப்பியர்க் குடன்பா டெனத் தெரிகின்றோம். அந்தணர் அறுதொழிலும், வேள்வியும் முறையே குறிக்கப் பெற்றுள்ளன. இவைகளைக்கொண்டே அந்த மிகப் பழங் சாலத்திலேயே தமிழர் பழக்க வழக்கங்களில் ஆரிய வழக்கங்கள் பரவியிருந்தன வென்பதை யுணரலாம். எனினும் ஊன்றி ஆராயின், இவ்வித ஆரிய வழக்கங்கள் விரவியிருந்தும், அவைகளால் மறைந்தொழியாமல், அப்பழங்குடிமக்கள் பரவியிருந்த இன்றுவரையும் நிலைத்திருப் பனவும், தமிழர்க்கே சிறப்பாக உபயனவென்று கருதப்படுவனவுமான கொள்கைகளும், வழக்கங்களும் இல்லாமற் போகவில்லை யென்பது தெளிமக்கூடும். தொல்காப்பியத்தில் உருத்திரனைப்பற்றியோ, சிவப்பிரானைப்பற்றியோ ஒன்றுங் குறிக்கப்படவில்லை. தமிழ் மக்கள் பாற்கண்ட சில மதக்கொள்கைகளும், வழிபாட்டு முறைகளும் பின்னர்க் கூறப்படும்.

இனி, மிகச் சிறந்த நீதிநூலாகவும், இலக்கியமாகவும் கருதப்பட்டு வந்திருக்கும் செய்வப் புலமைத் திருவள்ளுவர் இயற்றிய திருக்குறள், சி. ல் முதல் நூற்றாண்டிலெழுந்ததாகக் கொள்ளலாம். இக்கூறுக் கித்திந்து சாஸ்தத்திற்குமுன் எழுந்ததாகவுங் கூறுவர்.

இந்தூல் அறம், பொருள், இன்பம் என்ற மூன்று பிரிவினது. பொதுவாக எந் நூலும் அறம், பொருள், இன்பம், வீடு என்ற நான்கு உறுதிப் பொருள்களையே விரித்துக் கூறும்.

“அறம்பொரு ளின்பம்வீட்டைத ணூற்பயனே”

என்றது காண்க. செந்நாப்போதாரும் இம்முறையைப் பின்பற்றித்தான் தமது நூலே யியற்றினர். முப்பால் என்று அந்தூற்குப் பெயராதலாலும், தூங்கண், அறம், பொருள், இன்பம் என்ற பாடுபாடே காணப்பட்டு வீட்டென்ற பகுதி காணப்படாத தாலும், சிலர் திருவள்ளுவர் வீட்டைப்பற்றிக் கூறவில்லை யென்பர். அம்மன்று உரையாசிரியர் பரிமேலழகர் “வீடு என்பது சிந்தையு மொழியுஞ் செல்லா நிலைமைத் தாகலின், துறவறம் என்ற காரண வகையாற் கூறப்படுவதல்லது இலக்கண வகையாற் கூறப்படாதது” என்றெடுத்தோதி, வீட்டினை அறத்துப்பாலின் இறுதிக் கணமைந்த துறவு, நிலையாமை, மெய்யுணர்தல், அவாவறுத்தல் என்ற நான்கு அதிகாரங்களினுற் கூறினார்” என்றெழுதினர். ஆதலின் திருவள்ளுவர் நான்கு உறுதிப் பொருளைப் பற்றியும் கூறியுள்ளார் என்று கோடலே ஏற்புடைத்து. இனி இந்தூலிற் காணப்

படும் சமயவுணர்ச்சி, தெய்வ வழிபாட்டு முறைகளை ஆராய்வோம். உத்தர வேதத்தின் முதற் பகுதி முதல் அதிகாரத்தில், ஆதிபகவன் என்றும், வாலரிவன் என்றும், மலர் மிசையேகிஞன் என்றும், வேண்டுதல் வேண்டாமையிலான் என்றும், இறைவன் என்றும், பொறிவாயிலேந்தவித்தான், தனக்கு வமையில்லாதான். அறவாழி யந்தனை என்றும் தெய்வத்திற்குரிய அடைமொழிகளாகக் காணப்படுகின்றன. முதற் குறளில் உலகிற்கு மூலகாரணம் ஆதிபகவன் என்று கூறுகிறார். கட்டிலுறைய உலகினின்று காணப்படாத இறைவன் ஒருவன் உளனென ஊகிக்கின்றார். இரண்டாவது குறள் அவன் எல்லா முனார்த்தவனென்றும், உயர்ந்து நிறைந்த அறிவினன் என்றும் அறிவிக்கின்றது. மூன்றாவது குறள் இறைவனை “மலர்மிசை யேகிஞன்” என்று கூறும். இங்கே குறிக்கப்பட்ட மலர்தன்னை வணங்குபவரின் உள்ளக் கமலமென்றும், அதன் கண் எஞ்ஞான்றும் அவன் உறைவன் என்றும் நாம் அறியக்கிடக்கின்றது. நான்காவது குறள் இறைவனைப் பகை நட்பற்றவளுக அறிவிக்கின்றது. ஐந்தாவது, பத்தாவது குறள்கள் இறைவன் என அவனைக் கூறும். இதனால் எப்புவனங்கட்கும் அவன் தலைமை வகிப்பவன் அல்லது எவ்வயிர்ச்சுண்ணுந் தங்குபவன் என்பதறியலாம் ஆறுவது செய்யுள் அவனைப் பொறிவாயிலேந்தவித்தான் எனக் கூறும். அதாவது எல்லா இந்திரியங்களையும் ஒருசேர அடக்கிவன் என்பது. ஏழாவது செய்யுள் அவனுக்கு நிகர் யாருமில்லை என்று கூறும் எனவே அவனிணுமிக்காருமில்லை யென்பதும் தெளியப்பட்டது. எட்டாவது குறள் அறவாழி யந்தனை என்று அவனைக் கூறும். அதாவது எல்லா நற்குணங்களும் வாய்ந்தவன் என்பர். ஒன்பதாவது குறள் அவனை எண்ணுத்தான் என்னும்.

இங்ஙனம் மேலே காட்டிய பத்துச் செய்யுட்களும் ஓர் பரம்பொருளின் உண்மையை நிலைநாட்டுகின்றன. இரண்டு, மூன்று, நான்காவது குறள்கள் அவனை நினைத்து வாழ்த்தி அவனால் மக்கள் உய்தற்கருளப்பட்ட தொன்கைக்கண் ஈடுபடவேண்டுமென்று கூறுகின்றன. ஐந்து, ஆறு, ஏழாவது செய்யுட்கள் மேற்கூறிய நெறிகளைக் கடைப்பிடியாமலிருப்பின் நீக்கும் பாவங்களைக் குறிக்கின்றன. இறுதிக் குறள் வேறு சிந்தனையின்றி இறைவனையே ஒரு மனப்பட்டெண்ணுவோர் பிறப் பிறப்புக்களினின்றும் விடுபடுவரென்றும், எண்ணாதவர் பெரிதும் வருந்துவரென்றும் கூறும்.

ஆகவே இறைவனது சகுணம் அல்லது உருவோடுகூடிய அம்சம் மேற்காட்டிய செய்யுட்களிற் கூறப்பட்டிருக்கிறது. அவனை எண்ணுத்தான் என்று குறிக்கப்பட்டது. குணத்தினின்று குணத்தையுடைய குண ஊகிக்கப்பெறும். மேலும் அவன் திருவடிமைக் குறித்து அதனைத் தொழுமாறு வற்புறுத்துகிறது. கற்றதனாலாய பயன் அவனை யறிந்து தொழுவதே என்றும், பகை நட்பின்றி விளங்கும் பராபரனருட்குப் பாத்திரமாக வேண்டுமெனின், வேண்டுவோரும் அய்வாறு அவற்றினின்றும் நீங்கப் பெறவேண்டுமென்றும் நாம் மேற்கூறிய செய்யுட்களினின்று அறிகிறோம். பின்னும் நல்வினை தீவினைகளைப்பற்றியும், அவைகள் எஞ்ஞான்றும் ஆண்டவனைத் துதிப்பாரைப் பற்றா என்றும் அவைகள் குறிக்கின்றன. “பொறிவாயிலேந்தவித்தான்” என்ற தொடர் ஒவ்வொருவனும் இறைவன் அருள்பெற வேண்டின் இந்திரிய நிக்கிரகம் செய்ய வேண்டுமெனக் காட்டுகின்றது. நெறி என்ற சொல் உண்மை நிலையையும் அதனை யெய்தும் வழிகளையுங் கூறுவதோடு, வேதங்கள் ஆகமங்கள் உபநிடதங்கள் முதலியவற்றையும் குறிக்கும். இறுதிக் குறள் பிறவிக் கடலையும், அதைக் கடக்கு மாற்றையும் கூறும். இன்னும் இதே நூற்கண் பின்வரும் அதிகாரங்களில் இறைவனைக்

குறிக்கும் பல சொற்கள் உள்ளன. திருக்குறளாசிரியர் திருமாலை அடியாளந்தான், தாமரைக் கண்ணன் என்று கூறுகிறார். ஐந்தவித்கூற்றற்றலை இந்திரனடைந்த சாபத் தைக் கொண்டு விளக்குகின்றார். அவர் இயற்றிய இப்பெருநூலில் ஊழ் என்பது ஓர் தனி அதிகாரமாக அமைக்கப்பட்டுள்ளது. வான் சிறப்பு என்ற அதிகாரத்தில் இறை வர்க்குரிய பூசனைகளும் சாறுகளும் குறிக்கப் பெற்றுள்ளன.

“அவிசொரிந் தாயிரம் வேட்டலி னென் தன்
உயிர் செகுத் துண்ணுமை நன்று”

என்ற குறள் அக்காலத்தில் கிகழ்ந்த பல வேள்விகளைக் குறித்து நிற்கும். இவ்வாறு இவ்வரிய நீதி நூற்கண் மதத்தின் முக்கியமான சொற்கைகளும், மதாசாரங்களும் காணப்படுகின்றன. ஆனால் கடவுட்கென்று குறிப்பிடப்பட்ட ஒருருவவருணனை காணப்பெறவில்லை. எனினும் “உலகனந்தான்” என்று அவர் குறிப்பிடுகின்ற இறைவனை எங்கும் பார்த்த பேருருவத்தோடுகூடிய ஒருவனை அவர் கருதினர் என்பது ஒருவாறு ஐனியலாம். மேலும் சாக்காடு, மறுபிறப்பு இவைகளின் உண்மை, தத் தம் நல்வினை தீவினைகட்சேதப் ஆன்மாக்கள் இன்ப துன்பங்களைத் துய்த்தல் இவை மாவம் பின் குறிப்பிட்டுள்ள குறள்களிற் தெளிவாகக் கூறப்பட்டுள்ளன.

“நெருந லுனநெருவனின் றில்லை யென்றும், பெருமை யுடைத்திவ்வலகு”
ஒருமைக் கட்டான் கற்ற கல்லியொருவற், செழுமைபுமே மாப்புடைத்து”

“அதத்தாறி துவென வேண்டா சிவிகை, பொறுத்தாடுஞ் சீர்ந்தானிடை”

என்ற குறள்களை நோக்கி யறிக.

உருவ வழிபாடு

“இந்தியர் விக்கிரக வரலாறு” என்ற தமதரிய நூலிற் சாலஞ்சென்ற கோபி நாத ராவ் அவர்கள் பின்வருமாறு எழுதியுள்ளார் : “இந்தியாவில் உருவ வழிபாடு மிகப் பழமையான காலத்தொட்டு இருந்து வருகிறது. அது உயவாழ்வுமுந்தது என்பது தெரியக்கூடவில்லை. பலர் கௌதம புத்திரரை அவர் அடியார்கள் உருவமைத்து வழிபட்டதுதான் இதற்குக் காரணம் என்றுகூசுகின்றனர். ஆனால் கௌதம புத் தருக்கு வெகு காலத்திற்குமுன்பே இவ்வருவ வழிபாடு இந்தாட்டில் இருந்ததாகத் தெரிகின்றது. மோச முறைத்திற்பனத்தின் பொருட்டு மனதைச் செலுத்துதற்கென ஒரு பொருளை அமைத்தாக் கொள்வதென்பது இந்தியாவில் ரென்றுதொட்டுக் கேட்கப்படுவதென்று. பாணினி பசுவான் தமது சூத்திரத்தில் விக்கிரயஞ் செய்யாமல், ஜீவிடத்திற்காக வைத்துக்கொள்ளும் உருவங்கள் கன் பிரத்ய யத்தைப்பெறு” என்று கூறினர். எனவே அவர் காலத்தே, இறைவன் இறைவி கட்டு உருவங்கள் தீட்டப்பெற்றன வென்பது புலனுகின்றது. வேத காலத்தில் உருவ வழிபாடு உண்டா என்பது இன்னும் விவாதத்திற்குள்ளான விஷயம். Maxmul-ler (மாஷ்முல்லர்) என்ற மேலுட்டறிஞர் வேத காலத்தில் உருவங்களிருந்ததில்லை என்பார். அவரை மறுத்து Dr. Bellenson என்பார் வேத வாக்கியங்களில் இறைவன் உருவவருணனைகள் காணப்படுவதாகக் கூறுவர். நமதுள்ளத்தில் ஓர் பொருள் நன்று கப் பதியப் பெறுமேல், அதற்கு ஓர் வடிவினை நமது மனம் உற்பித்து விடுகின்றது. பின்னர் அதனை வ்யக்தமான தொழத்தருவடிவிற் சித்திரித்தமைப்பதென்பது ஓர் அரிய காரியமன்று. ஆகவின் இந்திய மக்கள் தெய்வங்கட்கு மானிட வடிவங்களை நினைவில் மாத்திரமன்றி, சிறந்த உருவங்கள் மூலமாகவும் அளித்தனர் என்பது தேற்றம்.

ஒவ்வொரு இந்துவும் உலகிற்கு இறையாய் எங்குமுள்ள கடவுள் ஒவ்வொரு பொருட் கண்ணும் உள்ளனர் என்றும், கல்லில் இருப்பது போலவே அடியார்களின் கணிந்த வுள்ளத்தினும் இருக்கின்றனர் என்றும் நம்புகின்றான். வழிபடுவோனது அறிவு நிலைக் கும் ஆற்றற்கு மேற்றபடி உருவங்கள் வேறு படலாம். தன்னுள்ளக் கமலத் துறையும் ஒருவனை அகக் கண்ணால் நோக்கும் முனிவார்க்கு வெளிப்படையாகத் தொழற்கென ஒருருவம் வேண்டப்படுவதுண்டு. அத்தகைய மனநிலை எய்தாதவர்க்குத்தான் உருவ வழிபாடு வேண்டப்படுவதாகும். கிரியா ரூபமாகவும், தியான ரூபமாகவும் இறைவனை வழிபடற்கென உண்டாய நெறிகளும் முறைகளும் எண்ணிலவாகும். மனவறுதியிற் றுப் பக்குவநிலை யெய்தாதவர்க்கே இவ்வருவ வழிபாடு அவசியமென இந்து சாத்திரங்கள் கூறுகின்றன. யோகி தன்னுள்ளத்திலேயே இறைவனைச் காண்கின்றானென்றும், மட வோர்ப்பொருட்டே உருவங்கள் எற்பட்டன வென்றும், ஜாபாலி தமது உபநிஷத்திற் கூறியுள்ளார். மேலும் உருவ வழிபாடு பிறந்திறத்தற்கே ஏதுவென்றும், அதனின்றும் விடுபட எண்ணும் யோகி அதனை மேற்கொள்ளக்கூடாதென்றும் அவரே கூறியுள் ளனர்.

ஆகலின் உருவ வழிபாடு எவ்வாறெழுந்திருத்தல் கூடுமென்று ஒருவாறுணரலாம். இனித் தமிழரிடமிருந்த தெய்வத் தொகுதிகளையும், வழிபாட்டு வகைகளையும் குறித்து ஆராய்வோம்.

புவித்தாய் வழிபாடு

மக்களிடமுள்ள பகுப்புணர்ச்சி தம்மையும், வினைய சாராரங்களையும் சன்று காத தளிக்கும் உலகைத் தமதன்னை யெனக்கொண்டு, அவளை அம்முறையில் வழிபாடு செயத் தூண்டியது. சில ஆண்டுகட்கு முன்னர் அகழ்ந்தெடுத்த மஹேந்திரசதிரோ ஹரப்பா என்ற இடங்களிற் புவித்தாய் உருவங்கள் காணப்படுகின்றன. மேலை ஆசியா விலும், இஜீயன் கரைகளிலும் இவ்வழிபாடு இருந்ததென மார்ஷல் என்பவர் எழுது கிறார். 'தெய்வக் கொள்கை' என்ற தலைப்பின் கீழ் அவர் எழுதுவதாவது :

“இந்தியாவிலுள்ளதுபோல உலகின் பலபாகங்களிலும் தொன்று தொட்டு இவ் வழிபாடு இருந்ததில்லை. புவித்தாய்க்கென அமைக்கப்பட்ட ஆலயங்கள் எங்கு பார்த் தாலும் காணப்படுகின்றன. அவளை பேரன்னை, அவளை பராசத்தி. நாளடைவில் இப்புவித்தாய் வழிபாடு சிறிய நிலப்பகுதியளவில் நிகழ்ந்து வந்தது. தொடக்கத்தில் உலகு முழுதையும் அவ்வாறு கொண்ட கொள்கை மாறி, சிறு நிலப்பகுதியளவிற்கு குறுகிவிட்டது. இப்புண்ணிய பூமியாகிய ஜம்புத்வீபம் புவித்தாயாகவே கருதப்பட்டு அத்தாயை யாவரும் வணங்கினர். தமழிப் பஞ்ச காலியங்களில் ஒன்றாகிய மணி மேகலை என்ற நூலில், தென்னிந்தியா பூதங்களாம் றுன்புறுத்தப்பட்டபோது, ஜம்புத்வீபத்தின் காவற் தெய்வமாகிய சம்பாபதி வடக்கேநுந்து தனநிருப்பைவிட்டு, அத்துண்பத்தை நீக்குதற்குத் தெற்கண் போந்ததாகக் கூறப்பட்டுள்ளது.” அப்பகுதி பின்வருமாறு :

“இளங்கதிர் ஞாயிறெள்ளந் தோற்றத்து
விளங்கொளி மேனி விரிசடை யாட்டி
பொன்றிகழ் நெடுவரை யுச்சித் தோன்றித்
தென்றிசைப் பெயர்ந்த வித்தீவத் தெய்வதம்
சாகைச் சம்புத் தன்கீழ் நின்னு
மாளில மடந்தைக்கு வருந்துயர் கேட்டு
வெந்திற லரக்கர்க்கு வெம்பகை நோற்ற
சம்பு வென்பாள் சம்பாபதியினள்”.

(மணி. பதி. 1—8)

இத்தெய்வத்திற்கு முன்னூற்றிற் சோழர் கலைநகரான புளூர் நகர்க்கண் அழகிய கோயிலுண்டு. அவட்குப் பலவருவங்கனம் பெயர்களுந் கூறப்பட்டுள்ளன. மணிமே கலையில் அவனைக் குமரி (மணி. 18, 152) என்றும், தொன்மூதாட்டி (மணி. பதி. 26) என்றும் கூறப்பட்டிருக்கிறது. தவத்திரும் புன்வொழுதும் ஓர் முதிடாளாக அத் தெய்வத்தைப் புனைந்தது அவனைச் சிந்தித்து வழிபடுவோர்க்குத் தாயின்பாற் காட்டற் சூரிய அன்பு பக்தி என்ற விவைகளைத் தவிர்த்து வேறு பிறமுண்டிசிகள் இல்லாம லிருத்தற்சென்றே உணரலாம். ஒளிரான்ற செந்தித்தாளாக அவனைக் குறித்திருப் பது, செம்மண் நிலர்செழுமையை உண்டாக்கும் என்று காட்டற்குப்போலும், இன் னும் ஒவ்வொரு கிராமத்திலும் வழிபடும் கிராம தேவதைகள் இத்தெய்வத்தின் பிரதி நிதிகளே. ஒவ்வொரு கிராமத்தாரும் தத்தம் பேராக கேஷமங்கட்கு இத்தேவதைகளின் அருளையே எதிர்பார்க்கின்றனர். மறைந்ததிரோவைப்பற்றித் தாம் எழுதிய விரி வுரையில் மார்ஷல் என்பவர் பின்வருமாறு கூறியிருார் :

“மேலே ஆசியாவின் காணப்பெறும் புவித்தாய் தெய்வங்களைப்போன்று கிராம தேவதைகளும் தாய்க்கு முதன்மை கொடுக்கத் தாயை வழிபடும் ஒரு கூட்டத்தாரிடமே தோன்றியிருத்தல் கூடுமென்பது ஓர் பொருத்தமான எண்ணமே. ஆதெவ்வாறெனினும் ஆசியாவிலாத ஐன எழுகக்களில், இத்தேவதைகள் பெரிதும் பயில்வன என்பதிற் சிந்திக்கும் ஐயமில்லை. பழையமையான வகுப்பினரிடமுள்ள மதக் கொள்கைகளாலும் அவர்களின் வழிபாட்டுக் கட்டிற்குப் பெரும்பாலும் பிராமணரல்லாதாரைக் கொண்டே கட்டத்தப்படுவதினின்றும் இவற்றிற் சித்தக்கின்றது. ஆசியர்க்கு முற்பட்ட சில சமூகத் தாய் இந்து மதத்திற்குப் புதம்பாயிருந்தும், இப்பயித்தாய் வழிபாட்டை மேற் கொண் டுள்ளனர். உண்மையிற் பழைய ஆசியர்கள், மேற்கூறிய பவித்தாய் வசிக்கிறவந்த மயர் நிலத்திற், ஒரு பெண் தெய்வத்தை யுபாசிசென் என்பது கேட்கப்படுவதின்று. வேக காலங்களில் முன்னரே காட்டியபடி பெண் தெய்வங்கள் அதிகமாக வாழ்க்கி லிருந்ததைக் தெரியக்கூடவில்லை. வேக காலத்த ஆசியர் வணங்கி வழிபட்டதாகக் கூறும் பிருத்திவி என்ற புவி தேவதை இன்னும் பழைய காலத்தவர் கொண்டாடியு பவித் தெய்வத்தினின்றும் வேறா ”.

இவண் மேற்கூறிய கொள்கையினின்றும் சிறிது மாறபடவேண்டியுள்ளது. இவ்விரு தெய்வங்கட்கும் உண்மையில் எந்தத் பேசுதும் இருப்பதாகத் தோற்றவில்லை. வத்திரிய உபாஸ்தம் புவித் தெய்வத்தைப்பற்றிக் கூறியிருக்கிறது. மஹா இதுகாச மாகிய இராமாயணத்தில் சீதாதேவி தன்னை ஏற்றுகொள்ளுமாறு புவித்தாயைத் துதி செய்ததாகக் கூறப்படுகிறது. அவ்ஓர் பெருமான் சாஸ்திரான் இயற்றிய சாகுந்தலம் என்னும் நாடகத்தில் நாடகதலைவி பூமிபை உலகமாகாகாகப் புழங்கு பேசுகின்றாள். இவைகளின் விவரத்தை மஹா விதவான் R. இராமையங்கார் Madras 'Journal of Oriental Research' இல் “புவித்தாய் வழிபாடு” என்ற தலைப்பின்கீழ் எழுதியுள்ளார் ளள். ஆய்ந்து கூறின் புவிபைத் தாயாக வழிபடுதல் ஆசியர் திராவிடர் என்ற இரு பிரிவினரிடமும் இருந்ததென்பதே பொருத்தமுடைத்து.

இனி, கி. பி. முதல் அல்லது இரண்டாம் நூற்றாண்டிற் ரோன்றினவாகக் கருதப் படுஞ் சங்க தால்களிற் பற்பல தெய்வங்கள் குறிப்பிடப்படுகின்றன. எட்டுத் தொகையுள் ஒன்றான பரிபாடலில் உருத்திரன் ஆதிரைக்கிதைவன் எனக் கூறப் பட்டான். இந்நூலிற் சிவன் என்னுஞ்சொன் யாண்டுங் காணப்படவில்லை. ஆயினும் பதினோரு ருத்திரர்கள் கூறப்பட்டுள்ளனர். செந்தமுடைமையால் உருத்திரனைக்

கபிலர் எனக் குறித்தனர். கதிரோனையும் உருத்திரனையும் ஒற்றுமைப்படுத்திக் கூறுவதும் வழக்கு. உருத்திரனைப்பற்றிச் சில குறிப்புகள் இந்நூற்கண் காணப்படினும் சிவபிராணப் புகழ்வனவாகவுள்ள பரிபாடல்கள் இதிற் காணப்படவில்லை,

“ திருமாற் கிருநான்கு செவ்வேட்கு முப்பத்
தொரு பாட்டுக் காடுகாட்கொன்று—மருவினிய
வையையிரு பத்தாறு மாமதுரை நான்கென்ப
செய்யபரி பாடற்றிதம் ”

என்ற வெண்பாவிலும் சிவபிராணப்பற்றிய பரிபாடல்கள் உண்டெனக் குறிப்பிடவில்லை. சங்க நூல்களில் சிவபிரான் வருணனையாக வெழுந்த பகுதிகளை நோக்குவோம். அவன் கங்கைநீர் கரந்த சடையன் என்பதும் கருமிடற்றன் என்பதும்,

“ சலதாரி மணிமிடற்றண்ணல் ” (பரி. 9.6-7)
“ மறுமிடற்றண்ணல் ” (பரி. 8, 127)
“ பெரும் பெயர்க் கணிச்சியோன் மணிமிடற்றணிபோல ” (கலித். 105)
“ பிறங்கு நீர்ச் சடைக்கரந்தான் ” (கலித். 150)
“ மணிமிடற்று மாண்மலர்க் சொன்றையவன் ” (கலித். 142)
“ கதைமிடற்றண்ணல் ” (புறம். 55)
“ நீணிமிர் சடை முதல்வன் ” (புறம். 166)
“ கங்கை நீர் முடிக்கணிந்த கண்ணுதலோன் ” (சிலப். வேட்டுவவரி)
“ செஞ்சடை வானவன் ” (சிலப். கால் கோட்.)
“ யாழ்கெழு மணிமிடற் றந்தனன் ” (அகம். கடவுள் வாழ்த்து)

என்ற பகுதிகளாலுணரலாம்.

அவன் முக்கண்ணன் என்பது,

“ முக்கண்ணன் ” (கலித். 1)
“ முக்கட்செல்வன் ” (அகம். 181; புறம். 6)
“ முக்கட் பார்ப்பான் ” (பரி. 5, 27)
“ கண் முன்றுடையான் ” (இனியது நாற்பது)
“ முக்கட் பகவனடி ” (இன்னு நாற்பது)
“ முதல்விழி நாட்டத் திறையோன் ”
(சிலப். ஊர்காண் ; மணி-விழாவதை 54)

என்ற வரிகளாலுணரலாம்.

அவன் மதியணி சடையோன் என்பது,

“ மிக்கொளிர் தாழ்சடை மேவரும் பிறைநுதல் முக்கண்ணன் ”
(கலித். 104)
“ பிறைமுடிக்க் கண்ணிப் பெரியோன் ” (சிலப். காடுகாண் 72-3)

என்பனவற்றால் விளங்கும்.

அவன் ஆலின் கீழமர்வோன் என்பர்,

“ ஆலமர் செல்வன் ”
(கலித். 81, 9 ; 83, 14 ; மணி. மலர்வனம் 144)

“ஆலமர் செல்வன் புதல்வன்” (சிலப். குன்றக்குரவை)

“ஆலமர் செல்வன் அணிகூர் பெருவிதல்”

என்பன கண்டு தெளியலாம்.

அவன் விடையேறி என்பதும் குலம் கணிச்சி யேந்தியவன் என்பதும்,

“பெரும்பெயர்க் கணிச்சியோன் மணிமிடற்றோன்” (கலித். 105)

“மாற்றருங் கணிச்சி மணிமிடற்றோன்” (புறம். 56)

“பிறைமுடிக் கண்ணிப் பெரியோனேத்திய வதைவாய்ச் குலத்தருநெறி”

(சிலப். காடுகாண் 72-3)

“ஆனே ழார்ந்தோன்”

(சிலப். வரந்தரு. 141-2)

என்னும் வரிகளாற் தெரிகின்றன.

அவன் கைலை யிமயங்கட்கிறைவன் என்பதும் உமாதேவியாரைத் தமது வாமபாசத்து வைத்துள்ளான் என்பதும்,

“இமயச் சிமயத் திருங்குயிலாலுவத்துமையொரு பாசுத்தொருவன்”

(சிலப். நடுகத். 226-7)

“கயிலை நன்மலையிறை”

(சிலப். நடுகத். 226-7)

“உமையவள் ஒரு திறனாக”

என்ற வரிகளாற் குறிக்கப்பட்டன.

“முக்கண்ணன் முவையிலு முடன்றக்கால்”

(கலித். 1)

“செவ்விலைப்பாகன் நிரிபுரஞ்செற்றழி”

(பரிபாடற் திரட்டு)

“முவகை யாரெயிலோரழலம்பின் முனிப”

(பரி. 5)

“ஒருகளை கொண்டு முவையிலுடற்றி”

(புறம். 55)

“நிரிபுர மெய்த் தேவர் வேண்ட வெரிமுகப்

பேரம் பேவல் கேட்ப”

(சிலப். 6, 40, 4)

என்ற வித்தொடர்கள் இறைவன் நிரிபுர மெய்த்தைக கூடும். சிலப்பதிகாரம் இயற்றியருளிய ஆசிரியர் இளங்கோவடிகள் சிவபெருமானைப்

“பிறவா யாக்கைப் பெரியோன்”

(சிலப். 5, 169)

எனக்கூறிப் போந்தனர். பத்துப்பாட்டுள் ஒன்றாகிய நிறு பாணற்றுப்படை ஆ அய் என்னும் ஓர் தமிழ்த்தலைவன் தனக்கு நீலநாக பரிசாக அளித்த ஓர் நுண்ணிய கலிக்கத்தை ஆலமர் செல்வனுள் சிவபெருமானாக வரித்ததாகக் கூடும்.

“நீலநாக நல்கிய கலிங்கம்

ஆலமர் செல்வந் கமர்ந்தனன் கொடுத்த

ஆர்வ நன்மொழி ஆ அய்யம்”

(சிறுபாண். 96-97)

என்றது காண்க.

திருமால்

முல்லைக்கு முல்லையார்ந்த இடங்கட்கும் தெய்வம் திருமாலென்பது மேலே குறிக்கப்பட்டது. கோபிநாத ராவ் பின்வருமாறு எழுதுகிறார்:—

“திருமால் அல்லது மஹாலிங்கு நான்கு மறைகளிலும் கூடப்பெற்ற பழைய வேதகாலக் கடவுளே. அவனைச் சூரியனாகவும் அவன் மூவுலகையும் ஈரடியா லளந்தவன் என்றும் நூல்கள் பகரும். சதபதப்ராமணத்தில் அவன் ஓர் ஆதித்தனாகக்

கூறப்பட்டுள்ளான். மகா பாரதமும் பதினொரு ஆதித்தரைக் கூறிப் பனிரெண்டாவதாக விஷ்ணுவைக் குறிக்கின்றது இதனால் ஆதித்தனே விஷ்ணுவாக மாறியிருத்தல் கூடும் என ஊகிக்க இடனுண்டு. இதே விஷ்ணு யக்ஞஸ்வரூபம் என்றே மறைகளாற் கூறப்பட்டு அம்முறையில் யக்ஞ நாராயண வடிவில் வணங்கப்பட்டு வருகிறான். இந்நிகாச புராணங்களில் விஷ்ணுவே பரதேவஸ்தயாகவும், திருமூர்த்திகளில் ஒருவனாகவும் காணப்படுகிறான்.”

மேற்கூறியவற்றால் விஷ்ணு ஆரியக் கடவுள் எனத் தெரிகின்றது. அவ்வாறிருந்தும் அவன் திருநாமங்களும், திருவிளையாடல்களும் தொல்காப்பியர் காலத்திலேயே பெரிதும் தமிழ் நாட்டிற் பயின்றனவாகவும் அறிகின்றோம். அவரைக் குறித்தாற்றும் வழிபாடு முதலியன ஆரிய முறைப்படியேதான் இன்றும் நடைபெறுகின்றன. நமக்குக் கிடைத்துள்ள பரிபாடல்களில் ஆறுபாடல்கள் திருமால் புகழ்வனவாகும். அப் பாடல்களில் அவன் லீலைகளைப் பரக்கக் காணலாம். அட்டமூர்த்தம் என்பது பொதுவாகத் திருமால், சிவபிரான் என்ற இருவர்க்குங் கூறப்பெறினும், மூன்றாவது பரிபாடலில் அது சிறப்பாகத் திருமாத்கே கூறப்பட்டுள்ளது. இப்பாடல்களிலும், இதர சங்கப் பாடல்களிலும் இப்பெருமானைப் பற்றிய பல குறிப்புகளைக் காணலாம்.

திருப்பாங்கடலில் அரவணையில் யோச நித்திரை புரிவதாக இப்பெருமான் புகழப் படுவன். இதனை,

“அணங்குடை யருந்தலை யாயிரம் விரித்த
சணங்கொண் சுற்றத்தண்ணல்” (பரி. பக். 169)

“பாற் கடனாப்பண்
மின்னவிர் சுடர்மணி யாயிரம் விரித்த
கவைநா வருந்தலைக் காண்பின் சேக்கைத்
துளவஞ் சூழப் வறிதுயி லோனும்” (பரி. 13, 26-28)

“பாடிமிழ் பரப்பகத் தரவணை யசையுய
வாடுகொ ணேமியான்” (சலித். 105)

“அணிகிள ரரவி னறிதுயிலமர்ந்த
மணி வண்ணன்” (சிலப். நாடுகாண். 9-10)

என்ற பகுதிகள் அறிவிக்கும்.

அவன் திருமேனியும் விழியினைகளும் கருநிறமென்பர்.

“நின்னது திகழொளி சிறப்பிரு டிருமணி கண்ணே” (பரி. 2, 52, 3)

“கோளிரு ளிருக்கை யாய் மணிமேனி” (பரி. 4, 57)

“பூவை விரிமலர் புரையு மேனியை” (பரி. 1, 7)

“பைங் கண் மால்” (பரி. 3, 82)

“கடல் வண்ணன்” (சிலப். ஆய்ச்சியர்)

என்ற வரிகளையும் தொடர்களையும் நோக்குக திருமால் திருமகளையும் ஸ்ரீவதஸம் என்ற மறுவினையும் தன் மார்பகத்துக் கொண்டுள்ளான் என்பர். இதனை,

“திரு ஞெமர்ந் தமர்ந்த மார்பின்” (பரி. 1, 8)

“திரு மறு மார்ப” (ஐடி 1, 36)

“திருவின் கணவ” (ஐடி 3, 90)

“திருமறு மார்பன் போல்” (சலித். 104)

“மாயவன் மார்பிற்றிருப்போல்” (ஐடி 145)

“ திருவமர் மார்பன் ” (சிலப். காடுகாண். 40)

“ மதிமறுச், செய்யோன் சேர்ந்த நின் மாசிலகலம் ” (பரி. 2, 31)

என்று கூறுவனவற்றால் அறியலாம்.

அவன் விரைந்த செலவுள்ள கலுழனைத் தன் பரியாகவும், கொடியாகவும் கொண்டுள்ளான் என்பது,

“ புள்ளினிவந் தோங்குயர் கொடிச் சேவலோய் ” (பரி. 3, 17-18)

“ ஆயிரவணர் தலை யரவு வாய்க்கொண்ட சேவலுர்தியும் ” (ஹே 3, 59)

“ சேவ லோங்குயர் கொடியோயே ”; (ஹே 4, 36)

“ புள்ளார் கடவுளைப் போற்றினும் ”; (சிலப். ஆம்ச்சியர்)

என்ற வரிகளாலுணரலாம்.

அவன் சங்கு, சக்கரம், கதை, கட்கம், சார்ங்கம் என்ற பஞ்சாபுதங்களை வந்தியவன் என்று புகழப்படுவன். இதனை,

“ மிகாஅ விருவட மாழியான் வாங்க ” (பரி. பக். 168)

“ இடி யெதிர் கழறம் கனிமுதல்வனை ” (ஹே 2, 37)

“ செருமிரு திகிரிச் செல்வ ” (ஹே 13, 58)

“ அணங்குடை நேமிமால் ” (ஹே 13, 6)

“ நேமித் திருமறுமார்பன் ” (சலித். 104)

“ தொல்கதிர்த் திகிரியாற் பரவுதும் ” (ஹே 104)

“ நேமியஞ் செல்வன் ” (அகம். 175)

“ ஐம்படை நனைப்ப ” (மணி. மலர். 138)

என்ற பகுதிகளிற் காண்க.

அவனைப் பொன்னுடை புனைவோன் என்பர்.

“ அணி வனப் பமைந்த பூந்துகில் ” (பரி. 13, 2)

“ பொலம்புனை திருமறுமார்பன் ” (சலித். 104)

“ எரிநிரிந்தன்ன பொன்புனை புடுக்கையை ” (பரி. 1, 10)

என்ற தொடர்களிற் காண்க.

திருத்தழாய் மால் அகற்றப் பெரிதும் உகந்தகென்பர். இதனை,

“ வண்டு பொலிதார்த் திருநெரும ரகலத்துச்

கண்பொரு திகிரிக் கமழ் குரற்றழாஅ

யலங்கற் செல்வன் ”

(பதிற். 31)

என்பது தெரிவிக்கும். இங்குச் செல்வன் என்றது திருவந்தப்புரத்துத் திருமால் யென்பர் பழைய வுரைகாரர்.

மாலின் அவதாரங்கள் பழைய தூல்களிற் பலவிடங்களிலும் குறிக்கப் பெற்றுள்ளன.

“ வளர்திரை மண்ணிய கிளர்பொறி நாப்பண்

“ வைவான் மருப்பிற் களிற் மணையர்பு ”

“ கேழல் திகழ்வரக் கோல மொடு ”

(பரி. 2, 16)

இவ்வரிகள் அவனது வராகவதாரத்தைக் குறிக்கின்றன.

“ நீணில மளந் தோன் ”

“ஞால மூன்றடித் தாய முதல்வர்க்கு ”

(கலித். 125)

“அடி யளந்தான் ”

(குறள். 610)

இவைகள் அவனது ஐந்தாவ தவதாரமாகிய வாமனாவதாரத்தைக் குறிக்கும். சில இடங்களில் அவனது வியூகாவதாரங்களுங் குறிக்கப்படுகின்றன.

“செங்கட் காரி கருங்கண் வெள்ளை

“பொன்கட் பச்சை பைங்கண் மாஅல்”

(பரி. 3, 81-82)

இத் தொடர்கள் வாசுதேவன், சங்கர்ஷணன், செந்நிறக்காமன், நீனிறஅநிருத்தன் என்ற அவனது வியூக உருவங்களைக் குறிக்கின்றன.

மேற்காட்டிய பகுதிகளினின்று திருமால் மும்மூர்த்திகளிடிலொருவனென்றும், காப்புக் கடவுளென்றும், ஆதிசேடன் எனப் பெயரிய ஆயிரந்தலை யரவணையிற் கிடந்து அறிதூயில்கொண்டு திருப்பாற் கடலிலேயே நிலையாக உறைபவன் என்றும், அவன் நீனிற வண்ணனென்றும், அவன் மார்பிற்றிருவும் ஸ்ரீவத்ஸமும் காணப்படு மென்றும், அவன் சங்கு, சக்கரம், கதை, கட்கம், சார்ங்கம் என்ற பஞ்சாயுதமேந்தியவன் என்றும், பொன்னாடை புனைபவனென்றும், நில மகிளைக் காப்பாற்றுவதற்காக வராக வுருவம் எடுத்தவனென்றும், அவனது ஊர்தியும் கொடியும் சுலூனென்றும், அவனது வியூகாவதாரங்கள் நான்கென்றும் உணர்கின்றோம். முதற் பரிபாடலிலேயே சங்கு போன்ற வெண்ணிறமுடையவனும், யானை யெழுதிய கொடியை யுடையவனும், கலப்பையாகிய ஆயுதத்தையுடையவனும், குழை ஒன்றே உடையவனுமான பலராமன் விஷ்ணு அம்சமெனக் கூறப்பட்டுள்ளது. திருமாலின் பத்து அவதாரங்களுள் பல ராமவதாரமும் ஒன்றென்பர். அதே பாடல் காமன், பிரமன், இவர் இருவர்கட்கும் இவன் தந்தை என்றும், இவ்வுலகில் எவற்றிற்கும் இவனே மூலகாரணமென்றும் கூறா நிற்கும். பின்வரும் பாடற் பகுதிகள் இவற்றை விளக்கும்:—

“நீயே அன்பு. ஐந்துதலைகொண்ட அறிவன் நீ,

அறிவும் நீ, படைப்புத்தொழிலை இயற்றுபவன் நீ,

மேகம் நீ, ஆகாயம் நீ, நிலமும் மலையும் நீ,

நீ ஒப்புயர்வற்றவன்”.

“பஞ்ச பூதங்கள், சுதிர், மதி, மாகபதி, ஐந்து கிராமங்கள், அசுரர்கள், பன்னிரண்டு ஆதித்தர்கள், அஷ்ட வசுக்கள், பதினெரு ருத்திரர்கள், அசுவினி தேவர்கள், இயமன், அவன் எவ்லாளியான கூடற்றவன், இருபத்தொருலகம், அவ்வுலகினுள்ளோர், யாவும், யாவரும் உன்னிடமிருந்தே தோன்றினவாகும்”.

“கேசி என்ற அரக்கனைக் கொன்றவன் நீயே; பாற்கடல் கடையும்போது மேல் வந்த அமுதத்தை நீ மோங்ளி வடிவில், அசுரர்களைப் புறக்கணித்துத் தேவர்கட் சளித்தனை. வேதங்களோ ஆசுவங்களோ உன் உண்மை ஸ்வரூபத்தை அறியக்கூடியன வல்ல. விண்ணுறை தேவர்கட்கெல்லாம் மேலான தெய்வம் நீ”.

“நீ அனலின் வெம்மையென்றும், மலரில் மணமென்றும், மணியின் சிவப் பென்றும், சொல்லில் உண்மையென்றும், காரியத்தில் உறுதியென்றும், நியாய வழிகளில் அன்பென்றும் கூறப்படுவான். நீ பிறவாப் பிறப்பிலே பிறப்பித்தோரினை”.

“இரணிய கசிபு உன்னை இகழ்ந்தரையாடியபோது நின்னையே தன் உள்ளத்துக் கொண்டிருந்த நின் அன்பின் பிரகலாதனைக் காப்பாற்றுவதற்காக ஓர் தூணில் வந்து தோன்றினே. உன் பகைவனது மார்பை உகிர் கொண்டுண்டினே.”

பதினேந்தாவது பரிபாடலில் திருமாலும் அவன் முன்னோன பலதேவனும் கோயில் கொண்டுள்ள சோலமலை புகழப்படுகிறது. அதே செய்யுளில் திருமாலின் இருப்பான இருந்தையுருங் குறிக்கப்படுகிறது.

இவற்றால் திருமால் எங்கும் நிறைந்தான் என்றும், எல்லாம் வல்லவனென்றும், சீயோரை அழித்து நல்லோரைப் புரப்பவனென்றும், பாவரும் எளிதில் அறியமுடியாத தன்மையனென்றும், அன்பர் அன்புக் கெளரியனென்றும் நாம் அறிக்கிறோம். ஸ்ரீபகவத் கிஷோரிலும் இறைவனது மேற்பாட்டிய தன்மைகள் விரிவாகக் கூறப்பட்டிருப்பதை அறிஞர் டணாவா. உபநிடதங்களும் இதே வகையிற் திருமால் புகழ்ந்து கூறிபுள்ளன. ‘பிறவாப் பிறப்பிலே பிறப்பித்தோரிலேபே’ என்ற தொடரும், “அ ஜாய மாநொபஹு தா விஜாபதெ” என்ற வரிபும் ஒத்திருப்பதைக் காணலாம். சூகவே பரி பாடல் இயற்றப்பட்ட காலத்தும் அதற்கு முன்பும் ஆரியர் வேதங்களும், உபநிஷத்துகளும் தமிழ் நாட்டிற் பெரிதும் பயிலப்பெற்று வந்தனவென்றும், அவைகளிலுள்ள பல உயரிய கருத்துக்களைத் தக்க தமிழறிஞர் தமது செய்யுட்கண் அமைத்தனர் என்பதும் வெளிப்படை.

பின் குறிக்கப்பெறும் சிலப்பதிகாரப் பகுதிகளிலிருந்து திருமாலின் பல்வேறு உருவ நிலைகளை மறியலாம்.

“நீலமிக வெண்பெருங் குன்றத்துப்
பால்விரிந் தகலாது படிந்ததுபோல
ஆயிரம் விரித்தெழு நிலையுடை மருந்தித
பாயத் பள்ளி பலர் தொழுதேத்த
விரிநிறைக் காவிரி விவன் பெருந்தருத்தித்
திருவமர் மாபன் கிடந்த வண்ணமும்”. (சிலப். காடுகாண். 35-40)
“வீங்கு நீரகவி வேங்கட மென்னும்
ஒங்குமர் மலையத் துச்சி மீன்கை
விரிகழிர் குயிலுந் திசுளும் விளங்கி
யிருமருங் கோங்கிப் விடைநிலைத் தானத்து
மின்னுக் கோடி புதித்ப் விளங்குவித் புண்டு
நன்னிற மேக நன்றது போலப்
பகையணந் காழிடும் பால்வெண் சங்கமும்
தகைபெறு தாமரைக் கைமலேந்தி
நலங் கிளரார மாப்பித் புண்டு
பொலம்பு வாயடையிற் பொலிந்து தோன்றிய
செங்க லொடி போனின்ற வண்ணமும்”. (ஹி. காடுகாண். 41-51)

திருமாலின் வீர சயனமும், யோக சயனமும் இவ்விரு பகுதிகளிலுந் குறிக்கப் பட்டிருப்பதைக் காணலாம். மிகவும் புகழ்பெற்ற திருவாங்கமும், திருவேங்கடமும் இங்கே காணப்படுகின்றன. அவன் அகதாரங்கள் அம்சாவதாரமென்றும், ஆவேசாவ தாரமென்றும் இருதிதப்படும். அவனது மச்ச கூர்மாத் அகதாரங்கள் அம்சாவ தாரங்கள், பரசுராமாவதாரம் ஆவேசாவதாரம். பழைய நூல்களில் இராமாவதாரத்தைப் பற்றிய குறிப்புகள் காணலாம். புற நானூற்றுச் செய்யுள் ஒன்றில் (368) ஊன்பொதி பசங்குடையார் என்னும் புலவர், இளஞ்சேட் சென்னியென்று தன்னை ஆகரித்த செல்வனைப் புகழ்ந்த செய்யுட்கண், இராவணன் சீதையைத் தூக்கிச்சென்றதை

வருணிக்கின்றார். அவ்வருண்ணையில் அவன்பால் நகையுருவிற்கும் பெற்ற பரிசிலை நகைச்சுவைப்படக் கூறுவர். வீடு சென்றபோது அவர் மனைவி மக்கள் இந்நகைகளை அணிமுறை யறியாது மாறுபட வணிந்து அலங்கோலமாக நின்றனர். இதனைக்கண்ட புலவர் தம் மனைவி மக்கள் ஆற்றிய செயற்கும், விண்வழிப் படரும் சான்றி களைந்து போகட்ட அணிகலங்களைக் கண்டவுடன் அவைகளைப் பொறுக்கி விரலணிகளைச் செவி களிலும், கழுத்தணிகளை இடையிலும் பூண்டு விளங்கிய குரங்குகளின் செயலுக்கும் ஒப்புக் கூறினர். அப்பகுதி பின்வருமாறு:—

“விரற்செறி மரபின செவித் தொடக்கு நரும்

.....

அரைக் கமை மரபின மிடற்றியாக்கு நரும்

கடுந்தெற விராமனுடன் புணர் சீதையை

வலித்தகை யரக்கன் வெளவிய ஞான்தை

நிலஞ்சேர் மதானி கண்ட குரங்கின்

செமமுகப் பெருங்கினை யிழைப்பொலிந் தாங்கு” (புறம். 378)

இன்னுஞ் சிலப்பதிகாரத்துக் காமஞ் சார்பாக்

காதலினுழந்தாங் கேமஞ் சாரா விடும்பை

யெய்தினரைக் குறிக்கு மிடத்துக் கவுந்தி

யடிகள் கூற்றாகத்

“தாதை யேவலின் மாதாடன் போகிக்

காதலி நீங்கக் கடுத்துயருழந் தோன்

வேத முதல்வற் பயந்தோ னென்பது”

என்ற வரிகள் காணப்படுகின்றன,

இங்கு வேத முதல்வன் என்றது ஸ்ரீராமபிரானே. இனிக் கண்ணன் அவதாரமும், பழைய தூல்களுள் ஆங்காங்குக் குறிக்கப்படுகின்றன.

“வண் புனற் றொழுனை வார்மண லகன்றுதை

யண்டர் மகளிர் தண்டழை யுடஇயர்

மரஞ்செலி மிதித்த மாஅல் போல”

(அகம். 59)

என்ற அகப்பாட்டும்,

“நீணி வண்ணென்று நெடுந்துகில் கவர்ந்து தம்முன்

பானி வண்ண னோக்கிற் பழியுடைத்தென்று கண்டாய்

வேனிதத்தானே வேந்தே விரிபுனற் றொழுனை யாற்றுட்

கோனி வளையினார்க்குக் குருந்தவனொசித்த தென்றான்” (சிந்தா. 209)

என்ற சிந்தாமணிச் செய்யுளும் நோக்கி யறிக. ஆயர் பாடியில் எருமன்றத்து மாய வனுடன் பலராமன் ஆடிய பாலசரிதை நாடகங்களில் வேனெடுங்கட் பிஞ்ஞா யோடாடிய குரவை, சிலப்பதிகாரம் ஆய்ச்சியர் குரவையிற் குறிக்கப்பட்டுள்ளது. இதில் திருமால் ஏழு ஏறுகளை யடர்த்து நப்பின்னைப் பிராட்டியை மணந்த வரலாறு குறிப்பாகக் காணப்படும். இதே குரவையில்,

“கொல்லப் புனத்துக் குருந்தொசித்தான்” என்றும்

“கன்றுகுணிலாக் கனியுதிர்ந்த மாயவன்” என்றும்

“பாம்பு கயிறுக் கடல்கடைந்த மாயவன்” என்றும்

“தொழுனைத் துறைவன்” என்றும்

அவன் ஆம்பலந் தீங்குமுல் பயில்பவன் என்றும் கண்ணபிரான் வரலாறுகளைக் காணலாம்.

“இறுமென் சாயனுடங்க வொடுங்கி

யறுவை யொளித்தான்”

என்ற வரிகள், அவன் தொழுனை யாற்றிற் புனலாடிக்கொண்டிருந்த கோவியர் ஆடைகளைக் கவர்ந்த கதையைக் கூறுகின்றன. மகா பாரதத்தில் அருச்சுனர்க்காகக் கதிரைத் திகிரியான் மறைத்த கதையும் இக்குரவையிற் குறிக்கப்பட்டுள்ளது. அவன் புள்ளூர் கடவுள் என்பதும், கோகுலம் மேய்த்தவன் என்பதும் வடவரையை மத்தாக்கி வாசுகியை நாணங்கிக் கடல் வயிறு கலக்கிய திறமும், யரோதையாற் கட்டுண்ட திறமும், உறுபசி பொன்றின்றி உலகடைய வுண்ட வண்ணமும், வெண்ணெயுண்ட செய்தியும், இரண்டடியான் மூவுலகு மனந்த விவரமும், பஞ்சவர்ணக்குத் தூது நடந்தபடியும், தன் மாமனாகிய கஞ்சனூர் வஞ்சங்கடந்த செயலும் குறிக்கப்பட்டுள்ளன.

திருமாலின் பாசராமாவதாரம்,

“மன் மருங்குறத்த மழுவா ணெடியோன்
முன்முயன் றரிதினின் முடித்த வேள்விக்
கயிற்றை யாத்த காண்ட குவனப்பி
னருங் கடி நெடுந்தூண் போல”

(அகம். 220)

என்ற அகப்பாட்டு வரிகளிற் குறிக்கப்பட்டது. இப்பகுதியில் தன் தந்தையைக் கொலைபுரிந்த கார்த்தவீரியார்ஜுனனைப் பழிக்குப்பழிவாங்க வெண்ணி அரசகுலத்தை இருபத்தொரு தலைமுறை யழிப்பதெனப் பாசராமன் மேற்கொண்ட குளுறவும், அவன் இயற்றிய மகாயக்ஞமும் கூறப்பட்டன. திருமாலின் இந்த அவதாரம் ஆவேசாவதாரமாகும். அல்தாவது எதிர் ஒரு காரியம் நிறைவேற்றவேண்டி அவ்வப்பொழுது மேற்கொள்ளப்படும் ஒரு அவதாரம் என்றிதனைச் சொல்வர். டாங்கடல் கடைந்த காலத்தில்தான் கூர்மமாகவிருந்து மத்தாகிய மந்தரகிரியைக் திருமால் தாங்கி நின்ற வரலாறு மேலே கூறப்பட்டது. ஆகவே இனிக்கலிமுடிவில் வரவிருக்கும் கல்கி அவதாரம் தவிர ஏனைய அவதாரங்கள் யாவும் பழைய தூல்களிற் குறிக்கப்பெற்றுள்ளன. இப்பெருமானை வழிபடும் வகைகளும், இவற்றென ஏற்பட்ட திருவிழாக்களும் இவைகள் சம்பந்தமான தாழிசைகளும் சிலப்பதிகாரத்தில் உள்ளன. அவைகள் மேலே காட்டப்பட்டன. இவன் பத்துவித ஆடல் மேற்கொண்டதாகத் தெரிகிறது,

“அஞ்சன வண்ணனுடிய வாடலும்”

(சிலப். 6, 47)

என்றது காண்க. இச்சிலப்பதிகாரம் என்னும் காவியத்தால் ஒவ்வொரு தேவதைக்கும் உரிய மூலமந்திரங்கள் அடியார்களால் உச்சரிக்கப்பட்டுவந்தனவாக அறிகின்றோம்

“அருமறை யெழுத்தினேங்கினு மெட்டினும்

வருமுறை யெழுத்தின் மந்திரமிரண்டும்”

(சிலப். காடுகாண். 128-29)

என்ற வரிகளைக்காண்க. இவன் சிவபெருமான், திருமால் இவர்கட்கு முறையே உரித்தான திருவைந்தெழுத்தும் திருவெட்டெழுத்தும் குறிக்கப்பெற்றுள்ளன. சிறப்பாகத் திருமாலெப்புகழும் பாசரத்திற்குத் தேவபாணியெனப் பெயரிட்டு வழங்கினர்.

“மாயோன் பாணியும்”

(சிலப். கடலாடு. 35)

என்றது காண்க.

பலதேவன்

திருமாலின் தசாவதாரங்களுள் பலராமாவதாரமும் ஒன்றென்பர். சங்க தூல் களிலிருந்து அவர்க்குந் கோயிலிருந்ததாக உணர்கிறோம். மேலே காட்டியபடி மதுரை ஜில்லா சேரீஸ்மையிற் நிருமாலுடன் கூடப் பலராம விக்கிரகமும் காணப் படுகிறது. தன் முன்னோன பலராமர்க்குக் கண்ணன் தொழுநாயாற்றிற் குருந்த மரத்தை வளைத்த வரலாறு முன்னமே கூறப்பட்டது, எட்டுத்தொகையில் ஒன்றான கலித்தொகையில்,

“ ஒருகுழை யொருவன் போலிணர்சேர்ந்த மரா அமும் ” (கலித். 26)

என்ற வரியில் வெண் கடப்பமலர் பலதேவன் நிறத்திற் குவமையாகக் கூறப்பட்டது. முல்லைக் கலியில்,

“ பனைக்கொடிப் பானிறவண்ணன்போற் பழிதீர்ந்த வெள்ளையும் ”

என்ற இடத்து வெள்ளையேறுபோன்ற அவன் நிறமும் அவனது பனைக்கொடியுங் கூறப்பட்டன. மேலும்

“ நாஞ்சிலொருகுழை யொருவன் ” (பரி. 1)

“ வளையொடு புரையும் வாலியோன் ” (பரி. 2, 20)

“ புதையிரு றுடுக்கைப் பொலம் பனைக்கொடியோன் ” (பரி. 22)

“ பொலியகழ் புழுதியின் நிறனுழு வளைவாய் நாஞ்சிலோனும் ” (பரி. 13, 32-33)

“ மேழிவலனுயர்த்த வெள்ளை நகரமும் ” (சிலப். ஊர்காண். 9)

“ மாமணி வண்ணனும் தம்முனும் பிஞ்சைபுமாய குரவை ” (மணி. 19, 65)

“ கடல்வளர் புரிவளை புரையுமேனி அடல்வெந் நாஞ்சிற் பனைக்கொடியோனும் ” (புறநா. 56)

“ மாநிறவுருவிற் பனைக்கொடியோனும் நீநிறவுருவி னேமியோனும் ” (புறநா. 58)

என்ற வரிகளாற் பண்டைநாளிலிருந்து பல தேவற்குக் கோயிலிருந்ததும், அவனது பனைக்கட்டையின் அமைந்த மேருக்கொடியும், அவனது வெள்ளை நிறமும், நப்பின்னைப் பிராட்டியுடன் கண்ணன் குரவைக் கூத்தாடுங்காற்றினுங் கலந்துகொண்டதும் பிறவும் அறிகின்றோம். தற்காலத்திற் பலராமற்கென அமைந்த கோயில்கள் இல்லை. சிலர் புத்தனை வேதவிரோதியாகக் கொண்டிருந்தபோதிலும் திருமால் வழிபாட்டிற் சிறந்தவர்களாலேயே தசாவதாரத்திற் பலராமற்குப் பதிலாகப் புத்ததேவன் வைத்து வழங்கப்படுகின்றான்.

முருகன்

கோபிநாதராவ் இத்தெய்வத்தைப்பற்றிக் கூறுவன பின்வருமாறு :—

“ தமிழரால் முருகன் என்று வழங்கப்படும் சுப்பிரமணியம் தென்னிந்தியத் தெய்வமே. சிறிதோ பெரிதோ, ஒவ்வொரு கிராமத்திலும் முருகனுக்குக் கோயில் உண்டு. வட இந்தியாவில் முருகன் வழிபாடு மிகக் குறைவு. அவற்கென அமைந்த கோயில்களும் மிகக் சிலவேயாகும்.”

இத்தெய்வத்தைக் குறித்து எழுந்த விவாதங்கள் எண்ணிலவாகும். சிலர் இவனைத் தென்னிந்தியத்தெய்வம் என்பர். சிலர் ஆரியத்தெய்வமே என்பர். கிடைத்த வரலாறுகளைக்கொண்டு ஆராய்வோம்.

சிவன், பார்வதி, அக்கினி, வாயு, அறுவர் மகளிர் என்ற நாமங்களும், முருகன் இந்திரன் தனையையான தேவகுஞ்சரியை மணந்ததும், சரவணத்திற் பிறந்ததும், காங்கேயன், குன்றெறிந்தோன், தேவசேனாபதி என்ற பெயர்களும், பிறவும் இவனை வட இந்தியத்தெய்வமெனக் கொள்ளுமாறு தூண்டுவன. தொல்காப்பியர் காலத்துக்கு முன்னமேயே தமிழ்நாட்டில் முருகன் அல்லது சேயோன் வழிபாடு இருந்ததென முன்னர்க் குறிக்கப்பட்டது. ஆரியர் கொள்கைகளும் பழக்க வழக்கங்களும் அச்சாலந் தொட்டே தமிழ்நாட்டில் வந்து விரவின என்பதும் முன்னமேயே கண்டோம். அகத்தியமியற்றியவராகக் கூறப்படும் அகத்தியமுனிவர், சிவபிரானிடமும் முருகனிடமும் தமிழ்கற்றுத் தேர்ந்ததாக வரலாறுகள் உள்ளன. வடநாட்டிலிருந்து அகத்தியர் தென்னாடுவந்த வரலாறு பழைய நூல்களிற் காணப்படுகிறது. தமிழ்நாட்டிற் சிறந்து விளங்கிய கோசர், வேளர், மோரியர் முதலியவர்கள் வடபாலிலிருந்து தெற்கண் போந்தனரென்று தெரியவருகிறது.

இவ்வாறு இடையீழ்ந்து வந்தவிலிருந்து தெற்கண் போந்த பல மங்களின் கொள்கைகள், பழக்கவழக்கங்கள் என்ற யாவும் தமிழ்நாட்டிற் பரவி, இரு நாகரிகம் கடனும் ஒன்றுபட்ட நிலையில் முருகன் வழிபாட்டை இருதிரத்தாகும் மேற்கொண்டனரென்று சொல்வதே ஏற்புடைத்தாகும். சித்தமிதந்து ஆற்றல் காண்ட தெய்வமாகத் தமிழர் அவனைக் கூறுங்கூற்று வடநாட்டு நூல்களில் அவனை அக்னிமினின் தந்தோன்றியவனுக்கூறும் வரலாற்றிற்கியைந்து நிர்நின்றது. பிச்சலம் என்ற தமிழ் நிகண்டும் 'பாவதி' என்பது முருகன் திருப்பெயர்சொல்லு ஒன்றெனக் கூறும். வட மொழியிற் பாவகன் என்பது அக்கித்தெனக் கொடுவாய். மற் றம் முருகனை ஆரியர் வழிபடும் முறைக்கும் தமிழர் வழிபாட்டுமுறைக்கும் வேறுபாடுண்டு. நக்கீரர் இயற்றிய திருமுருகாற்றுப் பாட்டையே காண்க. ஆராய்ச்சு கொக்கின் இருதிந்து நாகரிகமும் அப்பண்டைக்காலத்திலேயே ஒன்றுபட்டு நின்றதைக் காணலாம். திருவேரத்திற் கோயில் கொண்டமர்ந்த பெருமானின் வழிபாடு அவரின் முறையைத் தழுவித் தப்ப பழமுதிர்சோலையில் அதே பெருமான் வழிபாடு தமிழ் முறைக்கேற்ப மீளிக்கின்றது. எனவே, வடநாட்டிலிருந்து சுப்பிரமணியம் கடவுளின் வழிபாடு தென்னாட்டுப் போந்து தமிழ்நாட்டிற் பயின்றுவந்த கூத்துக்கள், சேனாட்டம், வெறிபாட்டு முதலியவைகளோடு விரலிவிட்டன; அவ்வாறு கிராமிய முருகன் வழிபாடு எங்கும் பரவியது என்று கோடலே ஏற்புடைத்தாம். இச்சலப்பின் உச்சமே தென்னாற்காடு மில்லாவில் உள்ள வள்ளிமலைக்குத்தி வள்ளிப்பிராட்டியை முருகன் மணஞ்செய்துகின்ற நன்குணரலாம். இம்மணமும், தமிழராத் பவபடப் பாராட்டப்பெற்றதும், தமிழர்க்குச் சிறந்து விளங்கியதுமான கனவுமுறையில் நிகழ்ந்ததாகப் பல வரலாறுகள் உள்ளன. தம்போதில் ஆரியர், தமிழர் என்ற இருக்குப்பினரும் இப்பெருமானைக் கலிபுக வரதனென்றும், நினைத்த வரமளிப்பவனென்றும் புழந்தது வழிபட்டு வருகின்றனர். அநேக அடியார்களுக்கு அவன் குலதெய்வமாகவே விளங்குகின்றான். அவனிடம் அன்பு சான்மவர்கள் பல பிரார்த்தனைகள் செய்துகொண்டு, காவடிமெடுத்தல், அபிஷேகம் செய்தல் முதலியன இன்னுஞ் செய்துவருவதைக் காணலாம். இந்தியத் தெய்வங்களில் இவனுக்கமைந்த இடம் இன்னதென்றிளி ஆராய்வோம். இவனைப் புசுமும் பரிபாடல்கள் இப்பொழுது கிடைக்கப்பெற்றன எட்டாகும். ஆனாலும் வையைநிலைப் புசும்து வருணிக்கும் சில பாடல்களில் இப்பெருமானைப்பற்றியும், அவன் கோயில்கொண்டொளிரும் திருப்பரங்குன்றம் பற்றியும் குறிப்புகள் கிடைக்கின்றன.

பெருமான் பிறப்பு

இவன் பிறப்பைப் பற்றிய வரலாறுகள் பல. செவ்வேளைப்பற்றிய ஐந்தாம் பரி பாடலிற் பின்வரும் வரலாறு காணப்படுகின்றது :—

“திரிபுரமெரித்த விரிசடைக் கடவுள் தனது சத்தியான உமாதேவியுடனிருந்த பொழுது உமையின் வயிற்றிற் கருவுண்டாயிற்று. இதனை உணர்ந்து அஞ்சிய இந்திரன் வேண்டுகோட்கிணங்கி, இதைவன் அக்கருவைப் பல்லாற்றானும் அழிக்கத் தலைப்பட்டான். இருடிகள் எழுவர் சிதறிய பகுதிகளைப் பொறுக்கித் தமது ஆகுதியிற் பெய்தனர். பெய்த சேடத்தை வசிட்டர் மனைவி அருந்தி யொழிந்த அறுவரும் உட்கொண்டு கருவுற்றனராய், அழகிய சரவணப்பொய்கையில் தாமரைச் சேக்கையில் ஆறுமுகனைக் கருவுயிர்த்தனர். இவன் பிறந்த நாளிடுமே இந்திரன் மிகவும் வெகுண்டு தனது வஜ்ஜிராயுதத்தை அப்பெருமான் மீதெறிந்தான். எறிந்தவளவில் முருகன் ஆறு வேறு திருவுருவங்கொண்டு பின்னர் ஒருருவாகி விளங்கினன். இவ்வாறு கிராயுதபாணியாயிருந்தும் இந்திரன் ஆற்றலை வென்றதிதத்தை வியந்து தேவர்கள் இப்பெருமானைத் தேவசேனாபதியாக்கினர். தோலாச்சேவலை அங்கித்தேவன் இவற் களித்தான். இயமன் ஓர் மயிலையும் ஆட்டுக்கிடாவையுங் கொடுத்தான். சிலர் அவனுக்கு அம்பு, மரம், கட்கம், ஏறியீட்டி, கோடரி, மழு, அக்கினி, மாலை, மணி முதலிய பலவம் அளித்தனர். இவையனைத்தையும் தன் பன்னிருகரங்களிலுந் கொண்டு வாலைப்பருவத்திலேயே இவன் தேவசேனாபதியாக விளங்கினன். இவ்வாறு தேவர்கட்கிதைவானுள் இந்திரனினும் மிகுந்த கீர்த்தியுடன் ஒளிர்ந்தான். இவன் கடப்பமாலை யணியோன். கொலை செய்வோரும், மறம்புரிசுநரும், தவத்திறம் பூண்டும் தகாதவழிச் செல்வோரும், மறுமையிலலை யென்போரும் இம்முருகப்பெருமான் அருட் கிலக்காகார். அவனது தெய்வப் பண்புகளைச் செவ்விதின் உணர்ந்து பேரின்பம் அடையுந் தகுதியுடையாரே அவன் திருவடி நிழலிலே அடைந்துறைவர். ஆகலின் அவன்பால் வேண்டுகூறு அழியும் மாலைத்தாகிய செல்வமும் போகமுமன்று. அவனதருளை எஞ்ஞான்றும் பெற்றொளிர்ந்தரு மூலமான அன்பும் அறமுமேயாகும்.”

எனைய பரிபாடல்களில் முருகப்பிரானைப்பற்றிய குறிப்புகள் பின்வருமாறு :—

திருப்பரங்குன்றம் பூரீ ஷண்முகப்பெருமானின் ஆறு படைவீடுகளுள் ஒன்று. முப்பத்து முக்கோடித் தேவர்களும் அவன் காட்சிபெறற்காக அம்மலைக்கண் உறைவ ரென்பர், முருகன் தன் கைவேலாற் கிரொளஞ்சகிரியைத் துளைத்ததாகக் கூறப் பட்டுள்ளது. அவன் நீலகண்டன் மகன் என்றும், மான் மகளார் வள்ளியைத் திருப்பரங்குன்றத்திற் களவுமுறையில் மணந்ததாகவுங் கூறுவர். இம் மணச்செய்தி யைச் செவியேற்ற இவன் மூத்ததேவியும் இந்திரன் மகளாருமான தேவகுஞ்சரியார் விண்ணிழி மழையெனக் கண்ணீர் பெருக்கினராம். வேதப்பொருளை விரித்துரைக்கும் ஆற்றலுள்ளவன் இப்பிரான் என்பர். தன் ஆண்மைக்கேற்பச் சக்திவேலை யேந்தியும், சேவற்கொடியை உயர்த்தும் உள்ளவன். சூரபன்மனை வேரொடுங்களைந்தவன் இவனே. அவ்வசுரன் ஆழியுள் ஓர் மாமரமாக மறைந்து நின்றபொழுது அம்மரத்தை யழித்தவன், எப்பொழுதும் கடப்ப மரத்தடியில் உரைபவன். பரங்குன்றிலும் அதன் அருகிலும் அன்பர் கண்டு களிக்கக்கூடிய சித்திரங்கள் அநேகம் உண்டெனச் சொல்வர். அவன் தேவி வள்ளி குமக்குலப்பெண் என்பர். தனது ஊர்தியாகிய மயிலல்லாது பிணிமுகம் என்ற யானையும் அவற்கோர் வாகனம் என்பர்.

ஒங்கு பரிபாடல் எனப்புகழப்பெற்ற சங்கத்தொகை தூலில் இப்பெருமானைப் பற்றிக் கூறப்பெற்றவையிவை. இனிப்பத்துப் பாட்டில் முருகன் புகழைத் தனித்துக் கூறும் திருமுருகாற்றுப்படை என்ற தூல் ஒன்றுண்டு. இது நக்கீரதேவரால் இயற்றப் பெற்றது. தமிழ்மொழியிலுள்ள 96 வகைத் தனிப்பிரபந்தங்களில் ஆற்றுப்படையென்பதொன்று. தன்னைப்பெரிதும் ஆதரித்துப் பரிசில் பலவளித்த ஓர் வள்ளலிடம் ஒரு பாணன் மற்ருரு வறிகுறைய ஓர் பாணனை ஆற்றுப்படுத்துவது இதனிலக்கணம். இதேதொகைநூற்கண் இதனைத் தவிர்த்து மூன்று ஆற்றுப்படைகள் உள்ளன. அவை யாவும் மேற்கூறிய இலக்கணத்திற்கு நேரிலக்கியங்களாகும். ஆனால் இம்முருகாற்றுப் படையோ நக்கீரர் தாம்பெற்ற அருளை எனைய அன்பரும் பெறக்கருதி முருகனிடம் ஓர் அன்பனை ஆற்றுப்படுத்துகின்றார். இச்செய்யுள் மூந்தூறு வரிகளாலாயது. சைவர் களாற் பெரிதும் போற்றப்படுவது. இந்நிகண்ட பொருள் பின்வருமாறு. இந்நூல் சரவணபவனது ஆறுபடை வீடுகளையும் புகழ்வதாகும். அவை முறையே திருப்பரங்குன்றம், திருச்சீரலைவாய், திருவாலினன்குடி என்ற பழனிமலை, மலைநாட்டில் உள்ள தாகச் சிலப்பதிகார அரும்பதவுரை காரராலும், சும்பகோணத்தை யடுத்துள்ள சுவாமி மலையென்று திருப்புகழை அருளிச்செய்த அருணகிரிநாதராலும் குறிக்கப்பட்டுள்ள திருவேரகம், குன்று தோருடல், திருமாலிருஞ் சோலைமலை என்ற பழமுதிர் சோலை என்பனவாம்.

ஆயிரம் பெயர்களை ஒருசேர உண்ண நினைந்து 999 பேர்களைப் பிடித்து ஓர் மலைக் குகையிலடைத்து மற்ருருவரையும் தேடிச்சென்றிருந்த ஓர் பூதம், வழிக்கண் நக்கீரர் அகப்பட, அவரையுஞ் சிறையிட்டுத் தன் பசிபாறுதற்குமுன் நீராடச் சென்ற பொழுது, தம்முயிர்க்கிரங்கி அழுதற்றிய அனைவரையும் தேற்றி, முருகன்மீது இப்பாடலைப் பாடி நக்கீரர் அவர்கட் குயிர்ப் பிச்சையளித்துத் தாமும் பெருமான் திரு வருட்குப் பாத்திரராயினர் என்பது வரலாறு. இந்நூலை அன்பர்கள் படித்தும், பாட்டுச் செய்தும் முருகன் சந்நிதிகளிற் கூறியும் வருகின்றனர்.

“நக்கீரர் தாமுரைத்த நன் முருகாற்றுப் படையைத்
தற்கோலம் நாடோறுஞ் சாற்றினால்—முற்கோலி
மாமுருகன் வந்து மனக்கவலை தீர்த்தருளித்
தானினைந்த வெல்லாந் தரும்”

என்பது இவர்கள் மனமார எண்ணுவது.

இனி, திருமுருகாற்றுப்படையிற் கூறப்படுவன யாவை என்று நோக்குவோம். முதற் பகுதியில் முருகன் உலகிருள் அகற்றும் ஞாயிராகப் புகழப்படுகிறான். அவன் இந்திரன் மகளாகிய தேவயானை கொண்கனென்றும், கடப்பமலை யணிபவனென்றும் கூறப்பட்டது. கிண்கிணி யணிந்த அவனது திரண்ட கால்களும், நுட்பமான இடையும், பரந்த புயமும், செந்நிறவாடையும், மேகலையுடுத்தும் பின்புறமும், பொதுவாக அவன் பாதமுதற் கேசம்வரைபுள்ள யாவும், அவன் கைக்கொண்ட சேவற்றுவசமும், தெய்வ மகளிரால் அவன் புகழப்படும் நேர்மையும், பிறவும் விரிவாகக் கூறப்பட்டுள்ளன. பின்னர் கடல் நடுவில் மாவாய் நின்ற சூரபன்மாவைத் தடிந்த திறம் கூறப்பட்டது. முடிவாகத் தான் செய்த பூர்வ புண்ணியப் பலனாக முருகன் வழிபாடியற்றும் எண்ணம் தோன்றுமெனின், பெருங் கடைவீதிகளும், வானளாவிய மாடங்களால் இருபுறமும் நிறைந்த அகன்ற நெடுந் தெருக்களும் உள்ள திருப்பரங்குன்றத்திற்கு ஏகம்படி அவ்வன்பன் பணிக்கப்படுகின்றான்.

இரண்டாவது பகுதியில் அவனது ஆறு முகங்களும் பன்னிரு கைகளும் வருணிக் கப்படுகின்றன. பல்லாயிரம் பரிதியென ஒளி வீசும் ஓர் முகம். பரவுவார் விழைந்த வரங்களைப் பாலிக்கும் ஓர் திருமுகம். அந்தணர் வேத விதிப்படி ஆற்றும் வேள்விகள் பல்க நினைக்கும் ஓர் திருமுகம். தமிழ் நாட்டில் வழங்காத பலவாய வேதங்கள் சமய நூல்கள், ஆகமங்கள் இவைகளிற் கூறிப் போந்தவற்றைச் சிந்திக்கும் ஓர் திருமுகம். பூதங்களையும் அவற்றின் பரிவார வர்க்கங்களையும் அறவே யொழிக்க வெண்ணும் ஓர் திருமுகம். குறவர் மகள் வள்ளிதன் அருகிருப்பக் குன்ற மகிழ்ச்சி கொண்டொளிரும் ஓர் திருமுகம். அவனது பன்னிரு கரங்களில் இருடிகளைப் புரக்கும் ஒன்று, இடைக் கண் பொருந்தியிருக்கும் ஒன்று, அங்குசம் கடாவும் ஒன்று, செவ்வாடை யுடுத்த துடையிற் பொருந்தும் ஒன்று. முறைபே கேடசத்தையும் எறி யீட்டியையும் பற்றி நிற்கும் இரண்டு. மார்பிற் பொருந்தியது ஒன்று. மாலை யணிந்திலங்கும் ஒன்று. நான் தன் வலியாற் கொன்று குவித்தவற்றை நோக்கும் ஒன்று. முகினின்றும் மாரி பெய்விப்பதொன்று. தெய்வமாயினையத் திருமுனைஞ் செய்தற் கறிகுறியாக அவள் கழுத்தில் மாலை யணிவ தொன்று. இவ்வைபவங்களைக் கண்ணிற்காணத் திருச்செந்தூர் சென்று சேருமாறு அன்பன் பணிக்கப்படுகின்றான்.

மூன்றாவது பகுதியிற் திருவாலினன்குடி. வருணிக்கப்படுகிறது. இவண் தெய்வ யானையுடன் முருகன் வீற்றிருக்கும் திருமுனைக் கோலமும், திருமூர்த்திகளும் முப்பத்து முக்கோடி தேவர்களும் அவன் திருவடித் தாமரையை வணங்கி வழிபட்டுத் தாம் வேண்டியவற்றை யெய்து மாறும் குறிக்கப்பெற்றுள்ளது.

திருவேரத்தைக் குறிக்கும் நான்காம் பகுதி நான்மறை பயின்ற நவை தீரந்தணர் பெருமானைப் பூசித்து வழிபாடியற்றும் முறையைக் கூறும்.

ஐந்தாவது பகுதி குன்று தோறாடலைச் குறித்துக் கூறும். இப்பகுதியிற் பெருமான் சம்பந்தமான திருவிழாக்களிலும், அவனைக் குறித்திப்பற்றும் பல சடங்குகளிலும், பெருமான் பிரதிக்ரிதியாக இருந்து நடக்கும் வேலன் அல்லது படிமத்தானைப் பற்றி விரிவாகத் தெரிகின்றோம். பச்சிலையு மலரும் விரவித் தொடுத்த மாலையை யணிந்து, மலைப்பக்கங்களிற்றும் குடித்த கள்வெறியால் மகிழ்ச்சி கூர்ந்து நிற்கும் குறவரும் வேட்டுவரும் குழுமி நிற்பப் பல பல பெண்டிருடன் இவ்வேலன் குரவை யாடும் வழக்கம் உண்டென்று தெரிகிறது.

ஆறாவதாகப் பழமுதிர் சோலை நிகழ்ச்சி கூறப்படுகின்றது. ஆரிய வழிபாட்டு முறையினும் வேறாய்த் தமிழ் நாட்டிற்கே சிறப்பாக உரியதெனக் கருதக்கூடிய வழி பாட்டு முறை காணப்படுகின்றது. இங்கு அவர்க்கென அளிக்கும் பலிகளையும் பிற வற்றையும் பெற்றுக் கோடற்கு இப்பெருமான் தோன்றக்கூடிய இடங்கள் கூறப் பெற்றுள்ளன. அவைகள் யாவையெனில்,

எங்கள் குல தெய்வமாகிய முருகன் இவண் தோன்றியருள்க என்று மனதில் நினைந்து தினையும் அரிசியும் படைத்தும், ஆட்டுக் கிடாய்கள் பலியூட்டியும், சேவற் கொடி நாட்டியும் கொண்டாடும் ஒவ்வொரு கிராம விழாவும், வேலன் வெறியாடுகளமும், ஆற்றிடைக் குறையும், குளக்கரையும், நாற்சாற்களும், புதுமலர் பொதுளிய பூங்கடம்பி னடியும், கிராமத்தார்க்குப் பொதுவான மன்றங்களும், ஆடுமாடுகள் உரிஞ்சுந் தறிகளும் ஆமென்பர்.

பின்னர் பெருமான் வழிபாட்டுமுறை கூறப்படுகின்றது.

முதலாவதாகச் சேவற்கொடி அவற்கென நாட்டிய கோயில் முன்னதாக அமைக்கப் பெறல்வேண்டும். ஐயவியும், நெய்யுங்கலந்த சூழம்பால் அவன் திருமேனி பூசப் பெறவேண்டும். பின்னர் அவற்குரிய மூலமந்திரமோதி, அவன் திருவுருவத்தின்மீது மலர்களை யிட்டருச்சித்தல் வேண்டும். செந்நூலைக் கையிற் காப்புநாணுகக் கட்டிக் கொண்டு பொரிகளை எல்லாப் பக்கங்களிலும் இறைக்கவேண்டும். பின்னர் கொழுத்த கிடாய்களின் உதிரற் துஉய்ப்பிசைந்த அரிசியும், பலவகைப் பிரப்பரிசிகளும் அவன் சந்நிதிக்கணவைத்து, மஞ்சளும், மணங்கமழ் சாந்தமும் இறைக்கவேண்டும். தோரணங்கள் நாட்டவேண்டும்; மலைநாட்டு வாசிகளைப் பசி, நோய், பகை இவற்றினின்றும் காக்கவேண்டுமென எல்லோரும் பெருமானை ஏத்தவேண்டும். வாசனைத் திரவியங்களும் அகித்புகை முதலியனவும் பின்னர் ஊட்டப்பெறுதல் வேண்டும். உடனே குதமகளிர் முருகனை மகிழ்வித்ததற்குக் குரவைக் கூத்தயர்வர் என்று விரித்துக் கூறப்பட்டுள்ளது.

இதன் பிறகு, மேற்கூறியவாறு முருகனை வழிபடும் இடங்கட்கு அன்பன் செல்லுமாறு எவப்படுகின்றான். சாவணப்பொய்கையில் முருகன் தோன்றிய வரலாறு அவனுக்கு அறிவிக்கப்படுகின்றது. இவண் கூறும் பிறப்பு வரலாறு பரிபாடலிற் கூறப்பட்ட வரலாற்றைப் பெரிதும் ஒத்து விளங்குகின்றது. இதன்பின் பழமுதிர் சோலையில் அருளுருவமைந்து வேண்டுவர் வேண்டுவன ஈந்தருளும் வேலப்பிரானைப் பலபடப்புகழ்ந்து, அவனதருள்பெறும் வழி குறிக்கப்படுகின்றது.

இவ்வாறு படைவீடுகள் ஆறாகக் கூறப்பட்டனும் சிலர் குன்று தோறாடலை ஓர் தனித் தலமாகக் கோடற்கியைகின்றனர். உண்மையிற் “சேயோன் மேய மைவரை யுலகம் என்பதற்கேற்ப, முருகன் மலைநாடுகள் எல்லாவற்றிற்கும் தெய்வம் ஆவன். குன்று தோறாடல் என்பதனால் யாம் அறியக்கிடப்பது அவன் ஒவ்வொரு மலைக்கணும் திருவிளை யாடல் புரிபவன் என்பதே ஆகும். இத்தலத்திற் கூறப்படும் வழிபாட்டுமுறை சிறப் பாகத் தமிழர் முறையே. மேற்கூறிய பெருமானைப்பற்றிய சிறப்புக்கள் யாவும் ஏனைய சங்க இலக்கியங்களிலும் ஆங்காங்குக் காணலாம். குறிஞ்சிப் பகுதிகள் வருமிடங்களிலெல்லாம் பெரும்பாலும் முருகன் அல்லது வேலனைப்பற்றியோ, அவனது வெறியாட்டைக் குறித்தோ பலகுறிப்புகள் காணப்படும். இந்த வெறியாட்டு என்பது அகப் பொருட்டுறைகளுள் ஒன்று.

ஒரு தலைவி பெற்றோரு மற்றோரு மறியாமல் களவுமுறையிற் றுன்கலந்த ஓர் தலைவன் கூட்டத்தை விரும்பியழுங்கினள். அவர்கட்குள் எழுந்த காதல் மறைவில் நிகழ்ந்தாதலின், அதனை வெளியிடத் துணியவில்லை. அவள் நற்றாயும் செவிலித்தாயும் அவளது மனக்கவலையின் காரணம் அறியாராய், அவளை முருகன் அணங்கினன் என்றும், வெறியாட்டெடுப்பின் அந்நோய் திருமேன்றும் உன்னி, வெறிபாடத் தொடங்கினர். வேலனை நினைந்து வழிபட்டுப் பலிகள் படைக்கப்பெற்றன. இடைநடுவிற தலைவி அவ்வாறு அவர்கள் செய்வதைத் தடுக்கவெண்ணி அறத்தொடு நிற்கின்றாள். வெறிவிலக்கு நிகழ்கின்றது. முருகனைக் குறித்து ஆடும் குரவையாட்டு,

“வரையுறை தெய்வ முவப்ப வுவந்து குரவைதழீஇ” (கலித். 39)
என்ற வரிகளிற் கூறப்பட்டுள்ளது.

முருகப்பெருமான் சூரபன்மாவை அழித்தது,

“சூர்கொன்ற செவ்வேலாற் பாடி”

“மாகடல் கலக்குற மாக்கொன்ற மடங்காப்போர்

வேல் வல்லான்”

(கலித். 104)

என்ற வரிகளிற் சிறப்பிக்கப்படுகிறது. அகநானூற்றில் நெடுவேளைப் பற்றியும், அவற் குரித்தான கோயில்களைப் பற்றியும் உள்ள பகுதிகள் காணப்படுகின்றன. அந்நூல் 22-ஆம் பாட்டில் வெறிபாடிய காமக்கண்ணியார் பாடிய செய்யுள் மேற்குறித்த வெறியாட்டைப் புனைந்து கூறுகின்றது. அவ்வரிகள் பின்வருமாறு :—

“காண்கெழு நாடன்
மணங்கமழ் வியன்மார் பணங்கிய செல்ல
விதுவென வறியா மறுவரற் பொழுதிற்
படியோர்த் தேய்த்த பல்புகழ் தடக்கை
நெடுவேட் பேணத் தணிகுவ எரிவனென
முதுவாய்ப் பெண்டி ரதுவாய்க் கூறக்
களநன் கிழைத்துக் கண்ணிருட்டி
வளநகர் சிலம்பப்பாடிப் பலி கொடுத்த
துருவச் செந்தினை குருதியொடு தூ உய்
முருகாற்றுப்படுத்த வருகெழு நடுநாள் ”. (அகம். 22)

இவ்வரிகள், காண்கெழுநாடன், தன் மகளது நோய்க்கு உண்மைக்காரண மின்ன தென வுணராத நிலையில், முதுமகளிர் போந்து, நெடுவேள் வழிபாடியற்ற இவள் மையல் தீர்வளெனப் புகல, பூசைக் கிடனமைத்து, மலர்களாற் புனைந்து, துதிசாற்றி, மலைகள் எதிரொலிக்குமாறு பாடிக் கிடாய்ப்பலி கொடுத்து, மலைபுறைய தெய்வங்கள் மகிழ்வெய்துமாறு கிடாயிரத்தங்கலந்த தினையைப் பலியீந்தனன் என்று கூறுகின்றன.

“சூர்மருங் கறுத்த சுடரிலை நெடுவேள்
சினமிரு முருகன் தண்பெருங் குன்றத்து ” (அகம். 59)

“கூடற்குடா அது
பல்பொறி மன்னை வெல்கொடி யுயரிய
வொடியா விழவி னெடியோன் குன்றத்து ” (அகம். 149)

என்ற அகப்பாட்டு வரிகள் திருப்பரங்குன்றத்தைக் குறித்து நிற்கின்றன.

முருகன் கை கொற்றவேற்கு விழாவெடுப்பது வழக்கென்பது,
“நெடுவேல் விழவயர்ந்தன்ன ” (அகம். 113)

என்ற வரியால் உணரலாம். அவன் ஆறுமுகன் என்பதும், வள்ளியைத் தன் துணைவி யாகக் கொண்டுள்ள என்பதும்,

“அறுமுகச்செவ்வே ளணிதிகழ் கோயிலும்” (சிலப். இந்திரவிழ. 170)

“அறுமுக வொருவன் ” (சிலப். மனையறம். 49)

“அறுமுகமில்லை யணிமயிலில்லை
குறமகளில்லை செறிதோளில்லை ” (குன்றக்குரவை)

என்ற வரிகளால் உணர்க. அந்நூலிலேயே குகக் கடவுட்குச் சொந்தமான திருச் செந்தில், திருச்செங்கோடு, வெண்குன்று, ஏரகம், என்ற இந்நான்கும் கூறப் பெறுகின்றன. கடலுண் மறைந்துநின்ற சூரபன்மனை முருகன் கொன்றதும் கூறப் பட்டுள்ளது.

“சீர்கெழு செந்திலும் செங்கோடும் வெண்குன்றும்
ஏரகமும் நீங்கா விறைவன்கை வேலன்றே
பாரிரும் பௌவத்தினுள்புக்குப் பண்டொரு நாட்
சூர் மாதடிந்த் சுடரிலை வெள்வேலே ”

என்ற வரிகளைக் காண்க. சிலப்பதிகாரத்திற் றிருச்செங்கோடு நெடுவேள்குன்றம் என்று கூறப்பட்டுள்ளது.

“நெடுவேள் குன்ற மடிவைத் தேறி” (சிலப். கட்டுரை)

என்றார் இளங்கோவடிகள்.

இவ்வாறு பழைய சங்கநூல்களில் முருகனைக் குறித்தும், அவன் ஆற்றல் சான்ற திருவிளையாடல்களைக் குறித்தும் பற்பல குறிப்புகள் உள்ளன. சில இடங்களில் சீற்ற முள்ளவனாகக் கூறப்படினும் அவனுக்கு அருள் புரிதற்கேற்ற அரும் பெரும் உருவங்களும் உள.

இந்திரன்

“மழையின்றி மாநிலத்தார்க்கில்லை” யென்றும், நீரின்றமையாதுலகு என்றும் கூறியதற் கேற்ப, நீர்க்குக் காரணமாகிய மேகம் தமிழராத் போற்றப்பட்டது அந்த முகில் சாரணமாகவே முகில் வாகனஞ்செய் இந்திரன் தெய்வமாக வணங்கப் பட்டான். இவ்வந்திரனும் ஆரியத் தெய்வக்குழுவிற் காணப்படுகின்றான். இவன் தேவர் கட்கிறைவனென ஆரிய நூல்கள் பகரும் எனினும் தொல்காப்பியத்திலும், சங்க இலக்கியங்களிலும் மருதநிலத் தெய்வமாக இவன் கூறப்படுவன்.

“வேந்தன் மேய தீம்புன லுலகமும்”

என்பது தொல்காப்பியம். (அகத். 5)

‘அமரர் தலைவனை வணங்குதும் யாமென” (சிலப். கடலாடு. 27)

“விண்ணவர் தலைவனை விழுநீராட்டி” (இந்திரவிழா. 168)

என்ற வரிகளையும் காண்க. அவன் கருநிறமென்றும், ஆயிரங் கண்ணென்றும் அறிகின்றோம்.

“கரியவன்”

“ஐயிரு நூற்று மெய்ந்நயனத்தவன்” (பரி. 9, 9)

“ஆயிரங் கண்ணேன்” (சிலப். கடலாடு. 20)

“மாதவன் மடந்தைக்கு வருந்து துயரெய்தி
ஆயிரங் செங்க ணமரர் கோன் பெற்றநம்” (மணி. 18, 90-91)

என்ற தொடர்கள் இவற்றை வலியுறுத்தும். இவன் அரசிருக்கை நகர் அமராவதி என்றும், நூறு பரிமேதமியற்றித் திசைக்காவலர்க்கரசென்ற ஆகண்டல பதவியை எய்தினன் என்றும்,

“அமராபதி சாத்து” (சிலப். கடலாடு. 14)

“ஒரு நூறு வேள்வி யுவோன்” (சிலப். பதி. 33)

என்ற வரிகளால் அறியலாம். அவனது ஊர்தி, பாற்கடல் கடைந்த காலத்து அதனின்றும் தோன்றிய ஐராவதம் என்ற வெள்ளையானை என்பர். பண்டைக்காலத்தில் இவன் ஊர்தியாகிய யானைக்கும், இவன் கரத்திற் பிடித்துள்ள வஜ்ஜிராயுதத்திற்கும் தனித்தனிக் கோயில் இருந்ததாகக் கேட்கப்படுகிறது. பின் கூறப்பெற்ற ஆயுதம் தத்சி முனிவரின் முதுகெலும்பினின்றும் செய்ததென்பர்.

“ஐராவதக் கோயில்”

“களிற்றுக் கோட்டம்”

“வால்வெண் களிற்றரச வயங்கிய கோட்டம்” (சிலப். இந்திரவிழா. 143)

என்ற வரிகளும்,

“அரிதமர் சிறப்பி னமரர் செல்வன்
எரியுமிழ் வச்சிரங் கொண் டிகந்து வந் தெறிந்த ” (பரி. 5, 51-2)

என்ற பரிபாடல் வரிகளும் இவற்றை விளக்கும். இவன் இடியை ஆபுதமாக உடையவ
னென்றும், கற்பகத்தருவிற் கதிபன் என்றும்,

“அமரர் தருக் கோட்டம் ” (சிலப். கருத்திதம். 9)

“தரு நிலைக் கோட்டம் ” (ஐடி இந்திரவிழா. 145)

“தருநிலை வஜ்ஜிர மெனவிரு கோட்டம் ” (மணி. 5, 114)

என்ற அடிகளால் உணரலாம். முனிவர் இயற்றும் வேள்விகளில் அவிர்ப்பாகம்
பெறுபவன் இவன் எனப் புகழப்படுகின்றான்.

“வேள்வி முதல்வன் ” (சிலப். 5, 31)

என்பது காண்க. கண்ணன் அவதரித்து ஆயர் பாடியில் இவ்வவிர்ப்பாகத்தைத் தான்
எற்றுக்கொள்ள எண்ணிய வரையில், இந்திரனுக்கே இவ்வுரிமையும் பெருமையும்
இருந்து வந்தன இவன் மனைவியின் பெயர் அயிராணி என்பதும், அவன் கடையம்
என்னும் ஆடலை ஆடினவன் என்பதும்,

“வடதிசை நின்று வடக்கு வாயிலுள்
அயிராணி மடந்தை யாடிய கடைமும் ” (சிலப். கடலாடு. 62-3)

என்றதனாலுணர்க. இவன் ஆயிரம் விழிகள் பெற்ற வரலாற்றைப் பின்வரும் வரிகளிற்
காண்க.

“இந்திரன் பூசை யிவளக லிகையின்
சென்ற கௌதமன் சினனுந் கல்லுரு
ஒன்றியபடி யிதென்றுரை செய்வோரும் ” (பரி. 19, 50-3)

“மாதவன் மடந்தைக்கு வருந்து துயரெய்தி
ஆயிரஞ் செங்க ணமரர்கோன் பற்றதும் ”. (மணி. 18, 90-91)

இவ்வரிகளில், கௌதம முனிவன் தருமபதினியை முறைதவறிக் காதலித்ததனால்
அம்முனிவன் சாபம் இவனுடையதும், பூசையுருவாக அவன் போக முயன்றதும்,
சாபத்தின் பயனாக இவன் ஆயிரங்கண் பெற்றதும், தன் கெட்ட நடத்தைக்காக
அகலிகை கல்லுருவாக மாறியதும் பிறவுங் காணலாம். திருவள்ளுவர், ஐம்புலனடக்கிய
அறிவரின் ஆற்றற்கு இவன் வரலாற்றையே உதாரணமாக எடுத்துக்காட்டுவர்.

“ஐந்தவித்தா னுற்ற லகல்விசம்பு ளார்கோமான்
இந்திரனே சாலுங் கரி ”

என்ற குறள் கண்டுணர்க. சங்க காலத்து விண்ணுறை அமரரும்விழைந்து காணுமாறு
மண்ணகத்து வந்து கூடுவதும், இந்திரனுக்காக நடத்தப்படுவதுமான திருவிழாக்கள்
நிகழ்ந்தனவாக அறிகின்றோம். அவ்வாறு இந்திரவிழாவை நடத்தத் தவறினால் அநேக
கேடுகள் நிகழக்கூடு மென்றும், இந்திரன் ஏவலில் அவனது பிரமத கணங்கள் யாவரையும்
கொன்று அழித்து விடுமென்றும் கூறப்பட்டுள்ளது.

“இந்திர விழவு கொண்டெடுக்கு நாள் ” (சிலப். கடலாடு. 6)

“விண்ணவர் கோமான் விழவுநா ளகத்தென் ” (ஐடி இந்திர. 240)

“வானவன் விழவு ” (சிலப். கடலாடு. 73)

“ஆயிரங் கண்ணோன் விழாக்கால் கொள்கென ” (மணி. விழாவமை. 28)

“தேவர்கோற் கெடுத்த பெருவிழாக்காணும் பெற்றியின் ” (மணி. 3, 35)

என்ற வரிகளில் காண்க. பிற்காலத்தில் இந்திர வழிபாடு கேட்கப்படவில்லை. அவற்கென ஆலயமிருப்பதாகவும் தெரியக்கூடவில்லை. கீழ்திசைக் காவலனாக மட்டும் கூறப்படுகின்றான். வானவில்லை இந்திரதனுசெனக் கூறுகின்றனர்.

வருணன்

மேற்றிசைக் காவலனான இவன் கடல், கடல் சார்ந்த. இடம் இவற்றிற்குத் தெய்வம் என்பர்.

“வருணன் மேய தீம்புன லுலகமும்”

என்பது காண்க.

இவனைக் குறித்த வழிபாடுகள் நெய்தனிலத்தில் நுளையர்களால் நடத்தப்படும். கடற்மெய்வத்தைப் பரவி, சுருக்கோட்டை நட்டு வழிபாடு நடத்தவர். குறுந்தொகை 164-ஆம் பாட்டிற் கடற்மெய்வம் குறிக்கப்பட்டுள்ளது. தமிழ் மக்களாற் பண்டைக் காலத்திருந்தே போற்றப்பட்டபோதிலும் இவ்வருணன் ஆரியத் தெய்வமென்றே கொள்வர் பலர்.

நாமகள்

“கால முலகம்” என்னும் தொல்காப்பியச் சொல்லதிகாரச் சூத்திரத்தில் சொல் என்பது நாமகளாகிய தெய்வம் என்றார் உரையாசிரியர். சொல்லையே தெய்வமாகக் கொண்டதால் சொல்லாலாகிய பாஷையையும் தெய்வம் எனக் கொண்டனர் தமிழ் மக்கள்.

“மொழிப் பொருட் தெய்வம்”

(அகத். 36)

என்றது காண்க. இத்தெய்வம் சிந்தாதேவி என்ற பெயரான் பண்டை நூல்களில் வழங்கக் காணலாம். இவளுக்குத் தென்மதுரையிற் கலா நிலயம் ஒன்றிருந்ததென்பர். மணிமேகலையில் ஆபுத்திரனுக்கு அமுத சூரியளித்தவள் இச் சிந்தாதேவியென்று கூறப்பட்டுள்ளது. அங்கு உரையாசிரியர் சிந்தாதேவி சரஸ்வதி தேவியென்றும், யாவருக்கும் சிந்தையிற் றேன்றிச் சொற்பொருள் உணர்த்துதலால் அப்பெயர் பெற்றனள் என்றும் கூறுவர். இவளையே, “நாமிசைப் பாவாய்” (மணி. 14, 18) என்றும், தென்மமிழ் மதுரைச் “செழுங்கலைப் பாவாய்” (ஐடி. 25, 139) என்றும் விளிப்பர்.

பழைய நூல்களில் இச் சிந்தாதேவியைப் பற்றிய குறிப்புகள் அதிகமாக இல்லை. தற்காலத்தில் திருமகட்டுச் சிற்சில இடங்களிற் கோயில் விளங்கக் காணலாம். ஆனால் கலைமகட்கிருப்பதாகத் தெரியவில்லை. நூல் நிலையங்களும் கல்வாரிகளுமே அம் மகளின் ஆலயங்களாகும். இயற்கையில் ஓரொழுங்குபட அமைந்த உலகம் முழுதும், ஒவ்வொரு அறிஞனும் அவரவர்க்கு வேண்டிய பொருள்களைத் தேடி யெடுத்துக் கொள்ளற்கேதுவான சிறந்த கல்விக் களஞ்சியம் என்று கருதியதே இக்கலைமகட்டுத் தனி ஆலயம் அமையாததன் காரணமென ஊகிக்கலாம். கலைமகளும், உணர்வுசான்ற மக்களால் நன்குணரப்படவேண்டிய சிறந்த பொருள்களின் உருவமென்றி வேறு யார்? இயற்கையை யுணர்ந்து இயற்கைத் தெய்வத்தை உணர்ந்தல் என்று 19-ஆம் நூற்றாண்டில் விளங்கிய வார்ட்ஸ் வொர்த் என்ற ஆங்கிலக் கவிஞர் கூறினர். இயற்கை யெழிலே இணையற்ற தனதுருவாக விளங்கும் இப்பேரழகி, உலகினையும், அதன்பாலுள்ள கண்ணைக் கவரும் வனப்புவாய்ந்த பொருள்களையும் உண்டாக்கிய இறைவனுடன் இரண்டறக் கலந்து இணையற்ற இன்பம் எய்துதலாகிய உயரிய நோக்கம் முற்றுப் பெறுதற்குத் தவி புரிகின்றனர். எந்த உண்மையான கல்வியின் முடிவான நோக்கமும் ஈதேயாகும்.

“கற்றதனா லாய பயனென் கொல் வாலறிவ
னற்றொடா ழாஅ ரெனின்”

என்று திருமயிலையிலிருந்த தெய்வப் புலவர் தமது திருவாக்கால் அருளிச் செய்தனரன்றோ.

அருந்ததி

இக் கற்புடையாட்டி தமிழ் மக்களாற் போற்றப்படும் பெருமை வாய்ந்தவள். விண் மீனில் ஒருவராகிய வசிட்டரின் மனைவி. சிலப்பதிகாரத்திற் கண்ணகியைப் புகழும்போது இளங்கோவடிகள் அவளைச்

“சாலி யொரு மீன் தகையான்”

(மங்கல. 51)

என்றார். அதற்குரைகாரர் அருந்ததியினது தகையானே என்று உரைகூறிச் செல்வது காண்க.

“வடமீன் கற்பின் மனையுறை மகளிர்”

(சிலப். இந்திரவிழா. 229)

என்றதுங் காண்க.

“அருந்தின் முனிவர்க் காரணங்காகிய

.....

அங்கி மனையான் அவரவர் வடிவாய்த்

தங்கா வேட்கை தனையவட் டணித்த தூஉம்” (மணி. உதயகுமரன் 93-96)

என்ற இடத்து, முன்னொரு காலத்தில் அக்கினி தேவன் ஸப்த ரிவிகளுடைய மனைவிகளை விரும்பினன் என்றும், அவன் எண்ணத்தையறிந்த ஸ்வாகாதேவி என்னும் அவன் மனைவி, அம்முனிவர் எழுவர் மனைவிகளுள், அருந்ததி யொழிந்தோருடைய வடிவத்தை முறையே யெடுத்து வேறு வேறு காலங்களிற் சேர்ந்து அவன் வேட்கையைத் தணித்தாள் என்றும் (வியாஸ பாரதம், ஆரண்ய. 224-226 ஆம். அத்) உரையிற் குறிக்கப்பட்டுள்ளது. அருந்ததி யொழிய என்பதனால் இவளது கற்பு மேம்பாடு நன்றாக விளங்கும். மேலும் பரிபாடலில் முருகக் கடவுள் அவதாரம் கூறும் பொழுது, சிவபிரான் நெற்றிக்கண்ணிலிருந்து உண்டாகிய கருவை அக்கினி தேவனிடம் இட, அதனைக் “கடவு ளொரு மீன் சாலினி யொழிய” ஏனைய முனி பத்தினிகள் அதனை அயின்றார் என உரையாசிரியர் பரிமேலழகர் குறிப்பார். இவ்வரலாற்றினும் கடவுட் கற்பினையுடைய அருந்ததியின் பெருமை விளங்கும். இன்னும்

“விசம்பு வழங்கு மகளி ருள்ளுஞ் சிறந்த

செம்மீ னனையனின் ரென்னகர்ச் செல்வி

(பதிற்று. 31)

“மீனொடு புரையுங் கற்பின் வாணுதல்”

(பதிற்று. 89)

“வடமீன் புரையுங் கற்பின் மடமொழி”

(புறம். 122)

“அங்கணுலகி னருந்ததி யன்னோ”

(சிலப். மங்கல. 63)

“அருந்ததி யசுற்றிய வாசில் கற்பினாய்”

(சிந்தா. 327)

என்ற அடிகளும் இப்பெருந்தகையாளது கற்பின் சிறப்பை யுணர்த்தும். இன்னும் இந்துக்களின் மணங்களில் மணமகார் எரிவலஞ் செய்து அம்மிமிதித்து அருந்ததி பார்க்கும் வழக்கம் பயிலக் காணலாம்.

“எரிமுன் வலஞ் செய்திடுப்பா

லருந்ததி காணுமளவும்”

(திருக்கோ. 300)

என்ற அடிகளை நோக்குக.

உரோகிணி

விண் மீனில் ஒன்றாக விளங்கும். இவள் சகடேனவும் வழங்கப்படுவள். சந்திரனுக்கு இவள்பாற் பேரன்புண்டு என்று தூல்கள் கூறும்.

“வானூர் மதியஞ் சகடணைய” (சிலப். மங்கல. 50)

என்றது காண்க. அக நானூற்றிலும்

“சகட மண்டிய துகடர் கூட்டத்து” (136)

என்ற இடத்தில் “திங்களை உரோகிணி கூடியதனால்” என்று உரைகாரர் எழுதுவதும் காண்க. இவளே “மதியங் கெடுத்த வயமீன்” (சிந்தா. பதி. 17) எனச் சிந்தாமணியில் வழங்கப்படுவாள். தன்னை விரும்பி மணந்த 27 விண் மீன்களிலும் உரோகிணியிடமாத்திரம் பேரன்பு பூண்டொழுகி, ஏனைய இருபத்தறுவரையும் புறக்கணித்ததால், மதி தன் மாமனாகிய தக்ஷனிடம் சாபம் பெற்றதையும் அதன் காரணமாகக் கலை குறையப் பெற்று வருந்தியதையும் இவ்வடி குறிப்பிடுவது காணலாம்.

கொல்லிப்பாவை

இத் தெய்வம் பேரழகம் எழிலும் வாய்ந்ததென்றும், யாவரையும் தன் வசமாகும் தன்மைத்தென்றும் பண்டைய தூல்கள் புகரும். திருமகள், அவுணரை மோகிக்குமாறு செய்யவெண்ணி இப்பாவை வடிவம் பூண்டு பாவையென்னும் ஆடலை யாடியதாகச் சிலப்பதிகாரம் கூறும்.

“செருவெங் கோல மவுணர் நீங்கத்
திருவின் செய்யோ ளாடிய பாவையும்” (சிலப். கடலாடு. 60-1)

“திருவின் செய்யோ ளாடிய பாவை” (மணி. 5, 4)

என்ற வரிகளைக் காண்க.

“பாவையன்ன குறுந்தொடி மகளிர்” (புறம். 251)

என்ற புற நானூற்றிலும் உரைகாரர் பாவை என்பதற்குக் கொல்லிப்பாவை என்று பொருள் கூறினார்.

“செய்வுறு பாவை யன்ன வென்,
மெய் பிறிதாகுதல்” (குறுந். 195)

“வல்லவன் தைஇய பாவை கொல்” (சலித். 56)

என்ற இடங்களிலும் இத்தெய்வம் குறிக்கப்படுதல் அறிக. இன்னும்

“கடவு ளெழுதிய பாவை” (அகம். 62)

“கொல்லி நிலைபெறு கடவுளாக்கிய
பலர் புகழ் பாவை யன்ன” (அகம். 209)

என்பதனால், இப்பாவை கடவுளாக வழிபடப்பட்டு வந்ததென்றும், கொல்லி மலையில் நிலைபெற்று விளங்கியதென்றும் உணரத்தகும். இத்தெய்வமே “ஒப்பரும் பாவை” “வாக்கமை பாவை” (சிந்தா. 667) என்று வழங்கப்பட்டது.

இனி, கலித் தொகையில் (குறிஞ்சிக். 20) “வல்லவன் தைஇய பாவைகொல்” என்றவிடத்து உரையாசிரியர் நச்சினார்க்கினியர் “கொல்லி மலையிலே வல்லவனாலே பண்ணப்பட்ட ஒப்பில்லாத பாவையோ” என்றெழுதுவர். மேலும்

- “கொல்லிக் கருங்கட் டெய்வம் குடவரை யெழுதிய
நல்லியற் பாவை ” (குறுந். 89)
- “கொல்லிக் குடவரைப் பாவையின் ” (குறுந். 100)
- “செந்நீர்ப் பசும்பொன் புனைந்த பாவை,
செல்குடர்ப் பசுவெயிற் றேன்றியன்ன் ” (மதுரைக். 410)
- “தாவினன் பொன் றைஇய பாவை ” (அகம். 212)

என்னும் அடிகளால் இப்பாவை தெய்வத்தாற் செய்யப் பெற்றதென் றறியலாம்.

- “பாவையிற் போத லொல்லா
ளென்னெஞ் சத்தானே ” (நற். 201)
- “ஒப்பரும் பாவை போன்றுறையும்;
அவனுக்குக் கொல்லிப் பாவை போன்று தங்கும்
வேறு கருத்துச் செல்லாமல் தன்னையே
கருதுவித்தலின் பாவை என்றார் ” (சிந்தா. 197 உரை)
- “வாக்கமை பாவை யொப்பார்—நீங்கலாகா
மையிற் கொல்லியம் பாவை யன்னாராய் ” (சிந்தா. 667)

என்ற அடிகளாலும், உரை வாக்கியங்களாலும் இத்தெய்வம் கண்டவர் உள்ளத்தைக் கவரும் வனப்பும் ஆற்றலும் வாய்ந்த தென்றறியலாம். இப்பாவை, காமப்பித் தேறியவரைக் கொல்லும் இயல்புடைமையாற் கொல்லியெனப் பெயர் பெற்றதென்றும், பின்பு இம்மையே அப்பெயர் பெற்றதென்றும் கூறுவர். இதனையே தற்காலத்துப் பச்சை மோகினி யென்பர். காமவெறி கொண்டவனைப் பச்சை மோகினி பிடித்தவன் என்பது உலக வழக்கு.

சூரமகளிர்

திருமுருகாற்றுப்படையில் “சூரமகளிராடுஞ்சோலை ” என்ற இடத்துச் சூர மகளிரைக் கொடுமையையுடைய தெய்வமகளிர் என்பர் உரைகாரர். இவர்கள் தேவதைகளேனும் அடிக்கடி பூமியின் வந்து ஆங்குள்ள மக்களை வருத்துவர்போலும்.

- “அணங்கு வீழ்வன்ன பூந்தொடிமகளிர் ” (மதுரைக். 446)
- அணங்கு வானுறை தெய்வங்களாகக் கூறப்படுதல் காண்க; மேலும்
- “அணங்குடை யாரிடை ” (கலித். 49)

என்றவிடத்து அணங்கு என்பதைச் சூரமகளிர் என்று உரைகார் குறித்தல் காண்க. மலைச்சுளைகளில் இவர்கள் நீராடுவரென்றும், மக்களை வருத்துவது இவர்கட்கியல் பென்றும் கூறுவர்.

- “அருவியான் ப் பெருவரை மருங்கிற்
சூர்ச்சுனை துழை இ ” (அகம் 91)
- “நிறைசுனையுறையுஞ் சூர்மகள் மாதோ ” (அகம். 198)
- “சூர்புகனனந்தலை மாயிருங் கொல்லி ” (அகம். 303)
- “சூரமகளினின்றீ மற்
றியாரையோ வெம்மணங்கியோ யுண்கென ” (அகம். 32)

என்றவரிகளால் இதனையுணர்க.

வேள் அல்லது காமதேவன்

செந்தமிழ் நூல்களில் இக்காமதேவன் உருவிலானென்றும், மாரனென்றும் புகழப் படுவன். ஆடவர் மகளிர் தமக்குட் பொருந்நி இன்பந்துப்த்து உலக வாழ்வில் ஈடுபடு தற்கு இன்றியமையாது தமிழராம் போற்றப்பட்ட தெய்வம். கருப்பு வில்லையும் ஐந்துமலர் வாளிகளையும் மகரக்கொடியையும் உடையோன்.

“உருவிலான்”

“விரைமலர் வாளி வெறு நிலத் தெறிப” (சிலப். வாரந்தரு. 583)

“மாமலர் வாளி வறுநிலத் தெறிந்து

காமர் கடவுள் ஐயத் தேங்க” (சிலப். அடைக்கல. 101-2)

“விரைமலர் வாளியொடு கருப்பு வில்லேந்தி

மகர வெல்கொடி மைத்தன் நிரிதர” (சிலப். அந்நிமாலை. 81-2)

“ஐங்குணை நெடுயவளரசு வீற்றிருந்த

வெண்ணிலா முன்றிலும் (சிலப். நடுகற். 6-7)

“விரைமலர் வாளியின் வியனில மாண்ட

வொருதனிச் செங்கோ லொருமகன்” (வேனிற். 50-5)

என்ற வரிகள் இவற்றைக் குறிக்கின்றன. இவனை வசந்தகாலம் அல்லது வேனிற் கிழைவன் என்பர்.

“மன்னன் மாரன் மயிழ்துணை யாகிய

இன்னின வேனில்” (சிலப். வேனிற். 6-7)

என்றது காண்க. மாறனுக் கென நிரூபித்த காமக் கோட்டங்களிற் பருளுனி மாதத்தில் இவனுக்குத் திருவிழாக்கள் நடக்கும். இவ்விழாவை வில் விழா என்றும் வழங்குவர். இவன் பேடி யாடல் ஆடியதாகச் சிலப்பதிகாரம் கூறும்.

“சோமகுண்டஞ் சூரியகுண்டந் துறைமூழ்கி

காமவேள் கோட்டந் தொழுதார்” (சிலப். களுத்திறம். 89-90)

“வெங்க ணெடு வேள் வில்விழாக் காணும்

பங்குனி முடிக்கத்து” (சிலப். ஊர்காண். 111-112)

“காமனாடிய பேடி பாடலும்”

என்ற வரிகளே காண்க. புதுமணம் புனர்ந்த ஆடவர் பெண்டிர்களுடைய இன்பத் திற்குக் காரணமாகலின் இவன் மக்களால் வணங்கப்படுவன். இவனைத் திருமால் மகனென்பர். இவன் உருவிலியான பாலாறு பண்ணைக் காலத்திருந்தே இத்தமிழ் நாட்டில் வழங்கிவருகின்றது. அவனைக்குறித்துக் கொண்டாடும் காமன் பண்டிகை இன்றைக்கும் பங்குனி மாதம் வளர் பிறையில் நிகழ்கின்றது. ஆனால் அவர்கென அமைந்த கோயில்கள் தற்காலத்திலில்லை.

ஆதித்தர்கள்

அக்காலத்திற் கதிரவன் வழிபாடும் நன்கு நடைபெற்றது. கதிர், பரிதி, பகல் கெழு செல்வன் முதலிய தமிழ்ப் பெயர்களான் இவ்வழிபாடு மிகவும் பழமையானதாக அறியலாம். அவர்கென அமைந்த தனிக்கோயில்களும் இருந்தன. இக்கடவுளைப் பற்றி ஸ்ரீமான் கோபிநாத ராவ் பின்வருமாறு எழுதுவர்!

“வேத காலத்திலேயே புகழப்படுவதால், இந்தியாவில் மிகவும் பழைய தெய்வமாக இவன் கருதப்படவேண்டும். பழைய சூறிப்புகளிலிருந்து இவ்வாதித்தர் எழுவரோ அல்லது என்மரோ எனக் கருதவேண்டியிருக்கிறது. அவர்கள் அதிதி புத்திரர் ஆவர். வட இந்தியாவில் ஆதித்தரை வழிபடுவோர் பலர். தென்னிந்தியாவில் சூரியனுக்கெனக் கோயில் அமைத்து, வழிபாடு நடக்குமிடம் குலோத்துங்கரை பதினொரு நூற்றாண்டிற் கட்டப்பட்ட குலோத்துங்க சோழ மார்த்தாண்டாலயமென்னும் பெயரினதும். தஞ்சாவூர் ஜில்லாவில் உள்ளதுமான சூரியனார் கோயில் ஆகும். நாகேந்திரநாத் வசு என்பவர் மயூர பஞ்சாவின் (Antiquities of Mayura-bhanj) பழமை வரலாற்றில் இந்நூக்கள் வணங்கும் நவக்கிரகங்களைப்பற்றிக்கூறி, சிதியப் பிராமணர்கள் அல்லது மாகர்கள் தான் முதல் முதலிற் சூரிய வழிபாட்டை இந்தியாவிற்குக் கொணர்ந்தவர்” என்றமேழுதுகிறார்.

பரிபாடலில் ஆதித்தன் தேயாமண்டலம் (பரி. 17, 22) எனப் புகழப்படுவன். அதே நூலிற் பதினொரு ருத்திரர், பன்னிரண்டு ருத்திரர் என்றும் குறிப்புக்கள் காணப்படுகின்றன.

“பதினொரு கயிலரும்” (பரி. 3, 7)

“உலகிருளகற்றிய பதின்மரு மிருவரும்” (பரி. 8, 4)

என்றது காண்க. சிலப்பதிகாரத்து

“வான் கண் விடியா வைகறை” என்றும் (சிலப். நாடுகாண். 1)
கலித்தொகையில்

“ஞாயிற்றுப் புத்தேள்” (கலித். 108)

“ஒண்கதிர்” (பாலேச். 2) “விடியல் வெங்கதிர்”
(குறிஞ்சிச். 8) என்றும்

நற்றிணையில் “செங்கதிர்ச் செல்வன்” (164)

“பகல்கெழு செல்வன்” (215)

என்றும் இக்கதிரவன் புகழப்படுகின்றான். பழந்தமிழ்மூலகத்து இவனது கோயில்

“உச்சிக்கிழான் கோட்டம்” (சிலப். ஊர்காண். 4)

என வழங்கியது. இருளகற்றும் இறைவனாக இவன் உலகத்தோராற்றொழப்பட்டான்.

“உலகு தொழு மண்டிலம்” (சிலப். ஊர்காண். 4)

என்றது காண்க.

இக்கதிரோன் உலகில் நிகழும் ஒவ்வொரு செயற்கும் நிலைத்த சான்றாக உள்ளவன் என்பர். கோவலன் மனைவியும் சிலப்பதிகாரக் கதாநாயகியுமான கண்ணகி, தன் கணவனைச் சிலம்பு திருடியவன் என்று கைப்பற்றிப் பாண்டியன் சிறையிலிட்ட ஞான்று, தன் கணவன் உண்மையிற் சூற்றவாளியா அன்றா என்று கூறவேண்டி, எந்நிகழ்ச்சியும் கண்ணொரும ஆதித்தனை வேண்டுகின்றாள்.

“பாய்திரை வேலைப் படுபொருள்நீயறிதி

காய்கதிர்ச் செல்வனே கள்வனோ என் கணவன்”

(சிலப். துன்ப. 50)

இவன் கீழ்திசைக்கண் தோன்றுவதைக் கீழ்கடலில் உதிப்பதாகவும், மேற்றிசைக்கண் மறைவதை மேற்கடலில் விழுவதாகவும் நூல்கள் கூறும். உதயகிரியென்ற கீழ்திசை மலையிறோன்றிக் குடமலையில் மறைவதாகவும் கூறும்.

“செழுங்கதிர் மண்டிலம் மால்வரை மறைய” (நற். 67)

“கல்சுடர் சேரும் கதிர் மாய் மாலை” (நற். 321)

“பகல் கெழு செல்வன் குடமலை மறைய” (நற். 215)

என்ற அடிகளைக் காண்க.

சந்திரன்

நவக் கோள்களில் ஒன்றான சந்திரனும் அக்காலத்திற் சிறந்த முறையில் வழிபடப் பட்டான். அவனது கோயில் நிலாக்கோட்டம் என வழங்கியது. (சிலப். கருத்திறம். 13). பின்வரும் பரிபாடலில் அவனைப் பற்றிய வரலாறுகள் காணப்படும்.

“அங்கணேர் வானத் தனி நிலாத்திகழ்தரும் திங்களும்” (பரி. 1, 41-2)

“நின் தன்மையுஞ் சாயலுந் திங்களுள” (பரி. 4, 26)

பாற்கடலில் ரோன்றிய காரணத்தால் அவன்பால் அமுதமுண்டென்றும், அவ் வமிர்த்தத்தையே விண்ணவர் எஞ்ஞான்றும் உட்கொண்டுறைவர் என்றுங் கூறப் பட்டுள்ளன.

“பிறைவளர் நிறைமதி யுண்டி

அணிமணிப் பைம்பூ ணமரர்க்கு முதல்வனீ” (பரி. 3, 52)

என்ற பரிபாடல் வரிகளைக் காண்க. அவன் பாற்றோன்றுங் களங்கத்தை முயலென்றும் மாமென்றும் கூறுப.

“திங்களுட் டோன்றி யிருந்த குறுமுயால்” (கவித். 144)

“முயலுந் தொழப்பவேம்”

என்ற தொடர்களை நோக்குக. ஒரு தலைவி தன் தலைவனிடத்துப் பொய்தோன்று மெனின் “திங்களுட் டித்தோன்றி யுற்று” என்று மொழியின்றாள். இதனால் மிகவுந் தண்ணிய வியல்பினன் என்பது புலனாம்.

“ஒரு புடை பாம்பு கொளினு மொருபுடை

யங்கண்மா ஞாலம் விளக்குறாஉம்”

திங்களைத் தக்கார்க்குத் தம்மாலியன்ற வரை நன்றாற்றும் நன்மகட்டு

வமித்துக் கூறும் நாலடியார் என்ற தமிழ் நீதிநூல், “திங்களன்ன தன்பெருஞ்சாயல்” என்பது புறநானூறு. சிலப்பதிகாரக் காப்புச் செய்யுளில் ஞாயிறு, திங்கள், மாமழை யென்ற மூன்றையுமே வணக்கத்திற் குரியனவாக இளங்கோவடிகள் எடுத்தாண்டனர். அப்பழங் காலத்திலேயே இரவி மதியை இரங்கு கேதுக்கள் விழுங்குமென்றும், அதுவே கிரகணத்திற்குக் காரணமென்றும் யாவரும் கருதினர் எனப் புலனாகின்றது. இச் சாயாக் கிரகங்களைத் தவிர என்னு கோள்களும் பழைய நூல்களிற் குறிப்பிடப்படுகின்றன. பின்னடை பரிபாடல் வரிகள் இக் கூற்றினை விளக்கும்.

“உருகெழு வெள்ளிவந் தேற்றியல் சேர

வருடையைப் படிமகன் வாய்ப்பப் பொருடெரி

புந்தி மிதுனம் பொருந்தப் புலர் விடியல்

அங்கி யுயர்நிற்ப வந்தணன் பங்குவின்

இல்லத் துணைக்குப்பா லெய்த விறையமன்

வில்லிற் கடைமகர மேவப்பாம் பொல்லை
மதிய மறைய வருநாளில் "

இப்பகுதியிற் சந்திர கிரகணம் வருணிக்கப்படுகின்றது. இவ்வரிகட்குப் பொருள் காண்பதில், சிறந்த அறிவாளிகளும் தம்முள் மாறுபடுகின்றனர். இதனால் கோள்கள் அக்காலத்தில் வழிபாட்டிற்குரியனவாக இருந்தன என்ற அம்மட்டில் ஏற்றுக் கொள்வோம். இவ்வரிகள் கூறுவதை ஆராய்வோம்.

"இராசிச் சக்கிரத்தில் சக்கிரன் தனக்குச் சொந்த வீடாகிய இடபத்திலும், புதன் மிதுனத்திலும், சூரு மீனத்திலும், சனி மகரத்திலும் இருந்தனர். கார்த்திகை உடு உச்சத்திலிருந்தது. மகரத்தில் மதியும் இராகுவு மிருந்தனர். கேது கடகத் திருந்தது."

இவ்வாறு மதிமறைவு நிகழ்ந்ததென்று நூல் கூறும். சந்திரன் வழிபாடும், அவனை அரவு விழங்குவதும் சிலப்பதிகாரத்தும் கலித்தொகையிலுங் கூறப்பெற்றுள்ளன.

"அங்கண் வானத் தரவுப் பகை யஞ்சித்
திங்களு மீண்டுத் திரிதலு முண்டுசொல்" (சிலப். இந்திரவிழா 206-7)

"வாண்மதி சேர்ந்த வரவினைக் கோள் விடுக்கு
நீனிற வண்ணனும் போன்ம்" (கலித். 104)

என்ற வரிகளிற் காண்க. பின் வரிகளிற் குறித்த வரலாறு இன்னதென ஒருவகையிலும் அறியக்கூடவில்லை. சூரிய சந்திரர்கள் மிசவும் மதிக்கப்பெற்று விளங்கினர் என்பது சோழரும் பாண்டியரும் தத்தம் சூல முதல்வராக முறையே அவ்விருவரையும் கொண்டதாற் தெரிகின்றது. இன்றைக்கும் சோழரைக் கதிர் வழியினராகவும், பாண்டியரை மதி வழியினராகவும் கூறி வருகின்றனர்.

திரைக்காவலர்கள்

காவலர்கள் எண்மருள் இந்திரன் வருணன் இவர்களைப்பற்றி முன்னரே கூறப் பட்டது. அங்கி, கூற்றம், வாயு, குபேரன் இவர்கள் முறையே தென்கிழக்கு, தெற்கு, வடமேற்கு, வடக்கு என்ற திரைக்களைக் காவல்புரிவதாகப் பழைய நூல்கள் பகரும்.

"கனைகதிர்க் கனலி" (கலித். 16)

"அங்கித் தேவனருளென" (பெருங். 1, 43)

என்ற வரிகளைக் காண்க. அக்கினியின் மனைவி சுவாகா தேவி பெணப்படுவள். உற் பத்திக்கிரமத்தில் அக்கினி அல்லது தேஜஸ் என்ற பூதம் வாயுவின் தெழுவதாகக் கூறப்பட்டுள்ளது. (மணி. 18. 93.) வேள்விகட்கின்றியமைபாததாலும் யாகத்தி மூட்டற்கு அவசியமாதலாலும், அக்கினி போற்றற்குரிய ஒருவனாக விளங்கினன். ஆகவனியம், காருகபத்தியம், தென்றிசைத்தீ என்ற மூன்றும் பழைய நூல்களிற் குறிக்கப்படுகின்றன. நியமப்படி ஆகுதி செய்து, அங்கி சாகுதியாக நடைபெறுவிடின் திருமணம் செவ்வனே நிகழ்ந்ததாகக் கொள்ளப்படுவதில்லை. பண்டைத்தமிழ் நாட்டில் நிகழ்ந்தனவாகக் கூறப்படும் களவு முறையிற் கூடிய கார்த்தருவ மணங்களும், தக்கார் பலர் முன்னிலையில் அங்கிசான்றாகப் பின்னர் உறுதிப்படவேண்டிய நிலை இருந்ததென அறிகிறோம். சங்கநூல்களிற் பற்பல இடங்களிற் கற்புக்கெடுத்துக் காட்டாகக் கூறப் படும் அருந்ததி குறிக்கப்படுதலின் திருமணங்களில் மணமகட்கு அருந்ததி காட்டும் வழக்கம் தொன்றுதொட்டு இருந்ததெனத் தெரிகின்றது.

“அந்தியந்தண ரருந் கடனிறுக்கும்
முத்தீ வினக் கிற்றுஞ்சும்”

என்ற புறநானூற்று வரிகளால் முத்தீ வழிபாடிருந்தது உணரலாம்.

இனி இயமனும் ஓர் திசைக் காவலனே. பரிபாடல் இயமன் வேறு, கூற்றவன் வேறு எனக் கூறும். சாதாரணமாக இவர்களிருவரையும் நூல்களில் வேறுபாடின்றி வழங்கக் காண்கின்றோம். பரிபாடலில்,

“ஒன்றா ருடந் குண்ணுங் கூற்றம் (பரி. 2, 50)

“தாமாவிருவருந் தருமனும்” (பரி. 3, 8)

என்ற அடிகளில் இவன் கூறப்படுதல் காண்க. அவரவர் புண்ணிய பாவச் செய்கை சுட்கேற்ப நடுநில தவறாது ஆண்மங்களைத் தண்டிப்பவன் ஆகவின் தருமன் எனப் பட்டான். இவனேப்

“பல்லுயிர் பருகும் பருவாய்க் கூற்றம்” (சிலப். இந்திர. 219)

எனச் சிலப்பதிகாரத்து இந்திரவிழாவிலும்

“எருமைக் கடும்பரியூர்வோன் உயிர்த்தொகை
ஒரு பக லெல்லியிலுண்ணுவோன்”

என்று கால்கோட்காணதலினும் இளங்கோவடிகள் கூறுவர். (சிலப். கால்கோட். 215-17)

திருமகள்

இருந்தித் தெய்வமான திருமகளும் அக்காலத்தே வழிப்பாட்டிற்குரியவளாயிருந்தனர். கவித் தொகையில்வரும்,

“செய்யவ ளணியகலத் தாரமொடு” (சலித். 28)

“திருமறு மார்பன்போல்” (சலித். 104)

“மாயன் மாந்தித்திருப்போல” (சலித். 145)

என்ற வரிகள் இவள் என்னுள்ளும் திருமாவின் மார்ப்பத்துறைவதாகக் கூறும். பரிபாடல் இத்தெய்வ மகளை “அல்லிபந்திடுவென” அழைக்கும் (1, 36). இவள் பாவையாடல் புரிந்ததாகச் சிலப்பதிகாரம் பகரும்.

“செரு வெங்கோல மவுணர் நீங்கத்

திருவின் செய்யோ ளாடிப் பாவையும்” (சிலப். கடலாடு. 60, 1)

என்றது காண்க. இவள் தேவாசுரர் பாற்கடல் கடைந்த காலத்து அழுதுடன் எழுந்த ஆரழகி எனக் கூறப்படுவர். புறநானூற்றில் (358)

“விட்டாரை விடா அள் திருவே

விடா அதோ ரிவன் விடப்பட்டோரே”

என்று இவனைப்பற்றிக் கூறப்பட்டுள்ளது. அதாவது மண், பெண், பொன்னுரையை அறவே வெறுத்து நீத்த மாசற்ற மக்களைத் திரு எப்பொழுதும் விடாள் என்பதும், இப்பற்றுக்கள் ஒரு சேர நிரம்பியவர்களை அவள் நீத்து ஒழிவள் என்றும் இவ்வரிகளால் உணருகிறோம். பிற்காலத்தும் வையை ஆழ்வாராடிய குலசேகரப் பெருமானும்

“நின்னையே தான்வேண்டி நீன்செல்வம் வேண்டாதான்
தன்னையே தான் வேண்டுஞ் செல்வம்”

என்று இக்கருத்தையே நயம்பெற வுரைத்ததுங் காண்க.

“அறனறிந்து வெஃகா வறிவுடையார்ச்சேருந்
திறனறிந் தாங்கே திரு”

(179)

என்ற குறட்கண் பரிமேலழகர் “இஃது அறனென்றறிந்து பிறர் பொருளை விரும்
பாத அறிவுடையாரைத் திருமகள் தானடைதற்கான காலமும், இடனுஞ் செவ்வியும்
அறிந்து சென்றடையும் என்றார். மேலும்

“இருமனப் பெண்டிரும் கள்ளுங்கவறும்
திருநீக்கப் பட்டார் தொடர்பு”

(920)

என்ற குறளிலும் கவர்ந்த மனமுடைய மகளிரும் கள்ளுஞ் சூதுமென்ற இம்
மூன்றும் திருமகளால் துறக்கப்பட்டார்க்கு நட்பு என்றார். பாலைச் சலியிலும்,
(பாலைக். 7)

“மரீ இத்தாங் கொண்டாரைக் கொண்டக்காற் போலாது
பிரியுங்காற் பிறரெள்ளப் பீடின்றிப் புறமாறுந்
திருவினுந் நிலயில்லாப் பொருளையு நச்சுபவோ”

என்ற விடத்தும் திருமகள் ஒருவர்பால் எஞ்ஞான்றும், நிலைத்திராள் என்றும் சகடக்கால்
போல மாறுவள் என்றும் கூறப்பட்டது. எனவே திருமகள் பண்டைத்தமிழர் காலத்தி
லேயே நிதித் தெய்வமாகக் கொண்டாடப்பெற்ற ரெய்தி தெளிபலாம்.

துர்க்கை; சக்தி அல்லது தேவி வழிபாடு

சக்தியை முதன்மையாகக்கொண்ட சாக்தர்கள் இவள் உதவியின்றிப் பிரம்மம்
ஒன்றும் இயற்றுதற்கியலாது என்று கூறுவர். உலகத்திற் காணப்படும் ஆற்றல்
அல்லது சக்தியே இத்தெய்வ வருவாகக் கொள்ளப்பட்டதென்பர். மக்கள்பாலுள்ள
சக்தியை ஆராய்ந்தறிதற்கு மூலகாரணமாக இருந்தது மந்திர சாஸ்திரமே.

இச்சக்தி வழிபாடு வைணவத்தைக்காட்டிலும் சைவத்திற்கு அதிகமாக ஒற்றுமை
யுள்ள தென்பர். முன்னமே சிவசக்தியாகிய உமாதேவியாரைப் பற்றியும், விஷ்ணு
சக்தியாகிய திருமகளைப் பற்றியும், பிரமன் மனோவியாகிய கலைமகளைப் பற்றியும்
குறித்திருக்கிறேன். ஏனைய கடவுளரைப்போன்று இவர்களும் வழிபாட்டிற்குரியரா
யிருந்ததோடு, அவரவர்கட்கேற்பட்ட கடமைகளும் இருந்தனவாக அறிகிறோம். சில
சமயங்களில் அவர்கள் ஆடிய கூத்துக்களுங் கூறப்பட்டன.

பண்டை நூல்களில் இத்தெய்வங்களின் பல்வேறு வகைகளும், அவைகளை வழி
பட்டுத் திருப்தி செய்யும் வழிகளும் கூறப்பட்டுள்ளன. இவைகளில் முக்கியமானது
துர்க்கை வழிபாடு. தமிழ் மக்கள் இவளை மிகவும் போற்றி வழிபட்டதற்குப் பல
சான்றுகள் உள்ளன. கொற்றவை எனும் பெயருள்ள இவள் பாலைத் தெய்வம் என்று
தொல்காப்பியங் கூறும். சிலப்பதிகாரத்தில் அவளது பல பெயர்களும் கூறப்பட்
டுள்ளன. அவை பின்வருமாறு:—

“பாய்கலைப் பாவை

..... அமரிளம் குமரி” (சிலப். வேட்டுவவரி. 55-73)

“வெற்றி வேற்றடக்கைக் கொற்றவை” (, வழக். 34-37)

“அறுவர்க் கினைய நங்கை யிறைவனை
யாடல் கண்டருளிய வணங்கு குருடைக்
கானக முகந்த காளி தாருகன்

பேருரங் கிழித்த பெண்” (, , 37 40)

“திருமாத் தினையோள்” (, வேட்டுவவரி)

“ஆடியல் கொள்கை யந்தரி” (, புறஞ்சேரி 104)

“மாமகளு நாமகளு மாயிடற் ரெற்றுக்கந்த கோமகள்”

“அடர்ந்தெழு குருதி யடங்காப் பசந்துணிப் பிடர்
தலைப் பீட மேறிய மடக்கொடி” (, வழக்குரை 34-36)

மேலே குறித்த மேற்கோள்களிலிருந்து துர்க்கை பிறையணிந்த நெற்றிய
என்றும், நெற்றி விழியினள் என்றும், பவள வாடி, வெண்ணகையும், கறுத்த
கண்டமும் உடையவள் என்றும், வாசகி யென்னும் அரவை நாணக்கி மேருமலையை
வில்லாக வளைத்தவள் என்றும், அரவக் கச்சினள் என்றும், காப்பணிந்த கையிற் கழுமுள்
உடையவள் என்றும், அவள் தானே உரித்த சிங்கவியும், சரியதளும், அவட்கு முறையே
மேகலையும் அரைக்கலையுமென்றும், அவள் வல இடக்கால்களில் சிலம்புற் கழலும்
அணிந்தவள் என்றும், மகிடை சுரனை வதைத்து அவன் தலைமீது நின்றனள் என்றும்,
தேவர்களும் முனிவர்களும் அவளை எப்பொழுதும் வழிபடுவார்களென்றும், அவள் எஞ்
ஞானமும் அணிகளை விழைபவள் அன்றென்றும், போர்த்திடம் வாய்ந்தவள் என்றும்,
இருள் வண்ணமாயவள் என்றும், திருமாத்கினையோள் என்றும், வெற்றி, நீதி, சல்வி இம்
மூன்றிற்கும் உரிய தெய்வமகள் என்றும், அவளது அழியாத மங்கையருவம் அரி
பிரமராத் றொழப்படுமென்றும், எழுமாதருள் ஏழாமவள் என்றும், கைலை யிறைவனை
நடம் புரியச்செய்தவள் அவள் என்றும், காட்டின் கண்ணையே விரும்பி யுறைபவள்
என்றும், தாருகன் என்னும் அலுவனது தடமாற்பைக் கீண்டவள் என்றும் அறி
கின்றோம். தொல்காப்பியம் புறத்திணையியலின் நான்காஞ் சூத்திரத்தில் “கொற்றவை
நிலை” யென்ற துறை காணப்படுகின்றது. அவ்விடத்து உரையாசிரியர் நச்சினூர்க்
கினியர், போர் வீரர்கள் இத்தெய்வத்திற்குப் பலியடுங்கால் போர் மகளாகிய அவளது
நிலையைக் கூறுவதும் புறத்துறை என்று பொருள் கூறுவர்.

“அத்தொழிற்கு (போர்த் தொழிற்கு)ச்
சிறந்த கொற்றவைக்குப் பரவுக்கடன்
கொடுக்குங் கால் அவளது (கொற்றவை)
நிலைமை கூறுதலும்”

என்று அவர் வரைதல் காண்க. சிலப்பதிகாரம் வேட்டுவ வரியிற் பின்வருஞ்
செய்துட்கள் காணப்படுகின்றன.

“உட்குடைச் சீறா ரொருமக னுனிரை கொள்ள வுற்றகாலே
வெட்சி மலர் புனைய வெள்வாளுழத்தியும் வேண்டும் போலும்
வெட்சி மலர் புனைய வெள்வாளுழத்தியும் வேண்டின் வேற்றூர்க்
கட்சியுட் காரி கடிய குரலிசைத்துக் காட்டும் போலும்” (வேட்டுவவரி)

“கள்விலை யாட்டி மறுப்பப் பொருமறவன் கைவிலேந்திப்
புள்ளும் வழிபடப் புல்லார் நிரைகருதிப் போகுங்காலக்

.....

கொள்ளுங் கொடியெடுத்துக் கொற்றவையுங்
கொடுமா முன் செல்லும் போலும் ”

(,)

இவற்றுள் முதற் செய்யுளிற் குறித்துள்ள பொருளாவது :—

பகைவர்க்கச்சம் வீணைக்கும் சிறு கிராமவாசியான ஓர் சிறந்த போர் வீரன் பகைவர் நிரையைப்பற்றி நீணையின் அவன் வெட்சி மாஸையுடன் வென்று வெளியேறத் துர்க்கையின் உதவி இன்றியமையாதது. அவன் அவனைச் செருக்களத்து அழைத்துச் செல்ல உடன்படிசின் அவனது பகைவர்க்கு நேரக்கூடிய கெடுதிகளைக் காரி என்னும் புள் கழறா நிற்கும் ” என்பது.

இரண்டாவது செய்யுளிற் குறித்துள்ள பொருளாவது :—

தான் முன் தரவேண்டிய தொகையைக் கொடாததால் கள் விலைஞன் தனக்குக் கடனாகக் கள் கொடுத்தற்கு இசையாமல் மறுத்து நிற்க, இதனைப் பொருத ஓர் வீரமகன், பகைவர் ஆநிரையைக் சவர எண்ணிப் புட்சகுனம் பொருந்தா நிற்ப, வில்லை கையிலேந்திப் புறப்படுகின்றான். அணிந்து இவன் செல்ல ஒருப்படுங்கால், கொற்றவையும் தன் யாளிக்கொடியை உயர்த்தி இவனுடன் செல்வன் ” என்பது. மேலும் அதே தூங்கண் (புறத். 13) வாண் மங்கலம் என்ற புறத்துறையும் குறிக்கப்படுகின்றது. வாண் மங்கலமாவது போர் மகளின் இணைபிரியாச் சுற்றுப் படைகளாகிய பேய்களும் பூதங்களும் போர்க்களத்தில் மிகுதியாகக் கொன்று குவித்துத் தமது ஆளுப்பசியைப் ஆற்றுவதற்குத் துணையாயிருந்த கூரிய வாள்களைப் புகழ்வதென்பர். இன்னும் புறத்திணையியல் 13-ஆம் குத்திரத்து,

“ வென்ற வாளின் மண்ணோ டொன்ற ”

என்று காணப்படுகின்றது. இதன் உரையிலிருந்து தனக்கு வெற்றியுதவிய வானைக் கொற்றவையின்மீது வைத்து அவ்வாறே நீராட்டுதல் வெற்றியுற்றோன் செயலாகக் கூறப்பட்டுள்ளது. அதே வேட்டுவ வரியில் (16-40) போர்மகன் தனக்குத் தக்க பலி யூட்டாமற்போனால் வாளுக்கேற்ற வெற்றி வழங்காளாகவின், அத்தெய்வத்தை மகிழ் ஆட்டும் பொருட்டு வேட்டுவர்கள் நோய்வாய்ப்பட்டு இறவாதவரது வீரக்குலத்துத் தோன்றிய சிறுமியைத் தேர்ந்து, அவன் கூந்தலைச் சடையாகச் செய்து, அதன்மீது ஓர் இள அரவின் வாடிவமாகப் பொன்னினைக் கட்டி, இளம் பிறைக்குப் பவிலாக காட்டுப்பன்றியின் வெண்கொம்பை நெற்றியிற் செருகிப் புலியின்வாயை வலியக் கிழித்துத் தாமே பிடுங்கிய புலிப்பற்றாவிடைக் கழுத்திற்கட்டிக் கொன்ற புலிகளின் புள்ளித்தோலாலாகிய மேகலையைப் புனைவித்து, வலியவில்லைக் கரத்தளித்து முறுக்கிய கொம்புகளையுடைய மானின் மீறிருத்தி, வேண்டிய வரிசைகளுடன் துர்க்கை அல்லது அந்தரிகோயிலுக்கு அழைத்துச் சென்று, அங்கு வீற்றிருக்கும் காளிக்குப் பலியூட்டு தற்கமைத்த பலிமேடையைச் சுற்றிவந்து துர்க்கை தேவியைத் துதிப்பார்கள் என்று கூறப்பட்டது. இதனால் மக்கள் உதிரத்திற்கவாவி நிற்கும் இத்தேவதையின் வழிபாடு தமிழ் நாட்டெவ்வாறிருந்ததென்று ஒருவாறறியலாம்.

சங்கத் தொகை தூலாகிய குறுந்தொகையிலும் துர்க்கை வழிபாடு குறிக்கப்பட்டுள்ளது. (218). இவண் குறித்த காலத்து வருவது தவிர்த்தனர், அன்பிலர், கொடியர் எனத் தன் ஆருயிர் நெயனைக் குறித்துக் குறைகூறிய தோழியை மறுத்துத் தலைவி கூறுவதாகக் காண்கின்றோம். தலைவி கூறுவதாவது :—

“சூலமேந்திய மலைப்பக்கத்துத் தேவதையாகிய தூர்க்கைக்குப் பலியூட்ட யான் சூள் கொள்ளேன். அதற்காக என் கையிற் காப்புமணியேன். புள் நிமித்தங்களோ வேறு சகுனங்களோ நான் தேர்ந்தறிய உடன்படேன். நான் அதைக் குறித்து நினைதலுஞ் செய்யேன். என்னெனில் என் நாயகன் வாக்கில் அவ்வளவு திடமான உறுதியுடையேன்” என்பதே.

இதிலிருந்து இத்தெய்வ வழிபாட்டு முறையிற் சிலவற்றைத் தெரிகின்றோம். மணி மேகலையில் (6, 50-54) உயர்ந்தொளிரும் பலி பீடமும், பலி கொடுக்குங்கால் உடலினின்று வெட்டி வீழ்த்திய தலைகள் தோரணமாகத் தொங்கவிடப்பட்ட உயர்ந்த தருக்கள் முன்னே நிறைந்து இத் தெய்வத்திற்கென அமைக்கப்பட்ட கோயிலும் கூறப்பட்டுள்ளன. தெய்வத்திற்குந் தமது மந்திரங்களிலும் தந்திரங்களிலும் வல்லநராய்த் தெய்வத்தைத் தம் வசமாக்கிக்கொண்ட பூசாரிகளும், பலியிடுவோர்களும் பைரவ வேடம் தரித்திருப்பவர்களும் அந்தூல் கூறும். பலி பீடத்தின் முன்பு பலியிடப்படும் மக்களின் தலை மயிரை அதன் முன்புள்ள மரக்கிளைகளிற் கட்டித் தொங்கவிடுவது வழக்கமென்றும் அறிகின்றோம். இதே வழக்கம் சயங் கொண்டார் என்னும் புலவர் பெருமானால், தமது கலிங்கத்துப் பரணியிற் குறிக்கப்பெற்றுள்ளது. (கலிங், கோயில் 21). பழைய காலத்தில் இத் தெய்வத்திற்குப் பல கோயில்கள் இருந்தனவென்று அறியக்கிடக்கின்றது.

“கானமர் செல்வி.....யேழிற் சூன்றத்து” (அகம் 345)

என்ற அடியிலிருந்து சேரநாட்டில் உள்ள ஏழில் மலை ஒரு ஆற்றல் சான்ற தூர்க்கை அல்லது காடுகிழாளின் இருப்பிடமென்று அறிகின்றோம். பெரும்பாலும் அவளது கோயில் இடுகாட்டிலோ அதற்கணித்தாகவோ காணப்படும்.

“கோளி யாலமூங் கோழரை மரங்களுந் குழுமித்
தூளி யார்த்தெழு சுடலையு முடலமுந் துவன்றி
மீளி யாக்கையதாக்கி யுண் பேய்க்கண மிடைசூழ்
கூளி தாய்க்கென வாகுகிய கோட்ட மொன்றுளதே”

என்ற நீலகேசிச் செய்யுளாலும் இச்செய்தியை புணரலாம். மேலும் இதிலிருந்து கூளிகட்கிறைவியான தூர்க்கைக்கு ஓர் கோயில் அமைந்திருந்ததென்றும், அவள் எப்பொழுதும் பூத பைசாசங்கள் புடைசூழ விருப்பனென்றும், அவைகள் இடையறாது மக்கள் ஊனுதிரத்திற்கு அவாவுவவென்றும் அறிகிறோம். கோயிலின் உள்ளும், புறமும், சுற்றியும், உயிரற்ற வுடல்களும் சுவங்களைச் சுட்ட சாம்பருமே காணப்படும். ஆலயத்தின் முன்பு கோளியாலமும் பிற தருக்களும் நிற்கும். தூர்க்கைக்குச் சண்டிகை, ஐயை, அந்தரி என்ற வேறு பெயர்களும் உண்டு. என்றும் விர்திய மலைக்கண் உறைவதால் இவள்

“விர்தமால் வரை யந்தரி யெனப் படுவள்” (மணி. 20, 116)

உண்மையில் தூர்க்கை என்ற பெயரே அவள் மலைப்பக்கத்துத் தெய்வம் என்று உணர்த்தும். வடமொழியில் தூர்க்கம் என்பது மலைக்குப் பெயர். முருகப் பெருமானே

“வெற்றி வெல்போர்க் கொற்றவை சிறுவ” (திருமுரு. 258)

என்பர் நக்கீரர். உரையாசிரியர் நச்சினர்க்கினியர் இவ்விடத்தில் “வெற்றியை உலகத் திற்குக் கொடுக்கும் வன தூர்க்கையினுடைய புதல்வ—வெல்போர் என்றது மகிதனைச்

செற்றதனை” யென்பர். இன்றும் நவராத்திரி காலங்களில் அவள் வணங்கப்படுகின்றாள். முதல் மூன்று நாட்கள் இவள் வழிபாட்டிற்குரிய வென்பர். பணியாளரும் சிறப்பாகப் போர்வீரரும் தாம் மேற்கொள்ளுங் காரியங்களில் வெற்றி பெறவேண்டி இத்தெய்வத்தை மனங்கொண்டு பரவுவர் என்ப.

“குருதி விதிர்த்த குவவுச் சோற்றுக் குன்றே
நெருகெழு மரபி னயிரை பரை இ” (பதிற். 88)

“நிறம் படு குருதி புறம்படி. னல்லது
மடை யெதிர் கொள்ளர வஞ்சவரு மரபிற்
கடவு ளயிரை பரை இ” (பதிற். 79)

என்ற பகுதிகளால் சேரநாட்டில் உள்ள அயிரை மலையும் இத்தெய்வம் வீற்றிருந்த ஓர் சிறந்த இடம் என்று விளங்கும். இவ்விடத்து உரையாசிரியர் “அயிரை யென்றது அயிரை மலை யுறையுங் கொற்றவையினே” என்றெழுதியது கண்டுகொள்க. “விந்தாடவியைக் கடவுட் பெயரிய கானம் (பதிற். 88) என்று பதிற்றுப் பத்திற் கூறப்பட்டது. விந்தா அல்லது விந்தை தூர்க்கையின் ஓர் பெயரென்ப.

தென்புலத்தார் வழிபாடு

எல். எ. கிருஷ்ணய்யர் என்பவர் இந்தியன் ஆண்டிக்வரி (Indian Antiquary) 24-வது தொகுதியிற் பின்வருமாறு எழுதுகிறார் :

மக்களின் மதத்தை யொட்டிய கொள்கைகளில் இது ஓர் பெரும் பிரிவு. இந்தியாவில் எவ்வகையிலும் இது முதன்மை பெற்றிருக்கிறது. இந்தக் கொள்கைகள் சமூக வாழ்வை ஒன்றுபடுத்தி நிற்கின்றன. டெய்லர் (Taylor) என்பவர் “தெய்வமாகக் கருதப்பட்ட தென்புலத்தார் அவர்களின் வழித்தோன்றல்களைத் தீது நோராமற் காத்து அவர்களளிக்கும் பலிகளைப் பெறுகின்றனர்” என்பர். ஆகலின் தென்புலத்தார்கள் தம்மைச் சேர்ந்தவர்கள் தம்மை ஆதரிப்போர் என்ற இவர்களைக் காத்து நிற்கின்றனர் என்ப.

இக்கட்டுரைத் தொடக்கத்திலேயே பழந்தமிழ் மக்களின் மத சம்பந்தமான வழிபாடு உயிரில்லனவற்றிற்கும் ஆன்மா உண்டென்ற கொள்கையை அடிப்படையாகக் கொண்டிருந்ததென்று குறிக்கப்பட்டது. ஆன்மாவின் அழியா வியல்பு, மறுபிறப்பு, பூதப் பிரேத பைசாசங்கள் உள என்ற கோட்பாடு, இவைகளை மகிழ்விக்காத வழி அவைகள் தம்மை வருத்தும் என்ற அச்சம் ஆகிய இவைகள் ஒருவகை வழிபாட்டை மேற்கொள்ளுமாறு மக்களைத் தூண்டிற்று. இவ்வாறு வழிபடப்பட்ட ஆன்மாக்கள் உருவற்றன வாகலின் அவைகட்குச் செயற்கை உருவம் ஏற்படவில்லை. உருவமில்லையாகவே கோயில்களும் அவைகட்கின்றாயின.

இந்தியன் ஆண்டிக்வரி (Indian Antiquary) 14-ஆம் தொகுதியில் புரொபஸர் ஆவேரி என்பவர், தென்னாட்டுப் பழைய வாசிகளின் சமயம் என்ற தலைப்பின்கீழ்ப் பின் வருமாறு எழுதுகிறார் : “உயிருள்ளவற்றிற்கும், உயிரில்லாதவற்றிற்கும் அழியாத தன்மைவாய்ந்த ஆன்மா வுண்டென்பது அவர்கள் கொள்கை. அவர்களால் வழிபடப் பெறும் சிறு தேவதைகள் மக்களை வருத்துவதிலும் பழி வாங்குவதிலும் நோக்கமுள்ளன. ஒவ்வொரு நோயும் ஒவ்வொரு தேவதையால் உண்டுபண்ணப்படுவதென்றும், அந் நோயைப் பரவச்செய்து பலரையும் அதற்குள்ளாக்குவதில் அத்தேவதைகட்குப் பெரு

மகிழ்ச்சி யுண்டென்றும் நம்பினர். இம்மக்கள் தாம் வழிபடும் தெய்வங்கட் கிருப்பிடம் ஈவர்க்கமென்றும், சேய்மைக்கண் உள்ள மலைகள் என்றும், தருக்கள் நிறைந்த அடவி என்றும் பலவாறு கூறுவர். தங்கட்கு நன்மை புரியக்கூடியவைகளாகத் தம்மாத் கொள்ளப்பட்ட தேவதைகளைத் தம் ஊர்க்கணித்தாக வைத்துப் போற்றுவது வழக்கம். ஒவ்வொரு ஊரிலும் பொதுமக்கள் வழிபடற்குரிய தோப்புகள் உண்டு. மண் குவியலோ, சிலையோ அல்லது கோல்களோ இவைகள் வழிபடற்குரிய தெய்வக் குறிக்களாம். தன்னைப் போற்றி வழிபடாத சிலரிடம் தாம் கொண்ட சினங் காரணமாகப் பெருநோயை உண்டு பண்ணி ஊர்ப்புறங்களை யழிப்பது இச்சிறு தெய்வங்களின் வேலை என்பது நாகர்கள் முதலிய பழ மக்கள் கொள்கை. இத்தேவதைகளின் குறிப்புணர்த்தற்கு இம்மக்கள் மேற்கொண்ட வழிகள் பலவாகும். நாளைத் கழியை வெட்டி அது எவ்வாறு விழுவினதது என்று பார்ப்பார்கள். சேவலைப் பலியிட்டு அதன் கால்கள் எவ்வாறு விழுந்தினை என்று நோக்குவர். இடது கால் கீழும், வலது கால் மேலுமாக அச்சேவல் விழுந்திருப்பின் அது நல்ல அறிகுறியாகும். மாறி விழுந்தாற் கெட்ட சகுனம் ஆம்.

இறந்த பின்னரும் உயிர் அழியாது நின்று நிலவும் என்பது இவராலுட்கோள். சிலர் மறுமை வாழ்க்கை இம்மை வாழ்க்கையின் தொடர்புதான் என்றும், ஆயினும் இவ்வுலக வாழ்வைவிடச் சிறிது சிறந்ததாகக் கூடும் என்று கூறுவர். இவர்கள் உயிரின் அழியாத தன்மையில் நம்பிக்கை உள்ளவர் என்பது இறந்தவர்களுடன் அவர்கட்குச் சொந்தமான அரிய பொருள்களைச் சேரப் புதைப்பதின்னின்றும் உணரலாம். முன்காலத்தில் பேராசரும் பெருஞ் செல்வரும் மரித்தால் அவர்களுடன் மறுமை வாழ்க்கையிலும் அவர்கட்குப் பணிவிடை செய்தற்கென, அவரது எவன்மாக்களையும் கொல்வது வழக்கம். இறந்த பின்னும் உயிர் அல்லது ஆன்மா தான் முன் இருந்து வந்த இடத்திலேயே உலாவும் என்பதும் அவர்களிற் பலரது கொள்கை. இவ்வுயிர் கூட்டினின்று நீங்கியவுடன் தெய்வத்தன்மை பெய்துவதாகவும், தான் முன் வந்த இடத்திலேயே அலைந்து திரிவதாகவும், தான் முன்பு அனுபவித்தவைகளையே மீண்டும் துயக்க எண்ணுமென்றும், அவ்வாறு துய்த்தற்குத் தடை நிகழின், தண்டயாடள்ளவர்களைப் பலவாறு வருத்தி நிற்குமென்றும் எண்ணினர். சில மக்கள் மறுமையில் நிகழும் வாழ்க்கை நிலை, இம்மையிற் செய்த நன்மை தீமைகளைப் பொறுத்தே நிற்கும் என்பர். ஆனால் இந்தக் கோட்பாடு இந்து மதக்கொள்கையைப் பின்பற்றிப் பிற்காலத் தெழுந்தெனக் கோடல் வேண்டும்.”

மேற்காட்டிய பகுதியால் பண்டை மக்களின் கோட்பாடுகள் சில தெரையலாம். இறந்த பிதிரர் வழிபாடு என்பது இந்நாட்டிற்குமட்டுமல்ல. உலகிற் பல இடங்களிலும் பரவியுள்ளது. ஸ்பென்ஸர், கிராண்ட் என்ற தத்துவ சாஸ்திரிகள் இதனை ஒவ்வொரு மதத்திற்கும் ஆணிவேரென்பர். இறந்தவரின் ஆன்மாக்கள் இருப்பவரின் நன்மையைப் பெருக்குமென்பர். இவ்வுயிர்கள் எங்கும் திரிவதாகவும், மனவலியற்றவர்களைப் பற்றிக் கொண்டு அவர்களைத் துன்புறுத்துமென்றும் கூறப்படுகிறது. தற்காலத்தும் மேலாட்டறிஞர்களும் இவ்வித ஆன்மாக்கள் உண்டென்று நம்பத் தலைப்பட்டனர். தீரா நோயினாலோ, தற்கொலை செய்துகொண்டோ, கொலையுண்டோ, அகால மாண மெய்தினோர், அவரவர்கட்குத் தோற்றத்திலேயே எற்பட்ட கால அளவு முழுதும் தீரும் வரையில் பேய்களாகத் திரிவரென்றும், பூவுலகிற் போன்று பின்னும் வசிக்க எண்ணங் கொள்வரென்றும் கருதுகின்றனர். உலகியலான உடல் இல்லாமற் போகவே, சிறிது காலம் இவ்வுலகிலிருந்து போகத் துய்ப்பதற்காக மன வன்மையற்றவர்களையும், கோழை

களையும் அற்றம் பார்த்துப் பற்றிக்கொண்டு மக்கட்குத் துன்பஞ் செய்வார். தொத்து நோய்களாகிய வாந்திபேதி, மகாமாரி முதலிய பெரும் பிணிகளை உண்டாக்கக்கூடியவைகளென்று மக்கள் இத்தேவதைகளைப் பெரிதும் அஞ்சுவர்.

இனித் தென்புலத்தார் வழிபாட்டு முறையை ஆராய்வோம். தேவர் திருக்குறளில்

“தென்புலத்தார் தெய்வம் விருந்தொக்கறனென்றும்
கைம்புலத்தா ரோம்ப றுல”

என்று கூறப்பட்டுள்ளது. இங்குக் கூறிய தென்புலத்தாரை வடமொழியாளர் பிதிரர் என்பர். இவ்வாழ்வான் ஒவ்வொருவனும் பலிகளோ, நிவேதனங்களோ தனது இறந்து பட்ட முன்னோர்களுக்கு அளித்தல் வேண்டுமென்பது நியதி. புதல்வனில்லாமல் இறந்த ஒருவன் வீட்டிற்குரியவன்மேன்றும், புத்தென்னும் நாகத்திற்கே உரியவன் என்றும் நம்பி யிருந்தனர். புறநானூற்றில் அறப்போரே ஆற்றி நிற்கும் ஓர் மன்னன் தான் படையெடுத்துச் சென்ற காலத்துப் பகைவர் மதிலு முற்றுகையிடுங்கால், மதிலகத் திருக்கும் மக்கட்கு எச்சரிக்கை செய்வது வழக்கம் என்று தெரிகின்றோம். அவ்வாறு எச்சரிக்கை செய்யுங்கால்,

“தென்புலம் வாழ்நர்க் கருங்கட னிறுக்கும்
பொன்போற் புதல்வர்ப் பெரு தீரும்
எம்மம்பு கடிவிடுது நும்மரண் சேர்மினென
அறத்தாறு றுவலும் பூட்கை” (புறம். 9)

என்ற புறநானூற்றிலிருந்து இறந்த பிதிரர்க்கியற்றவேண்டிய கடனை ஆற்றற்கு மகப் பெருதோர் யாரும் தம்மைப் புரப்பார்களிடஞ் சென்று புதுமாறு கூறுவர்.

“இம்மை யுலகத் திசையொடும் விளங்கி
மறுமை யுலகமு மறுவின் மெய்துப்
சிறுவர்ப் பயந்த செம்மலோரெனப்
பல்லோர் கூறிய பழமொழி”

என்ற அகநானூற்று (66) வரிகளும் இச்செய்தியை விளக்கும். மக்கட்கு அவர் தம் பாட்டன்மார் பெயரை வைத்து வழங்கும் முறையும் இவ்வழிபாட்டை யொட்டியே ஏற்பட்டிருத்தல் கூடும். ஒவ்வொரு அந்தணனும் பொதுவாக இவ்வாழ்வானும் தேவ யங்களும், பிதிர யங்களும், மனுஷ்ய யங்களும் என்ற மூன்றையும் ஆற்றியே தீரவேண்டும் இவைமூன்றும் அவன் பட்டகடனாகலின். நடுவண் கூறியதுதான் மேற்சொல்லப்பட்ட பிதிரர் அல்லது தென்புலத்தார் வழிபாடாகும். எட்புனலிதைத்தோ, அல்லது ஆண்டு தோறும் இறந்த பிதிரராக அவர் இறந்த திதியில் தக்க அந்தணர்களை வரித்து அவர்களை வயிரர ஊட்டியோ தென்புலத்தாரை மகிழ்வுறுத்தலாம். பின் கூறப்பட்ட முறையைத் திதி அல்லது சிராத்தம் என வழங்குவர்.

இந்த வழிபாட்டோடு பெரிதும் இயைபுடையதுதான் மிகவுஞ் சிறப்பு வாய்ந்ததும் பெரு வழக்கினதுமான நடுகல் அமைப்பு என்பர். போர்முகத்து வீரஞ் செறியப் பொருது, விழுமிய முடி வெய்திய போர்வீரன் கல்லறையீது எழுப்பப்படும் கல்லே நடுகல் அல்லது வீரக்கல் என்று பண்டை நாளில் வழங்கப்பட்டதென அறிகின்றோம். தம் உயிரைச் சிறிதும் பொருட்படுத்தாதவரும், புகழ் யாக்கையையே பெரிதும் விழைபவரும் ஆன சிறந்த போர்வீரர்கள், இவ்வாறு தமக்குக் கல் நடப்படுவதைப் பெரும்

பேராகக் கருதி நின்றனர். இக்கருத்துப் பின்வரும் புறப்பொருள் வெண்பாமாலையில் செய்யுளால் விளங்கும்

“ வந்த படை நோனாள் வாயின் முலை பறித்து
வெந்திற லெஃக மிறைக் கொளீஇ—முந்தை
முதல்வர்கழ் ருன்காட்டி மூதின் மடவார்
புதல்வனைச் செல்கென்றாள் போர்க்கு ”. (பு. வெ. மா. வாகை 21)

இதிலிருந்து கோட்டைவாயிலை முற்றுகையிடப் பகைவர் வந்தனர் என்று கேட்கப்பொருத ஓர் வீரத்தாய் தன் சிறுவனை அழைத்து, வீளைந்திருந்த வானைத் திருத்தி யளித்துப் போர்க்களத்தில் முன்னாளிற் சிறப்புறப் பொருது வீழ்ந்து அவரவர் தகுதிக் கேற்ப நடு கல் அமைக்கப்பெற்ற அவனது முன்னோர்களைச் சுட்டிக் காட்டிப் போர்க் கணுப்பியதாக அறிகின்றோம்.

இந்நடு கல் அல்லது வீரக் கல் நடுவதைப்பற்றித் தொல்காப்பியத்தில் சில குறிப்புகள் காணப்படுகின்றன.

“ காட்சி, கால்கோ ணீர்ப்படை நடுகல்
சீர்த்தகு சிறப்பிற் பெரும்படை வாழ்த்தலென்
நிருமூன்று வகையிற் கல்லொடு புணர ” (தொல். புறத். 5)

என்ற சூத்திரத்தைக் காண்க. உரையாசிரியர் நச்சினுக்கினியர் இங்குப் பின்வருமாறு எழுதுகின்றார் :

“ காட்சி இருவகைப்படும். மலைபடு கானில் அக்கல் உள்ளபடி யிருந்ததொன்று, பின்னர் வெட்டியுருச் செய்த பின்னர்க் காணப்பட்டது ஒன்று. கால்கோள் என்பது இறந்த பிதிரரை அக்கல்லின் உறுமாறு செய்தற்குக் கல்லை உருச் செய்யத் தொடங்கு தல். நீர்ப்படை என்பது கல் கொணரப்பட்டவுடனே அதனை நீர்ப்படுத்தித் தூய்மை செய்வதென்றும், மரித்த வீரனின் பெயரும் பீடும் எழுதிய பின்பை நீர்ப்படுத்திவ தென்றும் இரு வகைத்து. நடுதலும் இருவகைத்தாகும். கல் நடுதலும், கல்லில் இறந்த வீரனை நடுதலும் என்று. சீர்த்தகு சிறப்பிற் பெரும்படை யென்றது அக்கல்லினை இறந்த வீரனைக் குறிக்கும் தெய்வமாகவே கொண்டு பலி முதலியன சதல். மேலும் முதன்முதல் அவர்கள் கற்கொணரச் செல்லுங்கால், கடவுட்கு வணக்கங் கூறுதலும் பின்னர் நட்பு கல்லிற்கு வணக்கங் கூறுதலும் உண்டென்பர் ”.

நடுகல் வழிபாட்டு முறை

கல்லிற்கு மாலை அணிவித்து மணி யடிக்கப்படும். கள்ளை அக்கல்லின்மீது ஊற்றுவர். மயிற் பீலிகளைக் கல்மீதணிவர்.

“ இல்லடு கள்ளின் சில்குடிச் சீறார்ப்
புடை நடுகல்லி னாட்பலி யூட்டி
நன்னீராட்டி நெய்நறைக் கொளீஇய
மங்குல் மாப்புகை மறுகுடன் கமழும் அருமுனை யிருக்கை ”

என்ற புறப்பாட்டைக் காண்க. இவண் இறந்த வீரனைக் குறிக்குஞ் சிலையை நீர்ப் படுத்துகின்றனர். கள்ளும் பிறவும் அவ்வீரர்க்குத் தவப்படுகின்றன. மணங்கமழ் புகைகள் ஊட்டப்படும். பழந்தமிழ் நூல்களில் இவ்வகையான சமாதிக் கல்லைப்பற்றி அநேக

குறிப்புகள் காணப்படுகின்றன. அதன் வழியே செல்வோர் அக்கல்லைக் கும்பிட்டு வழி படாமற் செல்வதில்லை.

“கடும்பொடு கைவண் குரிசில்கற் கைதொழுகச் செல்பாண
தெய்வமாய் நின்றான் திசைக்கு” (பு. வெ. மா. 10, 13)

என்று ஓர் பாண்ணை நடுகல் வழிபாடு செய்யுமாறு கூறியதாகப் புறப்பொருள் வெண் மாலையிற் காணலாம். இதில் தெய்வமாய் நின்றவன் இறப்பதற்குமுன் ஒரு பேருபகாரி யாக விருந்தவன் என்று தெரிகிறது. இதனால் ஐம்பெரும் பூதங்கள், மும்மூர்த்திகள், எண்டிசைக் காவலர், நாமகள், திருமகள் தூர்க்கைபோன்ற தெய்வங்களன்றி, நிலவுலகில் இருந்து புகழ் எய்திப் பின்னர் இறந்த உயிர்களும் அவைகட்கெனக் கல் நாட்டப்பட்டுத் தெய்வங்களாக மதிக்கப்பட்டு வழிபடப்பெற்றன என்பது போதரும்.

பாலையைக் கூறும் அகச் செய்யுட்களிற் பல்லிடத்தும் இந்நடு கல்லைப் பற்றிய வருணனைகள் காணலாம்.

“நல்லமர்க் கூடந்த நாணுடை மறவர்
பெயரும் பீடு மெழுதி யதர் தொறும்
பீலி சூட்டிய பிறங்குநிலை நடுகல்” (அகம் 67)

“பெயரும் பீடுமெழுதி யதர் தொறும்
பீலி சூட்டிய பிறங்குநிலை நடுகல்
வேலுன்று பலகை வேற்றுமுனை கடுக்கும்” (அகம் 131)

என்ற வரிகளைக் காண்க. தெய்வப் புலவர் ஓர் வீரன் தன் தலைவனது வீரத்தைப் புகழுவதாக

“என்னைமு னில்லன்மின் தெவ்வீர் பலரென்னை
முன்னின்று கன்னின்றவர்” (குறள். 771)

என்ற குறளில் இக்கல் நடும் வழக்கத்தைச் சுட்டுதல் காண்க.

இனி இவ்வீரக் கற்களை யொப்ப மாஸ்தி கல் என்று பெயரிய கற்களும் பண்டைக் காலத்திலிருந்தே உண்டு. இச்சொல் மகா சதிக் கல் என்பதன் திரிபு. மகா சதிக் கல் என்பது இவ்வுலக வாழ்வை நீத்த ஓர் கற்புடை யாட்டிக்கு உயர்த்திய கல்லாகும். இக்கற்கள் வீரக் கற்கள்போல அத்துனை மிகுதியாகக் காணப்படவில்லை. ஆயினும் சிலப்பதிகாரக் கதா நாயகியும், கோவலனின் கற்பார் மனைவியுமான பத்தினி தேவி கண்ணகிக்கு நாட்டிய கல்லுருவம் சிந்திக்கற்பாலது. அந்தூரிலுள்ள 30 காதையில் இரண்டு அல்லது மூன்று காதைகள் அதன் ஆசிரியரான இளங்கோவடிகளால் இக்கல்லைச் சிறப்பித்தற்காக எழுந்துள்ளன. கண்ணகியின் உருவம் வகுத்தற்குக் கல்லின் பொருட்டு இமயமலைக்குப் புறப்பட்டுச் சென்றதை நன்கு வருணிக்கின்றனர் இப்புலவர் பெருமான். அரசன் செங்குட்டுவன் தன் நகர்க்கருகில் இருந்து கல்லை யெடுத்து வருவது தன் பெரு வீரத்திற்கு இழுக்கென எண்ணி வடநாடு நோக்கிப் புறப் பட்டான். வழியில் எதிர்த்த மன்னரை வணக்கினான். அவனை யெதிர்த்துப் பொருத வடநாட்டு மன்னர்களாகிய கனகவிசயரை முறியடித்து, அவர்கள் தலையில் தான் கொணர்ந்த பத்தினிப் படிவக் கல்லைச் சுமத்தித் தூக்குமாறு செய்தான். பின்னர் கண்ணகியின் சிலை முறைப்படி நிறுவப்பட்டது. இவ்விழாவைக் காணவந்த ஈழ

நாட்டு மன்னரும் பிறரும் தங்கள் நாட்டிலும் இக்கண்ணிக்குக் கல் நாட்டி வழி பட்டனர் என்ப.

“அது கேட்டுக் கொங்கிளங்கோசர் தங்கணுட்டகத்து நங்கைக்கு விழவொடு சாந்தி செய்ய ”

என்ற சிலப்பதிகார வரிகளால் இதனையறியலாம். தற்காலத்திற் சுமங்கலைப் பிரார்த்தனை என்று இல்லங்கடோறும் நடைபெறுவது சுமங்கலைகளாக இறந்த பெண் பிதிரரை அவர்க்கு கந்தன வளித்து வழிபடுவதென்பர். இவ்வழிபாடும் மேற்கூறிய கண்ணகி வழிபாட்டிற் கியையுடைத்தென்பதை உய்த்துணரலாம்.

திருவிழாக்கள்

கோயில்களிற் நெய்வங்களை நிறுவிய பின்னர் அத்தெய்வங்கட்குத் திருவிழாக்கள் நடத்தவேண்டிய அவசியம் எழுந்தது. ஆனால் பிற்காலத்தில் ஆசாமர்கள் தோன்றிய பிறகு காணப்படுவதுபோல, அவ்வளவு அதிகமாகவும் முறையாகவும் அத்திருவிழாக்கள் அக்காலத்திருந்ததில்லை. எனினும் அத்தெய்வங்களை மழிவித்தற்காக நிகழ்ந்த திருவிழாக்கள் குறிக்கப்பெறாமலில்லை. தொல்காப்பியம் அகத்திணையியல் குத்திரம் 28-இல் “படிமைய ” என்ற சொல் காணப்படுகிறது. உரையாசிரியர் நச்சினுக்கினியர் இதனை விராதம் அல்லது மதர் சடங்கு என்று கொள்வர். இளம் பூரணரோவெனின் இதனைத் “தேவர் பூசையும் விழவும் ” என்று கொள்வர். இப்பகுதி முழுதும் பின் வருமாறு :

“மேவிய சிறப்பினேனோர் படிமையவென்பது நால்வகை நிலத்தினும் மேவிய சிறப்பையுடைய மக்களை யல்லாத தேவரது படிமையவாகிய பொருள்கள். படிமை என்பது பிரதிமா வென்னும் வட சொற்றிரிபு. அது தேவர்க்கு ஒப்புமையாக நிலத்தின் கண் செய்தமைத்த தேவர்மேல் வந்தது. அவருடைய பொருளாவன பூசையும் விழாவும் முதலியன ” உரையாசிரியர் இவ்விடத்து

“பகைதொழு மரபிற் கடவுள் சான்ற
செய்வினை மருங்கிற் சென்றோர் ”

என்ற (அகம் 124) பாடல் வரியை மேற்கோளாகக் காட்டுவர். சேரன் செங்குட்டுவன் கண்ணகியைக் கடவுண் மங்கலம் செய்தற்குப் பிரிந்த பிரிவு சிலப்பதிகாரத்திற் கண்டு கொள்க.

இவ்வாறு நடைபெற்ற திருவிழாக்களிற் சிறப்பாகக் கேட்கப்படுவது இந்திர விழாவாகும். இதைக் குறித்து முன்னரே கூறியுள்ளேன். சிலப்பதிகாரத்தும், மணி மேகலையினும் இவ்விழா நன்கு சிறப்பிக்கப் பெற்றுள்ளது. இதன் தொடக்கத்திற் புகார் வாசிகள் அனைவரும் பெரு மகிழ்வுற்றிருந்தனர். காவற் நெய்வங்கன் உட்பட சகலமான உபதேவதைகளும் பூசிக்கப்பட்டன. இந்திரனையும், அவன் ஊர்திபாகிய ஐராவதத்தையும், அவன் எந்தும் வஜ்ராயுதத்தையும் பெருமைப் படுத்தற்காகச் செய்யப் பெறும் திருவிழா நாட்களை வள்ளுவன் களிற்று மிசையோறும் நகர்க்கறிவுறுத்தினன். வீடுகளிலும் பொதுக் கட்டிடங்களிலும் கொடிகள் உயர்த்தப்பட்டன. தேவேந்திரன் பொற்கலச நீரால் அபிஷேகம் செய்யப் பெற்றனன். அதே தருணத்திற் சிவபிரான், முருகன், திருமால் என்ற இத்தெய்வங்கட்கும் திருவிழாக்கள் நடைபெற்றன. இந்திரனைச் சிறப்பித்தற்காக வெவ்வேறு சாறுகள் நிகழ்ந்தன. இந்திரவிழா ஆண்டுதோறும்

கொண்டாடப்பட்டு வந்தது. இவ்விழாச் சிறப்பிக்க மறந்தால் அவ்வூர் வாசிகள் பெருங் துன்ப மடைவர் என்று கருதப்பட்டது. அழகிய புகார் நகரம் ஆழி வாய்ப்பட்டு ஒழிந்தது இவ்விழாவைப் புறக்கணித்ததன் பயனே யாகும். மணிமேகலையில் இதே விழாவைக் குறித்துக் கூறுவதையும் நோக்குவோம்.

இவ்விழா முதன்முதலில் ஹங்கெயி லெறிந்த தொடித்தோட் செம்பியன் என்ற ஓர் சோழ மன்னனால் ஏற்படுத்தப்பட்டது. இவன் இந்திரன் உத்திரவுபெற்று 28 நாள் இவ்விழாவை நடத்தினன். இவன் பின்வந்த சூரியகுல மன்னரும் இதனைத் தொடர்ந்து நடத்தி வந்தனர். ஆகவே அவ்வூர் வாசிகளும், வெவ்வேறு சமயச் சார்பினரும் ஒருங்கு கூடி இவ்விழாவை நடத்தத் தவறினால் நாளங்காடிப் பூதம் யாவரையும் புடைத்துண்ணு மாகலானும், அந்நகர்க் காவற்றெய்வம் ஊரை விட்டகலுமாகலானும், அதனை நடத்தத் துணிந்து முரசறைவோன்பால் இக்கருத்தைக் கூறினர். அவனும் யானைமீ திவர்த்து நகர் வாசிகட்குப் பின்வருமாறு சாற்றினன்.

“நகரறிஞர்களே! தேவர்களும் தமது தலைவனான இந்திரன் விழாவைக் காண விண்ணுலகம் வறிதாகப் புகார்நகரிற் புகுவார் என்பது துணிபாகலின், பூரண கும்பங்களும், பொற்பாலிகைகளும், பாவை விளக்குகளும் வைத்து அணி செய்மின். வாழை, கமுகு, கரும்பு முதலியவைகளை வீதிகளில் நாட்டுமின். தூண் முகங்களில் முத்து மாலைகளை நாற்றுமின். பழ மணலைப் பாற்றிப் புது மணலைப் பரப்புமின். மாடங்களிலும், மனை வாயில்களிலும் கொடிகளைக் கட்டுமின். சிவனாதியாகச் சதுக்கச் சந்திகளைக் காத்து நிற்கும் பூத மிறுதியாக எல்லாத் தெய்வங்கட்கும் வழிபாடியற்றுமின். அறநூல் வல்லவர்களே! நீவிர் மன்றங்களிலும், பொது மண்டபங்களிலும் உங்கள் சொற்பொழி வாற்றுமின். மதத் தலைவர்களே! உங்கள் வாதத்தைத் தொடங்குங்கள். ஆனால் ஒருவர் பாலும் பகை கொள்ளாதீர்கள்.”

இவ்வாறு இந்திரவிழா நகரத்தார்க்கு அறிவுறுத்தப்பட்டது. இத்துணை விரிவாக இவைகளை யெடுத்துக் கூறியதன் கருத்து என்னவெனின், பெரும்பாலும் எந்த விழாவும் இம்முறையிற்றான் நடைபெறும் என்று காட்டற்கேயாம். கற்புக்கரசியான கண்ணகிக்குச் சேரன் செங்குட்டுவன் கோயில் அமைத்ததும், கடவுண் மங்கலஞ் செய்ததும், அவள் பொருட்டு நிகழ்த்திய திருவிழாக்களும் மேலே கூறப்பட்டன. இதனையே இளங்கோவடிகள் சிறந்த முறையிற் பின்வருமாறு கூறுவர் :

“மேலோர் விழைய நூனெறி மாக்கள்
பால்பெற வகுத்த பத்தினிக் கோட்டத்
திமையவ ருறையு மிமயச் செவ்வரைச்
சிமயச் சென்னித் தெய்வம் பரசிக்
கைவினை முற்றிய தெய்வப் படிமத்து
வித்தக ரியற்றிய விளங்கிய கோலத்து
முற்றிழை நன்கல முழுவதும் பூட்டிப்
பூப்பலி செய்து காப்புக் கடை நிறுத்தி
வேள்வியும் விழாவும் நாடொறும் வகுத்துக்
கடவுண் மங்கலஞ் செய்கென வேவினன்
வடதிசை வணக்கிய மன்னவ ரேறென் ”. (சிலப். நடுகற். 224-34)

திருவிழாக்களில் சில ஆண்டுதோறும் நிகழும். சில திங்கள்தோறும் நடைபெறும். பக்கோற்சவங்களும் நித்தியோற்சவங்களும் உண்டு. பத்தினி தேவிக்கு நித்தியோற் சவங்கள் ஏற்பாடு செய்யப்பட்டன.

அகநானூற்றில் (368) உள்ளி விழாவைப்பற்றிய குறிப்புக் காணப்படுகிறது. கொங்கு நாட்டார் அவ்விழாக் காலத்துத் தமது அரையில் மணிகள் கட்டிக்கொண்டு ஆடுவது வழக்கம் என்று தெரிகின்றது.

“கொங்கர் மணியரை யாத்து மறுகிநாடு முள்ளி விழவின்”

என்றது காண்க. அதே நூலிற் திருச்சிராப்பள்ளி ஜில்லாவில் உள்ளதும், பழைய காலத்துச் சோழர் தலை நகரூள் ஒன்றா யிருந்ததுமான உறந்தையில் நிகழ்ந்த பங்குனி உத்திர விழாவும் குறிக்கப்பட்டுளது. இவ்வுறந்தைமா நகரும், அதன் கிழக்கேயுள்ள திருச்சி மலைக் கோட்டையும் அந்தூற்கண் குறிக்கப் பெற்றுள்ளன.

“கறங்கிசை விழவி னுறந்தைக் குணா அது
நெடும் பெருங் குன்றம்”

(அகம் 4)

என்றது காண்க.

நிம்க, திருமால் உவந்துதையும் சீரிய தலமான திருவேங்கடத்தில் அநேக சாறுகள் நிகழ்ந்தனவாகப் பழைய நூல்கள் அறிவிக்கின்றன.

“விழவுடை விழுச்சீர் வேங்கடம்”

(அகம் 61)

என்பது அகநானூறு. இஃதன்றி ஆற்றல் சான்ற மழவரால் நடத்தப்பட்டு வந்த பூந் தொடை விழாவும் கேட்கப்படுகின்றது. இதனால் குறிக்கப்படுவது இன்னதென்றறியக் கூடவில்லை. ஒரு வேளை, இப்பொழுது புதுக்கோட்டைச் சீர்மையில் உள்ள நார்த்தா மலை மாரியம்மன் முதலிய தெய்வங்கட்குச் செய்யப்படும் பூர்சொரிதல் அல்லது பூச் சாத்துற்சுவமாக இருத்தல் கூடும். இன்றேல் பூந்தொடை யுடையோடுகிய மாரனைப் பெருமைப் படுத்தக்கூடிய திருவிழாவாக இருத்தலும் கூடும், அல்லது வீரர்களாதலின் அம்பு தொடுத்து விளையாடும் வில் விழாவாகவும் இருக்கலாம்.

“மள்ளர் குழீஇய விழவினும்”

என்பதிலிருந்து வீரர்களின் வில் விழா முதலியன இருந்தது தெரியலாம்.

திருப்பரங்குன்றத்தில் முருகப்பிரானுக்கு நடத்தப்படும் திருவிழாவைப்பற்றி,

“சேரலர் சுள்ளியம் பேரியாற்று வெண்ணுரை கலங்க
யவனர் தந்த வினைமா ணன்கலம்

.....

பருஞ்சமந் கடந்து படிமம் வெளவிய

நெடுநல் யானை யடுபோர்ச் செழியன்

கொடி நுடங்கு மறுகிற் கூடற் குடா அது

பல்பொறி மஞ்ஞை வெல்கொடி யுயரிய

வொடியா விழவி னெடியோன் குன்றத்து” (அகம் 149)

என்ற அகநானூற்றுப் பகுதியால் அறிகிறோம். இதிற படிமம் வவ்விய செய்தி இன்ன தென்றுணரக் கூடவில்லை. ஆனால் இத்தலத்தைப்பற்றிக் கூறுங்காற் காலஞ்சென்ற டி. ஏ. கோபிநாத ராவ் திருப்பரங்குன்று முதலில் ஓர் சிவாலயமாக இருந்ததென்றும், கி. பி. 8-ஆம் நூற்றாண்டில் சடிவவர்மபராந்தக பாண்டியன் இச்சிவாலயத்தின் அருகி லுள்ள ஓர் பாறையில் ஓர் தூர்க்கை கோயில் அமைத்து அதில் ஜேஷ்டா தேவி சிலையை வைத்தனன் என்றும் கூறி அதற்குச் சிலாசாசனச் சான்றுங் காட்டினர். அக்கோயில்

முருகப்பிரானுக்கே உரியதென்று அவர் ஒத்துக்கொண்டபோதிலும் முருகனுக்காக நிருமித்த ஆலயமோ, அவற்கென வகுத்த உருவமோ அம்மலையிற் கிடையா எனக் கூறுவர். அவர் கூறுவதாவது :

“ ஏதோ ஒரு காலத்தில் ஜேஷ்டாதேவி பரிவாரத்தின் முக்கிய தேவதைக்கு ஆண் உடை உடுத்து அதனையே முருகக் கடவுளாக இப்பொழுது வணங்கி வழிபடுகின்றனர். ஜேஷ்டா தேவிக் குரியதும், அவள் சிலைக்கருகிற் காணப்படுவதுமான காக்கைக் கொடியைக் கோழிக்கொடியெனக் கொண்டனர். அர்ச்சகர்க்கும், ஆறு தலைகளும், இரு மனைவியரும், மயிலூர்தியும், இன்னும் முருகற்கே சிறந்த பலவும் அக் கோயிலிலில்லாமலிருப்பது ஒரு பொருட்டாகத் தோன்றவில்லை ” என்பதே. இவ்வாறு இவர் கூறுவது விரிந்தையாகக் காண்கிறது. மிகப் பழைய தமிழ் நூல்கள் சேவற் கொடியோனாகிய முருகவேளின் ஆறு படை வீடுகளில் ஒன்றாக இத்தலத்தைக் குறிக்கின்றன. இதனை முன்னரே எடுத்துக் காட்டிய அகநானூறு புறநானூறு இவைகளிலுள்ள செய்யுட்களால் அறியலாம். நக்கீரர் தமது திருமுருகாற்றுப்படையில் இத்தலத்தைப் புகழ்ந்து கூறுமுறை முன்னரே விரிக்கப்பட்டது. போரில் வெற்றிகொண்ட அரசர், தோல்வியுற்றவரிடமிருந்த பலவகைப் பொருளோடும் அவரார் பூசித்து வழிபட்பெற்ற படிமையையும் கவருதல் வழக்கமென்பது மேற்குறித்த அகநானூற்றுச் செய்யுளினின்றும் அறியலாம்.

இனிச் சிலப்பதிகாரத்தில் ஆய்ச்சியர் குரவையாடக் காண்கின்றோம். ஆயர் பாடியில் முல்லையிலத் தெய்வமாகிய திருமலை வழிபடற்காக ஆயர் ஆய்ச்சியர்கள் கைகோத்தாடியும், அவனைத் துதித்தும், அவனது பல வீரச்செயல்களைப் புகழ்ந்து போற்றியும், இன்னியங்களுடன் குழுமி நிற்பர். சில சாறுகளில் உயிர்ப் பலியும் கொடுக்கக் காணலாம்.

“ வாயின் மாடந் தொறு மைவிடை வீழ்ப்ப

நீ யாங்குக் கண்ட விழவினும் பலவே ” (புறம். 33)

என்ற வரிகளால் வீடுதோறும் கிடாய் முதலியன வெட்டப்படுதல் காணலாம். இவ்வழக்கம் இன்றும் ஒவ்வொரு கிராமத்திலும் பிடாரி விழாக் காலத்து நடைபெறுவதையாவரும் அறிவர். விழாத் தொடக்கத்தைக் கால் கோள் கொள்ளுதல் என்பர். அப்பொழுது விழாவிற்குரிய தெய்வத்தின் கொடியைக் கொடிநிலை அல்லது துவஜ ஸ்தம்பத்தின்மீது உயர்த்துவர். இவையல்லாது பழைய நூல்களில் விழா நடைபெறுங்கால் மிகவும் சினத்துடன் இருப்பதாகக் கருதப்படும் தெய்வத்தின் வெகுளியையோ, களைப்பையோ மாற்றி, அதனைத் தணிக்கக்கூடிய சாந்தி விழாவும் அதனையொட்டிச் சாந்திக் கூத்தும் நடைபெற்றதாகக் கேட்கப்படுகின்றது. இன்றைக்கும் எந்த கிராம தேவதை விழாவானாலும் தெருக்கூத்தின்றி முடிவு பெறுவதில்லை.

கார்த்திகை நாள் விழாவும் மிகவும் பழமையான விழாக்களில் ஒன்றாகும்.

“ வேலி னோங்கிய விளக்கு நிலையும் ”

(புறத். 35)

என்ற தொல்காப்பியச் சூத்திரத்தில் நச்சினுர்க்குணியர் கார்த்திகைத் திங்களில், கார்த்திகை நாளிற் கோலில் மாட்டி வீடுகளின் முன்பு அமைத்த தீப வரிசைகளை இவ்விளக்கு நிலை என்பது குறிக்கலாகுமென்பர்.

“கார்த்திகைத் திங்களில் கார்த்திகை நாளில் ஏற்றிய விளக்குக் கீழு மேலும் வலமு மிடமுந் திரிபரந்து சுடரோங்கிக் கொழுந்து விட்டெழுந்ததென்று அறிவோ ராக்கந் கூறப்படுவதாம்”

என்ற அவர் கூற்றை நோக்குக.

“மறை கானீங்கிய மாக விசம்பிற்
குறுமுயன் மறு நிறந் கிளர மதி நிறைந்
தறு மீன் சேரு மகவிரு நடு நாண்
மறுகு விளக் குறுத்து மாலைதூக்கிப்
பழ விதன் மூதூர்ப் பலருடன் றுவன்றிய
விழவுட னயர”

என்ற அகநானூற்றிலும் இவ்விழாவின் சிறப்பு நன்கு கூறப்பட்டுள்ளது. இதனால் முயற்கதையுடன் விளங்கும் நிறைமதி உரோகிணியுடன் கூடி நிற்குங் கார்த்திகைத் திங்கள் நள்ளிரவில் வீடுகளின் வாயிற்புறத்திற் தீபங்கள் வைத்தும், தோரணங்கள் கட்டியும், பெரு மகிழ்வுடன் இக் கார்த்திகை விழாவைக் கிராமவாசிகள் கொண்டாடுவது வழக்கம் என உணரலாம். மேலும் பதினெண் கீழ்க்கணக்கிற் சேர்த்தெண்ணப் பட்டுள்ள கார் நாற்பது, களவழி நாற்பது என்ற நூல்களில் இத் திருவிழாவைப்பற்றிய குறிப்புகள் காணப்படுகின்றன.

“நல மிரு கார்த்திகை நாட்டவரிட்ட
தலை நாள் விளக்கிற் றகையுடைய வாகி” (கார். நாற். 26)

என்ற வரிகளைக் காண்க. இங்குத் தலை நாள் என்பது கார்த்திகை மாதத்துக் கார்த்திகை நாள் என்பர்.

சாத்தன் அல்லது ஐயனார்

பண்டைத் தமிழ்ப் பணுவல்களிற் பலவிடத்துங் குறிக்கப்பட்டுத் தொய்வங்களுள் சாத்தன் ஒன்றாகும். கோபிநாத ராவ் இத்தெய்வத்தைப்பற்றிப் பின்வருமாறு எழுது கின்றார்:

“ஐயனாரென்றும், சாத்தன் என்றும், ஹரிஹர புத்திரன் என்றும் வழங்கும் இத் தெய்வம் வடஇந்தியாவில் அதிகமான வழக்கிலில்லை. திராவிட நாட்டிலும் இத்தெய்வம் பெரிதும் பயிர்வது மலையாள நாட்டிற்குள். கேரள தேசத்தில் ஆலயந்தோறும் தென்மேற்கு மூலையில் சாஸ்தா கோயிலைக் காணலாம். தமிழ்நாட்டில் இதனை ஐயனாரென வழங்குவர். ஐயன் என்பது ஆரியன் என்ற சொல்லின் மருஉ என்பர். சாத்தன் என்னும் பெயர் பெருவழக்கிலிருந்திருக்க வேண்டுமென்பது பண்டைய இலக்கணத்தில் எடுத்துக்காட்டாகக்கூறும் இடங்களிலெல்லாம் சாத்தன் கை, சாத்தனில்வெருது, உண்டான் சாத்தன் ஊருக்குப் போனான் என்றற்போன்று சாத்தன் என்ற சொல்லே எடுத்தாளப்பட்டிருப்பதனின்றியலாம். இவ்வாறு திராவிட நாட்டிற் சிறப்பாகக் காணப்பட்ட இத்தெய்வம் கோதாவரி நதியின் வடபாற் கேட்கப்படவில்லை. பழைய வடமொழி நூல்களுள் இப்பெயர் குறிக்கப்படவில்லை. நிகண்டு அகராதிகளும் இப் பெயரையும், இதன் பெயர்க் காரணத்தையும் குறித்திருப்பதாகத் தெரியவில்லை. ஆகவே இத்தெய்வம் திராவிடத் தெய்வமென்றும், பிற்காலத்திற் தமிழ் நாட்டிற்குமிடத் தமிழ் ருடன் ஒன்றுபட்ட ஆரியர் இதனை ஏற்றுக்கொண்டனரென்றும் ஊகிக்க வேண்டியிருக்க

கின்றது. தற்காலத்தில் தமிழ் நாட்டில் ஐயனார் வடிவம் ஓர் கிராம தேவதையாகக் கொண்டாடப்பட்டுப் பிராமணரல்லாதாராத் பூசிக்கப்பட்டு வருகிறது.”

முடிவாகப் பல சான்றுகளும் இதனைத் தென்னிந்தியத் தெய்வமெனவே உறுதிப் படுத்துகின்றன.

“கடவுட் சாத்தனுடனுறைந்த தேவந்தியும்”

“சாத்தன் மங்கல மறையோனாகத் தோன்றி” (சிலப். வரந்தரு 87-88)

“சாதவாகனன் கோயில்” (ஹே. கருத்திரம் 12)

“புறம் பணையான் வாழ்கோட்டம்” (ஹே 12)

“பாசண்டச் சாத்தன்” (மணி.)

என்ற மேற்கோள்களிலிருந்து சாத்தன் ஓர் தெய்வமாகக் கருதப்பட்டனன் என்றும், அவனுக்குச் சாதவாகனன் (யானையூர்தி) என்றும், புறம்பணையான் என்றும் பெயர் கருண்டென்றும் உணர்கின்றோம். அவன் செண்டைக் கையிலேந்தியவனாகக் கூறப் படுகின்றான். இன்றைக்கும் அவன் கோயில்களின் முன்பு வழிபடுவோர் உதவிய யானைகள் குதிரைகள் இவைகளின் உருவங்களைக் காணலாம். உயிர்ப்பலிகள் பெரும் பாலும் இவன் கோயிற் பலி பீடத்திற்கு முன்னிலையில் நிகழும். நிகண்டில் இவன் பெயர்கள் பலவற்றைக் காணலாம். சாதவாகனன், கோழிக் கொடியோன், சாத்தன், செண்டாயுதன், அரிகர புத்திரன் என்பன அவற்றுட் சிலவாகும். இப்பெயர்கள் நிகண்டிற் காணப்படுவதால், நிகண்டு அகராதிகளில் இச்சாத்தன் பெயர் குறிக்கப்படவில்லை என்ற கோபிநாத ராவ் கூற்றுப் பொருந்தாததாகும்.

சில மத வழக்கங்களும், கொள்கைகளும்

ஆரியர்களுக்குள் வழங்கும் கதைகளும் கொள்கைகளும் பெரும்பாலும் தமிழ் நாட்டிலுங் கேட்கப்படுகின்றன. உலகின் படைப்பு முறை, ஐம்பெரும் பூதங்களின் உண்மை, அவைகள் பரம்பொருளினின்று தோன்றிய வகை, அவைகள் முடிவில் ஆகாயத்தில் மறைந்தொழிதல், இவ்வுலகமேயன்றி ஏனைய வுலகங்களும் உள என்ற உறுதியான நினைவு, எண்ணச்சக் காவலரும் அவர் ஊர்திகளும், ஆன்மாவின் அழிவின்மை, அழியாப் பேரின்பம், போகவுலகு, நாகம், யுகவிறுதியில் நிகழும் ஊழிகள், கடையூழி என்ற இவைகளும் இன்னும் பலவும் பழந்தமிழ் நூல்களிற் காணப்படும்.

மறைகளை யுணர்வதன் அவசியம் மறை வல்லோரிடம் காட்டிய மதிப்பு, நால்வகை வருணப் பகுப்பு, ஆகம்பயிற்சி, வேள்விப்பயன் என்ற இவைகளும் மேற்கூறிய நூல்களிற் கூறியிருப்பதைக் காணலாம்.

“கருவளர் வானத் திசையிற் றேன்றி

உறுவறிவாரா வொன்ற னூழியும்

உந்து வளி கிளர்ந்த யூழு மூழியும்

செந்தீச் சுடரிய ஆழியும் பனியொடு

தண் பெய மலை இய ஆழியும்”

என்ற பரிபாடற் பகுதியில் உரையாசிரியர் பரிமேலழகர்

“பரம் பொருளினின்றும் ஆகாயந் தோன்றி, அதனின்றும் காற்றுத் தோன்றி, அதனின்றும் தீத் தோன்றி, அதனின்றும் நீர் தோன்றி, அதனின்றும் நிலம்

தோன்றிற்றென்று வேதத்துள்ளுந் கூறப்பட்டது” என்றெழுதுகிறார். மேலும்

- “மறு பிறப்பில் லெனு மடவோர்” (பரி. 5, 76)
 “மறுமை யின்பம்” (ஐடி 91)
 “அவிய மா ரழ லென” (ஐடி. 10, 84)
 “படிநிலை வேள்வியுட் பற்றியாடு கொளலும்” (பரி. 2, 62)
 “அந்தணர் காணும் வரவு” (பரி: 2, 62-68)
 “நிலந்தீ நீர் வளி விசம் போடைந்தும்
 கலந்த மயக்க மூலக மாதலின்” (தொல். மரபி. 89)
 “சென்ற வுயிரினின்ற யாக்கை” (தொல். புறத். 71)
 “ஒருமைக் கட்டான் கற்ற கல்வி யொருவற்
 கெழுமைபு மேமாப் புடைத்து” (குறள் 398)
 “அளவிற் கோட லந்தணர் மறைத்தே” (தொல். எழுத். பிறப்பு. 20)
 “மறையோர் தேளத்து மன்ற லெட்டு” (தொல். களவி. 1)
 “விரிந் தகன்ற கேள்வி” (பரி. 3, 48)
 “உரித மர்து தக்கம்” (பரி. 13, 13)

என்ற மேற்கோட் பகுதிகள் பழந்தமிழ் மக்கள், மறுபிறப்பு, வேள்வி, வேதம், ஆகமம், புண்ணியம் புரிவோர் புகுந்தமர் வீடு, ஐம்பெரும் பூதத்தான் உலகம் இயன்றதென்பது. உயிர் அல்லது ஆன்மாவின் அழியாமை, முறைப்படி ஒதப்பெறும் மறைகள், மறை சுளால் வகுக்கப்பட்ட எண்வகை மணங்கள் என்ற இவைகளைப்பற்றிக் கொண்டிருந்த கருத்துக்கள் இன்னவென வுணரலாம். இறுதி மேற்கோளிற் குறிக்கப்பட்ட துறக்கம் திருமால் என்றும் அமர்ந்து விளங்கும் வைகுண்டமென்று கூறினர் பரிமேலழகர். இதனையே “தாமரைக் கண்ணாணுலகு” என்பர் திருவள்ளுவர். “மறப்பினுமோத்துக் கொளலாகும்” (குறள் 134) என்ற குறளில் ஒத்து என்பதற்கு வேதம் என்று கூறினர் பரிமேலழகர்.

“அவி சொரிந் தாயிரம் வேட்டலின்”

என்ற குறட்கண் வேத வேள்விகள் டெருவழக்கினவாக விருந்ததைத் திருவள்ளுவர் குறித்தனர்.

நிற்க, அற்புதமான அல்லது தெய்வீக நிகழ்ச்சிகளிற் பெரிதும் நம்பிக்கை இருந்து வந்ததாகக் காண்கின்றோம். (Miracles) மிரகிள்ஸ் என்ற இவ்வற்புதச் செய்திகள் பெரும்பாலும் எத்தேசத்திலும் எச்சாதியார் கண்ணும் இன்றுங் காணலாம். சிறு பாணாற்றுப் படையிற் பின்கண்ட வரலாறு காணப்படுகின்றது. பாட்டுடைத் தலைவன் ஓய்மானாட்டு நல்லியக் கோடன் என்பவன் முருகப் பெருமான் சிறந்த அடியார்களுள் ஒருவன். ஓரமயம், அவனை அவனது எதிரி எதிர்த்து மேல்வந்த ஞான்று அவன் தனது குல தெய்வமாகிய அறுமுகனைப் போற்றினான். உடனே இறைவன் அவனுக்குக் கனவிடைத் தோன்றி, அவன் வீட்டுக் கிணற்றிற் காணப்படும் மலர்களை வீசி யெறிந்து எதிரியுடன் போர் புரியுமாறு கூறி மறைந்தனன். அம்மலர்கள் அவ்வளவில் வேல் களாக மாறின. இவ்வியக்கத்தகு நிகழ்ச்சியை முன்னிட்டு அவனார் வேலார் என வழங்கப்பெற்றதென்பர்.

“திமல் வேணுதியிற் பூத்த கேணி
 விமல் வேல் வென்றி வேலா ரெய்தி” (சிறுபாண். 172-3)

என்ன வரிகளில் இவ்வரலாற்றைக் காணலாம்.

இனிச் சகுனங்களும் குறிகளும் அடிக்கடி பார்த்து வந்ததாகத் தெரிகின்றது. அவைகளைப் பற்றிய குறிப்புகளும் பலவாகக் காணலாம். “விரிச்சியோர்த்தல்” என்பது பெரிதும் வழங்கியது. பிரிந்து வேற்றுநாடு சென்றிருந்த தன் கணவன் வரவை யெதிர்போக்கித் தலைவி குறி பார்க்கின்றனள். நாழி நெல்லீது முல்லை மலரும் அரளி யலரும் விரவித் தெய்வத்திற்குப் படைத்துத் தெய்வத்தைக் குறி கேட்கின்றனள்.

“நெல்லொடு நாழி கொண்ட நறுவீ முல்லை
யரும்பவி மலரி தூஉய்க் கைதொழுது
பெருமுது பெண்டிர் விரிச்சி நிற்ப”

என்ற முல்லைப்பாட்டு வரிகளைக் காண்க. ஆயர் மகள் மேயச் சென்றிருந்த தன் தாய்ப் பசுவைக் காண விழையும் ஆன் கன்றின் நிலைக்கிரங்கிக் கன்றை நோக்கி “இன்னே வருவர் தாயர்” என்று கூறி ஆற்றுகின்றாள். இவ்வார்த்தைகள் தலைவியை ஆற்றி நிற்கும் முதுமகளிர் செவியிற் படுகின்றன. அவர்கள் உடனே இவ்வசீரி வாக்கை நல்லதோர் அறிகுறியாகத் தலைவிக்குச் சாற்றுகின்றனள். இதைக் குறித்துத் தொல் காப்பியம் புறத்தினையியலிற் பின்வருஞ் செய்திகள் காணலாம் :

“ஒரு அரசன் தன் பகைவன் நாட்டிற் படையெடுக்க வெண்ணும்பொழுது அந் தணரையும், ஆவையும் புரப்பது அவனது முதற்கடமை. ஆகலின் தன்னுடன் சூழ் வாரைக் கொண்டு பகைவர் நாட்டிலுள்ள எல்லாப் பசுக்களையுங் கைப்பற்றுமாறு கட்டளையிடுவன். கட்டளையை மேற்கொண்டு அவர்கள் பகைவர் நாட்டின் எல்லையை எய்தித் தங்கள் தொழிலைச் செய்யத் தொடங்கு முன்னர் தாம் மேற்கொண்ட காரியத் திற் தமக்கு வெற்றி கிடைக்குமா என்று குறிபார்ப்பர். இம்முறையைத்தான் “விரிச்சி யோர்த்தல்” எனவழங்குவர். (தொல். புறம். 2-3) பல்லி சொல்லும், புருவத்துடிப் பும், காகம், கருடன் முதலிய புட்சகுனங்களும் கனவின் நன்மை தீமைகளும், பிறவும் ஆராயப்பட்டு வந்தன.

- “பாங்கர்ப்பல்லி படுதொறும் பரவி” (அகம் 9)
 “பல்லியும் பாங்கொத் திசைத்தன
 நல்லெழிலுண் கணுமாடு மாலிடனே” (கலித். 11)
 “பகுவாய்ப் பல்லிப்பா டோர்த்துக் குறுகும்” (அகம் 88)
 “கனவும் கங்கு றேறினிய நனவும்
 புனைவினே நல்லிற் புள்ளும் பாங்கின” (அகம் 141)
 “நாளன்று போகிப் புள்ளிடைத்தட்ப” (புறம். 124)
 “புள்ளும் வழிப்படார் புல்லார் நிரைகருதிப் போகுகாலை”
 (சிலப். வேட்டுவவரி)

என்ற வரிகள் இப்பழைய வழக்கங்களை விளக்கும்.

இவற்றால் பகுத்தறிவில்லாதனவான புள், விலங்கு முதலியன மூலமாகவும், அவை கட்டுள் எள்ளும் எண்ணெயும்போற் கலந்துறையும் தெய்வ சங்கல்பம் வெளிப்படும் என்று கொண்டனரென்றும், அவைகளின் குரல் செயல்களைக்கொண்டே தமது காரியங்களைத் துணிந்தனரென்றும் போதரும்.

“பல்லியின் சொல்லையும் சொல்லாகக் கொள்வர் பண்டு பண்டே”

என்றார் நம்மாழ்வாரும். மேலும் “கட்டினுங் கழங்கினும்” குறிபார்க்கு முறையும் பழைய தூல்களில் உள்ளன. முன்னரே குறிஞ்சிநிலத் தெய்வத்தின் ஆவேசங்கொண்ட வேலனை மக்கள் வழிபட்டுக் குறிகேட்ட செய்தி கூறப்பட்டது.

“தெய்வமுற்று மெய்ம்மயிர் நிறுத்துக் கையெடுத்தோச்சி”
(சிலப். வேட்டுவவரி)

“தெய்வமேறிக் கூறுதல்” (குறுந். 23)

என்ற அடிகளை நோக்குக. சிலப்பதிகாரம் அரங்கேற்று காதையுள், “தெய்வமுற்றேன விநயம்” என்று காணப்படுகின்றது. இன்னும் கிராமத் தெய்வங்களின் திருவிழாக் காலங்களில் மருளாளி என்ற ஆவேசங்கொண்டவன்பால் மக்கள் திரள் திரளாய்ச் சென்று குறி கேட்பதைக் காணலாம். சிலப்பதிகாரத்திற்கண்ட தேவந்தியின் ஆவேசமும், அவள் அதனையுற்றவழி அவள் கூறிய கூற்றுக்களும் முன்னரே காட்டப்பட்டன.

இவ்வாறு மாறிமாறி நிகழும் பிறப் பிறப்புக்கள், மறுமையுண்மை, பாவபுண்ணியங்கள் உயிரைப் பின்பற்றிச் செல்கை, ஒவ்வொரு உயிரும் தனது இறுதிக்காலத்துக் தன் உள்ளத்துள்ள நினைவிற் கேற்பப் பிறவியினை பெய்துதல் என்ற கருத்து, வீரம் விளங்கப் படுகளத்திறந்தோர் வீர சுவர்க்கம் அடைந்து அரமகளிராம் தழுவப்படுவர் என்னும் விழுமிய கொள்கை, சதி அல்லது உடன்கட்டை யேறுதல் என்ற முறையால் வீடெய்தல் கூடும் என்ற கோட்பாடு, ஆகிய இவைகளும் இன்னும் சிலவும் பழந்தமிழ் நிலத்து மக்கள் பாற்பெரிதும் வழங்கி நின்றன.

“இறந்த பிறப்பின் எய்திய வெல்லாம் பிறந்த பிறப்பிற் காணையோ நீ”
(சிலப். காடுகாண். 156-7)

“தொல்லை வினையாற் றுயருழந்தார்” (ஐடி வாழ்த்து)

“உரிகளை யரவ மானத்தானே
அரிதுசெல் லுலகிற் சென்றன னுடம்பே” (புறம் 260)

“ஒலிகடல் சூழ் மண்ணகலம் வேண்டாது வான்வேண்டி யீண்டிவோர்”
(தொல். புறத். 21 மேற்கோள்)

“வான்றுறக்கம் வேட்டெழுந்தார் வாண்மறவர்”
(ஐடி 17 மேற்கோள்)

“குழவி யிறப்பினு முன்றடி பிறப்பினு
மாளன் றென்று வாளிற் றப்பார்” (புறம் 74)

“பெருந்தோட் கணவன் மாய்ந்தென வரும்பற வள்ளிதழலர்ந்த தாமரை
நள்ளிரும் பொய்கையுந் தீயுமோரற்றே” (புறம் 246)

“பல்லார் புகழ், விருந்தாயடை குறுவார் விண்”
(பு. வெ. மா. வஞ்சி. 12)

“இகன்மறவர் வென்றியமரர் விருந்து” (ஐடி நொச்சி, 2)

“உறத்தழி இத்தோட்குரிமை பெற்ற துணைவனையார்
பாராட்ட வாட்குரிசில் வானுலகினான்” (ஐடி நொச்சி 7)

“ஆங்கூதால் வீரியரெய்தற் பால வீடு” (ஐடி வாகை 30)

என்ற வரிகள் மேற்கூறியவற்றை விளக்கா கிற்கும்.

நிற்கத் தணக்கு மிகவும் வேண்டியவர்களை முன்னிட்டுச் சூளுறுதலும் அக்காலத் துண்டென அறிகின்றோம்.

“கொடுஞ்சுழிப் புகார்த் தெய்வ நோக்கிக்
கடுஞ் சூடருகுவனினக்கே” (அகம் 110)

“சூன்றினடி தொடல்” (பரிபா)

“தலை தொடட்டேன்” (ஐடி)

என்பன காண்க. இன்னும் இத்தகைய பழைய வழக்கங்களில் ஒன்றாகக் குறிக்கப்பட்டவற்றுள் தைநீராடல் என்பது சிறப்பாகக் காணப்படுகின்றது. ஆறுகளும் மலைகளும் அக்காலத்துத் தொழப்பட்டு வந்தன. அதிகாலையிலெழுந்து புண்ணிய நதிகளில் முழுகி டின், கன்னியர்கள் தமக்குகந்த கணவரை மணந்து பெரும் போகமெய்துவர் என்ற நம்பிக்கை யிருந்தது.

“தைநீராடல்”

(பரிபா.)

“தைநீராடுந் தவந் தலைப்பட்டாயோ”

(கலித். 23)

எனப் பரிபாடலிலும், கலித் தொகையிலும் வருதல் காண்க. பாரி மகளிர் பறம்பு மலையைக் தை தொழுது சென்றதாகப் புறப்பாட்டான் அறிகிறோம். இவையன்றிப் பிற வழக்கங்களும் பல இருந்தன. முடிவாகப் பழைய நூல்களை யாராய்வதினன்று பழந்தமிழ் மக்கள் உயர்ந்த நாகரீகமுள்ளவரா யிருந்தனர் என்றும், கடவுள் பக்தி உடையவரென்றும், உயிரைப் பற்றியும், மக்களுக்கும் கடவுட்கும் உள்ள தொடர்பு பற்றியும், துதிக்குள்ள பெருமையைக் குறித்தும், அழியாப் பேரின்பத்தைக் குறித்தும் சிறந்த கருத்துக்கள் உடையவரென்றும் தெரிகின்றோம். பக்தி மார்க்கத்திற் பிற்காலத் தெழுந்த சமயப் பகுப்புணர்ச்சி அக்காலத்தில் அதிகமாக இல்லையென்றே கூறலாம். சங்கப் புலவர்களிடமும், காப்பிய ஆசிரியர் பாலும், அவர்கள் வெவ்வேறு மதங்களைத் தழுவி நின்றபோதிலும் பொதுவாக ஒற்றுமை இருந்ததென உணர்கின்றோம். இளங் கோவடிகள் சமணப் பற்றுடையவரேனும் வீனய சமயக் கொள்கையையும் பெருமை பெற எடுத்து மொழிவர். மணிமேகலை யாசிரியரும் பௌத்தருமான கூலவாணிகள் சாத்தனார்க்கு ஆருயிர் நண்பராய் இவர் சமணப் பற்றுள்ளவராக, அவர் தம்பின்றோன்றல் சேரன் செங்குட்டுவன் சிறந்த சைவனென அறிகின்றோம். ஒரு சார்மதப் பற்றுக் கொண்டு பிற மதங்களின்மீது வெறுப்பும் அக் காலத்திருந்ததாகத் தெரியக்கூடவில்லை. எம்மதத்தினர் ஆயினும் கல்வி வலாராயிருப்பின் மத வேற்றுமையின்றிப் பலராலும் பெருமைப் படுத்தப்பட்டனர். அவைதிக மதங்களாகிய சமணம், பௌத்தம் என்ற இவைகட்கும், வைதீக சமயங்கட்கும் சில வேறுபாடுகளும், சச்சரவுகளும் இருந்திருக்கக் கூடும். தமிழ் நூல்களில் அவைகளைப் பற்றிய விரிந்த விவரங்களில்லை. தமிழிலக்கியந் தழைத்தோங்கின காலம் எனக் கருதப்பட்டு வருகின்ற கி. பி. முதல் இரண்டா நூற் ருண்டுகள் அன்பும், அமைதியும், செழிப்புமுள்ள காலமாகவே விளங்கியது என்னலாம்.

TATTVASĀRAH

BY

VATSYA VARADAGURU

EDITED WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

BY

R. RAMANUJACHARI, M.A.,

Na dvaitam partipādayanty upaniṣadvācaḥ prasiddham hi tat
 kin tv advaitam ananyagocaratayā tadvedyam āsthiyatām |
 aprāpte khalu sāstram arthavad iti vyarthaḥ prayāso yataḥ
 prakhyātād itaras tu śāstraviṣayo bhedaḥ tvadadvaitavat || 50

Yacchvetāśvataraśrutir nṛbahutām eko bahūnām iti
 brūte tatra vidhir viśiṣṭaviṣayas tv aṣṭākapālālādivat |
 nityatvāt mabahutvam atra nigamād anyatra vidmaḥ katham
 pratyaktvena parāktayā svaparayor muktau ca bhedas
 sphuṭaḥ || 51

Sāmānādhikaranyabhāgiṣu padastomeṣu sarveṣu kim
 pratyāyyam vyatiricyate pratipadam vaktavyam advaitinā |
 yad vā ne'ti na ced anarthakatayā nai'kātiriktaṁ padam
 paṭhyeta prativādinā tv itarathā yuktis svam āsīdati || 52

Dṛśyatvād anṛtam vigītam iti yad dṛṣṭāntayanto jaguś
 śuktyāropitarūpyam atra katicit tatre'dam ācakṣmahe |
 dharmigrāhakamānadhikkṛtam idaṁ sopādhikatvaṁ punaḥ
 sautraṁ vyaktam abhaṅguram vyabhicaral lingṇ ca
 bhaṅgāya vaḥ || 53

Mithyātvam bhrāntisiddham yadi khalu jagatas sādhyate
 siddhasādhyo
 hetus satyaḥ prapañco bhavati hi yadi vā satyam advaitahāniḥ |
 sādhyam brahmasvarūpam yadi bhavati tadā siddhasādhyatvam
 eva
 syād evaṁ ca prapañcavyudasanasaraṇir dūratas te nirastā || 54

चिन्मात्रव्यतिरेकि वस्तु सकलं मिथ्येति जोषुष्यते

योगाचारमते यदौपनिषदीकर्तुं तदाकृष्यते ।

मायावादिभिरप्रतीतनिगमन्यायप्रमाणान्तर-

प्रस्थानैरपहस्तयन्ति हि सह न्यायैः प्रमाणानि तत् ॥ ५५ ॥

नानात्वक्षणिकत्वयोरुपगतेरेकत्वनित्यत्वयो-

रप्येकत्र मतेऽपरत्र च धियो वैषम्यमस्तीति चेत् ।

मायावादिमतस्य सौगतमतादेतन्न यत्तात्त्विको

वर्मस्तत्र मतद्वयेऽपि न धियः कश्चित् स्वरूपादृते ॥ ५६ ॥

स्वरूपानादित्वस्वपरघटने दुर्घटनता

प्रवाहानादित्वं पुनरिति चतस्रो हि गतयः ।

असत्या विद्याया गदितुमनवस्थापरिहृतौ

मतास्त्वेतास्तुल्याः स्फुटमसदधिष्ठानसरणौ ॥ ५७ ॥

रे रे खण्डनकार खण्डय भवत्यक्षः प्रतिक्षिप्यते

तर्कैस्त्वत्कथितैस्ततः किमिति चेदस्मन्मतं तिष्ठति ।

यद्वन्माध्यमिकोक्तचिद्व्युदसनप्रत्यासतस्त्वन्मतं

तिष्ठत्येव यथा च बाधकहतौ लोके स्वरूपस्थितिः ॥ ५८ ॥

अधीत्वं वेद्यत्वे प्रसजति धियः कुम्भवदिति

स्वसिद्धिस्सा धात्वादिति यदिह कोऽप्याह तदसत् ।

स्वसिद्धिः स्वाधारं प्रति हि न परं प्रत्यपि नरं

परज्ञेया सेयं तदपि न मतित्वं विघटते ॥ ५९ ॥

Cinmātra-vyatireki-vastu sakalam mithye'ti Joghuṣyate
 yogācāra-mate yad-aupaniṣadikartum tad ākṛṣyate |
 māvādvādhir apratita-nigama-nyāya-pramāṇāntara-
 prasthānair apahastayanti hi saha nyāyaiḥ pramāṇāni tat || 55

Nānātva-kṣaṇikatvayor upagater ekatva-nityatvayor
 apy ekatra mate'paratra ca dhiyo vaiṣamyam astī'ti cet |
 māvādvādi-matasya saugatamatād etan na yat tāttviko
 dharmaḥ tatra matadvaye'pi na dhiyaḥ kaścit svarūpād ṛte || 56

Svarūpānāditva-svaparaḥṣaṇe durghaṭanātā
 pravāhānāditvam punar iti catasro hi gatayaḥ |
 asatyā vidyāyā gaditum anavasthā-parihṛtau
 matāḥ tvetāḥ tulyāḥ sphuṭam asadadhiṣṭhāna-saraṇau || 57

Re re Khaṇḍanakāra khaṇḍaya bhavat-pakṣaḥ pratikṣipyate
 tarkais tvatkathitais tataḥ kim iti ced asman-matam tiṣṭhati |
 yadvan mādhyamikokta-cidvyudasana-pratyāsatas tvanmatam
 tiṣṭhaty eva yathā ca bādhaka-hatau loke svarūpa-sṭhitiḥ || 58

Adhītvam vedyatve prasajati dhiyaḥ kumbhavad iti
 sva-siddhis sā dhītvād iti yad iha ko'py āha tad asat |
 sva-siddhis svādhāram prati hi na param praty api naram
 parajñeyā se'yam tad api na matitvam vigraḥate || 59

तथाहि प्रत्यक्षप्रभृतिमितिर्वर्गप्रकटितः

स्वभावो भावानामपसरति वेद्यास्त इति किम् ।

स्वभावप्रत्यासो यदि भवति वेद्यत्ववशतः

पटस्य ज्ञेयत्वे घटवदपटत्वं प्रसजति ॥ ६० ॥

प्रकाशः कुम्भादौ जडिमवति तद्गोचरमितिः

तिरोधिश्चैतस्या विरतिरजडे ब्रह्मणि पुनः ।

स्वरूपं चिन्मात्रं स्फुरणमपिधिश्च स्वनिधनं

जडं वा ब्रह्म स्यादपिधिविधुरं वाप्यपरथा ॥ ६१ ॥

पुरोवर्तिद्रव्यस्फुरणमपि रूप्यभ्रमसहं

न शुक्तित्वस्फूर्तिर्भ्रमविहतये या प्रभवति ।

यदि ब्रह्म प्राग्वन्न खलु जगदध्यासविरतिः

क सिद्धयेदध्यासो यदि भवति शुक्तित्वसदृशम् ॥ ६२ ॥

इदं मायावादे विविधमुदितं दूषणमिह

स्वयं ज्योतिर्ब्रह्म व्यपगतविशेषं यदि कथम् ।

मते तस्मिन्नस्मदृशि तु स विशेषः पुरुष इ-

त्यतद्रूपारोपस्तदुपरतिरित्यादि घटते ॥ ६३ ॥

अधिष्ठाने पुंसि स्वयमहमिति स्फूर्जति वपुः

प्रकाराध्यारोपः पशुरहमहं मानुष इति ।

अणुत्वादौ देहव्यतिकरविदूरे च विहिते

तिरोधिस्सङ्कोचो ननु भवति तद्गोचरधियः ॥ ६४ ॥

Tathā hi pratyakṣaprabhṛti-mitivarga-prakaṭitaḥ
 svabhāvo bhāvānām apasarati vedyās ta iti kim |
 svabhāva-pratyāso yadi bhavati vedyatvavaśataḥ
 paṭasya jñeyatve ghaṭavad apaṭatvam prasajati || 60

Prakāśaḥ kumbhādaḥ jaḍimavati tadgocaramitiḥ
 tirodhiś cai'tasyā viratir ajaḍe Brahmani punaḥ |
 svarūpam cinmātram sphuraṇam apidhiś ca sva-nidhanam
 jaḍam vā Brahma syād apidhi-vidhuram vā'py aparathā || 61

Purovarti-dravya-sphuraṇam api rūpya-bhramasaham
 na śuktitva-sphūrtir bhrama-vihataye yā prabhavati |
 yadi Brahma prāgvan na khalu jagadadhyāsa-viratiḥ
 kva siddhyed adhyāso yadi bhavati śuktitva-sadṛśam || 62

Idam māvāvāde vividham uditam dūṣaṇam iha
 svyam jyotir Brahma vyapagata-viśeṣam yadi katham |
 mate tasminn asmaddṛśi tu saviśeṣaḥ puruṣa ity
 atadrūpāropas taduparatir ityādi ghaṭate || 63

Adhiṣṭhāne puṁsi svayam aham iti sphūrjati vapuḥ
 prakārādhyāropaḥ paśur aham aham mānuṣa iti |
 aṇutvādaḥ dehavyatikara-vidūre ca vihite
 tirodhis saṅkoco nanu bhavati tadgocara-dhiyaḥ || 64

अहंत्वज्ञातृत्वे ननु पुरुषधर्मौ न तु वपु-
 गुणौ वस्तुस्थित्या तदपि न तथात्वन्ननु तयोः ।
 अनादेरध्यासादवगतमिदानीं श्रुतिनयः
 स्वयोगाद्यैरन्यः स्फुरति वपुरादेस्तु पुरुषः ॥ ६५ ॥

जीवन्मुक्तिमतन्न जीवति यतश्शस्त्रेण शास्त्रात्मना
 लूनं लोकविरुद्धसिद्धिं च यतस्तेनेदमादावपि ।
 आपस्तम्बनिरस्तमौपनिषदं प्रस्थानमातस्थुषा-
 गाचार्योऽपि निराचकार खलु तद्वैपायनाख्यो मुनिः ॥ ६६ ॥

क वेदान्ताः कामी निहितमतयश्शङ्करमते
 वदन्तः प्रामाण्यं भ्रमविलसितं वेदवचसाम् ।
 अहो यद्बहुद्वयप्रथितफणितीनामथ च ते
 कलिग्राहग्रस्तैरगणिषत वेदान्तिन इति ॥ ६७ ॥

यत् सामान्यविशेषवर्त्मसु गुणप्रत्यासविध्यात्मसु
 त्रय्यन्तेषु जनार्दनप्रणयिषु प्राबल्यदौर्बल्ययोः ।
 प्रस्तावं प्रतिपेदिरे कतिचनापच्छेदनीतिच्छला-
 न्मीमांसापदवीपरिश्रमकथादूरेषु तच्छोभते ॥ ६८ ॥

यद्ब्रह्मणो गुणविकारशरीरभेद-
 कर्मादिगोचरविधिप्रतिषेधवाचः ।
 अन्योन्यभिन्नविषया न विरोधगन्ध-
 मर्हन्ति तन्न विधयः प्रतिषेधबाध्याः ॥ ६९ ॥

Ahamtva-jñātṛtve nanu puruṣadharmāu na tu vapur-
 guṇau vastusthityā tad api na tathātvān nanu tayoh |
 anāder adhyāsād avagatam idānīm śrutinayaḥ
 svayogādyair anyas sphurati vapurādes tu puruṣaḥ || 65

Jīvanmukti-matan na jīvati yataś śāstreṇa śāstrātmanā
 lūnam lokaviruddha-siddhi ca yatas tene'dam ādāv api |
 Āpastamba-nirastam aupaniṣadam prasthānam ātasthuṣām
 ācāryo'pi nirācakāra khalu tad Dvaipāyanākhyo munih || 66

Kva vedāntāḥ kvā'mī nihitamataś Śaṅkara-mate
 vadantaḥ prāmāṇyam bhramavilasitam veda-vacasām |
 aho yadvad buddha-grathita-phaṇitīnām atha ca te
 kali-grāha-grastair agañṣata vedāntina iti || 67

Yat sāmānya-viśeṣavartmasu guṇa-pratyāsavidhyātmasu
 trayyanteṣu Janārdana-praṇayiṣu prābalya-daurbalyayoh |
 prastāvam pratipedire katicanā'paccheda-nīticchalān
 Mīmāṃsāpadavī-pariśrama-kathā-dūreṣu tac chobhate || 68

Yad Brahmaṇo guṇavikāra-śarīrabheda-
 karmādigocara-vidhi-pratiṣedha-vācaḥ |
 anyonya-bhinna-viṣayā na virodha-gandham
 arhanti tan na vidhayaḥ pratiṣedhabādhyāḥ || 69

अग्नीषोमीयहिंसा निजविधिविहिता किन्निषिद्धा न हिंसा-
 द्रुतानीत्येतयोक्त्या पशुपदविषयश्छाग एव न्यरूपि ।
 छागो वा मन्त्रवर्णादिति च तदुभयन्यायतो हेयधर्म-
 क्षेपार्था निर्गुणोक्तिश्चतुशुभगुणके निर्मले ब्रह्मणि स्यात् ॥ ७० ॥

कस्त्वं तत्त्वविदस्मि वस्तु परमं किन्तर्हि विष्णुः कथं
 तत्त्वेदम्परतैत्तिरीयकमुखत्रय्यन्तसन्दर्शनात् !
 अन्यास्तर्हि गिरः कथं गुणवशादत्राह रुद्रः कथं
 तद्वृष्ट्या कथमुद्भवत्यवतरत्यन्यत्कथं नीयताम् ॥ ७१ ॥

यदुक्तो याज्ञिक्यामुपनिषदि निस्सीममहिंसा
 स उक्तः पुंसूक्ते परमपुरुषः कारणतया ।
 पुनस्सौवालिक्यामुपनिषदि माहोपनिषदी
 गतिश्चैवं तद्वत्कलय कठवल्लीप्रभृतयः ॥ ७२ ॥

व्याजह्ने जगदेककारणतया साकूतमेको ह वे-
 त्यारम्भवता महोपनिषदुद्धोषेण नारायणः ।
 ब्रह्मेशद्युवसुन्धरोडुसलिलस्वाहेशसोमांशुम-
 त्पूर्वाशेषजगत्प्रणाशयति यः काले समुन्मीलति ॥ ७३ ॥

अप्राप्तत्वान्महत्यामुपनिषदि जगत्कारणत्वानुवादो
 न स्यादेको ह वा इत्ययमुपरि हि देवेभ्य इत्यादिनीत्या ।
 वाक्यस्वारस्यतो हि व्यगणि भगवतः कारणत्वं परेषां
 कार्यत्वञ्चाविरुद्धं तदपि न परमस्त्यत्र किञ्चिद्विधेयम् ॥ ७४ ॥

Agnīṣomīyahimsā nijavidhi-vihitā kim niṣiddhā na himsyād
 bhūṭānī'ty etayo'ktyā paśupadaviṣayaś chāga eva nyarūpi |
 chāgo vā mantravarṇād iti ca tadubhaya-nyāyato heyadharma-
 kṣepārthā nīrguṇoktiś śruta-śubhaguṇake nirmale Brahmani
 syāt || 70

Kas tvam tattva-vid asmi vastu paramam kim tarhi Viṣṇuḥ
 katham
 tattvedampara-taittirīyakamukha-trayyanta-sandarśanāt |
 anyās tarhi giraḥ katham guṇavaśād atrā'ha Rudraḥ katham
 taddr̥ṣṭyā katham udbhavaty avataraty anyat katham
 nīyatām || 71

Yad ukto yājñikyām upaniṣadi nissīmamahimā
 sa uktaḥ puṁsūkte parama-puruṣaḥ kāraṇatayā |
 punas saubālikyām upaniṣadi Māhopaniṣadi
 gatiś cai'vam tadvat kalaya kaṭhavallī-prabhṛtayaḥ || 72

Vyājahre jagadeka-kāraṇatyā sākūtam eko ha ve'
 ty ārambhavatā Mahopaniṣad-udghoṣeṇa Nārāyaṇaḥ |
 Brahmeśa-dyu-vasundharoḍu-salila-svāhe'śa-somāṁśumat
 pūvāśeṣajagat praṇāśayati yaḥ kālē samunmilati || 73

Aprāptvatvān Mahatyām upaniṣadi jagat-kāraṇatvānuvādo
 na syād eko ha vā ityayamupari hi devebhya ityādinītyā |
 vākya-svārasyato hi vyagaṇi Bhagavataḥ kāraṇatvam pareṣām
 kāryatvam cā'viruddham tad api na param asty atra kiñcid
 vidheyam || 74

यत्संज्ञामूर्तिकर्तुः परमपुरुषतः किञ्चिदाकाशनाम्नो
 हृत्पद्मे स्यादुपास्यं श्रुतिशिरसि परा सामगानामगायि ।
 तत्र प्रश्नोत्तराभ्यामघविहतिमुखान्सत्यसङ्कल्पतान्ता-
 नष्टौ शिष्टांस्तदीयाननिदमुदयिनस्तद्गुणानुद्गृणन्ति ॥ ७५ ॥

प्रस्तुत्यामृतहेतुमादिपुरुषं न्यक्कृत्य मार्गान्तरं
 तस्यैतद्वटनाय निष्प्रतिभटामुद्गुप्य सार्वेश्वरीम् ।
 उक्तिस्तत्र ततो यदुत्तरतरं तन्मुक्तिदायीति या
 तच्छ्वेताश्वतरागमे निगमनं प्रोक्तस्य हेतूक्तिमत् ॥ ७६ ॥

यच्छ्वेताश्वतरागमे भगवति स्पष्टप्रयोगान्तरं
 तस्मिन्निर्दिशति ध्रुवं शिवपदं प्रक्रान्तमुक्तिप्रदे ।
 सर्वव्यापिनि सर्वतोमुखशिरोम्रीवे स एव प्रभुः
 सत्त्वस्यैष महाप्रवर्तक इति व्यक्तः पुनः पूरुषः ॥ ७७ ॥

यच्छ्वेताश्वतरश्रुतिशिवपदं वक्ति प्रयुक्तं हरा-
 वग्रे जाग्रति विश्वकारणपरं तलैव युक्तं हि तत् ।
 साधारण्यविदूरविष्णुभगवन्नारयणाद्याह्वयै-
 राहुः कारणमेनमौपनिषदा भागास्तदाकाङ्क्षिणः ॥ ७८ ॥

यदग्रे जागर्ति श्रुतशिवपदं ब्रह्म परमं
 जगद्धेतुश्चेताश्वतरनिगमान्ते स भगवान् ।
 प्रयुक्तो यत्तस्मिन् यजुषि शिवशब्दश्रुतिशिर-
 स्यतत्साधारण्यं न समगणि नारायणगिरः ॥ ७९ ॥

Yat sañjñāmūrti-kartuḥ parama-puruṣataḥ kimcidākāśa-
nāmno

hṛt-padme syād upāsyam śrutiśirasi parā sāmagānām agāyi |
tatra Praśnottarābhyām aghavihatimukhān satya-saṅkalpatāntān
aṣṭau śiṣṭāms tadyān anidam udayinas tadguṇān udgrṇanti || 75

Prastutyā'mṛtahetum ādipuruṣam nyakṛtya mārgāntaram
tasyai'tad-ghaṭanāya niṣpratibhaṭām udghuṣya sārveśvarīm |
uktis tatra tato yad uttarataram tan muktidāyī'ti yā
tac chvetāśvatarāgame nigamanam proktasya hetūktimat || 76

Yac chvetāśvatarāgame Bhagavati spaṣṭaprayogāntaram
tasmin nirdiśati dhruvam śivapadam prakrānta-mukti-prade |
sarva-vyāpini sarvatomukha-śirogrīve sa eva prabhuḥ
sattvasyai'sa mahān pravartaka iti vyaktaḥ punaḥ pūruṣaḥ || 77

Yac chvetāśvataraśrutiś śivapadam vakti prayuktam harāv
agre jāgrati viśvakāraṇaparam tatrai'va yuktam hi tat |
sādhāraṇyavidūra-viṣṇu-bhagavan-Nārāyaṇādyāhvayair
āhuḥ kāraṇam enam aupaniṣadā bhāgās tadākāṅkṣiṇaḥ || 78

Yad agre jāgarti śruta-śivapadam Brahma paramam
jagaddhetuś śvetāśvatara-nigamānte sa Bhagavān |
prayukto yat tasmin yajuṣi śivaśabdaś śruti-śirasy
atatsādhāraṇyam na samagaṇi Nārāyaṇagiraḥ ||

यदेवैरनुयुक्त उत्तरमुशन् रुद्रो विवृत्यात्मनि
 व्याजहे महतीमधीश्वरधुरामाथर्वणे मूर्धनि ।
 स प्रादुर्भवदन्तरात्मभगवद्भूमाफणत्सोऽन्तरा-
 दन्तः प्राविशदित्यधीतविधया तद्वामदेवादिवत् ॥ ८० ॥

नान्यः कश्चिन्मत्त इत्युग्रवाक्या-
 दूर्ध्वं नेतिस्तत्समाप्तिं ब्रवीति ।
 प्राग्वत्पश्चादुग्रवाक्यानुवृत्तेः
 सोऽहं नित्योनित्य इत्यादिभङ्ग्या ॥ ८१ ॥

सोऽतो हेतुं वक्ति नेतिः प्रकारं
 प्रह्लादोक्तो हेतुरन्तः प्रवेशः ।
 प्रह्लादोक्तिस्सर्वगत्वादनन्त-
 स्येति व्यक्ता वैष्णवाख्ये पुराणे ॥ ८२ ॥

अथवेति पदेन हेतुरत्र व्यतिरेकोऽर्कथ नान्य इत्यधीतः ।
 अहमेक इतीरितान्वयस्य प्रतिपत्तुं सुकरः प्रकारपक्षः ॥ ८३ ॥

रुद्रस्योक्तिस्सोऽन्तरादित्यतोऽसौ
 तस्मादन्यः कोऽपि तस्यान्तरात्मा ।
 अन्येषाञ्चेत्युच्यते सोन्तरादि-
 त्युक्त्या रौद्र्या सोऽपि विष्णुः प्रसिद्धः ॥ ८४ ॥

इत्युक्तिर्वा समाप्तिं वदतु हरगिरस्सोऽन्तरादित्यतोऽसौ
 मामृद्रुद्रोक्तिरित्थं सति न विघटना किञ्चिदस्मन्मतस्य ।
 रुद्रस्वात्मात्मभूतं हरिममलधिया स प्रविष्टश्चिकीर्षुः
 मेधावीव स्ववश्यं नरमपरमिति व्यज्यते वेदवाचा ॥ ८५ ॥

Yad devair anuyukta uttaram uśan Rudro vivṛtyā'tmani
 vyājahre mahatīm adhīśvaradthurām ātharvaṇe mūrdhani |
 sa prādurbhavad antarātma-bhagavad-bhūmā'phaṇat so'ntarād
 antaḥ prāviśad ity adhītaavidhayā tad vāmadevādivat || 80

Nānyaḥ kaścin matta ityugravākyaḍ
 ūrdhvam ne'tis tatsamāptim bravīti |
 prāgvat paścād ugravākyaṇuvṛtteḥ
 so'ham nityo nitya ity ādibhaṅgyā || 81

So'to hetum vakti ne'tiḥ prakāram
 Prahlādokto hetur antaḥ praveśaḥ |
 Prahlādoḥ sarvagatvād ananta-
 sye'ti vyaktā vaiṣṇavākhye purāṇe || 82

Athave'ti padena hetur atra vyatireko'kathi nā'nya ity adhītaḥ |
 aham eka itī'ritānvayasya pratipattum sukarāḥ prakāra-
 pakṣaḥ || 83

Rudrasyo'ktis so'ntarād ityato'sau
 tasmād anyāḥ ko'pi tasyā'ntarātmā |
 anyeṣām ce'ty ucyate so'ntarād i-
 ty uktyā raudryā so'pi viṣṇuḥ prasiddhaḥ || 84

Ity uktir vā samāptim vadatu Haragiras so'ntarād ity ato'sau
 mā bhūd Rudroktir ittham sati na vigḥaṭanā kiñcid asman-
 matasya |
 Rudras svātmātmabhūtam harim amala-dhiyā sa praviṣṭaś
 cikīrṣuḥ
 medhāvi'va svavaśyam naram aparam iti vyajyate vedavācā || 85

श्रुत्वा रुद्रवचस्तदीयमहिमस्तोत्राय लब्धोद्यमाः
 सर्वैश्वर्यमथर्वमूर्ध्नि यदपि व्यजहिरेऽस्यामराः ।
 तेऽन्तर्यामिसमाधिहेतव इह व्यक्ता हि रुद्रोक्तयः
 तद्युक्तास्तदनूक्तयस्तु दिविषद्वाकास्तदेकाशयाः ॥ ८६ ॥

ओङ्कारपूर्वकतया प्रतिपादितानि
 नामान्तराणि ननु रुद्रपुरस्सराणि ।
 आथर्वणे शिरसि तानि तु न प्रसिद्ध-
 रुद्रेशितृत्वमुपपादयितुं क्षमन्ते ॥ ८७ ॥

समाख्याः प्रक्रान्तप्रणवविषयिण्यः प्रतिपदं
 निरुक्ता रुद्राद्या यदपि हि महादेवशिरसः ।
 श्रुतेराथर्वण्याश्शिरसि तदिदं तारविभवं
 व्यनक्त्योङ्कारस्यादुपरितनविद्यापरिकरः ॥ ८८ ॥

पन्था बन्धस्य शान्तेः पशुपतिभजनं नन्विहाथर्वमूर्ध्नि
 प्रोक्तः प्राच्या तदुक्त्या स्फुरति हरिरिहोपासनीयस्तदात्मा ।
 यद्वन्मध्वादिविद्यास्त्रितरसुरतनुस्रष्टृसृज्यादिभावः
 श्रौतस्त्वत्रापि तुल्यश्श्रुतमिह भसितं प्रस्तुतौपास्तिशेष ॥ ८९ ॥

प्रस्तुत्य रुद्रवपुषः पुरुषोत्तमस्य
 विद्यामथर्वशिरसीरितमङ्गमस्याः ।
 भस्मप्रसक्तिरितरत्र न चास्ति यद्व-
 त्सौत्रामणिप्रकरणस्थसुराग्रहस्य ॥ ९० ॥

Śrutvā Rudra-vacas tadīya-mahimastotrāya labdhodyamāḥ
 sarvaiśvaryam atharvamūrdhni yad api vyājahrire'syā' marāḥ |
 te'ntaryāmi-samādhi-hetava iha vyaktā hi Rudro'ktayaḥ
 tadyuktās tadanūktayas tu diviṣadvākās tadekāśayāḥ || 86

Oṃkāra-pūrvakatayā pratipāditāni
 nāmāntarāṇi nanu Rudrapurassarāṇi |
 Ātharvaṇe śirasi tāni tu na prasiddha-
 Rudreṣiṭṭvam upapādayitum kṣamante || 87

Samākhyāḥ prakrānta-praṇava-viṣayiṇyaḥ pratipadam
 niruktā Rudrādyā yad api hi Mahādeva-śirasaḥ |
 śruter ātharvaṇyāś śirasi tad idam tāravibhavam
 vyanakty oṃkāras syād uparitanavidyā-parikaraḥ || 88

Panthā bandhasya śānteḥ paśupati-bhajanam nanv ihā'
 tharvamūrdhni
 proktaḥ prācyā taduktyā sphurati harir iho'pāsanīyas tadātmā |
 yadvan madhvādi-vidyāsv itara-suratanusraṣṭṛ-srjyādibhāvaḥ
 śrautas tv atrā'pi tulyaś śrutam iha bhasitam prastutopāsti-
 śeṣaḥ || 89

Prastutya Rudra-vapuṣaḥ puruṣottamasya
 vidyām atharvaśirasī'ritam angam asyāḥ |
 bhasma-prasaktir itaratra na cā'sti yadvat
 sautrāmaṇi-prakaranastha-surāgrahasya || 90

आथर्वण्यां शिखायामगणि भगवतो या जनिः कारणैक-
 ध्येयत्वेदम्परायां जगदुपकृतये सोऽयमिच्छावतारः ।
 यद्विष्णोः कारणैकप्रवणफणितिभिः कारणत्वोपदेशः
 स्पष्टो दृष्टप्रयोगस्सुखजनकतया शम्भुशब्दोऽपि तस्मिन् ॥ ९१ ॥

उदितमुपासनद्वयमथर्वशिरश्शिखयोः
 स्फुटमपुनर्भवाय पुरवैरिकळेवरिणः ।
 कमलदृशः कचित्कचन कारणतत्त्वपर-
 श्रुतिविहितस्य हार्दसुषिमध्यजुषो विदुषः ॥ ९२ ॥

उक्तं केनचिदीश्वरः पुरुष इत्युक्ती शिवश्रीशयोः
 वर्तेते बहुशो महत्परमवाग्युक्ते वियुक्ते अपि ।
 इत्युत्कर्षनिकर्षगोचरपदव्याख्यातयोरेतयो-
 रुत्कर्षो गिरिशस्य वक्तुमुचितः पुंसः प्रधानादिव ॥ ९३ ॥

नैतत्साधु समाख्याया हि बलवद्वाक्यादिभग्नार्थया
 नोत्कर्षो गिरिशस्य वक्तुमुचितः केनापि देवेन्द्रवत् ।
 इन्द्रस्स्यात्परमेश्वरस्त्वितरथा तत्तत्समाख्यावशा-
 दाख्या हि प्रबलप्रमाणविहता तस्मिन्महावृक्षवत् ॥ ९४ ॥

किं जीवः पुरुषोक्तिगोचर इति श्रीशोऽपि तद्गोचरः
 जीवः स्याद्गिरिशो ध्रुवो भवति किं तौ स्थाणुसंज्ञाविति ।
 तक्षत्वाय घटेत किं मुखभुवामाचार्यसंशब्दनं
 मण्डूकत्वमुपैति किं हरिपदस्पर्शेन कण्ठीरवः ॥ ९५ ॥

Ātharvanyām śikhāyām agaṇi Bhagavato yā janiḥ kāraṇaika-
 dhyeyatvedamparāyām jagadupakṛtaye so'yam icchāvatāraḥ |
 yad viṣṇoh kāraṇaika-pravaṇa-phaṇitibhiḥ kāraṇatvo'padeśaḥ
 spaṣṭo dr̥ṣṭa-prayogas sukha-janakatayā śambhu-śabdo' pi
 tasmin || 91

Uditam upāsanadvayam atharva-śiraśśikhayoḥ
 sphuṭam apunarbhavāya puravairi-kalebariṇaḥ |
 kamala-dr̥ṣṭaḥ kvacit kvacana kāraṇatattva-para-
 śruti-vihitasya hārda-suṣi-madhyaja-juṣo viduṣaḥ || 92

Uktam kenacid īśvaraḥ puruṣa ity uktī śiva-śrīśayoḥ
 vartete bahuśo mahatparamavāgyukte viyukte api |
 ity utkarṣa-nikarṣagocara-pada-vyākhyātayor etayoḥ
 utkarṣo giriśasya vaktum ucitaḥ pumsaḥ pradhānād iva || 93

Nai'tat sādhu samākhyayā hi balavad vākyaādibhagnārthayā
 no' tkarṣo giriśasya vaktum ucitaḥ kena'pi devendravat |
 Indras syāt parameśvaras tv itarathā tattat-samākhyāvaśād
 ākhyā hi prabala-pramāṇa-vihatā tasmin mahā-vṛkṣavat || 94

Kim jīvaḥ puruṣoktīgocara iti śrīśo'pi tadgocaraḥ
 jīvas syād Giriśo dhruvo bhavati kiṁ tau sthāṇu-samjñāv iti |
 takṣatvāya ghaṭeta kim mukhabhuvām ācārya-saṁśabdanam
 maṇḍūkatvam upaiti kim haripada-sparśena kaṇṭhīravat || 95

प्राणाकाशमुखैः पदरूपनिषद्भागेषु जोषुष्यते
 किन्न ब्रह्मपरं परत्वगणना जागर्ति किं तावता ।
 प्राणाद्येषु शिवादिशब्दगदितं तच्चेत्परत्वं कुतः
 तत्तत्कारणवाक्यसिद्धभगवत्सृज्येषु रुद्रादिषु ॥ ९६ ॥

यदुपनिषद्भिरप्रथि परिव्रदिमा परमः
 कमलदृशो विशुद्धनयलब्धपरिष्कृतिभिः ।
 इतरगिरोऽनुरोद्धुमिदमेव घटन्त इति
 स्फुटमुपबृहयन्ति मुनयोऽपि मनुप्रमुखाः ॥ ९७ ॥

ऐदम्पर्यमपौरुषेयवचसामर्थेषु नैसर्गिकं
 साक्षादक्षरसिद्धिपर्यवसितस्स्वाध्यायविध्याशयः ।
 व्याहन्तोति वदन्ति ये जपविधिन्यायेन सन्तुष्यता-
 मायुष्मद्भिरनन्यलभ्यविषये शब्दस्समुज्जृम्भते ॥ ९८ ॥

यस्त्वार्षेष्वादिदम्पराश्श्रुतिगिरस्स्वाध्यायविध्याशया-
 दाचष्टे स विकल्पमर्हति विधिस्सार्थः किमास्थीयते ।
 यद्वा नर्थक इत्यनेन वचसा तुल्यत्वमासां गिरा-
 माद्ये स्यादितरत्र तत्प्रतिभटः किं स्यादकस्माद्विधिः ॥ ९९ ॥

यच्छ्रोतुर्गृहमेधिनो गुरुगृहे काष्ठोदकाद्याहति-
 व्यासक्तस्य न सम्भवत्यवसरस्तत्तत्स्वकर्मक्रमे ।
 स्याच्चेद्गुर्वनुवर्तनाद्यनुगुणः कुत्रावकाशो भवे-
 दित्युक्तं कतिमिच्छिदत्र कुशलैरित्थं समाधीयते ॥ १०० ॥

Prāṇākāśamukhaiḥ padair upaniṣad-bhāgeṣu joghuṣyate
 kin na Brahmaparam paratva-gaṇanā jāgarti kim tāvatā |
 prāṇādyeṣu śivādiśabda-gaditam tac cet paratvam kutaḥ
 tattatkāraṇa-vākya-siddha-bhagavat-sṛjyeṣu Rudrādiṣu || 96

Yad upaniṣadbhir aprathi paribradḍhimā paramah
 kamala-drśo viśuddha-naya-labdha-pariṣkṛtibhiḥ |
 itara-giro'nuroddhum idam eva ghaṭanta iti
 sphuṭam upabṛhmayanti munayo' pi Manu-pramukhāḥ || 97

Aidamparyam apauruṣeya-vacasām artheṣu naisargikam
 sākṣād akṣarasiddhi-paryavasitas svādhāya-vidhyāśayaḥ |
 vyāhantī'ti vadanti ye japavidhinyāyena santuṣyatām
 āyusmadbhir ananya-labhya-viṣaye śabdāḥ samujjṛmbhate || 98

Yas svārtheṣv anidamparās śruti-giras svādhyāyavidhyāśayād
 ācaṣṭe sa vikalpam arhati vidhis sārthaḥ kim āsthīyate |
 yadva' nārthaka ity anena vacasā tulyatvam āsām girām
 ādye syād itaratra tat pratibhaṭaḥ kim syād akasmād vidhiḥ || 99

Yac chrotur gr̥hamedhino guru-gr̥he kāṣṭhodakādyāhṛti-
 vyāśaktasya na sambhavaty avasaras tattatsvakarmakrame |
 syāc ced gurbanuvartanādyanugūṇaḥ kutrā'vakāśo bhaved
 ity uktam katibhiścid atra kuśalair ittham samādhiyate || 100

यद्वेदाक्षरराशिसिद्धयुपरतस्वाध्यायविध्याशय-
 स्तत्तन्मूलकशिष्यकृत्यविरतेर्लब्धावकाशः क्रियाः ।
 श्रोतुः श्रावयितुं येत्यवसरश्श्रोतुश्च सिद्धयेत्तथा
 स्नेहेन स्पृहया च वित्तयशसोऽशिष्यं गुरुः श्रावयेत् ॥ १०१ ॥

अर्चिरहसितपक्षानुदगयनाब्दमरुदकेन्दून् ।
 अपि वैद्युतवरुणेन्द्रप्रजापतीनातिवाहिकानाहुः ॥ १०२ ॥

शेषत्वं ननु दुःखमीक्षितमतो मुक्तेषु युक्तत्र त-
 न्मैवं माधवदास्यमौपनिषदं जागर्ति भूयः प्रियम् ।
 धर्मिग्राहकमानधिक्कृतमतस्तद्दुःखतासाधनं
 यद्वा तद्व्यतिरिक्तदास्यमसुखं साध्येत सिद्धं हि तत् ॥ १०३ ॥

वरदाह्वयमण्डनो मनीषी यतिवृन्दारकभागिनेयपौत्रः ।
 निगमन्तपयोधिकर्णधारो विदधे विश्वहिताय तत्त्वसारम् ॥ १०४ ॥

॥ वास्यवरदगुरुविरचितस्तत्त्वसारस्सम्पूर्णः
 श्री गोविन्दः प्रीयताम् ॥

Yad vedākṣara-rāśi-siddhyuparatas svādhyāya-vidhyāśayas
 tattanmūlaka-śiṣya-kṛtya-virater labdhāvakāśāḥ kriyāḥ |
 śrotuś śrāvayitur yathe'tyavasaraś śrotuś ca siddhyet tathā
 snehena sprhayā ca vittayaśasoś śiṣyam guruś śrāvayet || 101

Arcirahas-sitapakṣān udagayanābdamarudarkendūn |
 api vaidyuta-varuṇendra-prajāpatin ātivāhikān āhuh || 102

Śeṣatvam nanu duḥkham iksitam ato mukteṣu yuktan na tan
 mai'vam mādharma-dāsyam aupaniṣadam jāgarti bhūyaḥ
 priyam |
 dharmigrāhakamāna-dhikkṛtam atas tad duḥkhatāsādhnam
 yadvā tadvyatiriktadāsyam asukham sādhyeta siddham hi
 tat || 103

Varadāhvaya-maṇḍano maṇīṣī
 yatibṛndāraka-bhāgineya-pautraḥ
 nigamānta-payodhi-karṇadhāro
 vidadhe viśva-hitāya Tattvasāram || 104

Vatsya-Varadaguru-viracitas Tattvasāras sampūrṇaḥ ||

Śrī Govindaḥ prīyatām

VEDĀRTHA-SAMGRAHA

BY

BHAGAVAN RAMĀNUJA

EDITED WITH ENGLISH TRANSLATION AND NOTES

BY

R. RAMANUJACHARI, M.A.

AND

PANDIT K. SRINIVASACHARYA.

तदेतत्सकलस्य वस्तुजातस्यैककारणत्वं पितृहृदि निहितमज्ञानन्पुत्रः परस्पर-
विलक्ष्णेषु वस्तुषु अन्यस्य विज्ञानेन तदन्यविज्ञानस्याघटमानतां बुद्ध्या परिचोदयति
'कथन्नु भगवस्स आदेशः' इति ।

परिचोदितः पुनस्तदेव हृदि निहितं ज्ञानानन्दामलत्वैकैस्वरूपमपरिच्छेद्यमाहात्म्यं
सत्यसङ्कल्पत्वमिश्रैरनवधिकातिशयासङ्ख्येयकल्याणगुणगणैर्जुष्टमविकारस्वरूपं परं ब्रह्मैव
नामरूपविभागानर्हसूक्ष्मचिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरं खलीलायै स्वसङ्कल्पेनानन्तविचित्रस्थिरत्रस-
रूपजगत्संस्थानं स्वांशेनावस्थितमिति तज्ज्ञानेनास्य निखिलस्य ज्ञाततां ब्रुवन् लोकदृष्टं कार्य-
कारणयोरनन्यत्वं दर्शयितुं दृष्टान्तमाह—'यथा सोम्यैकेन मृत्पिण्डेन सर्वं मृण्मयं विज्ञातं
स्यात् वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्' इति । 'एकमेव मृद्व्यं स्वैक-

Not knowing the fact which the father has borne in mind, namely, that the entire collection of things has but a single cause and doubting the appropriateness involved in maintaining that by a knowledge of one thing among many differing from one another there results a knowledge of some other thing, the son raised the objection, "O Revered Sire! can there be such an *ādeśa* (controller)? What is it like?"

The Supreme Brahman Himself—who possesses as His essential nature knowledge, bliss and freedom from evil,¹¹ has immeasurable greatness and possesses hosts of qualities, such as owning a will that is ever fulfilled, which are auspicious, infinite and of unsurpassed excellence and who is essentially unchanging¹²—has for His body all the sentient and non-sentient things in a subtle form, i.e., in that state wherein they cannot be differentiated by names and forms. For the sake of sport (*līlā*) He assumes with the aid of His will the shape of the world constituted of infinite and wonderful things, movable and immovable; and (He) exists along with His modes (*amśa*). Therefore, by a knowledge of Brahman all things become known. To prove this (Uddālaka thinks it necessary) to elucidate the idea that he had all along borne in mind, namely, that the cause and the effect are non-different; and, for this purpose, when interrogated, he cites illustrations drawn from everyday experience.—“Just as, my dear boy, from (a knowledge of) one lump of clay whatever is made of clay becomes known, modifications and names being given to clay for the purpose of daily intercourse, clay alone being real . . .”¹³ That is to say.—Although, for the purpose of daily inter-

11. Knowledge (*jñāna*), bliss (*ānanda*) and freedom from evil (*amalatva*) are qualities that reveal the very essence of Brahman (*svarūpa-nirūpaka-dharmas*).

12. Brahman is essentially unchanging (*avikāra*) in so far as the *viśeṣya* element is concerned.

13. *Chānd. Up.* VI. i. 4.

देशेन नानाव्यवहारास्पदत्वाय यथा घटशरावादिनानासंस्थानावस्थारूपविकारापन्नं नानानाम-
धेयमपि मृत्तिकासंस्थानविशेषत्वात् मृद्व्यमेवेत्यमवस्थितम्, न वस्त्वन्तरमिति, यथा
मृत्पिण्डविज्ञानेन तत्संस्थानविशेषरूपघटशरादि सर्वं ज्ञातमेव भवति' इत्यर्थः ।

ततः कृत्स्नस्य जगतो ब्रह्मैककारणतामजानन्पुत्रः पृच्छति १ 'भगवांस्त्वेव मे
तद्वचीतु' १४ इति ।

ततः सर्वज्ञं सर्वशक्तिं ब्रह्मैव सर्वकारणमित्युपदिशन् स होवाच १६ 'सदेव सोम्ये-
दमग्र आसीत्, एकमेवाद्वितीयम्' १५ इति ।

अत्र 'इदम्' इति जगन्निर्दिष्टम् । 'अग्रे' इति च सृष्टेः पूर्वकालः ।
तस्मिन् काले जगतः सदात्मकतां 'सदेव' इति प्रतिपाद्य, तत्सृष्टिकालेऽप्यविशिष्टमिति
कृत्वा 'एकमेव' इति सदापन्नस्य जगतस्तदानीमविभक्तनामरूपतां प्रतिपाद्य, तत्प्रतिपाद-

course, one and the same substance, viz., clay, from out of a part of itself, undergoes modifications in the form of shapes, such as, the diverse configurations of jars, plates, and so forth, and acquires various names, yet, inasmuch as these things are the manifold modifications of the self-same substance, viz., clay, it is definitely established that it is only clay, and no other substance, which exists in these forms; and by a knowledge of a lump of clay all things, such as, jars and plates which are diverse configurations assumed by clay, become known.

Thereupon, the son (Śvetaketu), who does not understand how the entire universe has Brahman for its unitary source, entreates (his father thus): "May it please your reverence to explain it to me!" 14

Then, in order to show that the omniscient and omnipotent Brahman Himself is the cause of all things, the father says, "In the beginning, this, my dear boy, existed as *Sat* alone, which was one only, and without a second." 15

Here, the world is referred to by the word 'this' (*idam*); and the period of time prior to creation is signified by the expression 'in the beginning' (*agre*). By means of the expression 'Sat alone' (*Sadeva*) it is first pointed out that at this period the world existed as *Sat* (i.e., in the causal condition). Keeping in mind the fact that even in the period of creation the world continued to be so (i.e., to be *Sat*), it is next pointed out by the expression 'one only' (*ekameva*) that the world which was in the form of *Sat* was at that stage not differentiated by names and forms. Since by this assertion alone it is stated that *Sat*

14. *Chând. Up.* VI. i. 7.

15. *Chând. Up.* VI. ii. 2.

नेनैव सतो जगदुपादानत्वं प्रतिपादितमिति स्वव्यतिरिक्तनिमित्तकारणमद्वितीयपदेन प्रतिषिद्धमिति ।

‘तमादेशमप्राक्ष्यः येनाश्रुतं श्रुतं भवति’ इत्यादावेव प्रशासितैव जगदुपादानमिति हृदि निहितं इदानीं सुव्यक्तम्* । एतदेवोपपादयति—स्वयमेव जगदुपादानं जगन्निमित्तञ्च सत् ‘तदैक्षत बहु स्यां प्रजायेय’ इति ।

तदेतत्सच्छब्दवाच्यं परं ब्रह्मैव सर्वज्ञं सर्वशक्ति सत्यसङ्कल्पमवाप्तसमस्तकाममपि लीलार्थं ‘विचित्रानन्तचिदचिन्मिश्रजगद्रूपेणाहमेव बहु स्याम् तदर्थं प्रजायेय’ इति । स्वयमेव सङ्कल्प्य स्वांशैकदेशादेव वियदादिभूतानि सृष्ट्वा, पुनरपि सैव सच्छब्दाभिहिता परा

is the material cause of the world, the existence of an efficient cause other than *Sat* is excluded by the term ‘without a second’ (*advitīya*).

The idea that the Controller (*Prasāsita*) Himself is the material cause of the world—an idea which was borne in mind even at the very outset when the father put the question : “Did you ask about that *Ādeśa* by a knowledge of whom what was not heard becomes heard ?”—is now rendered explicit. The father explains this very idea more clearly by stating that *Sat* or Brahman which is in itself both the material and the efficient cause of the world “resolved ‘let me become manifold, let me be born as many’.”¹⁶

Although this Supreme Brahman who is referred to by the expression *Sat* is omniscient and omnipotent and has a will that is ever fulfilled, and although He possesses all objects that are desired, yet, for the sake of sport (*līlā*), He makes of His own accord the resolve “May I become manifold, in the shape of infinite entities, sentient and non-sentient, and may I, for that purpose, be born as many !” ; and creates¹⁷ ether and other elements from a part of matter (*prakṛti*) which is but a part (*aṁśa*) of Himself. Afterwards the same Supreme Lord (*Parā Devatā*),¹⁸ who is denoted by the word *Sat*, makes the further resolve “By entering into these three divinities (not directly, but indirectly) through the individual

* *Abhivyaktam* is a variant reading.

16. *Chānd. Up.* VI. ii. 3. “In the beginning, this, my dear boy, existed as *Sat* alone, which was one only and without a second” is taken by the Advaitins to deny all differences, *sajātīya*, *vijātīya* and *svagata*. Such an interpretation is hardly consistent with subsequent passages, such as “It resolved ‘let me become manifold . . .’”

17. The reference here is to *samaṣṭi sṛṣṭi*. At this stage Brahman enters into created things directly (*advāraka*).

18. This equation of *Sat* with *Parā Devatā* must clearly stand in the way of any attempt to distinguish the Absolute of philosophy from the God of religion.

देवता ऐक्षत—‘हन्ताऽहमिमास्तिस्रो देवता अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि’ इति । ‘अनेन जीवेन आत्मना’ इति जीवस्य ब्रह्मात्मकत्वं प्रतिपाद्य, ब्रह्मात्मकजीवानुप्रवेशादेव कृत्स्नस्याचिद्वस्तुनः पदार्थत्वम्, एवं भूतस्यैव सर्वस्य वस्तुनो* नामभाक्त्वमिति च दर्शयति ॥

एतदुक्तं भवति—जीवात्मा तु ब्रह्मणः शरीरतया प्रकारत्वात् ब्रह्मात्मकः ‘यस्या-
त्मा शरीरम्’ इति श्रुत्यन्तरात् । एवंभूतस्य जीवस्य शरीरतया प्रकारभूतानि देवमनुष्यादि-
संस्थानानि वस्तुनीति ब्रह्मात्मकानि तानि सर्वाणि । अतो देवो मनुष्यो यक्षो राक्षसः
पशुर्मृगः पक्षी वृक्षो लता काष्ठं शिला तृणं घटः पट इत्यादयः सर्वे प्रकृतिप्रत्यययोगेनाभि-

self, let me create distinctions of names and forms.”¹⁹ After conveying by the expression ‘anena jivena ātmanā’ the idea that the individual self has Brahman for its self (ātman), (the passage just cited) asserts that all non-sentient things acquire the character of being objects (*padārthatva*, i.e., come to possess their respective shapes) only because of the entry into them of the individual souls who have Brahman for their self, and that only such objects acquire distinctions of names.²⁰

This amounts to saying that the individual self has Brahman for its Self, since it is but a qualification (*prakāra*) of Brahman in the sense of being His body, and since another text explicitly declares “whose body the self is”. All (non-sentient) objects have Brahman for their self, because these objects, having the shapes of gods, men and so forth are the qualifications (*prakāra*), in the sense of bodies, of the individual self described just now (as being itself the *prakāra* of Brahman).

Hence, all words, such as god (*devaḥ*), man (*manuṣyaḥ*), *yakṣaḥ*, demon (*rākṣasaḥ*), animal (*paśuḥ*), beast (*mṛgaḥ*), bird (*pakṣī*), tree (*vṛkṣaḥ*), creeper (*latā*), wood (*kāṣṭham*), stone (*śilā*), grass (*tṛṇam*), jar (*ghaṭaḥ*) and cloth (*paṭaḥ*)—which are well known to refer to objects by virtue of the association of the stem (*prakṛti*) with suffix

अचिद्वस्तुनो (*Acidvastuno*) is a variant reading.

19. *Chānd. Up.* VI. iii. 2. The reference here is to *vyāṣṭi sṛṣṭi*. At this stage Brahman enters into created things indirectly (*sadvāraka*), through the finite self. It is sometimes contended that at *vyāṣṭi sṛṣṭi* Brahman may also enter directly into what He has created.

20. “*Vastuno nāmabhāktvam iti*” has been preferred to “*vastuno nāmarūpa-bhāktvam iti*” found in all the printed editions; because the previous statement that “all non-sentient things acquire *padārthatva* . . .” means that they acquired distinctions of forms (*rūpa*), and it would be needless to refer to that again in the next passage. Further, in commenting on this passage, *Sudarśanācārya* refers in his *Tātparya Dipika* only to distinctions of names. Cf. “*tat paryantasyaiva devādi nāma-bhāktvam cetyāha evambhūtasyaiveti.*”

धायकतया प्रसिद्धाशब्दा लोके तत्तद्वाच्यतया प्रतीयमानतत्तत्संस्थानवस्तुमुखेन तदभिमानि-
जीवतदन्तर्यामिपरमात्मपर्यन्तस्य सङ्घातस्थैव वाचका इति ॥

एवं समस्तचिदचिदात्मकप्रपञ्चस्य सदुपादानता सन्निमित्तता सदाधारता सन्नियाम्यता
सच्छेषतादि सर्वं च 'सन्मूलाः सोम्येमाः प्रजास्सदायतनास्सत्प्रतिष्ठाः'^{२१} इत्यादिना विस्त-
रेण प्रतिपाद्य कार्यकारणभावादिमुखेन 'ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वं तत्सत्यम्' इति कृत्स्नस्य जगतो
ब्रह्मात्मकत्वमेव सत्यमिति प्रतिपाद्य, कृत्स्नस्य जगतः स एवात्मा, कृत्स्नं जगत्तस्य शरीरम्,
तस्मात्वंशब्दवाच्यमपि जीवप्रकारं ब्रह्मैव इति जीवविशेष उपसंहृतम् ।

एतदुक्तं भवति 'ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वम्, इति चेतनाचेतनप्रपञ्चं 'इदं सर्वम्' इति

(*pratyaya*)—first denote objects having various shapes which are made out to be the meanings of the respective words. Thereby they signify an aggregate of entities including the individual self, who controls those things (*tadabhimāni*), and extending as far as the Supreme Self, who is the Inner Controller of the individual self.

Thus, in the passage commencing with the statement, "All things that originate, my dear boy, have their origin in *Sat* and have *Sat* for their support, and are absorbed in *Sat*",²¹ it is first established that the entire world composed of sentient and non-sentient things has *Sat* for its material cause, *Sat* for its efficient cause, *Sat* for its support, and is directed by *Sat* and is wholly subservient to *Sat*. Then, in the passage—"All this has *Sat* for its Self, this is true"²²—it is proclaimed, on the ground that the relation of Brahman to the world is the relation of cause and effect, (the supporter and the supported) and so forth, that the following view alone is true, namely, that the entire world has Brahman for its Self." Finally, in the text "that thou art" (*tat tvam asi*) the proposition enunciated earlier, namely, "All things have Brahman for their Self", which conveys the idea that Brahman Himself is the Soul of the entire world, that the whole world is His body, and that, consequently, even the thing denoted by the word 'thou' (*tvam*) is really Brahman who has the individual self for His mode (*prakāra*)—is applied to a particular finite self (i.e., *Śvetaketu*).

What has been said comes to this :—In the passage, "All this has That (*Sat*) for its Self" (*aitadātmyam idam sarvam*), the world consisting of sentient and non-sentient things is referred to by the expression

21. *Chānd. Up.* VI, viii. 4.

22. *Chānd. Up.* VI, viii. 6.

निर्दिश्य तस्य प्रपञ्चस्यैष आत्मा इति प्रतिपादितः; प्रपञ्चोद्देशेन ब्रह्मात्मकत्वं प्रतिपादितमित्यर्थः तदिदं ब्रह्मात्मकत्वं किमात्मशरीरभावेन ? उत स्वरूपेण ? इति विवेचनीयम् । स्वरूपेणेति चेत्, ब्रह्मणस्सत्यसङ्कल्पत्वादयः ‘तदैक्षत बहु स्यां प्रजायेय, इत्युपक्रमावगता बाधिता भवन्ति । शरीरात्मभावेन च तदात्मकत्वं श्रुत्यन्तराद्विशेषतोऽवगतम् । ‘अन्तः प्रविष्टः शास्ता जनानां सर्वात्मा’ इति । प्रशासितृत्वरूपात्मत्वेन सर्वेषां जनानामन्तः प्रविष्टः अतः सर्वात्मा सर्वेषां जनानामात्मा ; सर्वज्ञास्य शरीरमिति विशेषतो ज्ञायते । ‘य आत्मनि

‘all this’ (*idam sarvam*),²³ and then it is declared that He is the soul of this world. In other words, in respect of the world Brahman is said to be its Self.

It has (now) to be determined whether the *Brahmātmakatva* just now referred to is based on the relation of soul to the body or on identity (of Brahman and the world). Should it be said that it is one of identity, then qualities, such as the possession of a will that is ever realised, which are learnt at the very outset in the passage, “It resolved ‘may I become manifold, and may I be born as many’,” would become contradicted.²⁴ That *Brahmātmakatva* is based on the relation of the soul to the body is specifically learnt from other scriptural texts. (For example) “Entering within and ruling over all things that are born, He is the Self of all.”²⁵ From this passage it is learnt specifically that He has entered into all things that are born as their Self in the sense of His being their Ruler, and it is also specifically learnt He is, therefore, spoken of as “the Self of all” (*sarvātmā*). *Sarvātmā* means “He is the Self of all things ; and all things constitute His body”. (Yet another text is :—)

23. It is contended that ‘aitadātmīyam idam sarvam’ teaches the oneness of Brahman and the material world, while ‘tat tvam asi’ speaks of the identity of Brahman and the jīva. But there is little warrant for interpreting ‘idam sarvam’ to refer to material nature alone. Hence, it is here insisted that ‘idam sarvam’ signifies the world consisting of sentient and non-sentient things.

24. *Satyasaṃkalpatva* (the possession of a will that is ever realised) cannot be attributed to Brahman so long as it is identified with the jīva or with matter ; for the jīva, being subject to karma, cannot be said to possess *satyaṣaṃkalpatva*. As for matter, it has no will at all.

25. *Tait. Up. III. 24*. Whatever enters into another cannot be treated as its Self ; for ether which is all-pervasive is not considered the self of what it pervades. Again, whatever exercises sway over another cannot be called the self of the latter ; for, obviously, the king is never treated as the self of his subjects. Thus, both the *antah-praveśa* (entry within) and *prāśāsana* (control) are essential elements in the definition of the self.

तिष्ठन्नात्मनोऽन्तरो यमात्मा न वेद यस्यात्मा शरीरं य आत्मानमन्तरो यमयति स त आत्मान्तर्याम्यमृतः' इति च । अत्रापि 'अनेन जीवेनात्मा, इति इदमेव ज्ञायत इति पूर्वमेवोक्तम् । अतस्सर्वस्य चिदचिद्वस्तुनो ब्रह्मशरीरत्वात्सर्वशरीरं सर्वप्रकारं सर्वशब्दैर्ब्रह्मैवाभिधीयत इति 'तत्' 'त्वं' इति सामानाधिकरण्येन जीवशरीरतया जीवप्रकारं ब्रह्मैवाभिहितम् । एवमभिहिते सति अयमर्थो ज्ञायते - त्वं इति यः पूर्वं देहाधिष्ठातृतया प्रतीतः स परमात्मशरीरतया परमात्मप्रकारभूतः परमात्मपर्यन्तः पृथक्स्थितिप्रवृत्त्यनर्हः । अतः 'त्वं' इति त्वत्प्रकार-विशिष्टं त्वदन्तर्यामिणमेवाचष्ट इति । 'अनेन जीवेनात्मनाऽनुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि' इति ब्रह्मात्मकत्वैव जीवस्य शरीरिणः स्वनामभाक्त्वात् 'तत् त्वं' इति सामानाधिकरण्यप्रवृत्तयोर्द्वयोरपि पदयोर्ब्रह्मैव वाच्यम् । तत् तत्पदं जगत्कारणभूतं सकलकल्याणगुणाकरं निरवयं

"He who stands in the self, he who is within the self, whom the self does not know, of whom the self is the body, He who directs the self from within—He is thy Self, the Inner Ruler, the Immortal." ²⁶ It has already been pointed out that here also (i.e., in the *Chândogya*) the same idea (as is conveyed in the texts quoted from the other upaniṣads) is learnt from the passage beginning with '*anena jīvena ātmanā*' (through the individual self). Hence, for the reason that all things, sentient and non-sentient, constitute His body, Brahman Himself, who has all things as His body, and as His modes, is denoted by all words. Therefore, by means of the equation contained in *Tat tvam asi* Brahman Himself who has the individual self for His mode is referred to, because He has the self for His body.

When this statement is made (*Tat tvam asi*), what has to be understood is this.—The individual self who was at first understood by the term *tvam* as the controller of the body is but a mode of the Supreme Self in virtue of His being the body of that Supreme Self; he finds his completion in the Supreme Self and is incapable of either existing or acting independently of Brahman. Therefore the term 'thou' (*tvam*) means really Him who is the Inner Controller within thee and who is associated with thee as His mode. Since according to the passage—"After entering (the three divinities) through the individual self, let me create distinctions of names and forms"—the individual self associated with the body acquires his name only by reason of having Brahman for his Self, what is intended to be conveyed by both the words (*tat* and *tvam*) which are put in apposition is really Brahman (Himself). Of the two, *tat* signifies Brahman who is the cause of the universe, who is the

ब्रह्माचष्टे 'त्वम्' इति च तदेव ब्रह्म जीवान्तर्यामिरूपेण स्वशरीरजीवप्रकारविशिष्टमाचष्टे । तदेवं प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तभेदेव एकस्मिन्ब्रह्मण्येव तत् 'त्वं' इति द्वयोः पदयोर्वृत्तिरुक्ता । ब्रह्मणो निरवद्यत्वं निर्विकारत्वं सर्वकल्याणगुणाकरत्वं जगत्कारणत्वञ्चावाधितम् ।

अश्रुतवेदान्ताः पुरुषाः सर्वे जीवात्मानश्च ब्रह्मात्मका इति न पश्यन्ति । सर्वशब्दानाञ्च केवलेषु तत्तत्पदार्थेषु वाच्यैकदेशेषु वाच्यपर्यवसानं मन्यन्ते । श्रुतवेदान्तास्तु वेदान्तवाक्यश्रवणेन ब्रह्मकार्यतया तदन्तर्यामितया च सर्वस्य ब्रह्मात्मकत्वं सर्वशब्दानां तत्प्रकारसंस्थितब्रह्मवाचित्वञ्च जानन्ति ।

नन्वेवं गवादिशब्दानां तत्तत्पदार्थवाचितया व्युत्पत्तिर्बाधिता स्यात् । नैवम् । सर्वे

seat of all auspicious qualities, who is without any taint and without any change ; and *tvam* also denotes the same Brahman viewed as the Inner Controller of the individual self and as being associated with the *jīva*, who is a mode of Himself and who constitutes His body. Thus, it is pointed out that the two words *tat* and *tvam* denote one and the same entity, i.e., Brahman, but in two different aspects. (This interpretation accords best with the definition of *sāmānādhikarāṇya*). Besides, the qualities of Brahman, such as freedom from taint and changelessness, His being the seat of all auspicious qualities and the cause of the universe—these are not contradicted (as they would have to be on the theory which seeks to equate *tat* and *tvam* on the basis of identity, and which makes Brahman the seat of *avidyā*).

Persons who have not understood the Vedānta fail to realise that all inanimate things and all individual selves have Brahman for their Self. Further, they consider that the words refer only to their respective objects which are only a part of what those terms really signify. On the other hand, persons well versed in the Vedānta, after listening to discourses on upaniṣadic passages (from a competent *guru*) realise that all objects have Brahman for their Self, since they are the effects of Brahman and since they have Brahman for their Inner Controller ; they also realise that all words denote Brahman who has for His modes the objects signified by the respective terms.

It may be objected that, on such a view, the common understanding of words, such as 'cow' (*gau*) as denotative of their respective objects would be falsified. The reply to this objection is "It is not so". In commenting upon the text '*nāma rupe vyākaraṇāni . . .*' (let me dis-

शब्दा अचिज्जीवविशिष्टस्य परमात्मनो वाचका इत्युक्तं 'नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि' इत्यत्र । तत्र लौकिकास्तु पुरुषाः शब्दं व्याहरन्तः शब्दवाच्ये प्रधानांशस्य परमात्मनः प्रत्यक्षाद्य-परिच्छेद्यत्वाद्वाच्यैकदेशभूते वाच्यसमाप्तिं मन्यन्ते । वेदान्तश्रवणेन च व्युत्पत्तिः पूर्यते । एवमेव वैदिकास्सर्वे शब्दाः परमात्मपर्यन्तान् स्वार्थान् बोधयन्ति । वैदिका एव सर्वे शब्दा वेदादेवोद्धृत्योद्धृत्य परेणैव ब्रह्मणा सर्वपदार्थान् पूर्ववत्सृष्ट्वा तेषु परमात्मपर्यन्तेषु पूर्ववन्नामतया प्रयुक्ताः । तदाह मनुः.....

‘सर्वेषां तु स नामानि कर्माणि विविधानि च ।

वेदशब्देभ्य एवादौ पृथक्संस्थाश्च निर्ममे’॥ २८ इति ।

संस्थाः—संस्थानानि रूपाणीति यावत् । आह च भगवान्पराशरः

‘नामरूपञ्च भूतानां कृत्यानाञ्च प्रपञ्चितम् ।

वेदशब्देभ्य एवादौ देवादीनां चकार सः’२९॥ इति ॥

tinguish by names and forms), it has already been pointed out that all words denote the Supreme Self who is in association with non-sentient objects and individual selves. For the reason that of these three the primary part, namely, the Supreme Self, is beyond the reach of perception and other means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) based thereon, laymen (i.e. those unacquainted with Vedānta-śāstra), however, when they employ words, believe that the significance of each word ends with the particular object which is but a part of its total signification. But the understanding of the significance of words becomes complete only on hearing the Vedānta (expounded by a competent *guru*). Similarly, all the words found in the Veda reveal as their respective meanings what extend as far as the Supreme Self. All words, in fact, belong to the Veda.²⁷ After creating all things as before (as in the previous *kalpa*), and then taking all words one after another from the Veda itself, they were employed, as of old, by the Supreme Brahman Himself as names of several objects which find their completion in Brahman. Manu has expressed the same idea thus.—“From the words of the Veda itself He (i.e., the Lord) created in the beginning the diverse names and varied activities as also the manifold shapes (*samsthā*).²⁸ Here the term *samsthā* means *samsthānaḥ*, that is, shapes or configurations. The revered Parāśara also says:—In the beginning He fixed from the Vedic words themselves the diverse names and forms of all beings commencing from the divinities and also

27. Compare Lokavedādhikaraṇa in *Pūr. Mīmāṃsā Sūtra*, I. iii. 9.

28. *Manu Smṛti*, I. 20.

श्रुतिश्च....

‘सूर्याचन्द्रमसौ धाता यथा पूर्वमकल्पयत्’ इति । सूर्यादीन् पूर्ववत् परिकल्प्य नामानि च पूर्ववच्चकारेत्यर्थः ।

एवं जगद्ब्रह्मणोरनन्यत्वं प्रपञ्चितम् । तेनैकेन ज्ञातेन सर्वस्य ज्ञातता उपपादिता भवति । सर्वस्य ब्रह्मकार्यत्वप्रतिपादनेन तदात्मकतयैव सत्यत्वं नान्यथेति ‘तत्सत्यम्’ इत्युक्तम् ; यथा दृष्टान्ते सर्वस्य मृद्विकारस्य मृदात्मनैव सत्यत्वम् ।

शोधकवाक्यान्यपि निरवद्यं सर्वकल्याणगुणाकरं परं ब्रह्म शोधयन्ति । सर्व-प्रत्यनीकाकरताबोधनेऽपि तत्तत्प्रत्यनीकाकरतायां भेदस्यावर्जनीयत्वान्न निर्विशेषवस्तु—सिद्धिः ।

the wide range of their functions”.²⁹ The Veda also declares, “The Sustainer created the sun and the moon as before (as in the previous *kalpa*).”³⁰ It means that the Lord, after creating the sun and the moon as in the previous epoch, assigned to them names as before. In this manner the non-difference of Brahman and the world has been expounded.

Hence the proposition is established that by knowing that one thing (i.e., Brahman) all things become known. From the teaching that all things are the effects of Brahman, it follows that they are constituted of Brahman (*Brahmātmaka*); on this ground and on no other, do all things become real ;³¹ that is why it is declared *tat satya* (it is real); as in the example cited,³² all the modifications of clay are real solely because they are constituted of clay (*mṛtātmaka*).

Those texts also which attempt to determine the nature of Brahman (*śodhaka-vākya*) establish the Supreme Brahman as one in whom all auspicious qualities abide and one who is taintless. Even on the view that they teach that Brahman is opposed to the negative of each of the features suggested by the terms, it is impossible for these texts to establish a distinctionless entity, because distinction is bound to arise in respect of the several features negated.

29. *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, I. v. 63.

30. *Tait. Up.* IV. 1.

31. The world is real precisely because it has Brahman for its Ātman, and not on its own right.

32. The examples of clay, iron and copper adduced by the father are instances of causal substances undergoing genuine change (*pariṇāma*) and giving rise to real effects. It is interesting to note that the rope-snake illustration suggestive of the phenomenality of the effects and the fictitious character of causal change is nowhere employed.

BODHAVIMARSA

BY

V. SUBRAMANYA SASTRI.

एवं प्रातिपदिकार्थव्यतिरिक्तः सुबर्थलिङ्गसंख्याव्यतिरिक्तश्च सर्वोऽपि भावनायामन्वेति इत्युक्तावपि तत्तत्पदार्थस्य भावनायां भिन्नभिन्नसम्बन्धेनैवान्वयो वाच्यः । लङ्गर्थस्यैव वर्तमानकालस्य पचतोत्यादौ आधेयतासंबन्धेन, नश्यतीत्यत्र स्ववृत्त्युत्पत्तिकनाशनिरूपितत्वसंबन्धेनान्वयेन तत्तत्संस्पर्गकबोधे तादृशतादृशसमभिव्याहारज्ञानस्य हेतुत्वं कल्पनीयमिति अनन्ताः कार्यकारणभावाः प्रसज्यन्त एव । नच घटवह्न्यमित्यत्रेव शाब्दबोधे सर्वत्र संबन्धः संबन्धत्वेनैव संसर्गमर्यादया भासते । पश्चात् प्रमाणान्तरादेव संसर्गविशेषावगतिरिति न संसर्गभेदेन कारणताभेद इत्युक्तमिति वाच्यम् । संसर्गः विशेषरूपेणैव संसर्गमर्यादया भासते न संबन्धत्वेन सामान्यरूपेण । स्पष्टञ्चैतत् गदाधरीये प्रथमस्वलक्षणे । शाब्दबोधः विशिष्यैव संबन्धावगाहीति संसर्गभेदेन कार्यकारणभावभेदः अवर्जनीय एव । मतुवर्थसंबन्धी । वैयाकरणैरपि तथैवार्थनिरूपणात् । एवञ्च घटवह्न्यमित्यत्र संबन्धः प्रकार इति संबन्धत्वेन भाने न कापि क्षतिः । पर्वतो वह्निमानिति वाक्याद्वह्निसंबन्धी पर्वतः इति बोधो जायते । तत्र च संबन्धत्वेन प्रकारतया संबन्धो भासते इति संबन्धविशेषस्याज्ञानाद्युक्त एव केन संबन्धेन वह्निमानिति जिज्ञासोदयः ।

अपि च सर्वत्र संबन्धसामान्यसंसर्गकशाब्दबाधानन्तरं प्रवृत्त्यादिनिर्वाहाय संसर्गविशेषावगाही मानसो बोध इष्यते मीमांसकैः । एवञ्च शाब्दबोधसमनन्तरक्षणे न प्रवृत्तिः अपि तु विलम्बेनेति कल्पनीयम् । एवं सर्वत्र मानसबोधकल्पने तेनैव शाब्दबोधफलनिर्वाहात्संबन्धसामान्यसंसर्गकः शाब्दबोध एव निरर्थक इति शब्दप्रामाण्यमेव विलीयेत । किञ्च पदादनुपस्थितोऽर्थः आकांक्षाबलात्संसर्गतया भासते इति स्थितिः । यत्र सकलविभक्त्यन्तपदघटितं वाक्यं तत्र सर्वेषां विभक्त्यर्थानां स्वनिरूपकधात्वर्थघटितेन परम्परासंबन्धेन भावनायामन्वयः स्वीकृतस्तैः । तत्र धातूपस्थापित एवार्थः अनेकधा परम्परासंबन्धघटकतया भासते । एवं सुबर्थसंख्यायाः तदर्थे परम्परासंबन्धः इति प्रायः गुरुभूतपरम्परासंबन्धावगाही बोधः । चैत्रः सुन्दरः इत्यादौ प्रतिपिपादयिषिताभेदः मानसबोधविषय इति शाब्दानन्तरक्षणे विषयान्तरसञ्चारानुभवविरोधश्च । एतेषां पर्यालोचनमेव साक्षात्संबन्धावगाहिनं सति संभवे प्रथमान्तार्थमुख्यविशेष्यकं बोधमङ्गीकारयति । अपि च

सामान्यतः संबन्धसंसर्गकशाब्दबोधानन्तरं यो जायते संसर्गविशेषावगाही मानसो बोधः तत्र तादृशसमभिव्याहारस्य तादृशानुपूर्वीकवाक्यजन्यशाब्दबोधस्य वा कारणत्वमवश्यकल्पनीयम् । अन्यथा मानसबोधे संसर्गविशेषभाननियमो न स्यात् । तथाच कार्यकारणभावानन्त्यमापतति । न हि शाब्दबोधनिरूपितकारणतानन्त्यमेव दोषः न मानसबोधनिरूपितकारणतानन्त्यमित्यत्र नियामकमस्ति । नच कार्यकारणभावकल्पनालाघवेन भावनामुख्यविशेष्यकं बोधे सिद्धे तदनुरोधिमानसबोधनिरूपितकारणतानन्त्यं न दोषः फलमुखत्वादिति वाच्यम् । प्रयोगातिप्रसङ्गाप्रसङ्गाप्रयोजकस्य साक्षात्संबन्धेन तत्र तत्र तत्तत्पदार्थावगाहिनश्शाब्दबोधस्यानुभवसिद्धत्वात्तद्व्यापककार्यकारणभावानन्त्यमपि न दोषः फलमुखत्वात् । अनुभवसिद्धबोधानुसारेण व्युत्पत्तयः कल्प्यन्ते । न तु व्युत्पत्त्यनुसारेण बोधः शिक्ष्यते । आरोपे सति निमित्तानुसरणं न तु निमित्तमस्तीत्यारोपः इति ह्यभियुक्ता वदन्ति । न च बोधानुरोधेन व्युत्पत्तिनानात्वस्वीकारे राजपुरुषः इत्यत्रापि विनैव लक्षणां नामार्थयोरिति व्युत्पत्तिं संकोच्य राजपदार्थस्यैव स्वस्वामिभावसंबन्धेन पुरुषपदार्थेऽन्वयः कुतो न स्वीक्रियते इति वाच्यम् । यतः राजप्रकारकं स्वत्वसंसर्गकं पुरुषविशेष्यकं बोधं राजपुरुषः इति समस्तपदादनुभवन्तो जगदीशभट्टाचार्याः समासस्थले नामार्थयोरपि भेदान्वयव्युत्पत्तिं स्वीकुर्वन्ति । लिङः समभिव्याहृतपदोपस्थापितकामनाविषयतावच्छेदकत्वोपलक्षितधर्मावच्छिन्नसाधनत्वे शक्तिस्वीकारेण यजेत स्वर्गकामः इत्यत्र लिङैव स्वर्गसाधनत्वबोधसंभवात् न स्वर्गपदार्थस्य लिङर्थैकदेशे इष्टेऽभेदान्वयव्युत्पत्तिः स्वीकरणीया प्रसज्यते । उक्तञ्च नागेशभट्टैः लघुमञ्जूषायां तिङर्थनिरूपणे “तत्तद्व्युत्पत्त्यनुसारेण तथा तथा बोधस्य तेषां तेषां जायमानत्वेन तथा तथा कार्यकारणभावानां सर्वेषामावश्यकत्वेन तल्लाघवगौरवविचारस्यायुक्तत्वात्” इति ॥

चैत्र एव पचतीत्यत्र चैत्रः पाकानुकूलकृतिमान् चैत्रान्यः पाकानुकूलकृत्यभाववानिति बोधः । मुख्यविशेष्यभेदाद्वाक्यभेदः इष्यते एव । चैत्रवृत्तिश्चैत्रान्यावृत्तिश्चैककर्तृका भावना इति बोधस्वीकारे चैत्रे मैत्रे च पचति सति चैत्र एव पचति इति प्रयोगापत्तिः । भावनापदार्थः कृतिः । सा च चैत्रनिष्ठा मैत्रनिष्ठा च भिन्नभिन्नेति चैत्रनिष्ठायां पाकानुकूलकृतौ चैत्रान्यावृत्तित्वस्याबाधात् । अस्मन्मते तु न कोऽप्यतिप्रसङ्गः संभवति ।

प्रथमान्तार्थमुख्यविशेष्यकबोधस्वीकारे चैत्रः कीदृशः इति प्रश्ने पचतीत्युत्तरं न सङ्गच्छते । घटः कस्मादिति पृष्टे दण्डादित्युत्तरयन्ति । न तु दण्डजन्य इति । घटत्वावच्छिन्ने जिज्ञासितधर्मावच्छिन्नजन्यत्वप्रकारकं बोधं जनयति प्रश्नवाक्यम् । उत्तरवाक्यमपि घटत्वावच्छिन्ने जिज्ञासितदण्डत्वावच्छिन्ननिरूपितपञ्चम्यर्थजन्यत्वप्रकारकबोधं जनयति । दण्डजन्य इति तु नोत्तरं तेन घटत्वावच्छिन्ने दण्डजन्यत्वावच्छिन्नप्रकारकभेदसंसर्गकबोधजननेऽपि आश्रयतासंसर्गकजन्यत्वप्रकारकबोधाजननात् । एतेन स्पष्टं जानीमः प्रश्नवाक्यं जिज्ञासितधर्मावच्छिन्नीयतत्संबन्धसंसर्गकबोधजनकमेवोत्तरवाक्यमिति । जिज्ञासितपदार्थस्य संसर्गो येन गम्यते । तदुत्तरमिति प्रोक्तमन्यदाभासशब्दितम् ॥ इत्यस्याप्ययमेवार्थः । चैत्रः कीदृश इति प्रश्नवाक्यं हि चैत्रविशेष्यकं जिज्ञासितधर्मावच्छिन्नप्रकारकभेदसंसर्गकं बोधं प्रसूते । उत्तरवाक्येनापि अभेदसंसर्गकबोधजनकेनैव भाव्यम् । चैत्रः पचतीति वाक्यात् आख्यातार्थकृतिप्रकारकः समवायसंसर्गको बोधो जायते । नत्वभेदसंसर्गकः । चैत्रः पाचकः इति वाक्यात् अभेदसंसर्गकः कृत्यवच्छिन्नप्रकारकः शाब्दबोधो जायते इति भवति तदुत्तरं कीदृशश्चैत्र इति प्रश्नस्य ।

न चेदेवं भावनाविशेष्यकबोधस्वीकारेऽपि कीदृशो कृतिरिति प्रश्नस्य चैत्रः पचतीत्युत्तरं स्यात् । नच स्त्रीलिङ्गविशिष्टकृतिबोधकस्य प्रश्नस्य तादृशलिङ्गविशिष्टकृतिबोधकमेवोत्तरम् । आख्यातार्थकृतेः लिङ्गानन्वयित्वाल्लिङ्गानास्कन्दितकृतिबोधकं पचतीति वाक्यं नोत्तरमिति वाच्यम् । कृतिरित्यत्र बाधेन स्त्रीत्वस्य बोधासंभवात् । यदितु वैयाकरणरोत्या शब्दनिष्ठस्य स्त्रीत्वस्य बोधः स्त्रीक्रियते । तदापि प्रश्नवाक्ये लिङ्गस्याविवाक्षितत्वे लिङ्गाबोधकस्याप्युत्तरवाक्यत्वे क्षत्यभावात् पचतोत्युत्तरापत्तिर्दुर्वारैव । अस्सदुक्तप्रकारादरे तु न कस्यापि दोषस्यावसरः । अनयैव सरण्या कीदृशौ चैत्रतदन्याविति प्रश्ने चैत्र एव पचतीत्युत्तरापत्तिः परिहरणीया । एवञ्च सति संभवे प्रथमान्तपदप्रयोगे प्रथमान्तार्थमुख्यविशेष्यक एव बोधः संगच्छते ॥

ननु प्रथमान्तार्थस्य मुख्यविशेष्यत्वे कथं पश्य मृगो धावतीत्येकं वाक्यम् । मृगस्य दर्शनकर्मतयान्वये च कुतो न मृगपदाद्वितीयेति चेन्न ।

धावति मृगः इत्यवान्तरवाक्यबोध्यस्य धावनविशिष्टस्य मृगस्य कर्मतया दर्शने-

ऽन्वयः । दर्शनञ्च आख्यातार्थे आश्रयत्वे तच्चाध्याहृतत्वंपदार्थेऽन्वेति इत्येकमुख्यविशेष्यकबोधजनकत्वात्पश्य मृगो धावतीत्येकं वाक्यम् । वाक्यार्थस्य कर्मतासंबन्धेन (भेदसंबन्धेन) दर्शनक्रियायामन्वयोऽपि न व्युत्पत्तिविरुद्धः । व्युत्पत्तेः नामार्थविषयकत्वेन वाक्यार्थविषयकत्वाभावात् । नचैवं सति नीलरूपविशिष्टघटस्य ज्ञानकर्मत्वे प्रतिपिपादयिषिते सति नीलो घटो जानातीति प्रयोगः स्यात् । नीलं घटं जानातीति प्रयोगश्च न स्यात् । नीलविशिष्टघटस्य वाक्यार्थत्वेन तद्बोधकात् द्वितीयाया अप्रसक्तेरिति वाच्यम् । विशिष्टस्य ज्ञानकर्मत्वतात्पर्येण नीलो घटो जानातीति प्रयोग इष्ट एव । नीलं घटं जानातीति वाक्यात् विशेष्ये विशेषणं तत्र च विशेषणान्तरमिति रीत्यैव शाब्दबोधः । यदात्वस्माद्वाक्यानीलविशिष्टघटकर्मकज्ञानशाब्दबोधः । तदा घटपटस्य नीलविशिष्टे लक्षणा । नीलपदं तात्पर्यग्राहकम् । एवञ्च विशिष्टबोधकस्य पदत्वात्तदुत्तरं द्वितीया उपपद्यते । वाक्यार्थस्य कर्मतयान्वयादेव ‘जानामि सीता जनकप्रसूता’ ‘श्रुत्वा ममैतन्माहात्म्यं तथाचोत्पत्तयः शुभाः’ इत्यादयः प्रयोगाः साधु संगच्छन्ते । एवञ्च पश्य मृगो धावतीत्यत्र वाक्यैकवाक्यता सिद्धा । एवमेव ‘देवाकर्णय संग्रामे चापेनासादिताश्शराः’ इत्यादावपि वाक्यैकवाक्यता बोध्या ।

यदि च पदैकवाक्यतैवात्र महाभाष्यसिद्धेति ब्रूयात् । तदा धावत्यर्थान्वितस्य मृगस्य प्रथमान्तार्थस्य विषयतापर्यवसितेन कर्मतासंबन्धेन दर्शनक्रियायामन्वयः । तस्य चाध्याहृतत्वं — पदार्थेऽन्वय इति पदैकवाक्यता सूत्रपादैव । नच तण्डुलस्य कर्मतासंबन्धेन धात्वर्थपाकेऽन्वयतात्पर्येण तण्डुलः पचतीति प्रामाणिकप्रयोगवारणाय नामार्थधात्वर्थयोः साक्षाद्भेदेनानन्वयव्युत्पत्तेः स्वीकरणीयतया मृगस्य विषयतासंबन्धेन दर्शनेऽन्वयो न संभवतीति वाच्यम् । आख्यातार्थाविशेषितनामार्थधात्वर्थयोरेव भेदेन साक्षादनन्वय इति व्युत्पत्तिस्वरूपम् । तण्डुलस्य आख्यातार्थाविशेषितस्य कर्मतासंबन्धेन पाकेऽन्वयो न संभवतीति न तण्डुलः पचतीति वाक्यं प्रामाणिकम् । धावतीत्याख्यातार्थधावनकर्तृत्वान्वितस्य मृगस्य नामार्थस्यापि कर्मतासंबन्धेन दर्शनक्रियायामन्वयो युज्यत एव । स्पष्टञ्चैतत् प्रतिज्ञालक्षणविवरणे कृष्णभट्टीये । पश्य लक्ष्मण पम्पायां बकः परमधार्मिकः इत्यत्रापि अस्तीति क्रियापदस्याध्याहारात् तादृशक्रियाकर्तृत्वान्वितस्यैव बकस्य नामार्थस्य दर्शनक्रियायामन्वयान्न कोऽपि

व्युत्पत्तिविरोधः । दृश्यते च व्युत्पत्तिवैचित्र्येण प्रथमान्तार्थस्यापि कर्मतासंबन्धेन कर्मत्वान्त-
रविशेषणतापन्नक्रियायामन्वयः काष्ठं भस्म क्रियते इत्यादौ । कर्तृत्वान्तरविशेषणतापन्नायां
च क्रियायां प्रथमान्तार्थस्य कर्तृत्वसंबन्धेनान्वयः नोलो घटो भवति, काष्ठं भस्म भवति
इत्यादौ ।

अथवा पाकविशेष्यककर्मतासंसर्गकतण्डुलप्रकारकशाब्दबोधस्यैवाप्रसिद्ध्या तत्सा-
माग्र्या अकल्पनात् आपादकाभावेन तण्डुलः पचतीति वाक्यात्तादृशबोधापादनस्यैवा-
संभवात् नामार्थधात्वर्थयोरिति व्युत्पत्तिरेव न कल्पनीयेति मृगस्य कर्मतासंबन्धेन दर्शने-
ऽन्वये न कोऽपि व्युत्पत्तिविरोधः । एवञ्च पश्य लक्ष्मण पम्पायां बकः परमधार्मिकः इत्यत्र
निरुक्तव्युत्पत्तिविरोधपरिहाराय अस्तिपदाध्याहारोऽपि नावश्यकः । एवञ्च मृगवृत्तिकर्मतायाः
संसर्गतया न मृगपदात् द्वितीयापत्तिः । अनभिहिते कर्मणि द्वितीयेत्यनेन प्रातिपदिकार्थ-
विशेष्यतया कर्मत्वे विवक्षित एव द्वितीयानुशासनात् । अनभिहितसूत्रस्य
चात्रैवार्थे तात्पर्यमिति निपुणतरमुपपादितं भट्टाचार्यैः । एषैव सरणिरादृता काष्ठं
भस्म क्रियते इत्यत्र भस्मपदोत्तरं द्वितीयावारणे भट्टाचार्यैः द्वितीयार्थनिरूपणं व्युत्पत्ति-
वादे । एवञ्च पश्य मृगो धावतीत्यत्र पदैकवाक्यतोपपादिता भवति ।

यदि च महाभाष्यसिद्धायाः पदैकवाक्यताया उपपादनेऽपि भाष्यसिद्धं धावन-
क्रियायाः दर्शनक्रियाकर्मत्वं नोपपादितमिति मन्यते । तदा प्रथमान्तार्थविशेषिताख्यातार्थ-
धावनकृतेः कर्मतया दर्शनक्रियायामन्वयस्वीकारेण पदैकवाक्यत्वं धावनस्य दर्शनकर्म-
त्वञ्चेत्युभयमपि सिद्धं भवति । तथाहि प्रथमान्तकर्तृवाचकपदसमभिव्याहारे प्रायः
प्रथमान्तार्थमुख्यविशेष्यक एव बोधः । क्वचित्पश्य मृगो धावतीत्यादौ प्रथमान्तार्थस्यापि
आख्यातार्थे विशेषणतयान्वयः व्युत्पत्तिवैचित्र्यात् । एवञ्च मृगस्य आधेयतासंबन्धेन
धावनान्वितकृतावाख्यातार्थेऽन्वयः । मृगान्वितायाश्च धावनविशिष्टकृतेः कर्मतासंबन्धेन
दर्शनक्रियायामन्वयः । तदन्विताख्यातार्थाश्रयत्वस्य चाध्याहृतत्वंपदार्थेऽन्वयः । तथा च
मृगनिष्ठधावनानुकूलकृतिकर्मकदर्शनाश्रयस्त्वमिति शाब्दबोधः । एतत्स्थलानुरोधाद्बहु-
त्यन्त्यन्तरकल्पनन्तु सर्वेषामभिमतमेव । धात्वर्थस्यापि धात्वन्तरार्थेऽन्वयार्थे अन्यस्या व्यु-

त्यक्तेः वैयाकरणैः, धावनभावनायाः दर्शनभावनायामन्वयायान्यादृश्या व्युत्पत्तेः मीमांस-
कैश्च स्वीकारात् । नच प्रथमान्तार्थस्याविशेष्यत्वे अपसिद्धान्तापातः । व्युत्पत्ति-
वैचित्र्येण प्रथमान्तार्थस्यापि अन्यत्रान्वयस्य बहुषु स्थलेषु प्रदर्शितत्वात् । नहि नैया-
यिकाः वाक्यघटकप्रथमान्तार्थस्सर्वोऽपि मुख्यविशेष्यतया भासते इति, . प्रथमान्तपदा-
समभिव्याहारेऽपि अध्याहृत्य प्रथमान्तपदं तदर्थमुख्यविशेष्यक एव बोधः इति
वाभ्युपगच्छन्ति । नीलो घटः इत्यत्र प्रथमान्तार्थस्य नीलस्य, भूतले घटो नेत्यत्र
घटस्य, अर्घ्यं नमः इत्यत्र अर्घ्यस्य च मुख्यविशेष्यतया भानानङ्गीकारात् । ‘अत
एव यत्र समानविभक्तिकं विशेष्यवाचकपदं निपातपदं वा नास्ति तत्र प्रथमान्तार्थस्य
विशेष्यभासकसामग्र्यभावादसौ मुख्यविशेष्यतया भासते’ इति व्युत्पत्तिवादे गदाधर-
भट्टाचार्या निरूपयन्ति । एवञ्चात्र मुख्यविशेष्यस्त्वंपदार्थ एक एवेति एतदेकं वाक्यम् ।
आख्यातार्थस्य दर्शनेऽन्वयाच्च पदैकवाक्यता । आख्यातार्थस्यैव धात्वर्थेऽन्वयोपगमेन
न नामार्थधात्वर्थयोरिति व्युत्पत्तिविरोधः । आख्यातोत्तरं द्वितीया शङ्कितुमपि न शक्यते ।
कृतेरतीन्द्रियत्वाद्धावनविशिष्टकृतेः दर्शनकर्मत्वमवगाहमानो बोधः सविशेषणे हि विधि-
निषेधौ विशेषणमुपसंक्रामतस्सति विशेष्ये बाधे इति न्यायेन विशेषणधावनस्यैव दर्शन-
कर्मत्वे पर्यवस्यति । एवञ्च धावनस्य दर्शनकर्मत्वं महाभाष्योक्तं उपपद्यते । आवश्यक-
चेयं रीतिः वैयाकरणाणामपि । आनय मृगो धावतीत्यत्र मृगकर्तृकधावने आनयन-
कर्मत्वस्य बाधात् मृगविशिष्टस्य धावनस्य बोधितं आनयनकर्मत्वं सविशेषणे हीति न्या-
येन मृगे पर्यवस्यतीति तैर्वक्तव्यत्वात् । एवञ्च नास्माकं मते पश्य मृगो धावतीत्यत्र काचित्
क्षतिः । शृणु मेधो गर्जति इत्यत्रापि एवमेवोपपादनीयम् ॥

पचति भवतीत्यत्र भवनाश्रयत्वस्य पचधात्वर्थान्विताख्यातार्थे कृतावन्वयः ।
पाकानुकूलकृतिर्भवनाश्रय इति बोधः । पाकविशिष्टकृतेर्भवनाश्रयत्वबोधे विशेषणीभूत-
पाकस्यापि भवनाश्रयत्वं भवनकर्तृत्वरूपं बुद्धं भवतीति ‘पचादयः क्रियाः भवतिक्रियायाः
कच्यो भवन्ति इति महाभाष्यमपि संगच्छते ।

प्रथमान्तपदोभावे अध्याहृत्य प्रथमान्तपदं तदर्थमुख्यविशेष्यक एव बोधो वाच्य

इति नामाकं निर्बन्धः । चैत्रः पचति भवतीत्यत्र तु भवत्यर्थान्वितायाः पाकान्विताख्यातार्थ-
कृतेः प्रथमान्तार्थेऽन्वयः । भवनाश्रयपाकानुकूलकृतिमांश्चैत्रः इति प्रथमान्तार्थमुख्यविशेष्यको
बोधः । एकवाक्यता चानायासेन निर्वहति ।

नच राजपुरुषो भार्यायाश्च, घटो द्रव्यत्वस्य इति प्रयोगवारणाय एकसंबन्धेन एक-
विशेषणविशिष्टे तज्जातीयसंबन्धेन विशेषणान्तरानन्वयव्युत्पत्तेः स्वीकरणीयतया, चैत्रः पचतीति
वाक्यात् समवायेन चैत्रत्वविशिष्टे समवायेन पाकानुकूलकृतिवैशिष्ट्यावगाहिबोधो न
संभवतीत्युक्तमिति वाच्यम् । शाब्दबोधे विभक्त्यर्थः प्रकोरतया भासते इति येऽभ्युपगच्छन्ति
तैः निरुक्तव्युत्पत्तिस्वीकारेण निरुक्तप्रयोगो न वारयितुं शक्यते । घटो द्रव्यत्व-
स्येति वाक्याद्धि द्रव्यत्वप्रतियोगिकषष्ठ्यर्थसमवायसंबन्धप्रकारकः घटविशेष्यको बोधो
भवेत् । सच नोक्तव्युत्पत्तिविरुद्धः तस्य समवायेन घटत्वविशिष्टे विशेष्ये
विशेषणान्तरप्रतियोगिकसजातीयसंबन्धप्रकारकत्वेन समवायेन द्रव्यत्वरूपविशेषणान्तरा-
प्रकारकत्वात् । एवं राजपुरुषो भार्यायाश्च इत्यत्रापि स्वस्वामिभावसंबन्धेन राज-
विशिष्टे पुरुषे भार्यानिरूपितषष्ठ्यर्थसंबन्धप्रकारक एव बोधो भवेत् । न तु स्वस्वामि-
भावसंबन्धेन भार्याप्रकारकः । अतः विभक्त्यर्थप्रकारतावादिभिः निरुक्तप्रयोगयोर्वारणाय
एकसंबन्धेन एकविशेषणविशिष्टे विशेषणान्तरनिरूपितसजातीयसंबन्धप्रकारकबोधो नेति
व्युत्पत्तिरङ्गाकरणीया । चैत्रः पचतीति वाक्यजबोधे समवायेन चैत्रत्वविशिष्टे पाकानुकूल-
कृतेः समवायेन प्रकारत्वेऽपि कृतिरूपविशेषणान्तरनिरूपितसजातीयसमवायसंबन्धप्रकारकत्वा-
भावात् निरुक्तव्युत्पत्तिविरोधो नास्ति । तथाच प्रथमान्तार्थविशेष्यकः आख्यातार्थकृति-
प्रकारको बोधः नाव्युत्पन्न इति सिद्धम् ।

पचति व्रजतीति प्रयोगश्च येषां धात्वर्थविशेष्यः आख्यातार्थः कर्ता तान्प्रत्येवा-
पादयितुं शक्यते । पाककर्ता व्रजनाश्रयः इति बोधसंभवात् । अस्मन्मते च आख्यातार्थः
कृतिः । पाकानुकूलकृतेश्च व्रजनाश्रयत्वं बाधितमिति कथं तादृशप्रयोगापत्तिः । यैः आख्या-
तस्य कर्तरि निरुद्धलक्षणा स्वीकृता तेषां मीमांसकानां मते कर्तुर्भावनाविशेषणतया भानान्नो-

त्तापत्तिः । तदा कैव कथा आख्यातस्य कृतिमात्रवाचकतावादिनां नैयायिकानाम् । तस्मादसति बाधके प्रायः प्रथमान्तार्थमुख्यविशेष्यक एव बोधस्समुचितः ॥

चैत्रस्तण्डुलं पचति इत्यत्र द्वितीयार्थः आधेयत्वम् । तथाहि कर्मणि द्वितीयेत्यनुशा-
सनात्कर्मत्वम् द्वितीयया बोध्यते । तच्च क्रियाजन्यफलशालित्वं नत्वखण्डं सखण्डस्य निर्वचना-
संभव एव अगतिकतया अखण्डपदार्थस्वीकारात् । क्रियाजन्यफलशालित्वात्कर्मत्वमित्यत्र
कर्मत्वपदं कर्मसंज्ञायां कर्मपदव्यवर्त्यत्वे वा लाक्षणिकम् । न च लक्षणायां गौरवमिति
शङ्क्यम् । आश्रयनिरूपकभेदेन भिन्नानां अनेकेषामखण्डपदार्थानां कल्पनागौरवात्तस्यागुरुत्वात् ।
नच कर्मसंज्ञामजानतापि क्रियाजन्यफलाश्रयत्वात्कर्मत्वमिति व्यवहारात् कर्मत्वपदस्य न
संज्ञायां लक्षणेति वाच्यम् । अखण्डकर्मत्वशक्तिमजानतापि तादृशव्यवहारादखण्डशक्तिपरत्व-
मपि तस्य न संभवतीति वक्तुं शक्यत्वात् । अपि च तद्वति तत्प्रकारकत्वाद्याथार्थ्यं शब्दाश्रय-
त्वादाकाशत्वमित्यादिव्यवहारात् याथार्थ्याकाशत्वादीनामप्यखण्डता प्रसज्येत । तस्मात्सखण्डमेव
क्रियाजन्यफलशालित्वं कर्मत्वम् । तदेव द्वितीयया बोध्यते । क्रियाकारकभावश्च न द्विती-
यार्थः वाक्यजन्यबोधे तस्याभानात् । तस्य विभक्त्यर्थत्वे प्रमाणाभावाच्च । नच 'कष्टं श्रितो
भवतीत्यत्र क्रियाकारकयोरभिसंबन्धस्य द्वितीया वाचिका भवति इति भाष्यं प्रमाणमिति
वाच्यम् । कर्मत्वमपि संबन्ध एव । तस्य च निरूपकत्वाश्रयत्वाभ्यां क्रियाकारकोभय-
निष्ठत्वमक्षतमेव । तथा च भाष्यस्थं संबन्धपदमपि न लाक्षणिकम् । अत एव अखण्डकर्मत्वस्य
द्वितीयाशक्यत्ववादिनो मीमांसकाः स्वोक्ते क्रियाकारकयोरभिसंबन्धस्य द्वितीया वाचिका
भवतीति महाभाष्यं प्रमाणयन्ति ।

एवञ्च विशेषणत्वे ज्ञात एव तन्नियामकसंबन्धाकांक्षणात् विशेषणत्वमपि द्वितीयार्थः
इति न । क्रियाकारकभावसंबन्धस्यैव द्वितीयार्थत्वाभावात् । व्यवसायातिरिक्तमनुव्यवसायमङ्गी-
कुर्वतामस्माकं मते शाब्दबोधे विशेषणत्वादीनां भानाभावात् अनुव्यवसाय एव तद्वानात् ।

तस्मात्कर्मत्वमेव द्वितीयार्थः । शक्तिः कारकमिति पक्षस्य वैयाकरणैरपि स्वीकारात् ।
कर्मार्थकत्वापेक्षया कर्मत्वार्थकताया लाघवेनोचितत्वाच्च । तत्र क्रिया फलञ्च धातुत एव

लभ्यते । फलं व्यापारश्च धात्वर्थे इति सिद्धान्तात् । फलस्य व्यापारजन्यता च विनैव पदार्थतां संसर्गमयाद्या भासते । एवञ्चानन्यलभ्यमाश्रयत्वं द्वितीयार्थः इति वक्तव्यम् । प्रकृत्यर्थतण्डुलान्वितस्याश्रयत्वस्य निरूपकतासंबन्धेन धात्वर्थे फलेऽन्वयः स्वीकरणीयः । तथा च सति तेमनं पचति न तण्डुलमित्यत्र द्वितीयार्थाश्रयत्वस्य निरूपकतासंबन्धावच्छिन्नाभावः फले नञा बोधनीयः । तच्च न संभवति । वृत्त्यनियामकस्य निरूपकत्वस्य प्रतियोगितानवच्छेदकत्वेन तत्संबन्धावच्छिन्नतदभावाप्रसिद्धेः । अतः आधेयत्वमेवार्थः । निरूपितत्वसंबन्धेन तण्डुलान्वितं तत् आश्रयतासंबन्धेन फलेऽन्वेति । धातोः फले पृथक् शक्त्यङ्गीकारान्नैकदेशान्वयक्लेशोऽपि । आख्यातार्थभावनायाः करोत्यर्थत्वेन सकर्मकत्वेऽपि भावनाकर्मणि न द्वितीया । अकर्मकशीङ्धात्वर्थभावनाकर्मबोधकात् द्वितीयाया अदर्शनात् । अतः धात्वर्थकर्मत्वमेव द्वितीयाप्रयोजकम् । एवञ्च द्वितीयार्थकर्मत्वस्य साक्षात्संबन्धेन धात्वर्थ एवान्वयो युक्तः न तु धात्वर्थघटितपरम्परासंबन्धेन भावनायाम् । संबन्धांशे गौरवात् । भावनात्वस्यानुगतानतिप्रसक्तस्य दुर्बलत्वेन कारकप्रकारकशाब्दबुद्धित्वावच्छिन्नं प्रति भावनाविशेष्यतासंबन्धेन लिङ्गानन्वयिपदजन्योपस्थितिः कारणमित्येककार्यकारणभावकल्पनालाघवस्याप्यभावात् । न च काष्ठैरोदनं पचतीति वाक्यं काष्ठैः पाकेनोदनं करोतीति विवृण्वन्ति । अतः विवरणवाक्ये काष्ठादीनां करोत्यर्थेऽन्वयात् विव्रियमाणवाक्येऽपि तेषां कृतावेवान्वयो युक्त इति वाच्यम् । न हि विवरणवाक्याद्यद्विशेष्यकः यत्संसर्गकः यत्प्रकारको बोधः तादृश एव बोधः विव्रियमाणवाक्याज्जायते इति मीमांसकैरेव वक्तुं शक्यते । पाकेनोदनं करोतीत्यत्र आख्यातार्थाश्रयत्वरूपभावनायामेव ओदनमिति द्वितीयान्तार्थः प्रकारतया भासते ओदनं पचतीत्यत्र तु आख्यातार्थकृतौ (भावनायां) सः प्रकारतया भासते । एवञ्च निरुक्तविवरणानुरोधात्कर्मत्वादीनां आख्यातार्थभावनान्वयित्वं नावश्यकम् । तण्डुलमित्यत्र द्वितीयार्थसंख्या समवायेन साक्षात्संबन्धेन प्रकृत्यर्थेऽन्वेति । न तु परम्परासंबन्धेन कर्मत्वादौ, संबन्धांशे गौरवात् । तथा च द्वितीयार्थसंख्याविशेषितप्रकृत्यर्थतण्डुलान्वितं द्वितीयार्थधेयत्वं धात्वर्थेऽन्वेतीति सिद्धम् ।

पचधात्वर्थः रूपपरावृत्तिजनकतेजस्संयोगः विक्लृप्त्यनुकूलव्यापारो वा । आख्या-

तार्थः कृतिरेव । न कर्तृत्वरूपाखण्डधर्मवान्कर्ता आख्यातेन बोध्यते । न च पचतीति वाक्यजन्यबोधे सति पाककर्ता एको नवेति संशयानुदयात् पाककर्ता कः इति पाककर्तृत्वावच्छिन्नविशेष्यकजिज्ञासोदयाच्च कर्तृबोधः आख्यातादावश्यक इति वाच्यम् । प्रथमान्तपदासमभिव्याहृते पचतीत्यादौ आख्यातार्थसंख्या स्वाश्रयसमवेतत्व-संबन्धेन कृतावन्वेति । बोधे सम्सर्गविधया कृत्याश्रये (कर्तरि) एकत्वं भासते इति न तादृशबोधानन्तरं पाककर्ता एको नवेति संशय उदेति । एवं कृतेर्बोधे कृत्याश्रयस्य कर्तृरुपस्थितिसंभवात् पाककर्तृत्वावच्छिन्नधर्मिकजिज्ञासाप्युपपद्यते । न च शाब्दबोधानन्तरं ज्ञानान्तरकल्पनया जिज्ञासोदयविळम्ब इति वाच्यम् । यद्याख्यातबोधे कर्तरि तदर्थसंख्यायाः धात्वर्थस्य चान्वयः स्वीक्रियते । तदा एकः पाककर्तेति बोधसंभवात् क्षणविळम्बं विनापि निरुक्तजिज्ञासोदयः एको नवेति संशयानुत्पादश्चोपपादयितुं शक्यते । न चैवमभ्युप-गच्छन्ति आख्यातात्कर्तृबोधवादिनो वैयाकरणा मीमांसका वा । वैयाकरणैः आख्यातार्थ-कत्वान्वितः तदर्थः कर्ता धात्वर्थविशेषणमिध्यते । तथा च एककर्तृकः पाकः इति बोधो जायते । अनन्तरं पाककर्तृत्वावच्छिन्नविशेष्यकमेकत्वप्रकारकं मानसज्ञानमुत्पद्यते इति क्षणविळम्बेनैव निरुक्तसंशयानुत्पादजिज्ञासोदयावुपपादनीयौ । मीमांसकमतेऽपि धात्व-र्थो न कर्तृन्वेति । अपि तु भावनायामेव । धात्वर्थसाधारणकारकप्रकारकशाब्दबुद्धित्वा-वच्छिन्नं प्रति भावनाविशेष्यतासंबन्धेन लिङ्गानन्वयिपदजन्योपस्थितेः हेतुत्वस्वीकारात् । आख्यातार्थसंख्यापि कर्तृघटितपरम्परासम्बन्धेन भावनायामेवान्वेति न कर्तरि । भावप्रधान-माख्यातमिति स्मृत्या भावनातिरिक्ताख्यातार्थं प्रति भावनाया एव प्राधान्यबोधनात् । एवं कर्तापि भावनायामन्वेति । एवञ्च पचतीति वाक्यजन्यबोधे पाककर्तृत्वेन पाककर्तुः तत्र चैकत्वस्यानवगाहनात् पाककर्ता एकः इति मानसं बोधं संराधैव निरुक्तसंशयानुदय-जिज्ञासोदयावुपपादनीयौ इति क्षणविळम्ब आवश्यकः । तस्मादाख्यातात्कर्तुर्निरूढलक्षणया बोधो न समञ्जसः । यदि लाघवेन कृतेः शक्यत्वेऽपि लः कर्मणोत्याद्यनुशासनबलात्कर्तापि निरूढलक्ष्य इत्युच्यते । तदा अनुशासनाक्षरार्थानतिलङ्घनेन कर्तुरेवाख्यातवाच्यत्वस्वीकारो युक्तः । तस्मान्न कर्ता आख्यातस्य लक्ष्यः । नापि वाच्यः अनन्तानां कृतित्व्यक्तीनां शक्यतावच्छेदकत्वे गौरवात् । तस्मात्कृतिरेवाख्याताथः । तत्र धात्वर्थः विषयत्वसहिदानु-

कूलत्वसम्बन्धेनान्वेति। पचतीति वाक्यं पाकं करोतीति वाक्येन विव्रियते। तेन च पाककर्मकृति-
 बोधो भवति। कृतेः पाककर्मकत्वञ्च पाकविषयकत्वम्। तच्च विषयत्वं पचतीत्यत्र पाकस्य कृतौ
 संसर्गतया भासते इति पाकं करोतीति वाक्येन विव्रियमाणत्वं पचतीत्यस्योपपद्यते। विषयतामा-
 त्रस्य संसर्गत्वे पाकाद्यनिष्पत्तिस्थले पचतीति प्रयोगापत्तिः। अतः उपधायकत्वरूपानुकूलत्वस्यापि
 संसर्गता स्वीकरणीया । युक्तञ्चैतत् आख्यातेन हि पाककर्तृत्वं प्रतीयते । तत्तत्क्रि-
 याकर्तृत्वञ्च नाखण्डपदार्थ इति पूर्वमेवावेदितम् । न च तथानङ्गीकारे दम्पत्योः
 कर्तृत्वं व्यासज्यवृत्ति न स्यात् । उभयादिपर्याप्तस्यैकस्य व्यासज्यवृत्तित्वात् कृतिमत्ता-
 याश्च पतिनिष्ठायाः पत्नीनिष्ठायाश्च भिन्नभिन्नत्वादिति वाच्यम् । प्रकृतयागक्रियाविषयक-
 कृत्याधारतात्वेन अनुगतरूपेण कृत्याश्रयतारूपकर्तृत्वस्य व्यासज्यवृत्तित्वसम्भवात् । न चाय-
 मपसिद्धान्तः । सम्बन्धादिभेदेन भिन्नाया अपि महानसीयत्ववह्नित्वादिनिष्ठावच्छेदकतायाः
 महानसीयवह्न्यभावप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकतात्वेनानुगतरूपेण व्यासज्यवृत्तितायाः वह्नित्वे प्रति-
 योगितानवच्छेदकत्वसङ्गमनाय भट्टाचार्यैः सिद्धान्तलक्षणे प्रतिपादनात् ॥ अतश्च तत्क्रि-
 याकर्तृत्वं तत्क्रियानुकूल तत्क्रियाविषयिणी च या कृतिः तद्वत्त्वम् । एकक्रियाविषयक-
 कृतितः यत्र नान्तरीयकक्रियान्तरनिष्पत्तिः तत्र कृतिमति पुरुषे तत्क्रियाकर्तृत्वं नास्ति । अतः
 एव तत्र मत्तो भूतं नतु मया कृतमिति व्यपदेशसंगच्छते । अतः क्रियाविषयकत्वमपि
 कर्तृत्वशरीरे प्रवेशनीयम् ।

न चोदनं पचतीत्यस्य पाकेनोदनं करोतीति विवरणाद्धात्वर्थस्य करणतासम्बन्धेनैव
 कृतावन्वयो युक्त इति वाच्यम् । पाकं प्रति कृतेः कारणतया न पाककरणकत्वं
 कृतेः सम्भवति । अपि तु पाककरणकोदनोद्देश्यकत्वमेव । पाकेनोदनं करोति इति
 वाक्यात्पाककरणकोदनोद्देश्यकत्वं करोत्यर्थे कथञ्चिद्भासते इति वक्तव्यम् । अतः तत्र
 विवरणवाक्ये पाकेनेति तृतीया न करणे, अपि तु हेतौ । हेतुत्वञ्च प्रयोजकत्वम् । तच्च
 फलसाधारणम् । ‘फलमपीह हेतुः अध्ययनेन वसति’ इति प्रामाणिकैरभिधानात् ।
 पाकस्य ओदनविषयककृतिफलत्वमक्षतम् । तद्वाक्याच्च पाकप्रयोज्योदनविषयककृतिमानिति
 बोधो जायते । ओदनकृतेः पाकप्रयोज्यत्वञ्च पाकफलकत्वं पाकानुकूलत्वपर्यवसितम् ।
 एवञ्च धात्वर्थस्य कृतावनुकूलतासम्बन्धेन अन्वय एव निरुक्तं विवरणमनुकूलं भवति ।

तत्सिद्धं धात्वर्थः पाकः विषयत्वानुकूलत्वोभयसम्बन्धेन कृतावन्वेतीति ॥ अत एव
'यत्नमात्रं शक्यं विषयत्वं जनकत्वं वा संसर्गमर्यादया भासते' इत्याख्यातवाददीधितौ
वाकारस्समुच्चयार्थ इति मथुरानाथभट्टाचार्या निरूपयन्ति ।

आख्यातार्थवर्तमानकालश्च व्युत्पत्तिवैचित्र्यात्कृतावेवान्वेति । कृतिश्च प्रथमान्तार्थः ।
आख्यातैकवचनार्थः एकत्वसंख्या प्रथमान्तार्थे नान्वेतीति निष्कर्षानुसारिणः । एवञ्च
तण्डुलनिरूपिताधेयताश्रयरूपपरावृत्तिजनकतेजस्संयोगानुकूलकृतिमानेकत्वविशिष्टश्चैत्रः इति
निरुक्तवाक्याधीनो बोधः ।

चैत्रेण तण्डुलः पच्यते इत्यत्र तृतीयार्थः कृतिः । तस्य जन्यत्वविषयत्वोभयसंबन्धेन
धात्वर्थव्यापारेऽन्वयः । कर्माख्यातस्थलनियन्तितव्युत्पत्तिवैचित्र्याद्भात्वर्थो व्यापारः धात्वर्थफले
जन्यतासंबन्धेनान्वेति कर्माख्यातार्थश्च आश्रयत्वं कर्मत्वघटकस्याश्रयत्वातिरिक्तस्यान्यलभ्य-
त्वात् । आश्रयत्वश्च प्रथमान्तार्थे स्वरूपसंबन्धेनान्वेति । स च संबन्धो वृत्तिनियामक एवेति
नञ्चा तत्संबन्धावच्छिन्नतदभावबोधनं प्रथमान्तार्थे सङ्गच्छते । एवञ्च चैत्रनिष्ठकृतिजन्यव्यापा-
रजन्यरूपपरावृत्त्याश्रयः एकत्वविशिष्टतण्डुलः इति तद्वाक्याधीनो बोधः ।

चैत्रेण सुप्यते इत्याख्यातस्य भावे विहितत्वाद्भास्यस्य च धातोरेव लाभात्साधुतासं-
पादकत्वमेव । आख्यातार्थसंख्या न शाब्दबोधे भासते तदन्वयिनः अभावात् । तथाच
चैत्रकर्तृकः स्वापः इति धात्वर्थविशेष्यको बोधः ।

चैत्रो न पचतीत्यत्र पचतिप्रतिपाद्यपाकविशिष्टकृतेः नञ्भावे प्रतियोगितयान्वयः ।
तस्य च प्रथमान्तार्थेऽन्वयः । एवञ्च पाकानुकूलवर्तमानकृत्यभाववांश्चैत्रः इति बोधः ।

चैत्र एव पचतीत्यत्र एवकारस्य अन्यः अभावश्चार्थः । प्रथमान्तपदोपस्थाप्यस्यापि
प्रतियोगितया एवकारार्थैकदेशे भेदेऽन्वयः । आख्यातार्थकृत्यन्वितस्यैवकारार्थाभावस्य एव-
कारार्थेऽन्यस्मिन्नन्वयो व्युत्पत्तिवैचित्र्यात् । एवञ्च चैत्रः पाकानुकूलकृतिमान् चैत्रान्यः
पाकानुकूलकृत्यभाववानिति बोधः । एवं सति, न कस्यापि प्रयोगस्यातिप्रसङ्ग अप्रसङ्गो वा भवति ।

तस्मात्सति संभवे प्रथमान्तपदसमभिव्याहारे प्रायः प्रथमान्तार्थमुख्यविशेष्यको
बोधः युज्यते । प्रथमान्तपदसमभिव्याहारेऽपि कचिन्निपातार्थविशेष्यकः भावाख्यातस्थलेषु
धात्वर्थविशेष्यकः प्रथमान्तपदाभावे आख्यातार्थविशेष्यकश्च बोधो जायते । सर्वत्र प्रथमान्त-
र्थ एव मुख्यविशेष्य इति न नियमः इति व्यवस्थापयन्ति ॥

॥ इति बोधविमर्शः समाप्तः ॥

BHĀVANĀVIVEKA

BY

MAṆḌANAMIŚRA

WITH

VIṢAMAGRANTHIBHEDIKA

BY

NĀRAYANA

EDITED WITH INTRODUCTION

BY

V. A. RAMASWAMI SASTRI

AND

K. A. SIVARAMAKRISHNA SASTRI

॥ श्रीरस्तु ॥

॥ भावनाविवेकः ॥

(आचार्यमण्डनमिश्रविरचितः)

विष्णुनन्दननारायणकृतया विषमग्रन्थभेदिकाख्यया

व्याख्यया संवलितः ।

संसर्गमोहितधियो विविक्तं धातुगोचरात् ।

भावात्मानं न पश्यन्ति ये तेभ्यस्स विविच्यते ॥ १ ॥

यत्पादसेवैकनिबन्धनानि

पुंसां समस्तानि समीहितानि ।

सेन्द्रामराभ्यर्चित^१पादपद्मं

विघ्नेश्वरं तं प्रणतोऽस्मि मूढर्ना ॥ १ ॥

उज्जहारागमाम्भोधेर्यो धर्मामृतमञ्जसा ।

न्यायैर्निमथ्य^२ भगवान् स प्रसीदतु जैमिनिः ॥ २ ॥

^३स्वान्तर्ध्वान्तनुदं देवं सर्वज्ञं पुरुषोत्तमम् ।

प्रणतोऽस्म्यखिलेशानं स दिश्यान्नो मनोरथम् ॥ ३ ॥

१. अर्चित—अ

२. निर्मथ्य—छ

३. स्वान्तर्ध्वान्त—छ

श्रीमन्मण्डनमार्ताण्डसन्न्यायोक्तिगभस्तयः ।

स्फुरन्तो हृदयव्योम्नि मोहध्वान्तं हरन्तु नः ॥ ४ ॥

भावनाया विवेकस्य तात्पर्यप्रतिपत्तये ।

टीकेयं क्रियतेऽस्माभिः विषमग्रन्थभेदिका ॥ ५ ॥

१सर्वो हि सांशयिकः सप्रयोजनश्चार्थो विचारगोचरो भवति नान्यः ।
अत्रास्य प्रारिप्सितस्य प्रकरणस्य तथा २विधो विषयो वक्तव्य इति प्रथमं ३ तत्प्रतिपादनायाह—
संसर्गमोहितधियो ४ विविक्तं धातुगोचरात् । भावात्मानं न पश्यन्ति ये तेभ्यः स
विविच्यते इति ॥ अयमर्थः—अस्य प्रकरणस्य भावनापदार्थो विषयः । तस्य च स्वरूप-
सद्भावे शब्दार्थत्वे च विप्रतिपद्यन्ते । न संयोगविभागादेर्गुणविशेषाद्धेदेन क्रियात्मा भावना-
पदार्थो विद्यते । यद्यपि विद्यते तथापि नासावाख्यातप्रत्ययस्यार्थः, किन्तु धातुरेवेति ।

किं पुनरस्या विप्रतिपत्तेः कारणम् ? विवेकानवधारणमेव ।

ननु स्वतो विविक्ते वस्तुनि कुतो विवेकानवधारणम् ? संसर्गात् । पदार्थान्तर-
संसर्गात् । तथाहि—स्वतो विविक्तानामपि पदार्थानां पदार्थान्तरसंसर्गाद्विवेकानवधारणं दृश्यते,
यथा देहादिसंसर्गादात्मनः, यथा बोदात्तादिसंसर्गाद्विर्णानाम्, तथेहापि धात्वर्थेन
गुणविशेषेण संसर्गात् क्रियारूपा भावना प्रत्ययाभिधेया विवेकेन नावधार्यते । अतो
विवेकानवधारणाद्विप्रतिपत्तिः । विप्रतिपत्तिदर्शनाच्चान्येषामपि संशयो भवति । तेन
तन्निरासेन भावनास्वरूपावधारणाय युक्तः प्रकरणारम्भः ।

किं पुनरनया ५भावनाया विवेकेन प्रतिपादितया प्रयोजनम् ? स्वर्गादीनां साध्यत्वसिद्धिः ।

१. सर्वोऽपि—छ

२. तथा विषयो—च

३. 'प्रथमं' नास्ति—च

४. धिय इति—च

५. भावनाया—च

तथाह्याहुः^१—सामानाधिकरण्यात्तदर्थभेदाभिधानुमा ।

तथाहि—‘यजेत स्वर्गकामः’ इत्यादौ आख्यातप्रत्ययेन यदि भावना प्राधान्येन प्रतिपाद्येत तदा तदाकाङ्क्षावशात् पुरुषविशेषणानामपि सतां स्वर्गादीनां साध्यत्वेन संबन्धस्सिध्यति । ततश्च यागेन भावयेत्स्वर्गमित्येषोऽर्थः शब्दनिर्मितः स्यात् ; अन्यथा स्वर्गकामस्य यागे नियोगमात्रं वाक्यार्थः स्यात् इति । वक्ष्यति चैतदुपरिष्ठादाचार्यस्त्वयमेव । वक्ष्यमाणत्वादेव चेह विवक्षितमपि मुखतो नोक्तवान् । अतः सांशयिकत्वात्सप्रयोजनत्वाच्च भावनापदार्थस्य, तद्विवेकायेदं प्रकरणमारभ्यत इति श्लोकस्य तात्पर्यार्थः ।

इदानीमक्षराणि विव्रियन्ते । योऽयं धात्वर्थेन भावनायाः संसर्गः संवर्धितत्वं तदनुरक्ततया प्रतीयमानत्वम्, तेन संसर्गेण मोहिता धीः बुद्धिः येषां ते संसर्गमोहितधियः । तत एव हेतोः धातुगोचराद्धात्वर्थात् विविक्तं भावात्मानं भावनास्वरूपं ये न पश्यन्ति तेभ्यः स विविच्यते तेषां प्रतिपत्त्यर्थं विवेकेन भावनास्वरूपं प्रतिपाद्यत इत्यर्थः ॥ १ ॥

ननु धात्वर्थसंसर्गे सत्यपि भावनायाः ततो विवेकेऽपि हेतुर्विद्यत एव । तथाहि—सर्वाख्यातानां करोतिसामानाधिकरण्यमुपलभ्यते । तच्चैवं सत्युपपद्यते यदि करोतिना भावनावचनेनै^२कार्था आख्यातप्रत्यया भवेयुः, अन्यथा कुशपलाशादिशब्दवद्वैयधिकरण्यमेव स्यात् । न चैवं मन्तव्यम् तिङन्ते पदे पचत्यादौ प्रकृत्यंशस्य करोतिना सामानाधिकरण्यम्, न प्रत्ययांशस्येति ; व्यभिचारात् प्रकृत्यंशस्य, अव्यभिचाराच्च प्रत्ययांशस्य । नहि पचति यजतीत्यादौ करोतिसामानाधिकरणे

१. ‘तथाह्याहुः’ नास्ति—क

२. कार्थाख्यात—च

न तादर्थ्यानुमा^१नाह वृक्षतां शिशपाश्रुतिः ॥ २ ॥

इह खलु गगनशशविषाणयो^२रक्रियमाणत्वादभवतोः^३भवतश्च

प्रयोगे एको धातुरनुवर्तते, अनुवर्तते तु ४प्रत्ययो लकारात्मकः ; अतः करोतिसामानाधिकरण्यादाख्यातानां भावनार्थत्वं सुज्ञानमिति न तदर्थः प्रयासः कर्तव्य इत्याशङ्क्याह—
तथाआहुः—सामानाधि^४करण्यात्तदर्थभेदाभिधानुमा । न तादर्थ्यानुमा नाह वृक्षतां शिशपाश्रुतिः ॥ (इति ॥) अयमर्थः—करोतिसामानाधिकरण्यस्याख्यातानां भावनार्थत्वे हेतुत्वं यथा न संभवति तथा आहुः । कथम् ? सामानाधिकरण्याद्धेतोः पचत्यादीनां तदर्थविशेषाभिधान[मात्र]मनुमातुं शक्यम् ; न तन्मात्राभिधानम् । नहि वृक्षशब्दसमानाधिकरणः शिशपाशब्दः वृक्षतामाचष्टे अपि तु तद्विशेषम् ; एवमत्रापि करोत्यर्थविशेषाभिधानमेव पचत्यादीनां शक्यतेऽनुमातुम् । तथा च सति प्रकृतिभूता धातव एव करोत्यर्थविशेषाभिधायिनः स्युः, तेषां नानात्वात् नानात्मसु विशेषेषु वृत्त्युपपत्तेः । न-प्रत्ययः, तस्यैकत्वादनेकेषु विशेषेषु^६वृत्त्यनुपपत्तेः । धातूनां (च) करोत्यर्थविशेषाभिधायित्वमस्माभिरपीष्यत एवेत्यभिप्रायः ॥ अत्राक्षरानुलोम्यं सुबोधम् ।

इदानीं ‘सामानाधिकरण्यात्’ इति श्लोके निराकार्यतयोपन्यस्तस्य करोति-

१. नादा—क, ग, घ, ङ.
२. रभवतोरक्रियमाणत्वात्—ख
३. भवितुश्च—क, ख.
४. प्रत्ययलकारा—च
५. करण्येति—च
६. वृत्त्युपपत्तेः—छ

घटादेस्तत्त्वा^१द्भवत्यर्थस्य कर्तुः करोतिकर्मता । तथा च भवितुः करोत्यर्थस्य कर्ता प्रयोजक इति भवतेः प्रयोजकव्यापारे-

सामानाधिकरण्यस्य पचत्यादीनां भावनावचनत्वहेतोः निराकरणार्थतया श्लोकं व्याख्यातुकामः प्रथमं करोतेर्भावनावचनत्वोपपादनेन तस्य हेतुत्वं संभावनापदवीमुपारोहयितुमाह—
इह खल्वित्यादिना अनुमानमित्यन्तेन ॥

अयमभिप्रायः—अस्ति तावत्सर्वजनप्रसिद्धा करोत्यभिधेया क्रिया, २या कारकैः साक्षात्साध्यतया संबध्यते, यत्संबन्धनिबन्धनश्च कारकाणां परस्परसंबन्धः । सा च क्रिया भावनैव ; तस्याः कर्मापेक्षिणीत्वात् भवितुश्च तत्कर्मत्वात् । यो हि भवनस्य कर्ता घटादिः, कादाचित्कत्वेन, स करोत्यर्थकर्मतां प्रतिपद्यमानो दृष्टः । यश्च नित्यं सत्त्वेन नित्यसमवेतत्वेन (नित्यमसत्त्वेन) च भवनस्य कर्ता न भवति—गगनादिः गगनकुसुमादिश्च, न स करोत्यर्थकर्मतां प्रतिपद्यते । अतोऽन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां भवनस्य कर्ता करोत्यर्थस्य कर्मेति निश्चीयते । तथा च सति यः करोत्यर्थस्य कर्ता स भवितुः प्रयोजक इति भवितुः प्रयोजकव्यापारः करोत्यर्थः । स एव च भावनाशब्दस्याप्यर्थः, भवतेः प्रयोजकव्यापारे णिजुत्पत्तेः । तस्मात्सिद्धं करोत्यर्थो भावनेति । करोतिसामानाधिकरणाश्च पचत्यादयः प्रयुज्यमाना दृश्यन्ते । तथाहि—‘ किं करोति देवदत्तः’ इति केनचित्पृष्टोऽन्यः^५ प्रतिवक्ति—‘ पचति, पठति’ इति वा । अतः करोतिसामानाधिकरण्यात्पचत्यादीनां^६ भावनार्थत्वानुमानमिति ।

ननु ‘ किं करोति’ इत्यत्र प्रकृत्यर्थविषयः प्रश्नः, न प्रत्ययार्थविषयः; क्रियाविषयो ह्यसौ । क्रिया च प्रकृत्यर्थः । तस्याः प्रत्ययार्थत्वे प्रकृतिवैयर्थ्यप्रसङ्गात् । प्रकृत्यर्थत्वे तु

१ स्तथात्वात्—क, ग, घ, ङ.

२. ‘ या ’ नास्ति.—च

३. समत्वेन नित्यमसमत्वेन च—छ

४. भवितुं—च

५. हेऽन्यप्रतिपत्तिः—छ

६. भावार्थ—च

णिजुत्पद्यमानः करोत्यर्थमवलम्बते । तेन सा भावना । करोतिसमानाधिकरणाश्च पचत्यादय इति तेषां तादर्थ्यानुमानम् ।

प्रत्ययस्य कर्त्रा तत्संख्यया वा अर्थेनार्थवत्त्वोपपत्तेर्न वैयर्थ्यप्रसङ्गः । तस्मात्प्रकृत्यर्थविषयः प्रश्नः । भवतु ; को दोष इति चेत्—एवन्तर्हि पचतीत्युत्तरवाक्येऽपि प्रकृत्यंशेनैव २ क्रिया-समर्पणेनोत्तरं वक्तव्यम् । ततश्च करोतिसामानाधिकरण्याच्च प्रत्ययाभिधेया क्रिया सिध्यतीति चेत्—नैष दोषः । प्रश्नवाक्येऽपि क्रियायाः प्रत्ययार्थत्वादुत्तरवाक्येऽपि तथात्वोपपत्तेः ॥

नन्वेवं सति प्रकृतिवैयर्थ्यं स्यादित्युक्तम् । नैवम् ; प्रकृतेरपि क्रियार्थत्वात् । नन्वेकतरांशादेव क्रियासिद्धेः कथमुभयोस्तादर्थ्यम् ? एकतरांशादेव क्रियासिद्धौ संभवन्त्यामपि प्रकृतिप्रत्यययोः सहप्रयोगनियमात्परस्परापेक्षा न विरुध्यते । यद्यपि प्रकृतिः प्रत्ययमात्रमपेक्षते प्रत्ययोऽपि प्रकृतिमात्रम्, तथापि कर्तृविशेषणकक्रियासामान्यप्रतिपत्तिः तिङन्तेन करोतिना भवति, प्रकृत्यन्तरे सामान्याप्रतिपत्तेः, प्रत्ययान्तरे कर्तृविशेषणत्वाप्रतिपत्तेः । अतो यथोक्तक्रियाविवक्षायां अर्थवान्करोतिस्तिङन्तः । तस्मात्करोतिसामानाधिकरण्यात्पचत्यादीनां भावनावचनत्वमनुमीयत इति तात्पर्यम् ।

इदानीमक्षराणि विव्रियन्ते ॥ इह खलु गगनशशविषाणयोरभवतोः अविद्यमानाभूतप्रादुर्भावयोर्नित्यं भवनान्नित्यमभवनाच्चाक्रियमाणत्वाच्च ३ करोत्यर्थकर्मत्वाभावादित्येवं भवनकर्तृत्वाभावे करोत्यर्थकर्मत्वाभावो दर्शितः । भवितुश्च घटादेस्तत्त्वात् भवनकर्तुर्घटादेः क्रियमाणत्वाद्भवत्यर्थस्य यः कर्ता घटादिः तस्य करोत्यर्थकर्मता दृष्टेत्येवं

१. तदर्थत्वानुमानम्—क, ग, घ, ङ.

२. क्रियाविशेषणम्—छ

३. 'च' नास्ति—छ

तदसत् । एकाधिकरणता हि तदर्थभेदाभिधाननिमित्तं नैकार्थ्यमवगमयति । तादृशोऽस्सहप्रयोगानुपपत्तेः । न खलु वृक्षता शिशपादिशब्दगोचरः, अपि त्वभिधेयपरिप्रापिततया गम्यमाना ।

भवनकर्तृत्वेन करोत्यर्थकर्मताया अन्वयो दर्शितः । तथा च सति करोत्यर्थस्य यः कर्ता स भवितुः प्रयोजकस्संपद्यत इति भवतेः प्रयोजकव्यापारे णिजुत्पद्यमानः करोत्यर्थं प्रयोजकव्यापारात्मकमभिधेयतया २ अवलम्बते । तेन करोत्यर्थो भावनेति सिद्धम् । करोतिसमानाधिकरणाश्च पचत्यादयः प्रयुज्यन्ते । अतः तेषां तादर्थ्यमनुमीयत इति ।

इदानीमेतन्निराकरणार्थतया श्लोकं व्याचष्टे—तदसदित्यादिना । अयमाशयः—यद्यपि सामानाधिकरण्यमत्यन्तभिन्नार्थयोश्शब्दयोर्न दृष्टम्, तथापि नैकार्थ्यं गमयितुमलम् ; अपि तु तद्विशेषाभिधानमात्रम् । एकार्थयोश्शब्दयोस्सहप्रयोगानुपपत्तेः करहस्तादिशब्दवत् । ननु ‘सोऽयं देवदत्तः’ इत्यादावेकार्थयोरपि शब्दयोस्सहप्रयोगो दृष्टः । न, तत्रापि वाच्ययोर्भेदाभ्युपगमात् । लक्ष्यमाणस्यैव ह्यर्थस्य भेदाभाव इष्यते । ननु वृक्षशिशपाशब्दयोस्समानाधिकरणयोरैकार्थ्यं दृष्टमित्याशङ्क्याह — न खल्विति । अथवा—एकाधिकरणता हि तदर्थविशेषाभिधाननिमित्तमित्युक्तम् ३ तत्कुतो व्यज्ञायि? इत्याशङ्क्याह । ननु कथं वृक्षशिशपाशब्दगोचरो न भवतीत्युच्यते, यावता शिशपाशब्दाद्वृक्षोऽपि नियमेन प्रतीयत इत्याशङ्क्याह—४ अपि त्विति । शिशपाशब्दार्थाविनाभावनिबन्धना वृक्षार्थप्रतीतिः, नाभिधाननिबन्धनेत्यर्थः ।

१. ‘शब्द’ नास्ति—ऊ

२. आलम्बते—च

३. ‘तत्’ नास्ति—च

४. ‘अपि त्विति’ इत्यारम्भ ‘दृष्टत्वादित्याह’ इति पर्यन्तो भागः नास्ति ‘ऊ’ मातृकायाम् ।

तदेवमैकाधिकरण्यं स्फुटं विपर्ययसाधनम्^१। विशेषाभिधानोन्नयन-
मेवेत्थमिति चेत्-न, तस्याः प्रत्ययार्थत्वेनाभ्युपगमात् । प्रत्ययस्य
चैकत्वे वाचकभेदादहते वाच्यनानात्वायोगात् । धातवस्तु नाना-
त्मानः करोतिसामानाधिकरणतया तदर्थ^२विशेषाभिधायिन इति
साम्प्रतम् ।

न केवलं सामानाधिकरण्याख्यस्य हेतोः दृष्टान्ताभावात्सिषाधयिषितार्थासाधकत्वमेव,
किन्तु विपरीतसाधकत्वमपि प्राप्नोति, वृक्षशिशपादिदृष्टान्तेषु अर्थभेदस्य दृष्टत्वादित्याह—
तदेवमिति । अथ तद्दोषपरिजिहीर्षया करोतिसामानाधिकरण्यात्पचत्यादीनां तदर्थविशेषाभि-
धानमनुमीयत इति शङ्कते—विशेषाभिधानमि(धाने)ति। एतन्निराकरोति—नेति । निराकरण-
हेतुमाह—तस्या इति । तस्या भावनायाः प्रत्ययार्थत्वमभ्युपगम्यते भावनावादिना ।
तच्चैवं सति न सिध्यति, प्रत्ययस्यैकत्वे वाच्यनानात्वानुपपत्तेः । नहि वाचकभेदादहते
वाच्यनानात्वं संभवति । करोत्यर्थविशेषाश्च नानात्मानः । तस्मान्न तेष्वेकः प्रत्ययो
वर्तितुमर्हति । नन्वेवं सति करोतिसामानाधिकरण्यं पचत्यादीनां निर्निबन्धनमेव स्यादि-
त्याशङ्क्याह—धातव इति । पचियज्यादयो धातवो नानात्मानः करोत्यर्थविशेषान्नानात्मनो-
ऽभिधातुं प्रभवन्तीति सामानाधिकरण्योपपत्तिः, धातूनामेव च करोत्यर्थविशेषाभिधानानु-
माने सिद्धसाध्यता ; करोत्यर्थस्य धात्वर्थसामान्यमात्रस्याभ्युपगमादिति ।

१. तदिदमैका—क, ख, ग, घ, ङ.

२. साधनः—ख

३. तदर्थभेदाभि—क, ग, घ, ङ.

अपि च—

भावाभावे प्रयोगस्य द्विधापि खलु दर्शनात् ।

धात्वर्थवर्तिसामान्यं करोत्यर्थमुपागमत् ॥ ३ ॥

किं करोति घण्टा ? ध्वनतीति न ध्वनिजन्यमन्यत् । सदपि वा

इदानीं करोतेरपि भावनावचनत्वासंभवाच्चैतन्नोपपद्यत इत्याह—अपि च, भावा-
भावे प्रयोगस्य द्विधापि खलु दर्शनात् । धात्वर्थवर्तिसामान्यं करोत्यर्थमुपागमत् ॥

यो हि शब्दो यस्यार्थस्याभावेऽपि प्रयुज्यते न स तदर्थो भवितुमर्हति । प्रयुज्यते
च करोतिर्भावनाया^१ अभावे द्विधापि—भाव्याभावेन भावनाभिधायिशब्दाभावेन च ।
अतो न करोतेर्भावनार्थत्वं युक्तम् । कस्तर्हि करोतेरर्थः? धात्वर्थवर्तिसामान्यम् ।
तद्भावे प्रयोगात् तदभावे चाप्रयोगात् । ततश्च धात्वर्थसामान्यविशेषातिरेकी भावना-
पदार्थः करोत्यभिधेयः पचत्याद्यभिधेयो वा न सिध्यतीति श्लोकस्य तात्पर्यार्थः ।
नात्रातीवाक्षरवैषम्यमस्ति । एतदेव विवृणोति—किं करोतीत्यादिना । यदा हि कश्चि-
देवं पृच्छति ‘ किं करोति घण्टा ’ इति ? तदा २ अन्यः प्रतिवक्ति—
‘ ध्वनति ’ इति । तत्र भावनाया अभावे करोतेः प्रयोगो दृष्टः । ननु तत्रापि
भावना विद्यत एवेत्याशङ्क्याह—न ध्वनिजन्यमिति । यदि तत्र ध्वनिना
अन्यजन्यं स्यात् तदा भवेदपि भावना । न च तदस्ति । ननु तत्र
सुखं दुःखं ज्ञानं वा अन्यजन्यमस्त्येवेत्याशङ्क्याह—सदपि वेति । सदपि वा
जन्यं ३ नास्मिन्प्रयोगे विवक्षितम् । किं पुनरविवक्षाकारणमित्याशङ्क्याह—धात्वर्थेति ।
धात्वर्थमात्रं ही^४ह जिज्ञासितम् । घण्टादय (घण्टा ध्वनति वा न वेति), न पुनर्घण्टाध्वनने-

१. भावानायाम्—च

२. अन्यप्रतिपत्तिः. छ

३. नान्यस्मिन्—च

४. हि न जिज्ञासितम्—छ

न विवक्षितम्, धात्वर्थमात्रजिज्ञासनात्, तथा च नाभूतप्रादुर्भावनम् । अतो वस्तुतस्तदभावेऽपि प्रयुज्यमानस्य करोतेरिह कुतस्तदर्थः ।

तथा का क्रिया? पाकः इति धात्वर्थमात्राभिधानात् भावनाया अपरामर्शान्न भावनाविशेषनिमित्तमैकाधिकरण्यम् ।

नान्यज्जनयति वा न वेति । भवतु धात्वर्थमात्रस्य जिज्ञासितत्वम्, किमत इत्याशङ्क्याह—तथा च नाभूतप्रादुर्भावनमिति । अभूतप्रादुर्भावनमिति भावनोच्यते । यदा धात्वर्थमात्र एव करोतेः प्रयोगो निश्चितः स्यात्, तथा च सति न भावना (करोत्य)-भिधेया सिध्यति । मा भूत्तर्हि तत्र करोतेः भावनार्थत्वम्, प्रयोगान्तरे तु भवत्येवेत्याशङ्क्याह—अतो वस्तुतः इति । यत्र व्यभिचारः करोतेर्भावनानां प्रति तत्रान्यार्थत्वस्य निश्चितत्वात् अन्यत्रापि तादर्थ्यनिश्चयाभावादन्यार्थत्वमेव ग्रहीतुं युक्तम्, न भावनार्थत्वमित्यर्थः ।

द्विधा भावनाया अभावे करोतेः प्रयोग इत्युक्तम् । तत्रैकधा भाव्याभावेन भावनाया अभावे प्रयोगो दर्शितः । इदानीं भावनाविचिनश्शब्दस्याख्यातप्रत्ययस्याभावेन भावनाया अभावे निश्चिते करोतेः प्रयोगं दर्शयति—तथेत्यादिना । ‘का क्रिया’ इति केनचित्पृष्टोऽन्यः३ प्रतिवक्ति ‘पाकः’ इति । तत्र पाकशब्देन घञन्तेन धात्वर्थमात्र-

१. मात्रस्यात्र जिज्ञासनात्—ग, घ, ङ. भावनायास्त्वपरामर्शः ...क, ख.

२. इत्यत आह—छ

३. अन्यं—छ

**गम्यमानापेक्षमिति चेत्—न, तिङन्तेष्वपि प्रसङ्गात् । प्राधान्या-
त्तिङन्तेष्वभिधेयत्वमिति चेत्—न, इहापि तद्विशेषप्रश्नाद्वात्वर्थस्य**

मभिधीयते, २न भावना, तत्र तस्य सामर्थ्याभावात् । भवतु पाकशब्देन भावनाया अनभि-
धानम्, कथमेतावता करोतेर्भावनावचनत्वमपाक्रियते इत्याशङ्क्याह—न भावनाविशेष-
निमित्तमिति । यदि पाकशब्देन भावना न परामृश्येत तदा तस्य न भावनाविशेषा-
भिधानमुखेन करोतिसामानाधिकरण्यमुपपद्यते, अपि तु धात्वर्थविशेषाभिधानमुखेनैव ।
ततश्च करोतेर्धात्वर्थसामान्यातिरेकेणार्थान्तरं न सिध्येत् । ननु पाकशब्देन यद्यपि
नाभिधीयते भावना तथापि तदभिहितार्थानुपपत्त्या गम्यते, पाकस्य भावनाफलत्वात् ।
अतो गम्यमानभावनाविशेषापेक्षमेवैकाधिकरण्यम्, न धात्वर्थविशेषापेक्षमिति शङ्कते—
गम्यमानेत्यादिना । अस्योत्तरमाह—न, तिङन्तेष्वपीति । न पाकशब्दस्य गम्यमानभावनापेक्षं
सामानाधिकरण्यमिति शक्यते वक्तुम्, तिङन्तेष्वपि तथाप्रसङ्गात् । यथा
घञन्ते भावनाभिधानमन्तरेणाप्युपपद्यते करोतिसामानाधिकरण्यम्, तथा तिङन्तेष्वपि ;
विशेषाभावात् । ततश्च तिङन्तानां भावनावचनत्वमिष्टं न सिध्यतीत्यभिप्रायः ।

इदानीं घञन्तेभ्यस्तिङन्तेषु विशेषं शङ्कते—प्राधान्यादिति । यतस्तिङन्तेषु
४भावनायाः प्राधान्यम्; अतोऽभिधेयत्वं युक्तम् । भावनापरो हि तिङन्तानां प्रयोगः,
धात्वर्थपरस्तु घञन्तानामिति । एवं विशेषमाशङ्क्याविशेषं दर्शयति—इहापीति ।
तिङन्तानां भावनापरत्वनिश्चये यत्कारणं तद्वञ्जन्तानामपि समानम् । तथाहि—यथा

१. प्रसङ्गप्राधान्यात्—ख

२. न तु भावना—च

३. गम्यपाकस्य—च

४. भावनायां—च

**तल्लक्षणार्थत्वात्प्राधान्यमभिन्नम् । अतः सकलधात्वर्थानुयायिनः
करोतेः तत्सामान्यमर्थो नाभूतप्रादुर्भावनमिति शब्दप्रवृत्तिविदः**

‘किं करोति’ इति प्रश्नस्य भावनाविशेषविषयत्वात् पचतीति प्रतिवचनस्यापि तत्समानाधिकरणस्य ^१तत्प्रधानत्वं गम्यते, तथा ‘का क्रिया’ इत्यस्यापि क्रियाविशेष-विषयत्वात् क्रियायाश्च भावनात्वाभ्युपगमात् ‘पाकः’ इति प्रतिवचनस्य तत्समानाधि-करणस्य भावनाप्रधानत्वं गम्यते ।

ननु पाकशब्दस्य भावनाप्राधान्यमशक्यमभ्युपगन्तुम्; तस्य धात्वर्थमात्रे सामर्थ्यादित्याशङ्क्याह—धात्वर्थस्येति । यद्यपि पाकशब्देन धात्वर्थ एवाभिधीयते तथापि ^२भावनालक्षणार्थः न स्वरूपप्रधानः ^३ । का क्रियेति प्रश्नविषयं ^४ भावनाविशेषं लक्षयितुं पाकशब्देन तत्संबन्धिधात्वर्थोऽभिधीयत इत्यर्थः । ततश्चोभयत्र तिङन्ते घञन्ते च भावनाप्रधानत्वमभिन्नं अविशिष्टमिति यावत् ।

एवं श्लोकस्य पूर्वार्धं व्याख्यायेदानीं उत्तरार्धं व्याचष्टे—अतस्सकलधात्वर्थेत्या-दिना । यत उक्तेन न्यायेन भावना करोतेरर्थो न संभवति; अतो धात्वर्थसामान्यमेव तस्यार्थः, सर्वधात्वर्थानुगमात्—यथा गोशब्दस्य खण्डमुण्डाद्यशेषपिण्डानुयायिनः तत्सामान्यं गोत्वमर्थः । न च भावाभाव इव धात्वर्थसामान्याभावेऽस्य प्रयोगो दृष्टः, येन पूर्ववदनवकलसिस्स्यात् । अतो धात्वर्थसामान्यमेव करोतेरर्थः, नाभूतप्रादुर्भावनम् न भावनेत्येवं शब्दप्रवृत्तिविदः प्रतिपेदिरे ॥ उक्तमर्थमाप्तोक्तिभिस्संवादयति—तथा चोचुरिति ।

१. प्रधानता—च

२. स्वभावना—च

३. प्रधानम्—च

४. विषयः—छ

प्रतिपेदिरे । तथा^१ चोचुः—“ क्रियावचना^२ धातवः । कथं ज्ञायते क्रियावचनाः पचत्यादयः इति^३ ? यदेषां करोति^३ना सामानाधिकरण्यम् । कृभ्वस्तयः क्रियासामान्यवचनाः, क्रियाविशेषवचना^४श्च पचत्यादयः” ॥

अथ मतं^५ न भावरहितो धात्वर्थः । सर्वेण तेन किंचिदसदुपजन्यते इति^६ । तन्न ।

एवं तावद्भावनाभावे प्रयोगात् सकलधात्वर्थानुगमाच्च करोतेस्तत्सामान्यमर्थः, न भावना । अतः पचत्यादीनामपि तत्समानाधिकरणानां न धात्वर्थविशेषातिरिक्तभावनार्थत्वमित्युक्तम् । तत्रेदानीं शङ्कते—अथ मतमित्यादिना । अयमभिप्रायः—अस्ति तावत्सकलधात्वर्थानुगता भावना । तत्सामान्यं वदतः सैव व्यापारात्मिका करोत्य(तेर)र्थः । कथं पुनः सर्वधात्वर्थसंबन्धिनी भावना अस्तीति ? उच्यते, सर्वेण धात्वर्थेन किञ्चित् असदुपजन्यते । न चोपजननया विनोपजनयितव्यं संभवति । उपजनना च भावना ।

नन्वचेतनसंबन्धिनि धात्वर्थे भाव्यं किञ्चिन्नास्ति ? न नास्ति ; नहि सरति समीरणे दहति वा दहने प्रागभूतं किञ्चिन्न प्रादुर्भवति । तस्मात्सकलधात्वर्थेषु भाव्य-

१. यथा—ङ

२. वचनो धातुः—ग, घ, ङ.

३. करोतिसामाना—क, ग, घ, ङ.

४. च नास्ति—ग, घ, ङ.

५. नामावरहितो धात्वर्थः—क, ख. न भावरहितो—ग, घ. नहि भाव्य—ङ

६. किञ्चिदुपजन्यते—क, ख. किञ्चिदसज्जन्यते—ग.

७. इति—नास्ति क, ग.

८. प्राग्भूतं—ङ

सर्वत्र यदि धात्वर्थे भाव्यं सैवास्तु भावना ।

स्वर्गभूतिसमर्थोऽन्यो व्यापारः कोऽनुपागतः ॥ ४ ॥

भाव्य^१भवनसमर्थो हि व्यापारो भावना । धात्वर्थ एव चेत् कस्यचिदात्मलाभानुकूलात्मा, स एव भावना अस्तु, न तदतिरिच्यमानशरीरा ।

नियमात् भावनापि भवत्येवेति सैव करोतेरर्थः, ^२तत्समानाधिकरणानां च पचत्यादीनां इति साम्प्रतम् । अत्रैषा अक्षरयोजना—अथ मतम्—अथैवमभिप्रायः—न भावरहितो भावना-रहितो धात्वर्थः, यतस्तेन सर्वेण धात्वर्थेन किञ्चिदसद्वा प्रागभूतमुत्पद्यते भाव्यते इति । एतन्निराकरोति—तत्र—

सर्वत्र यदि धात्वर्थे भाव्यं सैवास्तु भावना । स्वर्गभूतिसमर्थोऽन्यो व्यापारः कोऽनुपागतः ॥ अयमर्थः—यदि सर्वत्र धात्वर्थे भाव्यं नियमेन किञ्चिदभ्युपगम्यते, तर्हि धात्वर्थ एव भाव्यभवनानुकूलस्वभावत्वाद्भावेनेत्यभ्युपगम्यताम्, किमर्थान्तरेण कल्पितेन ? एतदेव च न्याय्यम् । यागादन्यस्स्वर्गभवनसमर्थो व्यापारः कः ? न कश्चिदपि, अनुपलब्धेरित्यर्थः । एतद्व्याचष्टे—भाव्यभवेत्यादिना । इदं हि भावनाया भावनात्वं यदुत भाव्यभवनसमर्थव्यापारत्वम् । तत्र यदि धात्वर्थ एव कस्यचिदात्मलाभानुकूलस्वभाव-व्यापारात्मा स्यात्, तर्हि स एव भावना अस्तु, न ततस्तत्त्वान्तरम् ; भावनास्वरूप-लक्षणस्य तत्रैव भावादिति श्लोकपूर्वार्धस्यार्थो व्याख्यातः ।

१. कौतु चागतः—ख.

२. फक्तभवन—क, ख.

३. 'तत्समानाधिकरणानां' इत्यारभ्य 'धात्वर्थः' इत्यन्तो भागो नास्ति—ख. मा-
तृकायाम् ।

१एवं चैतत्; न खलु स्वर्गादिफलोदयानुकूलं यागादि-
धात्वर्थभेदप्रभाव्यं २व्यापारान्तरमुपलभामहे ३यद्भावनाशब्दोऽभि-
निविशेत् ४ । यागादय एव तु स्वर्गादिफलोदयाय ५चोदिता-
स्तत्समर्थतया तथाव्यपदेशमर्हन्ति । अव्यापाररूपत्वाद्धात्वर्थस्य
नैवम्, इति यदि मन्येत, वक्तव्यो ६ व्यापारः—यदि समीहितकार्यो

एवं चैतदित्यादिनोत्तरार्थं व्याचष्टे । अयमर्थः—न केवलं भावनाया धात्वर्था-
त्तत्त्वान्तरत्वस्यानध्यवसायमात्रम् अपितु तावन्मात्रत्वाध्यवसायोऽपि शक्यते, यतः न
स्वर्गादिफलोदयानुकूलो ८यागादिधात्वर्थविशेषनिष्पाद्योऽन्यो व्यापार उपलभ्यते, ९यं
भावनाशब्दो धात्वर्थं परित्यज्याभिधेयतया अवलम्बेत । कथं तर्हि यागादीनां भावना-
व्यपदेशभाक्त्वमित्याशङ्क्याह — यागादय इति । यतो यागादय एव स्वर्गादिफलो-
दयार्थतया चोदिताः अतस्तत् १०दुत्पादनसमर्थाः, ततश्च भावनाव्यपदेशमर्हन्ति इति ॥
तत्र शङ्कते—अव्यापारेत्यादिना । अयमर्थः—भाव्यभवनसमर्थो हि व्यापारो भावना ।
तत्र यद्यपि धात्वर्थस्य भाव्यभवनसामर्थ्यम्, तथापि न व्यापाररूपत्वमस्ति, तस्य
स्वभावसिद्धत्वात् । अतो न भावनात्वमिति । एवमाशङ्क्योत्तरं वक्तुं व्यापारस्वरूपं

१. एवं चेन्न—ग
२. व्यापारभेद—ख
३. यं भावनाशब्दो—क, ग, घ, ङ.
४. अभि नास्ति—ख
५. मोदिता—ग, घ, ङ.
६. वक्तव्यः स व्यापारः—ग, घ, ङ.
७. धात्वर्थो विधिभिन्नमतिवर्तते—क, ख.
८. यागादिधात्वर्थ—छ
९. यद्भावना—छ
१०. स्तदुत्पादान—च

पजननानुगुणः साध्यस्वभावो धर्मभेदः तदपेक्षया तथा व्यपदेश्यः,
न १ धात्वर्थस्तथाविधत्वमतिवर्तते इति । अथ परिस्पन्दः,
तदा २ तदात्मनां तावत् धात्वर्थानामविहतं भावनात्वम् ।

विकल्पयति—वक्तव्य इत्यादिना । किं समीहितकार्योदयानुकूलः साध्यस्वभावो धर्म-
विशेषो व्यापारः, किं वा परिस्पन्दः, आहोस्वित्प्रयत्नः इत्येवं विकल्पाभिप्रायेण ‘वक्त-
व्यो व्यापारः’ इत्युक्त्वा आद्यं३ विकल्पं विविक्तमनुकीर्तयति—यदीत्यादिना । समी-
हितकार्योपजननानुगुणस्य साध्यस्वभावस्य धर्मविशेषस्य भावनाव्यपदेशभाक्त्वं कथम्
[माशङ्क्यत] इत्याशङ्क्याह—तदपेक्षयेति । भाव्यभवनानुगुण्यापेक्षया । तथा व्यपदेश्यः—
भावनेति व्यपदेश्य इति । इदानीमस्मिन्पक्षे दूषणमाह—न धात्वर्थ इत्यादिना । धात्वर्थोऽपि तथा-
विधत्वम्—यथोक्तलक्षणत्वम्, नातिवर्तते, अतः स एव व्यापारो भावना चेति सा
म्प्रतमिति । द्वितीयं विकल्पं दूषणायोत्थापयति—अथ (परि) स्पन्द इति । तत्र दूषण-
माह—तदि(दे)त्यादिना । ये तदात्मानः—स्पन्दात्मानः धात्वर्थाः तेषां भावनात्वमविहतम् ।

ननु कथं परिस्पन्दात्मकत्वं धात्वर्थस्योच्यते, यावता गच्छत्यादावपि(स्ति) तद्व्यतिरिक्तः
संयोगविभागात्मा धात्वर्थ इति चेत्—नैष दोषः; परिस्पन्दबुद्धेः संयोगविभागातिरिक्तव्या-

१. तदात्मना धात्वर्थानां—ग, घ, ऊ.

२. अस्पन्दमानसाधनेषु—क, ग, घ, ऊ.

३. धं कल्पम्—छ

‘अस्पन्दमानकर्तृकेषु’ ‘आस्ते’ ‘यजते’ ‘जानाति’ इति
आत्मकर्तृकेषु तदभावप्रसङ्गः ।

आत्मकर्तृकमेवाह ३ व्यापारं योऽपि भावनाम् ।

कर्तृन्तरेऽस्य नाख्यातं ४ धीसाम्यान्नोपचारतः ॥ ५ ॥

पारविषयसद्भावे वक्ष्यमाणनीत्या प्रमाणासद्भावात् संयोगविभागात्मा धात्वर्थ एव परिस्प-
न्दबुद्धेर्विषयस्संपद्यत इत्यभिप्रेत्येदं धात्वर्थानां स्पन्दात्मकत्वमुक्तमिति । अथवा—संयोग-
विभागातिरिक्तं परिस्पन्दमेव धात्वर्थं गृहीत्वैवमभिधीयते इति । तत्रैव दूषणान्तरमाह—
अस्पन्दमानेत्यादिना । ‘आस्ते’ ‘शेते’ इत्यादिषु स्पन्दरहितदेहकर्तृकेषु व्यापार-
रूपत्वाभावप्रसङ्गः । तथा च सति दर्शनेन विरोधः स्यात् । न चैवमाशङ्कितव्यम्,
परिस्पन्दाभावेऽपि तद्योग्यस्य भावात् तन्निबन्धनो व्यापारप्रत्यय इति । परिस्पन्दा-
योग्यात्मकर्तृकव्यापाराभावप्रसङ्गादित्येतदुदाहरणान्तरोपादानेन द्योतयितुमाह— ‘यजते’
‘जानाति’ इति । आत्मा हि सर्वगतत्वेनामूर्तत्वेन च परिस्पन्दायोग्य इति तस्य
व्यापाराभावेन कर्तृत्वाभावात् ‘यजते’ ‘जानाति’ इत्यादिव्यापारानुपपत्तिप्रसङ्गः
शास्त्रवैयर्थ्यप्रसङ्गश्चेति भावः ॥

इदानीं प्रयत्नव्यापारभावनापक्षमनुभाष्य दूषयति—

आत्मकर्तृकमेवाह ५ व्यापारं योऽपि : भावनाम् । कर्तृन्तरेऽस्य नाख्यातं
धीसाम्यान्नोपचारतः । (इति) ॥ आत्मकर्तृक एव प्रयत्नव्यापारो भावनेति यो वदति तस्य पक्षे

१. अपरिस्पन्दमान—ख.

२. साधनेषु—क, ग, घ, ङ.

३. व्यापारोऽपि भावना ग, घ, ङ.
आत्मकर्तृकमेवाह—इत्ययं कारिकाभागः

उब्बेकवृत्तिप्रन्थेन संयोजितः सरस्वतीमवन-
मुद्रितपुस्तके—घ.

४. धीस्वाम्यात्—क.

५. व्यापारो—च.

योऽपि मन्यते सकलपुरुषप्रत्यात्मवेदनीयः^१ चेतनस्यात्मन
 'औदासीन्यप्रच्युत्युपलक्ष्यमाणात्मा'^२ ^३ प्रयत्नशब्दसंवेदनीयो व्या-
 पारो भावना, कर्त्रन्तरेऽस्य नाख्यातं प्रयुज्येत—'कूलं पतति',
 'रथो गच्छति', 'अग्निर्ज्वलति'^४ इति । 'न च'^५ शृणोत ग्रावाणः'

अचेतने रथादौ कर्त्रन्तरे आख्यातप्रयोगो न स्यात्, तत्र तदभिधेयप्रयत्नाभावात् । न च तत्रौप-
 चारिकः प्रयोगः, धीसाम्यात्—चेतनाचेतनविषययोः प्रयोगयोः प्रतीतिवैलक्षण्याभावा-
 दिति । एतद्व्याचष्टे—योऽपि मन्यत इत्यादिना । सकलपुरुषप्रत्यात्मवेदनीय इति प्रयत्न-
सद्भावे मानसं प्रत्यक्षमुपन्यस्यति । औदासीन्येत्यादिना शरीरचेष्टालिङ्गकमनुमानम् ।
 तथाहि—सत्यप्यात्मसंबन्धे कदाचिदेव शरीरं चेष्टते ; ततश्च तद्धेतुकत्वेनात्मसमवायी
 कश्चिद्व्यापारोऽनुमीयते ; स प्रयत्न इत्युच्यत इति । तत्रैव हेत्वन्तरमाह—प्रयत्नशब्देति ।
 प्रयत्नशब्दश्च साधुत्वेनानुशिष्टो न विना कारणेनानर्थको भवितुमर्हति^७ । न च तस्यार्था-
 न्तरं संभवति । तस्मादस्त्यात्मकर्तृको व्यापारः प्रयत्नाख्यः, स च भावनेति । एवं
 श्लोकस्य पूर्वार्धव्याख्यानेन परमतमनुभाष्य तन्निराकरणार्थतयोत्तरार्धं व्याचष्टे—कर्त्रन्तरेऽस्ये
त्यादिना । कर्त्रन्तरे प्रयोगं दर्शयति—^८तु(कू)लमित्यादिना । ननु ^९समारोपेणायं
प्रयोगः स्यादित्याशङ्क्याह—न चेति । यथा 'शृणोत ग्रावाणः' इत्यादौ

१. औदासीन्यप्रच्युप—ग, घ, ङ.

पलम्यते—ग, घ, ङ.

२. लक्षणीयात्मा....क.

६. शृण्वन्ति—ग, घ, ङ.

३. प्रयत्नादिशब्दप्रवेदनीयो—ग, घ, ङ.

७. मर्हतीति—च.

४. इति—नास्ति—क, ग, घ, ङ.

८. तुल्यमि—च.

५. 'न च' इत्यादिः 'विशिष्यत इति'

९. समारोपणोऽयं—छ.

इत्यन्तोऽयं भागः उल्लेखवृत्तावेवो-

इतिवत्समारोपेण^१ प्रयोगः, प्रत्ययस्यावैलक्षण्यात् । नहि^२
'रथो गच्छति' 'करी गच्छति' इति प्रत्ययो विशिष्यते^३ ।

अपि च—

धातुगोचरनिर्वृत्तिपर्यन्तत्वाच्च कर्मता ।

सर्वत्र तस्य न परः करणाभिमतेऽप्यसौ ॥ ६ ॥

पुरुषप्रयत्नो^४ हि^५ धात्वर्थनिर्वृत्तिमात्रापवर्गी; सर्वत्र

समारोपेण प्रयोगो न तथा पततीत्यादौ, प्रत्ययस्यावैलक्षण्यादिति^६ । एतदेव दर्शयति—
नहीति ।

इदानीं प्रयत्नव्यापारभावनापक्षे दूषणान्तरमाह—

धातुगोचरनिर्वृत्तिपर्यन्तत्वाच्च कर्मता ।

सर्वत्र तस्य न परः करणाभिमतेऽप्यसौ ॥ (इति) ॥

अयमर्थः—धातुगोचरः—धात्वर्थः, तस्य निर्वृत्तिः पर्यन्तः—अवधिः—यस्य सोऽयं
धातुगोचरनिर्वृत्तिपर्यन्तः प्रयत्नः । ततश्च धात्वर्थस्य पुरुषव्यापारलक्षणायां भावनायां
कर्मत्वापातः । सर्वत्र—काम्ये नित्ये नैमित्तिके च । न चैवं मन्तव्यं एकत्र कर्मभूतोऽपि
धात्वर्थो व्यापारान्तरे करणत्वं प्रतिपद्यते इति, व्यापारान्तरानुपलब्धेः । न खलु काम्ये

१. इतिवद्धमारोपेण—क, ख.

२. हि—नास्ति—क.

३. विशिष्यत इति—ग, ऊ.

४. प्रयत्नोऽपि—ख

५. धात्वर्थमात्रावगाही—क ; धात्वर्थ-
मात्रापवर्गी इति—ख ; धात्वर्थेनि
वृत्तिमात्रापवर्गात्—ग, घ, ऊ.

६. दिलादि—छ.

काम्ये नित्ये नैमित्तिके च तत्कर्मताप्रसङ्गः, व्यापारविशेषानु-
पलम्भात् । नहि काम्येऽपि^१ प्रयोगे करणाभिमतस्य धात्वर्थस्य
परस्तात्तत्साध्यस्वर्गादिफलविशेषसाधनः^२ प्रयत्नभेदः समस्ति ।

३ अपूर्वज्ञानं न प्रयत्नभेदः, ४ न कर्तृव्यापारः, करणव्यापार^५-
त्वाभ्युपगमात् । ६ अन्यथा व्यापारसङ्करात्कारकभेदाभावप्रसङ्गा-
दित्यलम्बनेन^७ ॥

प्रयोगे करणत्वाभिमतोऽपि धात्वर्थे तत्कर्मकाद्व्यापाराद्वेदेन तत्करणकोऽन्यो व्यापार उप-
लभ्यते इति । एतदेव विवृणोति—पुरुषप्रयत्नो हीत्यादिना । यतः पुरुषस्य प्रयत्नो
धात्वर्थनिर्वृत्तिमात्रपर्यवसायी, अतः सर्वत्र तस्य धात्वर्थस्य कर्मत्वमेव स्यात् न करणत्वम् ।
व्यापारविशेषानुपलम्भनात् (लम्भात्)—व्यापारभेदानुपलम्भनादिति । एतदेव दर्शयति—
नहीति । यत्र करणत्वेनाभिमतो धात्वर्थः काम्ये, तत्रापि तस्य परस्तात् उत्तरकालम्, तेन
धात्वर्थेन साध्यस्वर्गादिफलविशेषभावनालक्षणः प्रयत्नविशेषः संभवति ।

ननु अपूर्वं नामास्ति व्यापारान्तरमित्याशङ्क्याह—अपूर्वं नामेति । अपूर्वन्तु न
प्रयत्नविशेषः, यतो नासौ कर्तृव्यापारः; करणस्य यागादेर्व्यापारत्वेन तस्याभ्युपगमात् ।
यदि करणव्यापारोऽपि कर्तुः स्यात्, तदा व्यापारसङ्करात् कारकभेदस्याभावः प्रसज्येत,

१. 'अपि' नास्ति—ग, घ, ङ.

२. साधनप्रयत्न—क, ग, घ, ङ.

३. अपूर्वस्तु—क, ख; अपूर्वन्तु—ग,
घ, ङ.

४. न च कर्तृ—ग, घ.

५. व्यापाराभ्युप—क, ख, ङ.

६. अन्यथा कारकव्यापार—ख.

७. मतिप्रसङ्गेन—ग, घ, ङ.

कर्मणो भावभेदं यः^१ फलावधितया^२ वदेत् ।

तस्यादृष्टफलेष्विष्टमनुष्ठानं न युक्तिमत् ॥ ७ ॥

धातुर्हि कर्म स्वरूपमात्रणोपादत्ते । आख्यातोप^३संधानात्तु

व्यापारव्यवस्थया हि कारकव्यवस्थेति । तदेतदाह—अन्यथेति । प्रासङ्गिकीं व्यापार-
स्वरूपचिन्तामुपसंहरति—अलमिति ।

इदानीं प्रसङ्गान्मीमांसकैकदेशीयपरिकल्पितं धात्वर्थस्यैव फलावधिकस्य फल-
भावनात्वमनुभाष्य निराचष्टे—

४ कर्मणो भावभेदं यः फलावधितया वदेत् ।

तस्यादृष्टफलेष्विष्टमनुष्ठानं न युक्तिमत् ॥ (इति) ॥

अयमाशयः—न धात्वर्थात्तत्त्वान्तरं भावना, किन्तु स एव फलावधिकेन रूपेण
भावनेत्युच्यते इति यो मन्यते, तस्य पक्षेऽदृष्टार्थेषु यागादिषु नियतोपक्रमोपसंहारमिष्ट-
मनुष्ठानमनुपपन्नं स्यादिति तात्पर्यार्थः । इदानीमक्षराणि विव्रियन्ते । कर्मणो धात्वर्थस्य
भावभेदं भावनाख्यविशेषं फलावधितया फलपर्यन्तरूपेण यो वदेत्, अथवा कर्मणो
धात्वर्थात् भावस्य भावनाया भेदं विशेषं फलावधितया यो वदेदिति, तस्य पक्षेऽदृष्ट
स्वर्गादिफलेषु कर्मसु यागादिषु नियतोपक्रमोपसंहारत्वेनेष्टमनुष्ठानं न युक्तिमदिति ।
एतदेव विवृणोति—धातुर्हीत्यादिना । अयमर्थः—धातुः कर्म स्वरूपेणोपादत्ते, तस्य फला-
वधिकरूपं साध्यतारूपं च परिहृत्य; आख्यातसंबन्धात्तु फलावधिकेन भावनारूपेणाव-
गम्यत इति । एतदेव प्रपञ्चयति—तथा हीत्यादिना । यावता कर्मक्षणोत्पादनिच-

१. यत्—ख.

२. भवेत्—क.

३. संदानात्तु,—क, ग, घ, ङ.

४. कर्मण इति—क.

१ भावनात्मना अवगम्यते । तथाहि—यावता २ कर्मक्षणोत्पादनिचयेनेष्टमर्थं साधयति तावत्याख्यातं प्रयुज्यते । अतस्तेन तेन फलेनावच्छिद्यमानः ३ स स कर्मक्षणोत्पादनिचयः तेन तेनाख्यातेनाभिधीयते । तदिदं फलावधिकं कर्म भाव्यतया ४ अवसीयते, नाभाव्यमानं ५ फलभावनायालमिति । ६ फलोत्पादिका अवस्था

येनाभिलषितमर्थं साधयति तावत्याख्यातं प्रयुज्जा(ज्य)ते । नैरन्तर्येणोत्पद्यमानानां ८ क्षणिकानां कर्मणां समुदायेऽभिलषितफलनिवृत्तिपर्यन्ते प्रयोगादाख्यातप्रत्ययस्य तादर्थ्यं गम्यत इत्यर्थः । अतस्तेन तेनेत्यादेरयमर्थः—यद्यद्धात्वभिधेयेन येन येन कर्मक्षणनिचयेन यद्यत्फलमुत्पद्यते तेन तेन फलेन ओदनादिना स्वर्गादिना वा अवच्छिद्यमानः ९ स स-कर्मक्षण(ोत्पाद)निचयः तस्य तस्य धातोः परेणाख्यातप्रत्ययेनाभिधीयते 'पचति' 'यजति' इत्यादिना । कथं पुनरस्य फलावधिकस्य कर्मणः साध्यतारूपसिद्धिरित्याशङ्क्याह—तदिदमिति । फलावच्छिन्नं कर्म प्रतीयमानं भाव्यतया प्रतीयते ; कुत इति चेत्तत्राह—नाभाव्यमानमिति । यतः तत्कर्म अभाव्यमानं असाध्यमानं फलभावनाय फलोत्पादनाय नालं न समर्थमिति ।

१. भावात्मना अवगम्यते—ख.

६. फलं—ग, घ, ऊ.

२. कर्मणोत्पादनी च येनामीष्टमर्थं—ख.

७. फलोत्पादिता—ख. फलोत्पादिका

३. फलोत्पादनिचयेनावच्छिद्यमानः—ग, घ, ऊ.

चावस्था ऊ.

४. नः स कर्मक्षणोत्पादनी चयः—ख.

८. त्पाद्यमानानां—छ.

५. भावनात्मतया—ग, घ.

९. मानः स कर्म—छ.

आख्यातार्थः । ' तथा यतेत यथा यत्किञ्चिद्भवति ' इति दर्शितम् ।
एवं अवस्थाभेदेन २ भावनाकर्मणोर्भेदः । उक्तं च—' पूर्वा-
परीभूतं ३ भावमाख्यातेनाचष्टे व्रजति पचतीत्युपक्रमप्रभृत्य-

उक्तमथ मीमांसाभाष्याक्षरानुगुण्येन द्रढयति—फलोत्पादिका अवस्था आख्यातार्थः इति ।
यदुक्तमस्माभिः तत् ' तथा यतेत ' इत्यादिना भाष्येण दर्शितम् । भावार्थाधिकरणे हि भावशब्द-
विचारावसरे यजेत, जुहोतीत्यादीनां शब्दानां भावशब्दत्वे उक्ते तेषां यागादिशब्दत्वमेव
न भावशब्दत्वमित्याशङ्कितम् ; तत् उत्तरमुक्तम्—न केवलं यागादिशब्दा एवैते किन्तु
भावशब्दा अपीति । तत्र हेतुरप्युक्तः—यत् एवंजातीयकाच्छब्दाद्यागाद्यर्थोऽवगम्यते
भावयेदिति चेत्यर्थद्वयप्रतीत्यन्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधानात् उभयार्थत्वमिति । कथं पुनरेभ्य-
श्शब्देभ्यो भावयेदित्यवगम्यते इत्यस्यामाकाङ्क्षायां तेषां भावनार्थत्वं व्याचक्षाणेन भाष्यका-
रेण ' तथा यतेत यथा यत्किञ्चिद्भवति ' इति फलसंबन्धोक्त्या कर्मण एव फलोत्पादिका
अवस्था ४ आख्याताभिधेया दर्शिता ।

ननु तत्रापि धात्वर्थादर्थान्तरभूतैव भावना फलोपलक्षिता दर्शिता, न तस्यैवा-
वस्थामात्रमित्याशङ्क्याह—एवमिति । अवस्थाभेदेनैव भावनाकर्मणोर्भेदोऽभिप्रेतः न
स्वरूपभेदेन । स्वरूपभेदे तु फलानपेक्षया स्वशब्देनैव स्वरूपोक्तिसंभवात् फलसंबन्धो-
क्तिरनर्थिका । यदा तु कर्मण एव फलोत्पादिकावस्था विवक्षिता स्यात् तदा तस्याः
फलाधीत(नं) निरूपणमिति तदुक्तिरर्थवती स्यादिति । निरुक्तकारेणाप्येतदेवमेवोक्तमित्याह—
उक्तमिति । अयमर्थः—पूर्वापरीभूतो यो भावः तमाख्यातप्रत्ययेनाचष्टे वक्ता व्रजति

१. ' यत् ' नास्ति....ग, घ.

२. भावकर्मभेदः—स्व.

३. आख्यातमाचष्टे—ग.

४. ' आख्याताभिधेया ' इत्यादिः ' यदा तु '

इत्यन्तो मागः ऊ. मातृकायां नास्ति ।

पवर्गपर्यन्तम्' १ इति ॥ तत्र प्रतिक्षणमपवर्गवतः कर्मणः २
 कावुपक्रमापवर्गौ ३ ? फलापेक्षया तु कल्प्येते इति यो वदेत्,
 तस्य प्रत्यक्षफलेषु कर्मसु काममारम्भविरामौ कल्प्येते,
 ४ पुरः परस्ताच्च तत्पर्यन्तकर्मक्षणप्रचयपरिज्ञानात् । अदृष्टफलेषु ५

पचतीति । उपक्रमप्रभृतीति पूर्वापरीभावं दर्शयति । नन्वस्मिन्वाक्ये कथं
 फलावधिकस्य ६ कर्मक्षणनिचयस्याख्याताभिधेयत्वमभिप्रेतमिति गम्यत इत्याशङ्क्याह—
तत्र प्रतिक्षणमिति । अत्र हि कर्मण उपक्रमापवर्गवृत्तौ । तौ च कर्मणः
 स्वरूपापेक्षया न संभवतः । एकस्य कर्मणः क्षणद्वयेऽवस्थानाभावात् । एकक्षण-
 सबन्धिन्यनेकक्षणसंबन्धिष्वनेकेषु च तयोरसंभवात् । (?) फलावच्छिन्नं तु कर्मणो यद्रूपं
 फलोत्पादकरूपेण निरूप्यमाणं तस्य सकलक्षणानुयायिनः पूर्वापरीभावसंभवाद्युक्तावुपक्रमोप-
 संहाराविति । तदेव(वं) फलावधिकं रूपमाख्याताभिधेयमिहोक्तमिति गम्यते । तस्माद्भावार्थ
 एव फलावर्धको भावना न ततस्तत्त्वान्तरमिति यो वदेदिति श्लोकस्य पूर्वार्धं परमतानुवादपरं
 व्याख्यायेदानीं तदुत्तरार्थतयोत्तरार्धं व्याचष्टे—तस्येत्यादिना । तस्य एवं वदतः पक्षे ;
 यद्यपि प्रत्यक्षफलेष्वन्वयतिरेकसिद्धफलेषु कर्मस्वारम्भविरामावुपपद्येते । पुरः—पूर्वस्मिन्काले ।
परस्ताच्च—उत्तरस्मिन्काले; तत्पर्यन्तस्य—फलपर्यन्तस्य कर्मणः(णां) समुदायस्य परिज्ञानसंभवात्

१. इति—नास्ति क. ग.

२. कर्मणा—क.

३. वर्गौ स्याताम्—क. ख.

४. पुरस्तात्—ग.

५. फलकेतव—ग.

६. कर्मस्वक्षण—छ.

त्वनिरूपितफलपर्यन्तपरिमाणभेदेषु^१ कथं प्रवर्तते ? नहि नियुक्तोऽप्यप्रसिद्धविषयविशेषः प्रवर्तितुं^२ प्रभवति । प्रवृत्तौ वा पुरुः^३ फलादर्शनात्^४ अकृतशास्त्रार्थमात्मानं^५ मन्वबुध्यमानो न विरन्तुमर्हति । शास्त्रात्फलोत्पत्तिं प्रतिपद्य विरंस्यतीति चेत्-न; कृतशास्त्रार्थस्य फलोत्पत्तेः, फलोत्पत्त्या च कृतशास्त्रार्थत्वादितरेतराश्रयप्रसङ्गादित्यलं^६ प्रसङ्गेन ।

पूर्वापरकोट्योस्तुज्ञानत्वादिति यावत्, तथापि अदृष्टफलेषु शास्त्रीयेषु कर्मसु न कथञ्चित्प्रवर्तते, यतस्तान्यनिरूपितफलपर्यन्तपरिमाणभेदानि । नहि तेषु फलपर्यन्तपरिमाणविशेषो निरूप्यते, तस्यातीन्द्रियत्वात् । ननु नियोगः प्रवृत्त्यभावे स्वात्मानमलममानः पुरुषं प्रवर्तयति, ततश्च पुरुषः प्रवर्तते इत्याशङ्क्याह—(नहि) नियुक्तोऽपीति । अयमर्थः—नियोगो विषयज्ञानापेक्षयैव पुरुषं प्रवर्तयति यस्मात्, तस्मादप्रसिद्धविषयविशेषैः(षः) पुरुषो न प्रवर्तितुं प्रभवति । एवमुपसंहारानध्यवसायादप्रवृत्तेरुपक्रम एव न स्यादित्युक्तम् । इदानीमुपक्रमाभ्युपगमेन विरामानुपपत्तिं दर्शयति—प्रवृत्तौ वेति । [पूर्व] कर्मक्षणसमुदायस्य पूर्वकोटेः सुज्ञानत्वात् प्रवृत्तौऽपि पुरुषो न विरन्तुमर्हति, यतोऽयमकृतशास्त्रार्थमात्मानं मन्वते, फलपर्यन्तस्य कर्मणः शास्त्रार्थत्वात् । तस्य च फलादर्शने दर्शनानुप(कृतशास्त्रार्थता)नुपपत्तेः, अकृतशास्त्रार्थस्य च पुरुषस्य विरामानुपपत्तेरिति । तत्र शङ्कते—शास्त्रादिति । मा मूत्रप्रमाणान्तरात्फलावगतिः, शास्त्रात् फलोत्पत्तिं प्रतिपद्य विरंस्यतीति ;

१. परिमाणे—ख.

५. मन्वबुध्यमानो—ख, ड.

२. प्रवर्तितुमर्हति—ग, घ.

६. कृतशास्त्रार्थ इतीतरे—ख.

३. फलस्यादर्शनात्—क. फलदर्शनात्—ड.

७. लमतिप्रसङ्गेन—ख, ग, घ.

४. कृत...ख, ड.

प्रकृतमनुसरामः—

धातुप्रत्यययोर्वाच्ये प्रतीयेते नहि क्रिये ।

संबन्धो नावकल्पेत^१ द्वयोः साध्याभिधायिनोः ॥ ८ ॥

^२ 'येषान्तूत्पत्तौ' इत्याख्यातवर्ती धात्वर्थः साध्यः^३ क्रियात्मोपेयते । यदि च प्रत्ययः क्रियान्तरमाचक्षीत, क्रियाद्वयं प्रतीयेत—ओदनं पचति, करोति घटमिति यथा । ^४न च तथा प्रतीयेते । ^५तस्मान्न धात्वर्थव्यतिरेकिणी आख्यातेषु क्रिया अस्ति ।

एतन्निराकरोति—नेति । कृतशास्त्रार्थस्य हि पुरुषस्य फलोत्पत्तिः शास्त्राच्छक्यावगमानान्यस्य, कृतशास्त्रार्थत्वमपि फलोत्पत्त्येतीतरेतराश्रयप्रसङ्गः^६ इति । प्रासङ्गिकमुपसंहृत्य प्रकृतमनुसंधाति—अलमिति । प्रासङ्गिकं ह्येतद्धात्वर्थस्यैव फलावधिकस्य भावनात्वनिराकरणम्, धात्वर्थात्तत्त्वान्तरभूता (तु) भावनेह निराकार्यतया प्रकृता इति ।

धातुप्रत्यययोर्वाच्ये प्रतीयेते नहि क्रिये । संबन्धो नावकल्पेत द्वयोस्साध्याभिधायिनोः ॥ (इति) ॥

धातोस्तावत् क्रियावचनत्वमेष्टव्यम् । यदि प्रत्ययोऽपि भावनाख्यां अन्यां क्रियं आचक्षीत, एकस्मिन्नाख्यातप्रत्ययान्ते पदे द्वे क्रिये प्रतीयेयातां धातुवाच्या प्रत्ययवाच्या च । न च प्रतीयेते । तस्मान्नाख्यातप्रत्ययवाच्या क्रिया अस्ति । अपि च यदि धातुप्रत्ययावुभावपि क्रियाभिधायिनौ स्याताम्, तदा तदभिधेययोः क्रिययोस्साध्यत्वेन समत्वात् परस्परसंबन्धानुपपत्तेः तयोस्समभिव्याहारो न स्यादिति ॥

१. कल्पेत—ग.

२. येषामुत्पत्तौ—ख, ड.

३. साध्यक्रियात्मा—क, ग.

४. न च तथा प्रतीयेते—नास्ति. ग, घ, ड.

'न च प्रतीयेते' इति मुद्रितपुस्तके

उब्बेकवृत्तौ दृश्यते । अयं मूलग्रन्थ एवेति माति ।

५. तस्माद्धात्वर्थ ... ख.

६. तीतराश्रयप्रसङ्गः....ड.

साध्यस्य ^१च साध्यान्तरेण समत्वादसंबन्धता^२ । ततश्च तदभिधायिनोः प्रकृतिप्रत्यययोः समभिव्याहारानुपपत्तिः । करणत्वाद्धात्वर्थस्यानुपालम्भ इति चेत्—न; ‘येषाम्नुत्पत्तौ’

येषामित्यादिना श्लोकं व्याचष्टे । ‘येषाम्’ इत्यस्मिन्सूत्रे आख्यातान्ते पदे धात्वर्थः साध्यः क्रियास्वरूप उपेयते । तत्र यदि प्रत्ययोऽपि भावनाख्यं क्रियान्तरमाचक्षीत क्रियाद्वयं प्रतीयेत, यथा—करोति घटम्, ओदनं पचतीति । तथा नेह प्रतीयते । तस्मान्न धात्वर्थव्यतिरिक्ता आख्यातेष्वभिधेया क्रिया विद्यते इति श्लोकपूर्वार्धस्यार्थः ।

साध्यस्येत्यादिनोत्तरार्धं व्याचष्टे । साध्यस्य साध्यान्तरेण असंबन्धता अविद्यमानसंबन्धता । कुतः ? समत्वात् । तथाहि—यदलब्धात्मकं वस्तु तत् स्वनिर्वर्तनसमर्थमर्थान्तरमपेक्षते । न च स्वयमलब्धात्मकमन्यन्निर्वर्तयितुं प्रभवति । न चाकाङ्क्षां योग्यतां चानपेक्ष्य सन्निधिमात्रेण संबन्धो भवति । अतो न साध्यस्य साधनसाकाङ्क्षस्य साध्यान्तरेण तथाविधेन साधनत्वासमर्थेन संबन्धः संभवति । ततश्च तदभिधायिनोः प्रकृतिप्रत्यययोर्नियमेन सहोच्चारणं न स्यात्, अर्थान्वयसापेक्षत्वाच्छब्दान्वयस्य । तत्र शङ्कते—करणत्वादिति । करणत्वं तावद्धात्वर्थस्याभ्युपगन्तव्यम्, ‘उद्भिदा यजेत’ इत्यादौ धात्वर्थनामधेयादुद्भिदादेरुपपदात्तृतीयाविभक्तिश्रुतेः । अतः करणत्वाद्धात्वर्थस्य प्रत्ययाभिधेयया क्रियया संबन्धसंभवान्नोक्तदोष इति । अस्योत्तरमाह—नेत्यादिना । ‘येषामुत्पत्तौ स्वे प्रयोगे रूपोपलब्धिः तानि नामानि, तस्मात् तेभ्यः पराकाङ्क्षा न विद्यते, भूतत्वात् स्वे प्रयोगे । येषामुत्पत्तौ स्वे प्रयोगो न विद्यते, तान्याख्यातानि, तस्मात्तेभ्यः प्रतीयेताश्रितत्वात्प्रयोगस्य’ इत्यत्र सूत्रद्वये नाम्नां आख्यातानां च सिद्धार्थकत्वं साध्यार्थत्वं च विशेषो दर्शितः । स च धात्वर्थस्य साध्यत्वेऽवकल्पते, तस्य करणत्वे सूत्रविरोधः स्यात् ।

१. ‘च’ नास्ति—क, ग.

३. येषामुत्पत्तौ—ख.

२. दसंबन्धात्—क, ख, ऊ. साध्यान्तरेण संबन्धादर्शनात्—ग, घ.

४. न तथेह प्रतीयते—छ.

इति विरोधात् । न हि तद्भावनाभिप्रायम् ; नामपदार्थस्य धात्वर्थ-
संबन्धे दृष्टार्थता, ^१ अपेक्षितसंबन्धप्रतिपादनार्थत्वात् ।

अपि च—

न भावे नापि धात्वर्थे काष्ठैरिति समागमः ।

अक्रियात्वादन्यरोधाच्छाब्दत्वात् करणस्य च ॥ ९ ॥

ननु तत्राख्यातार्थस्य साध्यत्वमुक्तम् । तच्च धात्वर्थस्य करणत्वेऽपि भावनायाः
साध्यत्वात्तदभिप्रायेणोपपद्यत इत्याशङ्क्याह—नहीति । तत्र हेतुमाह—नामेत्यादिना ।
भावार्थाधिकरणे हि दृष्टार्थतान्यायेन नामपदार्थसाध्यत्वं धात्वर्थस्य स्पष्टमभिहितमित्यभिप्रायः ।
नामपदार्थस्य सिद्धस्य प्रयोजनवता साध्येन धात्वर्थेन ^२ साधनत्वेन संबन्धे सति दृष्टार्थता ।
ततश्चापेक्षितः संबन्धो भवति । यदा तु नामपदार्थस्य फलेन संबन्धः, धात्वर्थस्य च
नामपदार्थेन, तदा (अ)दृष्टार्थत्वादनपेक्षितः संबन्धः स्यादित्येतत्प्रतिपादयितुं द्रव्यगुण-
शब्दानां कर्मशब्दानां च सिद्धार्थत्वसाध्यार्थत्वलक्षणो विशेषः ‘येषां’ इति सूत्रद्वयेन
दर्शितः । तच्च (स च) धात्वर्थस्य साध्यत्वे उपपद्यते । अतो न भावनाभिप्रायमिति ।

अत्रैषा अक्षरयोजना । येषां शब्दानां उच्चारणोत्पत्तौ क्रियमाणायां स्वे अभिवेये
विषये यः प्रयोगः तस्मिन्सति रूपं स्वार्थ^३संबन्धनिष्पन्नमुपलभ्यते, तानि निष्पन्नरूपो-
पलभ्यमानार्थविषयप्रयोगाणि नामानि । तस्मात्तेभ्यः परं प्रत्याकाङ्क्षा न विद्यते, स्वे प्रयोगे
भूतत्वात् शब्दप्रयोगकाले तदर्थस्य निष्पन्नत्वात् । येषां तु शब्दानां उच्चारणोत्पत्तौ
(स्वे) सिद्धरूपे अभिवेये प्रयोगो न विद्यते साध्यरूप एवार्थः प्रतीयते, तान्याख्यातानि ।
तस्मात्तेभ्यः प्रतीयेत फलस्य भावनं अपूर्वं च, सिद्धार्थप्रयोगस्य साध्याश्रितत्वात् केव-
लस्य सिद्धस्य भावार्थमनाश्रितस्य फलहेतुत्वायोगादिति ॥

न केवलं धात्वर्थस्य करणत्वे सूत्रविरोध एव, पदान्वयविरोधश्च स्यादित्येतदाह—
अपि च—न भावे नापि धात्वर्थे काष्ठैरिति समागमः । अक्रियात्वादन्यरोधाच्छाब्दत्वात्करणस्य च ॥

१. अपेक्षिते—क. अपेक्षते...ख.

४. दर्शितम्...च.

२. नामार्थेत्यादिना—च.

५. सम्बद्ध—च.

३. साध्यत्वेन—च.

न तावद्धात्वर्थसंबन्धिता काष्ठानाम्, १ करणानां क्रिया-
पेक्षिणां अतदात्मना २ करणान्तरेण ३ संगमायोगात् । नापि
भावनासंबन्धिता, तस्याः ४ करणान्तरोपरुद्धत्वात् । ५ नाप्यं-
शान्तरतया संबन्धः, शाब्दत्वात्करणत्वस्य ६ । तदेवं यत्र
७ करणभावः क्रियायां ८ तस्याः अवरुद्धत्वात्, धात्वर्थे च अक्रिया-
त्मन्यकरणत्वात् काष्ठैः पचतीति संबन्धाभावः । अर्थाक्षिप्त-

(इति)॥ अयमर्थः—यदि धात्वर्थः करणमिष्यते, क्व तर्हि काष्ठैः पचतीति काष्ठानां संबन्धः, किं
धात्वर्थे ? आहोस्वित्प्रत्ययाभिधेयायाम् भावनायाम् ? न तावद्धात्वर्थे, आक्रियात्वाभ्युपगमात् ।
क्रियायां हि करणत्वेन संबन्धो भवति । न च भावनायाम्, अन्येन धात्वर्थेन समानपदोपात्ते-
नान्तरङ्गेनावरोधात्काष्ठानामनवकाशात् । न चेति कर्तव्यताभावेन काष्ठानामन्वयः आशङ्कितुं
शक्यते, काष्ठैरिति करणभावस्य श्रुतत्वादित्यर्थः । अतदात्मनेत्ययमर्थः—अक्रियात्मना
धात्वर्थेन करणकारकस्य संबन्धायोगात् । नापि काष्ठादेः करणस्य भावना-
न्वयः, करणान्तरेण धात्वर्थेनावष्टब्धत्वात् । तदेवेमित्यादिनोपसंहरति । एवम्—
उक्तेन प्रकारेण । क्रियात्मिकायां भावनायां ९ करणान्तरावरोधात् १० धात्वर्थ-
स्याक्रियात्वाभ्युपगमात् काष्ठैः पचतीति प्रसिद्धस्य ११ संबन्धस्याभावप्रसङ्ग इति ।
तत्र शङ्कते—अर्थेत्यादिना । मा भूत्प्रत्ययाभिधेयायां भावनायां सङ्गतिः, मा च भूद्धा-

१. कारकाणां—क, ग.

७. करणभावः—क, ख. करणता—ङ.

२. कारका—ग.

८. तस्या—क.

३. असंयोगात्—क, ख.

९. क्रियान्तरा—ङ.

४. कारणा—क. कारकान्तरावरुद्धत्वात्—ग.

१०. वधेरेधात्—च.

५. नचांशा—ङ.

११. संबन्धाक्षिप्तस्या—ङ.

६. करणस्य—क, ख.

भावनाद्वारकः^१ संबन्ध इति चेत्—न ; ^२ अव्यवधानेन संबन्धबोधनात्^३ । नहि मृदा घटम्, काष्ठैः पचतीति समः संबन्धावगमः, एकत्र नैराकाङ्क्ष्यात्, अन्यत्रान्यापेक्षणात्^४ ॥

विक्रियन्ति पचन्तीति न विशेषः प्रकल्प्यते ।

कः प्रत्ययार्थो धातूक्तव्यापारो^५ यदि कर्तृता ॥ १० ॥

त्वर्थे पाके साक्षात्, तदाक्षितभावनाद्वारकस्तु भविष्यतीति । कथमिति चेत्—उच्यते । पचतीति तावदयमर्थः प्रतीयते—पाकेन भावयत्योदनमिति । न च निष्पन्नः पाकोऽस्ति । न चानिष्पन्नस्य करणत्वम् । अतोऽर्थात्तन्निष्पत्तिफला भावना^६ प्रतीयते, तस्यां करणान्तरानवरुद्धायां साक्षात्करणत्वेनान्वयः काष्ठानां संभवति तद्वारेण पाके । (ते)नायमर्थः—काष्ठैर्निर्वर्तितेन पाकेनोदनं भावयतीति । तदेतन्निराकरोति—न, अव्यवधानेनेत्यादिना । साक्षात्काष्ठानां पाकेनान्वयावगमान्न भावनान्तरव्यवधानेन संबन्धो घटते । नहीत्यादि । मृदा घटमित्यत्र यथाक्षितकरोतिक्रियाद्वारो घटे मृदस्संबन्धः, साक्षान्न,^७ न तथा काष्ठैः पचतीति, तत्रैव नैराकाङ्क्ष्यावगमात् । तस्मान्नेहार्थाक्षितभावनाद्वारः संबन्धः, किन्तु साक्षादेव । स च धात्वर्थस्य करणत्वे नोपपद्यते । एकत्रेति । काष्ठैः पचतीत्यत्रेत्यर्थः । अन्यत्रेति । मृदा घटमित्यत्रेत्यर्थः । तत्रैव दूषणान्तरमाह—विक्रियन्ति पचन्तीति न विशेषः प्रकल्प्यते । कः प्रत्ययार्थो धातूक्तव्यापारो (रो) यदि कर्तृता ॥ इति ॥

१. द्वारः—क, च.

२. अव्यवधानसंबन्ध—ऊ.

३. बोधात्—क, ग, घ, च.

४. व्यपेक्षणात्—ग, घ, च.

५. व्यापारे—क, ख, ग, घ, ऊ.

६. 'प्रतीयते' नास्ति च.

७. 'न' नास्ति—छ.

८. विक्रियन्तीति—छ.

अपि च—‘विक्लिद्यन्ति पचन्ति’इत्युभयत्र प्रयोजकव्यापार-
स्य प्रत्ययेनाभिधानम्^१, धातुभ्यां च विक्लित्तेरिति नार्थ-
भेदः स्यात् । ^२नन्वस्ति तावत्कर्तृभेदेन व्यापारभेदः तदभि-
धानान्न दोषः । तथाहि—^३विक्लिद्यन्तीति तण्डुलाः कर्तारः,

विक्लिदिः पचिश्च विक्लित्तिमात्रं सङ्कल्पमात्रं(?) च आचक्षाते । उभयत्रापि प्रत्ययस्तदु-
परक्तां^४ कर्तृव्यापाररूपां^५ भावनामिति नार्थविशेषो घटते । अथ कर्तृभेदात्तद्व्यापार-
भेदः तदुपरज्जकधात्वर्थभेदेऽपीति यद्युच्यते, तदा तण्डुलानां कर्तृत्वे किं ^६कर्तृलक्षणम् ?
न तावत्साधनान्तरनियोक्तृत्वम्, तेषां तदभावात् । ततश्चागुणतो धातुपात्तव्यापारत्वमेव
कर्तृलक्षणं वाच्यम् । तथा च धात्वभिहितत्वात् कर्तृव्यापारस्य प्रत्ययार्थत्वं न स्यात्,
इति श्लोकस्यार्थः । अस्य स्पष्टीकरणाय अपि चेत्याद्याह । अयमभिप्रायः—‘ स्वतन्त्रः
कर्ता’ इति कर्तृलक्षणम् ; स्वातन्त्र्यं च द्वेधा प्रतिभाति—साधननियोक्तृत्वमित्येकः प्रकारः,
अगुणतो धात्वभिहितव्यापारत्वमित्यपरः । तत्र कर्तृभेदाद्व्यापारभेदं वदतः अनयोः
कतरत्कर्तृलक्षणमभिप्रेतम् ? पूर्वस्मिन्न कर्तृभेदः, तण्डुलानां तल्लक्षणाभावात्, देवदत्तादय
एवोभयत्रापि कर्तारः स्युः । नह्यचेतनानां तण्डुलानां साधननियोगलक्षणं^७ कर्तृलक्षणं
संभवति । अतो नार्थभेदः स्यात् । उत्तरस्मिन्नुभयत्रापि कर्तृव्यापारस्य धातुनैवाभि-
हितत्वान्न प्रत्ययाभिधेयत्वमभिप्रेतं सिध्यतीति । ‘ कः प्रत्ययार्थः’ इति पर्यनुयोगस्य

१. धानात्—क, ग, घ, च. ड.

२. नन्वस्ति तावत्—नास्ति क, ख.

३. विक्लिद्यन्ति तण्डुलान्—क, ख.

४. रक्तात्—च.

५. रूपा—च.

६. कर्तृत्व—च.

७. लक्षणः कर्तृलक्षणः—च.

पचन्तीति^१ देवदत्तादयः । किं^२ पुनर्भवान्कर्तृलक्षणं^३ मत्वैवमाह-
यदि साधननियोगादिकम्, कथं तण्डुलानां कर्तृत्वम्? देवदत्तादय
एव कर्तार इत्यविशेषप्रसङ्गः । अथागुणतो^४ धातुना अभिधीयमान-
व्यापारता, क इदानीं प्रत्ययार्थः? कर्तृव्यापारस्य भावनाया
धातुनैवाभिधानात् । फलधात्वर्थार्थभावनानात्वा^५द्धात्वर्थार्थो
व्यापारो धातुवाच्यः, फलार्थस्तु धात्वर्थकरणकः प्रत्ययवाच्यः ।
नैतत्सारम् ।

नहि धात्वर्थकरणफलभेद^६प्रभावनः ।

१० धात्वर्थ फलभेदं च व्यापारो दृश्यतेऽन्तरा ॥ ११ ॥

परिहारं शङ्कते—११ फलधात्वर्थार्थभावनानात्वादित्यादिना । अयमर्थः—फलार्थस्य धात्वर्थार्थस्य
च भावस्य भावनाया नानार्था(त्वा)त् भेदात् धात्वर्थार्थो यो व्यापारः स धातु-
वाच्यः, फलार्थस्तु व्यापारो धात्वर्थकरणः प्रत्ययवाच्य इति ‘कः प्रत्ययार्थः’ इति पर्यनु-
योगस्य अनवकाश इति । एतद्वृषयितुमाह—नैतत्सारम्—नहि धात्वर्थकरण^{१२}फलभेद
प्रभावना(नः) । धात्वर्थ फलभेदं च व्यापारो दृश्यतेऽन्तरा ॥ (इति)॥ व्यापार-
भेदे प्रमाणं नास्तीत्यर्थः ।

१. इति—नास्ति—क, ख.
२. किं—नास्ति—ग, घ, ङ.
३. लक्षणत्वेऽपीति यदि—क, ख.
४. अगुणतया—ग, घ ; तथा अगुणत-
या—ङ.
५. एव—नास्ति—क, ङ.
६. धात्वर्थभावनात्वात्—क.
७. धात्वर्थो व्यापारो—क, ख ; धात्व-
र्थोऽर्थो व्यापारो—ग.

८. धात्वर्थकरणः—क, ख, ग, घ, ङ.
९. फलभेद...ङ.
१०. ‘धात्वर्थः....अन्तरा’—अयं कारि-
काभागः उब्बेकवृत्तावेवोपलभ्यते मुद्रित-
पुस्तके ।
११. धात्वर्थार्थिभावनानात्वादित्यादिना—च.
१२. करणम्—च.

INDEX TO
Journal of the Annamalai University
Volume VIII 1938-39 (Numbers 1, 2 and 3)

Compiled by

DR. B. V. NARAYANASWAMI NAIDU, M.A.,

AND

SRI. T. K. VENKATARAMAN, M.A.

AUTHORS

- Bharathi (S. S.) Tholkappia Araichi—Ullurai. p. 35.
Chidambaranatha Chettiar (A.) The Passive Voice in Tamil. p. 22 and p. 125.
Jagadisan (T. N.) Lytton Strachey, the Biographer. p. 177.
Karunakara Menon (K. P.) St. John Hankin. p. 131.
Krishnamurti Sarma (B. N.) The Dasa-Prakaranas. p. 54.
—Certain Philosophical Bases of Madhva's Theistic Realism. p. 146.
Naidu (P. S.) The Foundation of Andhra Culture. p. 1.
—A Reconstruction of the Hormic Theory of Sentiments. p. 107.
Narayanaswami Naidu (B. V.) The Madras Agriculturists' Debt Relief Act. p. 79.
—University Notes. Vol. VIII, No. 1.
Ramakrishna Reddi (A.) The Development and Fate of the Operculum and Gill-Chambers in *Bufo Melanostictus* Schneider. p. 15.
Ramanujachariar (R.) and Srinivasachariar (K.) Nyayakulisa.
—Nitimala.
—Vedārtha-Samgraha.
Ramanujachariar (R.) Tattvasarah.
Ramasvami Sastri (V. A.) Bhārtrhari, a Pre-Sankara Advaitin, p. 42.
Ramasvami Sastri (V. A.) and Sivaramakrishna Sastri (K. A.) Bhavanaviveka with Visamagranthibhedika.
Sivaramakrishna Sastri (K. A.) Mukura.
Subramanyam (S.) and Sitaraman (B.) The Madras Land Revenue System. p. 118.
Subrahmanya Sastri (V.) Bodhvimarsa.
Varadarajan (E. S.) Ancient Tamilian Worship. p. 193.

SUBJECTS

- Economics.* The Madras Agriculturists' Debt Relief Act: By B. V. Narayanaswami Nayudu. p. 79.
—The Madras Land Revenue System: By S. Subrahmanyam and B. Sitaraman. p. 118.
English Language and Literature. St. John Hankin: By K. P. Karunakara Menon. p. 131.
—Lytton Strachey, the Biographer: By T. N. Jagadisan. p. 177.
History. The Foundation of Andhra Culture: By P. S. Nayudu. p. 1.
Miscellaneous. University Notes: By B. V. Narayanaswami Nayudu. Vol. VIII, No. 1.

- Philosophy.* A Reconstruction of the Hormic Theory of Sentiments: By P. S. Nayudu. p. 107.
- Certain Philosophical Bases of Madhva's Theistic Realism: By B. N. Krishnamurthi Sarma. p. 146.
- Sanskrit Language and Literature.* Bhartṛhari, a Pre-Sankara Advaitin: By V. A. Ramaswami Sastri. p. 42.
- The Dasa-Prakaranas: By B. N. Krishnamurthi Sarma. p. 54.
- Nyayakulisa: By R. Ramanujachariar and K. Srinivasachariar.
- Bodhavimarsa: By V. Subrahmanya Sastri.
- Tattvasarah: By R. Ramanujachariar.
- Vedartha-Samgraha: By R. Ramanujachariar and K. Srinivasachariar.
- Nitimala: By R. Ramanujachariar and K. Srinivasachariar.
- Mukura: By K. A. Sivaramakrishna Sastri.
- Bhavanaviveka with Visamagranthibhedika: By V. A. Ramaswami Sastri and K. A. Sivaramakrishna Sastri.
- Tamil Language and Literature.* The Passive Voice in Tamil: By A. Chidambaranatha Chettiar. pp. 22, 125.
- Tholkappia Araichi—Ullurai: By S. S. Bharathi. p. 35.
- Ancient Tamilian Worship: By E. S. Varadarajan. p. 193.
- Zoology.* The Development and Fate of the Operculum and Gill-Chambers in *Bufo Melanostictus* Schneider: By A. Ramakrishna Reddi. p. 15.
- Reviews.* Brahmaidya: By R. R. Vol. VIII, No. 1.
- New Catalogus Catalogorum: By R. R. Vol. VIII, No. 1.

TITLES

- Ancient Tamilian Worship: By E. S. Varadarajan. p. 193.
- Bhartṛhari a Pre-Sankara Advaitin: By V. A. Ramaswami Sastri. p. 42.
- Bhavanaviveka with Visamagranthibhedika: By V. A. Ramaswami Sastri and K. A. Sivaramakrishna Sastri.
- Bodhavimarsa: By V. Subrahmanya Sastri.
- ✓ Certain Philosophical Bases of Madhva's Theistic Realism: By B. N. Krishnamurthi Sarma. p. 146.
- (The) Dasa Prakaranas: By B. N. Krishnamurthi Sarma. p. 54.
- (The) Development and Fate of the Operculum and Gill-Chambers in *Bufo Melanostictus* Schneider: By A. Ramakrishna Reddy, p. 15.
- (The) Foundation of Andhra Culture: By P. S. Nayudu. p. 1.
- Lytton Stratchey, the Biographer: By T. N. Jagadisan. p. 177.
- (The) Madras Agriculturists' Debt Relief Act: By B. V. Narayanaswami Nayudu. p. 79.
- (The) Madras Land Revenue System: By S. Subrahmanyan and B. Sitaraman. p. 118.
- Mukura: By K. A. Sivaramakrishna Sastri.
- Nitimala: By R. Ramanujachariar and K. Srinivasachariar.
- Nyayakulisa: By R. Ramanujachariar and K. Srinivasachariar.
- (The) Passive Voice in Tamil: By A. Chidambaranatha Chettiar, pp. 22, 125.
- (A) Reconstruction of the Hormic Theory of Sentiments: By P. S. Nayudu. p. 107.
- St. John Hankin: By K. P. Karunakara Menon. p. 131.
- Tattvasarah: By R. Ramanujachariar.
- Tholkappia Araichi—Ullurai: By S. S. Bharathi. p. 35.
- University Notes: By B. V. Narayanaswami Nayudu.
- Vedartha Samgraha: By R. Ramanujachariar and K. Srinivasachariar.

Indian Agricultural Research Institute (Pusa)

LIBRARY, NEW DELHI-110012

This book can be issued on or before

Return Date	Return Date